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By now, the Travemünde Symposia have become a well-established tradition. 
The XIIIth Travemünde Symposium on Law and Economics took place in 
March 2012. Compared to previous symposia on issues of economic analysis 
of law, the 2012 event entered new ground. The topics traditionally dealt with 
at Travemünde covered a broad range of classical issues of Law and Econom-
ics, mostly linked with questions of private, commercial and economic law. 
The XIIth symposium in 2010 had broadened the range of topics by dealing 
with economic analysis of European law. This time, the symposium went fur-
ther and focused upon economic analysis of international law. 
The choice of topics is far from accidental. Since 2010, the faculties of law 
and of economics and social science at the University of Hamburg have host-
ed a Graduate School (Graduiertenkolleg) on “Economics of Internationaliza-
tion of Law” funded by the German Research Organization DFG. Doctoral 
students from all over the world conduct research on a broad range of topics 
dealing with economic analysis of international and transnational law. At the 
same time, an impressive number of well-known scholars working on issues 
of economic analysis of international law have come to Hamburg to give lec-
tures on recent research in the field. All this has given research on economic 
analysis of international law a boost. This is important since the branch of 
Law and Economics dealing with issues of international law is very young. 
The debate on economic analysis of international law did not start until the 
late 1990s, with a number of articles applying tools of economic analysis to 
questions of international economic law, but also with a number of articles of 
Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner as well as Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman 
on more general issues of international law. These articles took a rather criti-
cal stance on traditional international legal doctrine and were criticized by a 
number of authors which led to a thought provoking scholarly debate. Gold-
smith and Posner consolidated their position with the 2005 monograph on 
“The Limits of International Law”. Joel P. Trachtman and Andrew Guzman 
reacted in 2008 with their monographs on “The Economic Structure of Inter-
national Law” and “How International Law Works. A Rational Choice Theo-
ry”. These three books, together with a special issue of the University of Illi-
nois Law Review 2008 containing the papers of a 2006 conference at Bonn on 
“Public International Law and Economics”, have been the starting-point of a 
full-scale academic debate on a broad range of issues of economic analysis 
applied to international law. In this discourse of relatively recent origin, the 
Hamburg Graduate School plays an important role. 
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The 2012 Travemünde Symposium was intended to map the on-going debate 
on Law and Economics applied to international law. The topics covered in 
this volume range from classics of the on-going discussion on economic anal-
ysis of international law – like the issue of “Legitimacy of Customary Interna-
tional Law” – to rather new topics such as internet privacy, private military 
contractors, combat against piracy, the International Criminal Court and the 
highly topical issue of ‘land grabbing’.  
The first contribution by Stefan Oeter deals with the Legitimacy of Cus-
tomary International Law. This constitutes a classic of the Law and Econom-
ics debate on issues of international law. The debate started in the late 1990s 
with articles of Goldsmith and Posner dealing very critically with traditional 
doctrines of customary international law (CIL). Their massive onslaught on 
traditional doctrines provoked heavy reactions – and initiated an intense de-
bate. It demonstrated that the standard accounts of CIL in a doctrinal perspec-
tive are not really convincing; however, ridiculing customary international 
law (like it was done by Goldsmith and Posner) as misleading labels for situa-
tions where there are simply significant payoffs from cooperation does not 
really help to understand the intricacies of CIL either. Pay-offs from coopera-
tion are needed to stabilize certain patterns of action; without such payoffs, 
CIL would not exist. But the assumption that coordination always needs an 
immediate payoff would not do justice to the intricacies of social action in 
long-term relationships. The paper by Oeter tries to demonstrate the type of 
social dilemma underlying CIL and highlights how – in a rational choice per-
spective – rules of CIL evolve as a response to such dilemma structures. The 
paper takes recourse to recent experimental studies on the formation of cus-
tom. Customary Law mostly occurs in coordination games of a repeated na-
ture, where states need a focal point in order to develop concerted patterns of 
behaviour. The emergence of behavioural regularities is the first decisive fac-
tor of gradual emergence of norms out of social practice. The expectation 
goes towards a calculus that a certain pattern of behaviour will continue also 
in future. Such an expectation facilitates transactions between states, because 
it reduces insecurity about future behaviour, and in the medium term also 
minimizes transaction costs. Such behavioural regularities, however, may 
only be attributed legal significance if there is a shared interpretation regard-
ing the meaning of such usages in a given social environment. Entering into a 
dynamic of evolutionary creation of regular patterns of behaviour, linked 
shared meanings and – as a result – legitimate expectations are not as implau-
sible as some critical rationalist authors have argued. The paper attempts to 
shed some new light on a number of basic theoretical questions concerning 
customary international law. 
The second paper deals with the Economics of Informal International 
Law. In a strongly empirical research design, Stefan Voigt uses the US 
database of ‘international treaties’ (requiring the consent of the US Senate) 
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and of ‘international agreements’ (of an executive agreement character) to 
find answers to a number of questions in the realm of informal internation-
al law-making: Has the use of ‘international agreements’ (as opposed to 
the more formal ‘treaties’) truly increased, as is often presumed? What are 
the policy areas that are primarily tackled by this less formal form of inter-
national law and are executive agreements used primarily in bilateral rela-
tions or multilaterally? Which actors use international agreements – is it 
primarily the traditional actors that also enter into treaties, or is this type of 
law-making the arena of other ministries or even independent government 
agencies? With regard to the US, the inquiry shows that the number of in-
ternational agreements concluded did indeed increase dramatically until 
around 2006, but that since then their use has declined substantially. 
Around two-thirds of all international agreements are concerned with only 
three policy areas: the military, science and technology, and aid. More than 
90% of all international agreements are conducted bilaterally. And around 
40% of all agreements are concluded by a non-traditional actor on the US 
side, i.e., an actor other than the President or the Secretary of State. Unfor-
tunately, analysing data from just one country does not allow one to draw 
any general conclusions, but such a systematic analysis of the practice over 
a 30-year period does permit to reveal some interesting insights into the 
pattern of informal international law-making.  
In a third paper, the highly topical issue of Internet Privacy in the 
Evolving Technological Environments is looked at from a Law and Eco-
nomics perspective by Haksoo Ko. The paper elaborates in detail on the 
technological evolution of the internet as a constantly changing technolog-
ical environment for the issues of protection of internet privacy. Internet 
privacy definitively is endangered by the described technological changes, 
and it constitutes a difficult question of how to develop the ways and 
means of protecting rights of privacy under these conditions. In taking a 
Law and Economics perspective, the author attempts to shed some light on 
the chances of a sustainable protection of internet privacy. The chances of 
such protection are grim, but a closer look is needed why this is so – and 
the paper helps a lot in understanding the challenges and future prospects 
of endeavours to improve the protection of internet privacy.  
A fourth contribution is dedicated to a topic recently discussed very heavi-
ly in the realm of international law – the issue of Private Military Contractors 
and its position within the normative setting of international law dealing with 
armed conflicts. In this paper, Thilo Marauhn describes the economic ra-
tionale that leads to the outsourcing of military capabilities. The handling of 
military logistics, but sometimes even the conduct of military operations by 
private contractors raises a number of serious legal questions. What is the 
status of such contractors under international law, and how does responsibility 
of states operate if delicate types of action are conducted at arms-length by 
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private contractors? The paper states an ideological turn in security govern-
ance with a strong preference for organizational flexibility – a flexibility that 
is much easier to achieve if large segments of the security apparatus are out-
sourced to contractors. The paper analyses the applicable law to be found in 
the law of armed conflicts, but also in the rules of state responsibility. In par-
ticular, the rules on the prohibition of mercenaries prove to be completely 
inadequate to cover the situation. Additionally, the status rules of traditional 
humanitarian law pose problems, as well as the rules on direct participation in 
hostilities. Human rights law does not provide convincing answers either – 
thus the quest for new treaty law. An economic analysis perspective, however, 
demonstrates that there are not sufficient incentives for the elaboration of a 
new treaty regime. The alternative is a recourse to new forms of ‘soft law’ – a 
track that has been pursued with the Montreux Document and the complemen-
tary International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 
(with its innovative Oversight Mechanism). The paper provides an in-depth 
analysis of these mechanisms and explores the potential of such soft law ap-
proaches, but also revisits the question whether the established legal rules are 
sufficient to deal with the challenges raised by the growing use of private mil-
itary contractors. 
In this contribution to the volume, Christopher Drahozal deals with the 
Economics of Comity. Whereas the first paper in this volume (implicitly) de-
scribes the difficulties in distinguishing customary law from mere comity, this 
paper highlights the rationale of developing concerted patterns of behaviour 
by comity in a Law and Economics perspective. The doctrine of comity se-
cures a spirit of cooperation without entering in the intricacies of deep legali-
zation. The paper reconstructs the doctrine of comity as it is used by the US 
Supreme court in dealing with foreign official acts. Comity involves a balanc-
ing of competing public and private interests, in order to systematically take 
into account conflicts between the public policies of domestic and foreign 
sovereigns. Thus, it constitutes a complementary tool to the doctrines of state 
immunity. Drawing on economic tools, the paper then highlights the dynam-
ics of comity, oscillating between cooperation and defection. When courts 
refuse to defer to foreign acts, which in a choice left open under the doctrine 
of comity, they are deliberately defecting from the cooperative solution sug-
gested by the concept of comity. The ensuing dynamics of recognition of for-
eign judgments and denial of such recognition follows clear patterns of inter-
est. The doctrine of comity attempts to bring some structure into such 
opportunistic tendencies, and tries to strengthen cooperative modes of dealing 
with jurisdictional conflicts. A Law and Economics perspective helps in un-
derstanding not just the patterns, but also the challenges of such an approach, 
which is demonstrated by the subsequent remarks on the relationship between 
comity and more tight-knit solutions laid down in treaties of judicial coopera-
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tion. A perspective on rent-seeking and on judicial incentives gives interesting 
insights in this regard. 
Matters of cooperation in judicial matters, in particular in criminal prose-
cution, form the focus of Birgit Feldtmann’s paper on Fighting Maritime Pi-
racy. The paper deals with the possible actions in fighting piracy – and the 
consequences of such actions, modelled in terms of economic analysis. The 
paper accordingly looks at the question of how the international community 
reacts to the problem of maritime piracy. For this purpose, it takes a brief look 
at the general problem of maritime piracy; specifically in the Horn of Afri-
ca/Indian Ocean region, and looks at counter-piracy activities undertaken by 
the international community. The impact of those activities has been very 
much debated. The main international legal question raised has been whether 
the established legal framework is sufficient or not. This controversial issue 
forms the background of the paper, which in its second part analyses the legal 
framework for counter-piracy enforcement under international law in-depth. 
In a third part, the article examines the question of how this legal framework 
is implemented into national legislation and guidelines, as well as how it is 
actually used in different contexts. This is illustrated by two examples, one 
concerning the question of prosecution (or often, rather, non-prosecution) of 
suspected pirates arrested by States engaging in counter-piracy operations, the 
other concerning the importance of Rules of Engagement for the effectiveness 
of counter-piracy activities. As a conclusive part, the paper moves to the ques-
tion of what the consequences of the approaches chosen by the states in ques-
tion might be. The perception of the stakeholders in the shipping business 
gradually shifted towards the impression that counter-piracy operations were 
somewhat ineffective and that to some extent they were left alone with the 
problem. As a result, the tendency to take care of ship security by hiring Pri-
vately Contracted Armed Security Personnel was growing – a trend that caus-
es great concern in security circles. The resulting question is how this devel-
opment towards extended private security provision can be conducted and 
controlled in a sensible way, governed by the principles of the “rule of law”. 
The following paper deals with the experiences from the first ten years 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Florian Jeßberger supplements 
a stocktaking exercise concerning the development of the recent structures 
of an international criminal judiciary by the attempt to apply some ele-
ments of a law and economics approach to issues of international criminal 
justice in general and the ICC in particular. This is done, first and fore-
most, in order to identify topics and themes for a future research agenda – 
and it is warranted because, as the paper shows, there still is a significant 
lack of in-depth research concerning basic issues underlying and shaping 
the emerging system of international criminal justice. The paper is orga-
nized in three parts. The first part briefly summarizes the key characteris-
tics of the ICC, its roots and competences, and outlines its practice. The 
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second part looks into the roles and functions which may be ascribed to the 
ICC. The third part endeavours to identify a few issues which may deserve 
further scrutiny from the perspective of law and economics. While interna-
tional criminal law is made by states, in contrast to traditional international 
law its norms do not regulate the relationship between states, but directly 
impose obligations on the individual. Individuals are the addressees of in-
ternational criminal law. Thus, an analysis of international criminal law 
can either focus on the individual or on the actions of states. Reflecting 
this structure of international criminal law – at the intersection of individu-
al responsibility and international/inter-state regulation – there are two 
natural starting points of an economic analysis. First, it is possible to think 
about international criminal law in terms of crime and punishment; such a 
micro-analysis would take on a perspective which is well known in the 
traditional Law and Economics literature. Second, an economic analysis of 
international criminal law in general and the ICC in particular could start 
from the perspective of states as major actors in the international arena. In 
such a macro-analysis, the ‘sovereignty costs’ connected to the surrender 
of states to the ICC system could be taken into consideration as well as 
possible benefits. A third, separate starting point for an economic analysis 
of international criminal law (which the paper addresses briefly) could 
inquire into the costs and benefits of establishing mechanisms for the de-
termination and enforcement of individual responsibility on the interna-
tional level as compared to applying (traditionally existing) inter-state 
mechanisms of state responsibility. 
Another contribution takes up issues of the last Travemünde Symposi-
um dealing with issues of European law and focuses upon the European 
Constitutional Impossibility Theorem. This theorem, developed Christian 
Kirchner, highlights the difficulties in constitutional change plaguing the 
European Union. The constitutional quests for a further deepening of inte-
gration as well as for more decentralisation both focus very much on Trea-
ty revisions. But if Treaty revisions play a prominent role in power trans-
fers in both directions, procedural rules for Treaty revisions are of utmost 
importance for either centralisation or decentralisation. In order to find out 
whether moves towards more (or less) integration can be undertaken with-
in the present legal structure of the European Union, it is necessary to ana-
lyse the existing Treaty revision provisions and possible circumventions. 
The thesis of the paper is that, due to present legal provisions for Treaty 
revisions in the Lisbon Treaty, major moves in the direction of either more 
or less integration are impossible (European Constitutional impossibility 
theorem). This is the case for a revision of existing revision provisions as 
well. Thus, the present balance of competences between Member States 
and the European level is being petrified. Only slight shifts of power can 
be achieved within the present legal structure of the European Union. The 
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in-depth analysis of the paper supports to a certain degree such theorem. It 
demonstrates that revisions of the European constitution are extremely 
costly. This fact will prevent any substantial Treaty revision in the future. 
The incentive for Member States to participate in a race for stricter ratifi-
cation or quasi-ratification rules may lead to a situation where impedi-
ments for Treaty revisions become insurmountable. If Member States or 
the European Commission should not just try to circumvent the Treaty re-
vision provisions but ignore them and take recourse to unconstitutional 
activities and engage in de-facto revisions of the Treaty, the price of legal 
uncertainty and weakening the rule of law would be tremendous and would 
endanger the European integration process as such. 
The last paper is dedicated to an analysis of recent phenomena of Foreign 
Direct Investment in Agriculture – a phenomenon that is open to rather diver-
gent evaluations, phrased in the question: Land Grabbing or Food Security 
Improvement? In recent years, foreign direct investments in agricultural land 
in Third World Countries have grown enormously. Often traditional farmers 
are driven from the land, instead large commercial farms are created that pro-
duce crops for export. The phenomenon has been coined in negative terms as 
‘land grabbing’. Christian Haeberli tries to demonstrate that land grab, where 
it occurs, is not only another symptom of regulatory failure at the national 
level but also a lack of corporate social responsibility by certain private ac-
tors. National governance is clearly the most important factor; it is submitted, 
however, that there is also an international dimension involving investor home 
states in various capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a 
question whether a particular investment contract is legal or not. Since about 
2008, advocacy groups have drawn attention to numerous cases of what they 
consider as land acquisitions with a doubtful legal basis, especially in so-
called weak states. Economic studies as far back as 1989 had shown the ad-
vantages and the intrinsic distortions of agricultural FDI in a food security 
perspective. Since then, numerous impact modelling and assessment studies 
have been conducted, often with the World Bank economic research pro-
gramme. Legal scholars and policy makers lag far behind. Legal studies, es-
pecially of the international issues of agricultural FDI, are still virtually non-
existent. The numerous new proposals for codes of conduct, voluntary guide-
lines and principles for responsible agricultural investment are typically less 
than three years old, and they tend to focus on the national dimension of land 
grab. The paper deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped 
the attention of both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment law-
yers. It addresses this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, 
and policies, by asking two basic questions: Do governments and parliaments 
in investor home countries have any responsibility with respect to the behav-
iour of their investors abroad? And what should they and international regula-
tors do? There are still no valid answers to these questions, although the paper 
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outlines various lines of action that might make sense. Investment law and 
investment treaties have so far not been seriously scrutinised in this context. 
Since their principal objective is investment promotion and protection, most 
of them still fail to take on board other considerations and interests such as 
human rights and food security. The food security impact of agricultural FDI 
is far from clear, and an overall impact assessment would hardly be feasible. 
But there are enough allegations and some serious evidence of land grab to 
warrant a re-examination of the relevant regulatory framework by home states 
and in the competent intergovernmental organisations.  
This volume does not only contain the papers just described but also the 
comments presented by a commentator at the Symposium as well as a brief 
summary of the subsequent discussions. The reader of this volume will, 
hopefully, be able to grasp the lively and stimulating atmosphere that has 
become one of the trademarks of the Travemünde Symposium. Organizing 
such a symposium requires the help of many. First of all, the organizers 
would like to thank the German Research Foundation (DFG) for the finan-
cial support of the conference. We also wish to thank Christiane Ney-
Schönig for doing all the necessary preparatory work to make the confer-
ence a success; José Guilherme Moreno Caiado, Jan Engelmann, Elif Er-
demoglu, Joseb Gudiashvili, Jerg Gutmann, Christoph Kimmerle, Viola 
Prifti and Johannes Schwarze, who summarized the discussions; and, last 
but not least, David Börn and Kevin West for their invaluable help in for-
matting this volume. Finally, we are truly grateful for the – as usual – ex-
cellent and professional cooperation with the people working at Mohr Sie-
beck, our publisher, for all their assistance in the publication of this book. 
 
 
Hamburg, im März 2014   Thomas Eger 
    Stefan Oeter 
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Customary International Law has experienced massive onslaughts; authors like 
Goldsmith and Posner have negated the relevance of customary international law 
altogether. At the same time, a renewed interest in scholarship on customary interna-
tional law could be seen during the last years. The paper tries to use the existing 
scholarly studies to reconstruct and model the operation of customary international 
law in an economic analysis perspective. A key element in such a reconstruction is 
the role legitimate expectations (and the stabilization of legitimate expectations) play 
in the workings of international relations. Customary Law mostly occurs in coordina-
tion games of a repeated nature, where states need a focal point in order to develop 
concerted patterns of behavior in order to overcome social dilemma situations. The 
emergence of behavioral regularities is the first decisive factor of gradual emergence 
of norms out of social practice. The expectation goes towards a calculus that a certain 
pattern of behavior will continue also in future. Such an expectation facilitates trans-
actions between states, because it reduces insecurity about future behavior, and in the 
medium term also minimizes transaction costs. Such behavioral regularities, howev-
er, may only be attributed legal significance if there is a shared meaning of such us-
ages in a given social environment. Entering into a dynamic of evolutionary creation 
of regular patterns of behavior, linked shared meanings and – as a result – legitimate 
expectations is not as implausible as some critical rationalist authors have argued. 
The paper cannot purport to answer most of the open questions, but attempts to shed 
some new light on a number of basic theoretical questions concerning customary 
international law and to deal with some intricate operational questions of how to 
model certain details of the practice of customary international law. 
* Chair of Comparative Public Law and Public International Law, Faculty of Law, Uni-
versity of Hamburg, and Director, Institute of International Affairs, University of Hamburg. 
                                                 
2 Stefan Oeter 
A. Why Bother about Customary International Law? 
Customary International Law (CIL) until now has found only limited attention 
as a topic of law and economics scholarship. A reason for such neglect might 
be the two mega-trends that Goldsmith and Posner highlight in their book of 
2005.1 They point to the fact that political scientists as well as international 
lawyers strongly emphasize two trends which are in their view characteristic 
for the late twentieth century – the ‘legalization’ of international relations and 
the rise of multilateral institutions.2 Both trends rest on the assumption that 
what counts in international law are formal international organizations and 
multilateral treaties. This view – Goldsmith and Posner argue – betrays a lack 
of historical perspective.3 Customary international law has always served as a 
kind of backbone of public international law, with the same legal force as 
treaty law – and still today CIL regulates important elements of international 
relations in a structure which is equally as multilateral as modern treaty law. 
Despite the rise of multilateral treaties and organizations, they stress, “cus-
tomary international law remains an important component of international law 
and an important object of study for international lawyers”.4 
The following paper argues that there are good arguments for making such 
claim: Most of the foundational principles of international law (such as terri-
torial sovereignty and sovereign equality), together with the fundamental in-
stitutions of international law deriving from such principles, such as sovereign 
immunity of states, rules of recognition of states and governments, the de-
tailed norms of non-intervention, as well as state responsibility, are still gov-
erned by CIL.5 And even in areas where treaties have proliferated, such as the 
law of treaties, the laws of war, international criminal law and the law of hu-
man rights, international law continues to play an important role, since it of-
fers a fallback regime in cases where treaty rules do not apply (due to non-
ratification of important treaties by major states) and provides interpretive 
presumptions and guidelines for treaty norms as well.6 “For these reasons, no 
comprehensive theory of international law can ignore it”, Goldsmith and Pos-
ner formulate, only to continue with the blunt statement: “And yet, we have a 
poor understanding of customary international law.”7 
Such a statement of ‘poor understanding’, the paper admits, may be true – 
even the most fundamental issues linked with the doctrine of customary inter-
1 Goldsmith and Posner (2005), 21. 
2 See e.g. Abbot and Snidall (1998). 
3 Goldsmith and Posner (2005), 21. 
4 Goldsmith and Posner (2005), 21. 
5 Guzman (2008), 184. 
6 See also Goldsmith and Posner (1998). 
7 Goldsmith and Posner (2005), 21. 
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national law remain very much in dispute until today.8 Writings on interna-
tional law always have argued rather diverse positions on what constitutes 
CIL, which elements are needed to form it and what indicators should be 
looked at in order to identify its rules.9 Such diversity of views is inextricably 
linked to a lack of understanding of what might constitute the binding element 
in customary law. Why should states obey rules that are not written down, in 
the formation of which they might not have participated and which do not 
possess any formal institutions of compliance management and enforcement? 
The idea that such a kind of informal rules should exert any constraining force 
on the behavior of states – collective actors usually modeled as rational actors 
seeking to maximize their interests – is difficult to understand for many au-
thors working with rational choice paradigms.10 
The work of Goldsmith and Posner is exemplary for such epistemic diffi-
culties. Their treatment of issues of customary international law is more a 
symptom of the described problem of “poor understanding” of CIL than an 
attempt to deliver any kind of productive answer to improve the understand-
ing of CIL.11 In the approach they take, they show exactly the same lack of 
historical perspective that they complain about when approaching the issue of 
CIL. In trying to model the workings of CIL rules, they tend to approach the 
segments of international relations that are regulated by CIL as if they consti-
tuted simple forms of a one-shot-game – an assumption that by definition 
cannot do justice to the interactive arrangements that states are caught into. 
That one cannot do justice to the intrinsic problems of CIL by simply ignoring 
their character as (nearly endless) repeated games has already been highlight-
ed by Andrew Guzman.12 It is to be admitted that the typical standard ac-
counts of CIL in a doctrinal perspective are not really convincing – but ridi-
culing customary international law as misleading labels for situations where 
there are simply significant payoffs from cooperation does not really help us 
to understand the intricacies of CIL either. To be open: Pay-offs from cooper-
ation are needed to stabilize certain patterns of action; without such payoffs, 
CIL would not come into existence. But the assumption that coordination al-
ways needs an immediate payoff would not do justice to the intricacies of 
8 As a recent restatement of the conceptual as well as practical enigmas of CIL see Lepard 
(2010), 3–44. 
9 See only – as some more recent contributions – Mendelson (1998); Byers (1999); To-
muschat (1999); Kelly (2000); Goldsmith and Posner (2000); Roberts (2001); Chinen (2001); 
Stern (2001); Estreicher and Stephan (2003); Kolb (2003); Vagts (2004); Mofidi (2005); 
Guzman (2005); Hannikainen (2006); Golove (2006); Ochoa (2007); Petersen (2007); Nor-
man and Trachtman (2008); Orakhelashvili (2008); Treves (2009); Stephan (2010); Lepard 
(2010); Baker (2010); Kammerhofer (2011); Scharf (2013). 
10 See also Engel and Kurschilgen (2011), 6. 
11 As critics of Goldsmith and Posner’s position on CIL, see only Chinen (2001); Norman 
and Trachtman (2005); Golove (2006); Guzman (2008). 
12 Guzman (2008).  
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social action in long-term interactive relationships. In the background there is 
always a dilemma of social action – cooperation as such brings payoffs, but 
the biggest gains might be earned when one is successfully taking the position 
of a free-rider. But not all actors can be free-riders – since then no cooperation 
(and no pay-offs) would occur. In such a social dilemma, individual and so-
cial rationality fall apart: “What would be best for society is not in the best 
interest of the individual.”13 Such a dilemma is quite common in social inter-
action and can be easily modeled and made testable in terms of game theory.14 
In order to understand the radical onslaught on traditional doctrines of CIL 
that was launched by Goldsmith and Posner, one should read the decisive 
passage of their argumentation in full: “Although most international law 
scholars acknowledge that states are more likely to violate customary interna-
tional law as the costs of compliance increase, they insist that the sense of 
legal obligation puts some drag on such deviations. Our theory, by contrast, 
insists that the payoffs from cooperation or deviation are the sole determinants 
of whether states engage in the cooperative behaviors that are labeled custom-
ary international law. This is why we deny the claim that customary interna-
tional law is an exogenous influence on states’ behavior. And because we are 
skeptical about the possibility of cooperation by custom in multiplayer pris-
oner’s dilemmas, we are skeptical that customary international law fosters 
true multilateral cooperation.”15 
The following paragraph of their critical assessment goes even further by 
contending: “Similarly, pairwise coordination may emerge spontaneously, or 
evolve into a behavioral regularity. Multilateral coordination is, for reasons 
explained earlier, unlikely to evolve by custom, but if it were to evolve, states 
would not act as they do out of a sense of legal obligation, but to further their 
interests.”16 Only as a side-remark: The last formulation is a truism if we 
model state practice in rational-choice terms – law only works in these terms 
if it embodies an enlightened self-interest of states, i.e., helps states to further 
their interests, be it short-term, or long-term interests. We gain a first insight 
here: the time perspective is of utmost importance – it makes quite a differ-
ence whether we model the games as one-shot games or as repeated games, 
whether states pursue short-term gains limited to the concrete interaction or 
long-term gains linked to the repeated coordination game as such. 
The approach of Goldsmith and Poser might be reformulated in the follow-
ing words: States as actors of international relations might sometimes behave 
as if they were induced by rules that public international law doctrine de-
scribes as customary international law – but these are mere coincidences, 
13 Engel (2010), 4. 
14 For applications of game theory to international relations see Holzinger (2003); Sandler 
(2004). 
15 Goldsmith and Posner (2005), 39. 
16 Goldsmith and Posner (2005), 39. 
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since states are not compelled to behave in the way they do by an exogenous 
influence of law, but merely by their own calculus of interest in the concrete 
situation, more or less converging with the proclaimed rules of CIL. And that 
such convergence happens seems plausible for Goldsmith and Posner only in 
the context of bilateral relations, and not in multilateral relations – but CIL is 
always about multilateral rules, and not bilateral ones. In bilateral exchanges, 
there usually will be an immediate coordination gain – but not in multilateral 
interactions. Put in blunt terms: CIL does not exist in the perspective of Gold-
smith and Posner, but is a misnomer for certain types of converging interests 
where states show coordinated behavior due to a parallel calculus of interest.  
Are international lawyers a herd of fools that believe in a form of law that 
never existed? Or are they a band of manipulators that pretend to guide state 
practice by a set of inherited rules that are sacred to any member of the caste 
of international lawyers, but which now are proving as the ‘emperors’ new 
clothes’ if analyzed under the stringent categories of economic analysis? My 
hypothesis is that both questions are to be answered in the negative. CIL does 
indeed exist, and it is possible to reconstruct and model such a type of law in 
terms of a rationalist analysis of collective behavior of states.17 The following 
paragraphs will try to deliver a first sketch of the arguments that might help to 
prove that a category like CIL makes sense and rules of such a customary 
international law are capable to exert exogenous influence on states to abide 
by certain rules. “There is no reason in theory, or in data adduced by others, to 
believe CIL to be generally epiphenomenal.”18 
B.  Defining the Key Terms 
Customary law is not explicitly and intentionally created by individual au-
thors but constitutes a consequence of social practice, emerges in an evolu-
tionary fashion.19 The International Law Commission has even spoken of “the 
‘spontaneous’ nature of the customary process”.20 Customary law is not a new 
phenomenon in the long history of law, but probably the most ancient type of 
law that came into existence already at a very early stage of the history of 
mankind.21 Legal anthropology has found varieties of customary law all over 
the world, in practically all types of human society.22 In order to form socie-
17 See also Trachtman (2008), 72–117. 
18 Trachtman (2008), 72. 
19 Engel (2010), 18. 
20 See the ILC’s 2012 Report, para. 171 – International Law Commission, Report on the 
work of its sixty-fourth session (7 May to 1 June and 2 July to 3 August 2012), GAOR 67th 
Session, Suppl. No. 10 (UNGA Doc. A/67/10); see in addition Ago (1957), 727–730. 
21 Engel and Kurschilgen (2011), 2, and Mendelson (1998), 166–168. 
22 See only Fikentscher (2009); Donovan and Anderson (2003); Pospisil (1982). 
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ties with a certain division of labor, human beings must build up basic institu-
tions that stabilize expectations. Without stable expectations on what your 
fellows (on which you have to rely) will do with you, a societal development 
is more or less impossible. Cooperation and coordination of behavior in early 
societies probably developed in a long evolutionary process, driven to a cer-
tain degree by trial and error. But as soon as clans, tribes, peoples, expanding 
to ever larger societal set-ups, had developed certain behavioral regularities, 
they tended to trust in these regularities – not only because they seemed to 
repeat forever in terms of practical experience, but also because the members 
of the relevant society perceived their co-fellows to be obliged to behave in 
such a way because already the forefathers had behaved in such a way. Cus-
toms and mores were perceived as immutable, inherited from time immemori-
al – and men were obliged to respect such customs inherited from the forefa-
thers.23 
Factual regularity of social practices thus transforms – from a social sci-
ence perspective – at a certain point in a prescriptive ‘ought’. The other mem-
bers of society (and transaction partners) trust in the regularity, develop a ‘le-
gitimate expectation’.24 Lab experiments in the context of studies of 
behavioral economics have demonstrated that such ‘legitimate expectations’, 
based on regularities in behavioral patterns, develop quite easily in repeated 
game structures and help to overcome social dilemma situations where indi-
vidual and social rationality fall apart.25 If somebody disappoints these legiti-
mate expectations, the actor is perceived not only as showing an exceptional, 
perhaps even eccentric pattern of behavior, but – if the counterpart relied on 
the behavioral regularity for his own patterns of activity – is perceived to de-
stroy the ‘harmony’ of society, by violating an iron rule that ‘must’ be re-
spected. Typically, such rules of customary law in pre-modern societies are 
not seen as man-made, but as perennial, as inherited from time immemorial – 
and the violation of such rules cries for sanctions, in order to restore ‘harmo-
ny’, an intuition which is even visible in lab experiments when test persons 
opt for sanctioning rule breakers even if these sanctions are costly for them.26 
Modern times have not gotten completely rid of all forms of customary law 
– but they have lost their faith in rules of customary law as something peren-
nial and immutable. We are aware that even customary law is a creation of 
man and changes over time. The evolution of behavioral regularities in specif-
ic societal constellations is not difficult to reconstruct – but how such regu-
larities mute into something we could describe as law is much more difficult 
to model, in particular for a legal academia so much accustomed to authorita-
23 Pospisil (1982), 53. 
24 As to the role of ‘legitimate expectations’ in the customary process see very much in 
detail Byers (1999), 106–126. 
25 Engel (2010), Engel and Kurschilgen (2011). 
26 Engel (2010), 10. 
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tively enacted, written codes of law.27 But also rational choice theorists “have 
a hard time with customary law”, as Engel and Kurschilgen have put it, “since 
it seems unclear why self-interested actors should contribute to the formation 
of a rule that will prevent them from acts of selfishness”.28 
When natural law concepts that had dominated international legal thinking 
until early 19th century muted into concepts of customary international law, it 
was still easy to accept the rules concerned as law proper. Because the rules 
had been perceived before as ‘law’ deriving from the iron prescriptions of 
human reason, they had for a long time been practiced as a normative pre-
scription – and that what had been practiced as law for a time immemorial 
clearly constituted customary law in the perspective of lawyers.29 But with the 
changing dynamics of societies (and the international system) even such cus-
tomary law became a historical category. In traditional terms it was difficult 
to explain why something practiced for a long time should suddenly convert 
into a legal ‘ought’. These epistemic difficulties explain why international 
legal doctrine remained to a certain degree in a relatively crude state, linking 
the existence of a rule of customary law to the proof of two determinant fac-
tors: ‘consuetudo’ and ‘opinio juris sive necessitatis’, i.e., ‘custom’ (in the 
sense of a behavioral regularity) and a ‘sense of legal obligation’, the belief 
that one is bound to behave in the same way as one has one has usually be-
haved.. The need of the first element is indisputable – without a pattern of 
behavioral regularity, there can never be any trait of customary law. The rele-
vance of the second element, however, is very much disputed – and it has 
proven difficult to define more specifically what ‘opinio juris’ really might 
mean in operational terms. 
It is obvious that behavioral regularity alone cannot provide a foundation 
for a prescriptive legal rule. Some other element must be added, a kind of 
shared belief that a regular pattern of behavior is something to be relied on 
when shaping one’s own patterns of action, a kind of regularity that deserves 
legitimate trust – and if that trust is disappointed, constitutes a violation of 
legitimate expectations.30 
C. Some Theory: On the Incentive Structure of  
Customary International Law 
At the outset of the following arguments on the incentive structure of CIL, I 
would like to start with some basic observations grounded on theoretical re-
27 See also Guzman (2008), 184. 
28 Engel and Kurscilgen (2011), 6. 
29 See only Treves (2009), 1; as well as Ochoa (2007), 129. 
30 See also Byers (1999), 106–107. 
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flection of the experiences of international legal practice. CIL in most cases 
deals with coordination problems of a social dilemma nature.31 In some cases 
it might also help to stabilize relatively easy types of cooperation. But setting 
up and stabilizing complex patterns of cooperation necessitates an elaborate 
treaty regime with written codes and formal institutions. The types of coordi-
nation problems dealt with by CIL are definitely not of a ‘one-shot-game’ 
character – customary law is based upon a long trajectory of social practice, 
developing over time certain behavioral regularities.32 This conforms to the 
findings of economic literature dealing with the possibility to reach mutual 
cooperation in social dilemma situations – situations where individual and 
social rationality diverge and where a centralized authority with the power to 
enforce promises about behavior previously made is lacking.33 Availability of 
information regarding the past behavior of actors is key here, which presup-
poses a whole sequence of repeated games.  
Customary law thus is by definition embedded in a pattern of repeated 
games. Lab experiments in the context of the nascent experimental law and 
economics literature have demonstrated that the traditional positivist as well 
as more recent rational choice conceptualisations of customary law miss a key 
ingredient.34 In the words of Engel and Kurschilgen: “Practice turns into law 
since behaviour and normative expectations coevolve. If nearly everybody 
behaves in a certain way, this not only shapes beliefs about others’ future be-
haviour. If the pattern has been repeated for a while, the behavioural belief 
turns into a normative expectation. It no longer is purely cognitive. A motiva-
tional component is added to it. If one actor deviates from established prac-
tice, she violates others’ normative expectations: others regard such behaviour 
as not only anti-social but illegitimate.”35 
Such custom turned into legitimate expectations (and thus law) has a 
strong beneficial effect on the interaction of experimental participants in so-
cial dilemma situations. “It helps experimental participants overcome a social 
dilemma.”36 If there are no sanctions, the lab experiments of Engel and Kur-
schilgen demonstrate, the effect “basically coincides with the behavioural 
effect of what public international law calls comity.”37 But since normative 
expectations and regularities of behaviour often coevolve (as again lab exper-
iments demonstrate), comity tends to mute into rules of customary law. These 
rules tend to remain epiphenomenal as no sanctions are involved. “Whether 
the rule invokes the authority of the law is at best immaterial, if not detri-
31 See Engel (2010), 4. 
32 Guzman (2008), 191; Trachtman (2008), 83. 
33 See e.g., Axelrod (1984); Milgrom, North, and Weingast (1990); Guzman (2008). 
34 See also Engel and Kurschilgen (2011), 6. 
35 Engel and Kurschilgen (2011), 6. 
36 Engel and Kurschilgen (2011), 18. 
37 Engel and Kurschilgen (2011), 18. 
                                                 
 The Legitimacy of Customary International Law 9 
mental. Yet the authority of the law becomes instrumental as soon as there are 
sanctions. If combined with comity, sanctions crowd out some of the benefi-
cial effect. If the rule originates in law, however, the authority of the law and 
the threat of sanctions reinforce each other.”38 
These findings from decontextualized laboratory experiments gain even 
more force in real life contexts. The community of states is a close-knit com-
munity characterized by a relatively small number of members with intense 
interactions. There is practically no one-shot game in international relations. 
You always meet at least twice – a fact which is easily explainable by the sta-
ble structure of the community of states where a limited number of collective 
actors is caught in a network of repeated interactions which cannot be avoid-
ed. This means that the actors will have to interact with each other again and 
again, in a social set-up where acculturation and the evolution of shared ‘so-
cial constructions of reality’ in close-knit ‘epistemic communities’ play an 
enormous role. There are plenty of studies on normativity in international 
relations now that explore these issues.39 
The critics of customary law use, it is suggested, “an overly narrow and 
therefore inappropriate concept of normativity”.40 Normativity does not ex-
haust itself in guiding actors to patterns of behaviour the violation of which 
would be the addressee’s self-interest, thus compelling them to forms of ac-
tion running against their own interests. At the same time, however, in a so-
cial science perspective it is beyond doubt that the (moral or normative) duty 
to abide by the law is not the exclusive motivating force either. “Norms mat-
ter because they provide guidance. Most actors are most of the time willing to 
follow the norms prevailing in their context, or at least to be not too far off the 
mark, and most actors expect other actors to be thus guided.”41 In terms of 
customary law: As far as normative expectations and behavioural patterns 
coevolve, behaviour is guided into the normatively desired direction, thus 
helping actors to develop stable patterns of behavioural coordination.42 In a 
more enlightened sense, actors have a self-interest in such stable patterns ena-
bling structured coordination, since this makes their world more calculable 
and helps to further their interests in a stable social environment, thereby al-
lowing investments in cooperation. This goes in line with studies over an “ex-
pressive” function of law. Law serves as a focal point for patterns of coordi-
nation.43 It informs people about behaviour others will approve, and thus 
38 Engel and Kurschilgen (2011), 18. 
39 See only Risse (1999); Risse (2000). 
40 Engel and Kurschilgen (2011), 3. 
41 Engel and Kurschilgen (2011), 3. 
42 Engel and Kurschilgen (2011), 3. 
43 McAdams (2000), McAdams and Nadler (2005). 
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might inform also about the consequences associated with a specific type of 
action, minimizing collateral damage to social capital.44  
In addition, the nature of the social environment plays a strong role. The 
number of collective actors qualified as states is limited and the bilateral in-
teractions between them might have significant repercussions for others. Ac-
cordingly, states closely observe the interactions which happen even between 
third states. In taking a specific course of action vis-à-vis another state, they 
usually know which behavioral pattern is commonly preferred by the partner 
of their transaction, and they also tend to know what will be the pattern of 
action of the majority of the states in the field concerned. Mutual observation, 
the distilling of such observation into expectations of future behavioral pat-
terns of interaction partners, and finally formal reactions if the expectations 
are not fulfilled explain how behavioral patterns develop – behavioural pat-
terns that go much beyond mere bilateral relations45 Behavioral patterns thus 
not only consolidate into behavioral regularities on a temporal axis, but also 
spread among states that imitate successful patterns of interaction from others, 
thus at the end forming a more and more general pattern of action amongst a 
whole group of states (or even the entire state community).  
With such generalization of behavioral patterns not only over time, but also 
in terms of participating states, rational expectations on the behavioral pat-
terns of the interaction partners develop – rational expectations which facili-
tate interactions and lower transaction costs.46 With a behavioral regularity 
that might be trusted to continue in future, cumbersome calculations (and 
speculations) on what might be the future behavioral pattern of the partner 
become superfluous – information costs as well as the costs of decision-
making go down, fewer securities are needed to invest in a fruitful coopera-
tion with the other. A working pattern of behavioral regularities (in the sense 
of customary legal rules) thus improves efficiency of international coordina-
tion and cooperation. 
But how does it work? There are no explicit institutions of compliance 
management, few possibilities to adjudicate, and ‘tit for tat’ sanctions after a 
violation also do not work very well in traditional international law (although 
they play a certain role in expressing the discontent of the others disappointed 
in their legitimate expectations). Nevertheless, the experience of international 
legal practice demonstrates that customary international law works well to an 
astonishing degree. Why do states rely on these behavioral regularities alt-
hough there are few options really to enforce the rules? Reputation comes into 
play here as a key factor.47 States are well aware that others rely on their be-
44 See McAdams (2000); Geisinger (2002). 
45 Byers (1999), 106–110. 
46 As far as the category of transaction costs is concerned, see only the ground-breaking 
work of Williamson (1985). 
47 See in particular Guzman (2008), 191. 
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havioral regularities, have legitimate expectations that these regularities will 
continue – and that they can build their course of action on these regularities, 
including some kind of investment in enhanced coordination and cooperation. 
In inter-state communication signals are sent that certain regularities of be-
havior are trustworthy and can be relied upon, while others are still open and 
might change in future. But if it has been signaled that expectations of a con-
tinued behavioral regularity are legitimate, an aberration from that course, by 
taking a different path of action, clearly will violate these legitimate expecta-
tions. The state concerned thus finds itself under a constant pressure of such 
legitimate expectations, and perceives itself bound to comply with these ex-
pectations, because any other course of action would deny the commitment 
taken.  
Like in other cases of legal obligation, the reputation of the acting state as 
a ‘reliable’, as a ‘trustworthy’ partner in interactions is at stake. States may 
still choose otherwise, may take another course of action that does not con-
form to the legitimate expectations – but the state then has to pay the price for 
such a decision that – it knows – will disappoint legitimate expectations of 
others.48 Like with other categories of international law, states are not exoge-
nously compelled to abide by certain rules, but they have invested a lot of 
social capital in their reputation as a reliable partner of interaction, a partner 
others can rely upon, and they tend to avoid – at least if there are no stringent 
reasons for doing so – types of action that would too obviously damage such 
reputation and thus devalue the underlying investment in social capital.49 This 
implicit tendency towards preserving reputation gives the other partners in 
interaction a certain guarantee that the state concerned will abide by its legal 
commitments and will try not to disappoint the legitimate expectations of oth-
ers, at least as long as costs of compliance do not become too excessive. 
Bringing this arrangement of stabilization of rational expectations in the 
form of legal obligations makes sense. It is too cumbersome to rehearse any 
time you have to deal with another state its complete record of past interac-
tions. Transforming legitimate expectations into some kind of legal obliga-
tions minimizes transaction costs. The legal code allows an abbreviated form 
of decision-making calculus. As a result of the transformation, not every deci-
sion in a sequence of repeated games requires a new calculus whether and to 
what degree the expectations on the behavioral patterns of the interaction 
partner are justified; a brief (and very abbreviated) assessment suffices of 
what the legal rule is in the constellation concerned, and perhaps also whether 
the interaction partner has a reputation to abide by the law in general. The 
generalization of behavioral regularities into universal rules of customary law 
thus helps to minimize transaction costs, because it leads to a standardization 
48 Guzman (2008), 192. 
49 Guzman (2008), 71–117. 
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of the decisional calculus. Decision-makers can more or less abstract from the 
individual profile of the interaction partner and can simply look to the content 
of the rules at stake. The legal arrangement becomes even more stable if “re-
peated compliance gradually becomes habitual obedience” as international 
law “penetrates into a domestic legal system, thus becoming part of that na-
tion’s internal value set”50 and if, finally, obedience to the law constitutes an 
issue of morality, relying on the “habit and inertia of continued compliance”.51  
D. Some Practical Issues: Operational Details of  
Customary International Law 
The theoretical observations made above should now allow us to dive more in 
detail into some of the intricate problems of the construction of CIL. These 
more practical issues concern, first, the scope and extent of state practice rele-
vant for the formation of CIL; second, the problems around the question what 
role ‘opinio juris’ really plays in the formation of customary law, and how to 
find and model this ‘subjective element’ of CIL; and, third, the delicate ques-
tion how CIL might change over time, despite the stabilization of expecta-
tions. 
The position argued in the following pages resembles very much the posi-
tion taken by some authors like Maurice Mendelson who opines that ‘opinio 
juris’ plays a negligible role in the formation of customary law (if any) and 
that what really counts is state practice. Such construction goes very much in 
parallel to the findings of the lab experiments undertaken by Christoph En-
gel.52 Mendelson argues that the international legal order is embryonic, and in 
a deep way incomplete. Therefore, a ‘formalistic approach’ is misplaced.53 
There are no stringent formal conditions that must be fulfilled in order for a 
new rule to become a rule of customary law – the “customary process is in 
fact a continuous one, which does not stop when the rule has emerged.”54 Eve-
ry act of compliance later on will strengthen the rule, and “every violation, if 
acquiesced in, will help to undermine it”.55 Customary law thus must be mod-
eled as a result of the legitimate expectations of the other partners in the inter-
national community. Such legitimate expectations that states will continue to 
50 Koh (1997), 2603. 
51 Henkin (1997), 49. 
52 See Engel and Kurschilgen (2011), 6.  
53 Mendelson (1998), 168. 
54 Mendelson (1998), 175, see also the formulation by Sir Michael Wood, Special Rappor-
teur of the ILC for the topic “Formation and evidence of customary international law”, in his 
introductory note for the 2012 session of the ILC:, speaking of “the very essence of custom, 
its flexibility and constant evolution” – UN Doc. A/CN.4/653 of 30 May 2012, para. 3. 
55 Mendelson (1998), 175. 
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behave in the way they have done in the past arise “if the generality of states 
has regularly behaved in certain ways”.56 Phrased differently: “If, within a 
social group, people habitually behave in a certain way, then, particularly if 
others rely on the continuation of this conduct, the sentiment may develop 
within that society that one is obliged to continue so to act. In other words, a 
norm emerges from what is normal.”57 
I. State Practice 
Customary international law, we have learnt from experimental studies as 
well as from theoretical debate, emerges in an evolutionary fashion from the 
social practice of subjects of international law, mostly states. Because the 
actors forming such practice are usually states, it is also called ‘state prac-
tice’.58 This does not preclude, however, that international organizations also 
develop patterns of action which might be relevant for the formation of CIL. 
With the growing importance and rising decisional autonomy of international 
organizations (IOs) in international relations, actions taken by IOs are of high 
relevance for states concerned (and the international system in general). Also 
IOs may thus develop behavioral regularities that give rise to legitimate ex-
pectations.59 The practice we are dealing with consists in principle mostly of 
communicative acts. Nearly all acts of international relations are not physical 
acts that pursue a certain end on its own, but are acts of communication that 
try to influence the position and course of action of other international actors. 
To give only one example: Even a military intervention commonly does not 
bring about a changed situation in itself, but constitutes mainly (at least in a 
political perspective) a communicative act trying to force the other side into 
obedience with the declared will of the intervening power. 
The types of communicative acts that are of relevance in international rela-
tions vary a lot.60 Most typical forms are diplomatic notes, public declarations, 
documents submitted in the framework of treaty negotiations or in the context 
of international organizations, signatures and ratifications of treaties, deci-
sions in voting upon resolutions of international organizations (and declara-
tions explaining such votes), even – under certain circumstances – cases of a 
qualified form of omission.61 But relevant acts may also be legal acts original-
ly stemming from the internal, national legal order, such as national statutes, 
judicial decisions, parliamentary declarations.62 Authors generally must be a 
56 Mendelson (1998), 185. 
57 Mendelson (1998), 185. 
58 See Brownlie (2004), but also Byers (1999), 133–136 and Tomuschat (1999), 330–333. 
59 See Mendelson (1998), 201–202, as well as Lepard (2010), 277–282. 
60 See Byers (1999), 133–136, and Guzman (2008), 185 as well as 201–204. 
61 See Mendelson (1998), 204–209. 
62 See Mendelson (1998), 199–200. 
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state organ,63 and the content of the act must have a relevance for a specific 
issue of international relations.64 Whether a certain act really has relevance for 
the legal relationship between states, however, is regulated by the perception 
that others have of the act, which leads to a strong linkage between the prac-
tice element and the ‘subjective’ element linked to the social meaning of the 
act.65 A series of communicative acts, extended and stable enough to be called 
a behavioral regularity, becomes only relevant ‘custom’ when a certain mean-
ing can be attributed to such behavioral regularity.66 The ‘meaning’ will be the 
expectation of the others that the state concerned will continue with the be-
havioral regularity, and this behavioral regularity is of such importance for 
them that they rely on it for their own patterns of action. 
A specific problem consists with the requirement of “general and con-
sistent practice” (or “constant and uniform usage”).67 There are again two el-
ements in this requirement, a time element and a participation element. The 
element of ‘consistency’ points to the need of repetition of behavioral patterns 
over time – and these patterns must be more or less identical over time.68 But 
how much time is required? Do you need decades to form a reliable custom, 
or might that happen rather quickly? It is difficult to give an abstract answer 
to these questions, since the answer probably will depend on the intensity and 
frequency of interactions.69 In a field of social practice where – on a more or 
less daily basis – routinely interactions take place, a relatively short span of 
time will suffice to produce an impressive pattern of behavioral regularities.70 
In another sector, however, where states interact only in considerable inter-
vals, a rather long passage of time might be needed to come to some indica-
tion of behavioral regularity. And how about isolated acts inconsistent with 
the proclaimed custom? A single inconsistent act probably is not really rele-
vant, but if the number of acts following a completely different line of action 
becomes sizeable, ‘consistency’ definitively suffers.71 
The other element of ‘generality’ refers to the number of states that must 
participate in a specific kind of behavioral regularity in order to qualify it as 
‘general custom’.72 There exists a consensus that not all nearly 200 states of 
the world must actively participate in such practice.73 (Most problems dealt 
63 There is, however, a debate whether also other actors should be taken into account – see 
pars pro toto Ochoa (2007). 
64 See Mendelson (1998), 198–203. 
65 See also Byers (1999), 139–141. 
66 See Byers (1999), 148. 
67 See Mendelson (1998), 209–227. 
68 Mendelson (1998), 209–211, as well as Lepard (2010), 218–228. 
69 See Byers (1999), 160–162. 
70 As to so-called ‘instant customary law’, see only Mendelson (1998), 370–382. 
71 See Guzman (2008), 185. 
72 See in detail Mendelson (1998), 218–227. 
73 See Guzman (2008), 185–186. 
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with by international law are rather specific in nature, which implies that 
many states will have no relevant practice at all.74 Others might have some 
practice, but their standards of documentation and record-keeping might be so 
low that practice is difficult to learn from the outside. And even in the cases 
where relevant documentation exists, issues of language and culture might 
prevent the mainstream of international legal scholars of taking into consider-
ation such practice, since it is too difficult to extract it from sources and to 
process it for the discussion on relevant practice.75 As a result, international 
legal doctrine usually takes only a relatively small number of states into ac-
count when analyzing ‘relevant’ practice76 – and if there is a conformity of 
behavioral patterns amongst these states, ‘generality’ of the custom is com-
monly declared. 
For international lawyers taking a third-world perspective, there is a prob-
lem with such definition of ‘generality’.77 By practically limiting the amount 
of practice really to be taken into consideration when evaluating the ‘uni-
formity’ of usage to a small number of Western powers, plus Russia, China 
and some other BRICS states, the ‘eurocentrism’ (or ‘West-centrism’) of tra-
ditional international law continues to dominate international legal thinking.78 
As a result, authors decidedly taking a ‘Third-World Approach to Internation-
al Law’ are very skeptical towards traditional concepts of customary law.79 
‘Custom’ really counts – but ‘custom’ should be the practice of all the states 
of the world. That is why deliberations in the UN General Assembly need to 
be taken much more into account when assessing the uniformity of certain 
types of ‘usage’ – and not only by looking to the statements of great powers 
with a privileged position in the Security Council, but in particular as a tool to 
reconstruct the reactions of third world countries to certain types of ‘usage’.80 
Acquiescence can lead to limited usage transforming into ‘custom’ (and fur-
ther on into customary law). The counter-positions taken by smaller states, 
however, should be taken into consideration when evaluating the ‘generality’ 
of certain types of usage. 
II. Opinio Juris 
Traditional accounts of what the ‘subjective element’ in CIL – the so-called 
‘opinio juris’ – means, and how we can reconstruct whether such a conviction 
74 Mendelson (1998), 219. 
75 See Mendelson (1998), 225–226, as well as Guzman (2008), 186. 
76 See Byers (1999), 156, and Mendelson (1998), 225–227. 
77 See also Mendelson (1998), 226–227. 
78 See – pars pro toto – Onuma (2009), 236–240. 
79 See – as an example – Onuma (2009), 220–249. 
80 See Onuma (2009), 245–249. 
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of a legal relationship really exists, are far too simplistic.81 But it is possible to 
reconstruct in rationalist terms the role ‘opinio juris’ plays in the operation of 
CIL. As Joel Trachtman has formulated it: “Opinio juris should be understood 
as a way of referring to the intent of states to propose or accept a rule of law 
that will serve as the focal point of behavior, implicate an important set of 
default rules applicable to law but not to other types of social order, and bring 
into play an important set of linkages among legal rules.”82  
Opinio juris thus is not a simple belief of state actors to be bound by law, 
but an acceptance of a specific rule, brought about by continued social prac-
tice. Basis is the consistent practice, i.e., the behavioral regularity “in circum-
stances which give rise to a legitimate expectation of similar conduct in the 
future”.83 With other words: the acting state knows that its behavioral pattern 
showing a strong degree of regularity has given rise (or will give rise) to legit-
imate expectations, and being conscious of such expectations the state contin-
ues with that pattern, thus strengthening the expectations of the other states 
relying on his signal to accept the proclaimed rule.84 In other words: the pro-
cess of formation of customary law is a process of dynamic exchange of sig-
nals to accept a certain rule and the expectations going along with such a rule, 
in exchange for the expectation that also the others will follow the same rule 
and thus will make their behavioral patterns calculable to the acting state.85 As 
a result, what matters here “is more a question of the positions taken by the 
organs of States about international law, in their internal processes and in their 
interaction with other States, than of their beliefs”.86 
Accordingly, there is a ‘subjective’ element – one could also say: a norma-
tive consideration – involved in such creation of legitimate expectations in 
social interaction.87 The usage as such does not contain legal relevance em-
bedded as a practice category. The legal significance arises from the en-
grained structures of ‘shared meaning’ that accompany any act of social prac-
tice – a ‘shared meaning’ that is inextricably linked to the ‘cognitive patterns’, 
the shared ‘social construction of reality’ that characterizes a specific social 
system.88 In performing a certain act of social practice, actors know that the 
81 As a critical account of traditional doctrine, see Mendelson (1998), 245–293; see also – 
as some of the most recent contributions to the debate on ‘opinio juris’ – Yee (2000); Tasiou-
las (2007); Taki (2008); Dahlman (2012). 
82 Trachtman (2008), 73. 
83 International Law Association (2000), § 1 (i). 
84 This does not imply a position of rigid ‘consensualism’ where positive consent of states 
to rules of customary law is required; see – as a recent restatement of such ‘consensualist’ 
constructions – Orakhelashvili (2008), 80–89. 
85 See also Mendelson (1998), 269–270. 
86 Mendelson (1998), 270. 
87 As an attempt to elucidate the place of normative considerations in the analysis of CIL 
see Voyiakis (2010), as well as Lepard (2010), 112–121. 
88 See more in detail Wiener (2008). 
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others in the social system will ascribe a certain meaning to it – and in inter-
national relations this will often be a legal meaning.89 The knowledge about 
the social meaning of the practice will not always be explicit. A mere implicit 
knowledge often suffices to bind actors to the legitimate expectations that 
they create by their practices.90 In a sense, normative meaning is thus ‘as-
cribed’ to practices – but such attribution of meaning is not a wanton act, but 
is embedded in the meaning structures of social practice, thus constitutes a 
category open to empirical study.91 As a consequence, actors knowing that 
their acts will raise expectations of a certain legal meaning must complement 
the act with a disclaimer if they want to avoid such legal significance – thus 
the relevance of acquiescence and omissions in the formation of customary 
law.92 
If a state disappoints the expectations of other states and changes its pattern 
of action, the other will feel betrayed in its (seemingly legitimate) expecta-
tions and will sanction the ‘breach of law’ with reputational sanctions, adjust-
ing their assessments about the reliability of the acting state.93 Being con-
scious of the implicit threat of such sanctions, states are stabilized in their 
respect for the rules of CIL. If the overwhelming majority of states has ac-
cepted such a rule of CIL, it also becomes difficult to negate the existence of 
the rule. There exists a possibility to object against the coming into force of a 
rule of CIL ab initio, by consistently taking a position of so-called ‘persistent 
objector’.94 The option is not available, however, if the formation of the rule 
has already happened – and even in the situations where it applies in princi-
ple, the institution of ‘persistent objector’ is extremely difficult in its practical 
application, making it nearly impossible for individual states to fulfill its re-
quirements.95 
III. Changes in Customary International Law 
In a traditional, pre-modern perspective it was difficult to perceive that cus-
tomary law might change at all. Modernity, with all its archives and its institu-
tionalized historical memory, is well aware – at least in principle – that cus-
tomary law is a product of history, subject to historical change. But a 
theoretical conundrum remains: How can expectations be stabilized by per-
89 See in this direction also Byers (1999), 148–151. 
90 See also Orakhelashvili (2008), 91. 
91 See Wiener (2009). 
92 See also Orakhelashvili (2008), 97–101, and Byers (1999), 106–107. 
93 Guzman (2008), 194. 
94 See Guzman (2008), 197–198, and very much in detail Mendelson (1998), 227–244; see 
in addition Byers (1999), 180–183; Trachtman (2010); Dumberry (2010); Lepard (2010), 
229–242. 
95 See also Guzman (2008), 197–198. 
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ceiving a particular pattern of behavior as legally required, while keeping the 
whole set of rules dynamic and flexible? Must not a state that deliberately 
departs from his past behavioral pattern perceive such a type of action as a 
violation of law? In principle – yes! As long as the acting state still shares the 
wide-spread perception that the past pattern of behavior should be continued 
in future, it will perceive its own departure from the rule as a violation of a 
legal commitment, even if trying to blur that violation by arguing with the 
imprecision and the loopholes of common rules of customary law. But what 
happens if social and political circumstances have changed so much that the 
traditional behavioral norm does not qualify as efficient anymore? If an acting 
state perceives a traditional norm as inefficient and outdated, and wants to 
propose a new norm, as focal point for behavioral coordination, the state has 
the option of not trying to hide its departure from the old rule; if the state is 
willing to take the leadership, it can also discard the old norm as not serving 
its purpose any more, and try to propose openly a new norm, thus becoming a 
kind of ‘norm entrepreneur’.96 For the traditionalists, the acting state will still 
be a ‘law-breaker’, but if there are good grounds to be argued in favor of the 
new norm, other states will join the acting state, and – with more and more 
states changing side – a new norm might emerge.97 In that sense, CIL com-
bines in an interesting way the primary purpose of stabilizing expectations 
with a certain flexibility and openness to change. 
E. Concluding Remarks 
The argumentation led above had the purpose of demonstrating that the 
frontal assault of some rationalist authors on the traditional institution of CIL 
is erroneous, is based on wrong assumptions. Even inside the rationalist para-
digm of economic analysis, it is possible to reconstruct and model how CIL 
operates – in a way that makes sense also under more traditional understand-
ings of international law. CIL (if rightly modeled) is not a crude ideology, but 
a well-operating legal institution. CIL makes sense in coordination games 
with a repeated game character – and most problems of international relations 
are of that character. It is easily explainable that states have a mutual interest 
to agree on a series of coordinating rules even outside the formation of com-
plex treaty regimes. The emergence of behavioral regularities is the first deci-
sive factor of such gradual emergence of norms out of social practice – behav-
ioral regularities that from a certain moment start to create legitimate 
expectations of other states. The expectation goes towards a calculus that a 
certain pattern of behavior will continue also in future. Such an expectation 
96 See Trachtman (2008), 114. 
97 See Mendelson (1998), 270–271, 284–291, as well as Byers (1999), 157–160. 
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facilitates enormously transactions between states, because it reduces insecu-
rity about future behavior, and in the medium term also minimizes transaction 
costs. Such behavioral regularities only may be attributed legal significance if 
there is a shared meaning of such usages in a given social environment – but 
the international community in its diplomatic networks constitutes a relatively 
close-knit society with a strong degree of shared understanding. Entering into 
the described dynamic of evolutionary creation of regular patterns of behav-
ior, linked shared meanings and – as a result – legitimate expectations is not 
as implausible as some critical rationalist authors have argued. Just to the con-
trary, it is rather plausible under certain conditions of social dilemma situa-
tions where productive coordination games are needed. If states accept the 
expectations raised by their practices and confirm them by relevant communi-
cative acts, they inevitably become entangled in a web of mutual expectations 
that then transforms practice into legal obligations.  
The paper has attempted to demonstrate the dynamics of such processes of 
building converging expectations and of hardening the mutual expectations to 
legal obligations. At the same time, it has tried to shed some light on decisive 
issues of the doctrine of CIL that have been left unresolved in traditional in-
ternational legal doctrine. The author does not claim to know all the answers 
to the questions formulated. There is still a lot to do in order to understand the 
incentive structures that make CIL work. But such work is worthy of being 
done, since CIL is a relevant category, far from being epiphenomenal in inter-
national relations. Our understanding of the operation of CIL could still profit 
a lot from further studies in terms of economic analysis. 
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Comment on Stefan Oeter 
Customary International Law, Coordination and 
Dilemmas 
by 
Georg von Wangenheim 
A. Coordination and Dilemma? 
The contribution of Stefan Oeter to the conference and the present volume 
presents an important starting point for the discussion of customary inter-
national law (CIL). With good reasons, he argues that simplifying ap-
proaches to CIL based on one-shot coordination or dilemma games are 
inapt to reflect the underlying ideas of CIL. Neither can one-shot games 
describe consuetudo (behavioural regularity) nor is it possible to frame the 
idea of opinio iuris sive necessitates (opinion of law or necessity) in a 
simple game-theoretic setting of a coordination or of a dilemma problem. 
From this observation, Stefan Oeter does not infer that game theory and 
rational choice is the wrong methodology to understand CIL but rather that 
more sophisticated game-theoretic approaches are required. In particular, 
he calls for relying on repeated coordination games to describe the social 
dilemma situation in which CIL may emerge and for being very explicit 
about the meaning of opinio iuris in this framework. However, he only 
sketches the basic ideas of a model and does not always make clear wheth-
er such a model should be based on a repeated coordination game or on a 
repeated social-dilemma game, two games which are clearly distinct and 
mutually exclusive in game theory. In the following paragraphs I therefore 
endeavour to present an explicit and more precise model of CIL which 
aims at representing Stefan Oeter’s ideas as much as possible. This may 
alter some of his intermediate arguments, but the results are the same, if I 
understand them correctly. 
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I start by arguing that neither a repeated coordination game nor a repeated 
social-dilemma game may capture the central ideas of CIL, even if one 
assumes random matching of players at each stage game. Adding random 
perturbations to the repeated coordination game will, however, allow me to 
describe a situation in which CIL may become relevant. Looking at the 
choice between strategies according to which countries may behave in such 
a game, I will show that the game has elements of a social dilemma. This 
social-dilemma structure of the game will make it possible to express the 
idea that deviating behaviour should be forbidden in a consistent way. 
Hence, by adding random perturbations to the coordination stage-games, it 
becomes possible to describe both the emergence of a behavioural regulari-
ty (consuetudo) in the coordination game and the dilemma situation re-
quired for the need for legal intervention (opinion iuris) within one model. 
All modelling will neglect public-choice theory and assume that the pref-
erences of the countries’ politicians, who actually make decisions, are per-
fectly aligned with the countries preferences. 
B. Unperturbed Stage Games 
A common starting point for modelling social norms in general and CIL in 
particular are (infinitely) repeated games with random matching of players 
at each stage and common knowledge about the proportions of behaviours 
chosen in the previous stage. The stage game is a coordination game when 
the spontaneous evolution of coordinated behaviour is the core interest, 
and a prisoners’ dilemma (or more general: a social dilemma) when the 
enforcement of cooperation by the threat of long-run defection is the main 
topic. At each stage, exactly one game is played after the players for this 
game are randomly selected from the population. 
This set of models is not capable of modelling CIL, independently of 
whether the stage game is a coordination game or a dilemma game. Let us 
start with repeated coordination games, as defined by Payoff Matrix 1 on 
the following page, and take a brief look at the well-known model of 
evolving coordination. Assume that such a game is played repeatedly by 
two countries randomly selected from the population of countries in each 
period. Every country knows the frequencies by which countries have cho-
sen actions a and b in the past (information may even be given about the 
specific countries, but this is not necessary). If all countries assume that 
other countries’ choice of action exhibits some inertia, then the infor-
mation about past behaviour is a good predictor of future behaviour. Thus, 
as soon as there happens to be a clear majority of countries choosing action 
a, for example, all countries will prefer to choose the majority action, a in 
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the example. The choice of this action will become unanimous; no country 
will ever want to deviate.1 
The very simplicity of the convergence to, and the stability of coopera-
tion described in the previous paragraph is the source of its inapplicability 
to CIL: since no country will ever deviate from the coordination equilibri-
um, the question of whether any deviation would be a violation of CIL will 
never arise. We get consuetudo, but we cannot get anything like opinio 
iuris. 
Turning to social dilemma games such as the Prisoners’ Dilemma in Ma-
trix 2 above, we get the reverse result: the Kaldor-Hicks-optimum reached 
when both countries play action c (which we will call “cooperation”) is 
Pareto-superior to the Nash-equilibrium at mutual choice of action d 
(which we will call “defection”) but all players have incentives to deviate. 
One could thus imagine a rule “you should not deviate from mutual coop-
eration” and reasonably ask whether its violation would be in contempt of 
law, i.e. whether it is a legal rule, which by definition allows sanctioning 
its violation and implies that this sanctioning itself is not a violation of 
law.2 Opinio iuris could thus exist. However, with this payoff matrix at 
each stage game, no country would ever start cooperation, to an even lesser 
extent could a behavioural regularity evolve – we lack consuetudo. 
One might of course argue that the total number of countries is so small, 
that the model of evolutionary game theory, as we used it in the previous 
paragraphs, is inappropriate because random matching is not incompatible 
with repeated play of the stage game amongst the same two players. Recall 
is large enough to allow for more complex strategies than “best response 
against expected behaviour at the current stage”. As a consequence, any 
pair of countries can enter into mutual, complete or partial, cooperation. 
Unfortunately, as it is well known from the Folk Theorem, there is an 
1 As presented here, the model is based on a number of simplifications, such as 
symmetry of the game and restriction to 2×2 games. Obviously, such simplifications 
could easily be replaced by more complex assumptions, but this would not provide any 
further insights. 
2 See Norman and Trachtman (2005), 574 for a similar decisive criterion for turning a 
rule legal. 
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abundance of strategies enforcing such cooperation. And not all strategies 
correspond to each other so that coordination of strategies is required. The 
dilemma game thus turns into a coordination meta-game about choosing 
strategies for the dilemma game.3  
By allowing for repeated interaction among stable pairs of countries and 
by thus allowing the Folk Theorem to work in our model, we have turned 
the game into an n-strategy coordination game. This brings us back to the 
problems discussed at the beginning of this section. However, there is one 
problem more: one of the many possible strategies is unconditional defec-
tion and general obedience to this strategy is one of the many coordination 
equilibria. Unless cooperative strategies start to be chosen in the first in-
stances of the stage game already, there will be a majority of countries 
defecting and thus all countries will coordinate on defection. Again, we 
lack consuetudo. And if we don’t, we are back to the coordination equilib-
rium which does not allow for opinio iuris. 
As a last twist in the discussion of the evolution of cooperation in inter-
national dilemma games, we should consider the possibility of agreeing 
explicitly on a specific set of corresponding strategies entailing self-
enforcing cooperation. For example, two countries could agree to act co-
operatively in every stage of the game and if one deviates, the other should 
also deviate for a predetermined number of stages and return to coopera-
tion if the first country did not again deviate in the meantime. Like many 
other strategies starting with cooperation (e.g., grim trigger, tit-for-tat) 
such penance strategies would induce mutual and continuous cooperation. 
However, when the two countries agree to continuously cooperate and 
even agree on the sanctions in case of deviation, then most lawyers would 
call this a treaty and not CIL. We therefore neglect this possibility in the 
remainder of this comment. 
C. Random Perturbations in Coordination Games 
In the previous section, we have argued that repeated coordination games 
fail to allow for deviation from the equilibrium and hence law cannot be-
come relevant. This changes, if we introduce random perturbations to the 
model. For simplicity, suppose that only for one-sided deviation from an 
equilibrium, payoffs are random numbers and the payoffs in the off-
diagonal cells of Payoff Matrix 1 are only their expected values. The coor-
dination game then turns into the randomized coordination game presented 
in Payoff Matrix 3 on the following page, where tTiJ  stands for the (ran-
domized) temptation of country { }B,AJ∈  to deviate from general play of 
3 Cf. Norman and Trachtman (2005) on this point. 
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action { }b,ai∈  at stage t . A simplifying example which we will use in 
what follows due to its ability to present the central elements of our argu-
ment is that all these random numbers are stochastically independent of 
each other, binary and take value 2  with probability 10/1=p  and value 
3/4−  with probability 10/91 =− p . This implies an expected value of 
( ) 1E iJ −=tT  for all i and J. 
Obviously, this randomization may only become relevant for the countries’ 
decisions, if the countries know the realizations of at least their own pay-
offs. We therefore assume that at each stage t the realizations of tTaA  and 
tTbA  are known to Country A, and 
tTaB  and 
tTbB  are known to Country B 
before they make their respective choices. We assume that this knowledge 
is private information.4 
Again, the game evolves towards either of two equilibria: Either all 
countries most often (namely when their own temptation to deviate is 
negative, 34a −=⋅
tT , i.e., in 90 per cent of all instances) play strategy a, 
and only rarely (namely when their own temptation to deviate is positive, 
2a =⋅
tT , i.e., in 10 per cent of all instances) play strategy b, or vice versa. 
The careful reader may easily prove that these two are Nash equilibria5 and 
4 If the other country also knew the realizations each country would be able to adapt 
to the other country’s temptation and thus guarantee itself a payoff of 1. Only when one-
sided deviation happened to be beneficial to both countries, both countries would get a 
payoff of 2. As a consequence, expected stage payoffs would be slightly less than 1.02 
and thus larger than under perfect coordination. To exclude this possibility from the 
further discussion, we could assume that collection of information about the other 
country’s realizations of random variables is too costly, i.e., it costs at least 0.02 or 2 
percent of the net temptation. 
5 To see that this is a Nash equilibrium, one should take brief look at a country’s 
expected payoffs in the stage game assuming that the other country deviates from the 
generally played action if and only if its temptation to deviate is positive. The country’s 
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that they are evolutionarily stable due to their strictness. When 90 per cent 
of all choices are for one of the actions, one may well be tempted to say 
that this is what countries generally do, or one could even say that choos-
ing this action is the rule. Whether it also becomes a legal rule, i.e., a rule 
of CIL will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
D. Behavioural Regularity or Legal Rule? 
As a preliminary, we note that with this perturbation, the overall expected 
stage payoffs for every country are 88.101.3409.209.181. =⋅+⋅−⋅+⋅ , 
where the 81. , 09. , 09. , and 01.  are the probabilities that the temptation to 
deviate is 2=tiJT  for neither country, only for the country we are looking 
at, only for the other country, and for both countries, respectively, and 
where 1, 2 , 34− , and 1 are the respective payoffs. Obviously, the pertur-
bation has reduced the expected equilibrium stage payoffs. In addition, if 
all countries always followed the general rule, the stage payoff would al-
ways be 1.  
It is at this point of the argument that the interference of a social di-
lemma with the coordination problem, which Stefan Oeter refers to in his 
article several times, becomes relevant: If all countries always acted ac-
cording to the general rule, all were better off in expectations than if all 
violate the rule whenever it is beneficial for them in the short run. Even 
worse, we do not only have this Pareto-superiority of the non-equilibrium 
strategy combination, but every country is tempted to deviate from the 
general rule even if some or all others follow it, because violating the rule 
against a rule follower increases a country’s own expected payoffs from 1 
to 1.121.19. =⋅+⋅  and violating the rule against a rule violator increases a 
country’s own payoff from ( )( ) 8.21.349.1.19. =⋅+−⋅⋅+⋅  to 88. .6 Payoff 
expected payoff from playing the more frequently played action is then =⋅−⋅ 341.19.  
766.  or 1.121.19. =⋅+⋅ , depending on its temptation to deviate from the other strategy. 
Its payoff from deviating is 1.111.349. −=⋅+⋅−  if the country’s own temptation is 
negative and 9.111.29. =⋅+⋅  if it is positive. Deviation from the generally played 
action is thus worthwhile if and only if the country’s temptation to deviate is positive. 
6 Expected payoffs from violating against a rule follower are given by the payoff from 
jointly following the rule when the temptation to violate the rule is negative and the 
payoff from being the only violator when the temptation is positive. Expected payoffs 
from following the rule against a violator are given by the payoff from jointly following 
the rule when the temptation of the other country to violate the rule is negative and by the 
expected payoff from being the sole follower of the rule when the other country’s 
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Matrix 4 summarizes these expected payoffs and elucidates that the choice 
between following the rule as a rule or only when it is opportune exhibits 
the structure of a Prisoners’ Dilemma.  
If not only the author and the reader of these lines but also the involved 
countries understand that the constantly positive probability of temptations 
to deviate from the general rule adds a dilemma problem to the cooperation 
game, then these countries may realize that the general rule of behaviour 
should be a legal rule, i.e., one whose violation may be punished by retal-
iation, possibly in a completely different policy field, without any threat of 
sanctions against the retaliatory act, although the retaliatory act would oth-
erwise be seen as illegal.7  
As a consequence, we may have both consuetudo and opinio iuris sive 
necessitates: A behavioural regularity may evolve spontaneously and be-
fore countries think about the behaviour being legal or necessary. Of 
course, such regularity fails to comprise each and every action, as would 
be the case with an unperturbed coordination game. But this broader un-
derstanding of behavioural regularity as a behaviour which countries ex-
hibit most often, but not always is exactly what we need for understanding 
CIL: Only when a regularity is imperfect, we can reasonably ask and an-
swer whether the regularity has turned into law, viz. customary internation-
al law. 
Unfortunately, the last step of the coming about of CIL and of custom-
ary law in general still seems to be hardly studies in law and economics, so 
far. It is still unclear, how and why individuals or countries adopt the opin-
ion that a regularity exhibited by a large majority is not only a regularity 
but required by law. A nice experiment by Engel and Kurschilgen (2013), 
to which Stefan Oeter refers extensively, elicits that such adoption occurs 
but does not always occur. However, the process of the adoption proper 
seems to be still unresearched and would go beyond the scope of a com-
ment. 
Once opinio iuris sive necessitates has been adopted, the now legal rule 
will be enforced and stabilized in the same way as most of international 
law: sanctioning of violations and toleration of these sanctions by third 
countries. Such enforcement may and probably will be incomplete, but still 
there would be consuetudo and opinio iuris, so that we can reasonably 
speak of customary international law. 
temptation to violate is positive. Expected payoffs from violation against a violator have 
been derived at the beginning of this section. 
7 Cf. the argument supra at footnote 2 and Norman and Trachtman (2005), 574. 
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E. Conclusions 
Stefan Oeter stresses in his article that one should understand CIL within 
the framework of evolutionary game theory while taking care of the com-
plexities inherent to CIL: repeated interaction, spontaneous evolution of 
cooperation and a social dilemma in enforcing such cooperation. In this 
comment, I developed a framework to embrace all these complexities 
which clearly separates the cooperation game underlying spontaneous evo-
lution of cooperation and the social dilemma resulting from randomized 
temptations to deviate from cooperation. What is still open to further re-
search, however, is the adoption of opinio iuris both by early adopters and 
by imitators. 
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Discussion on Stefan Oeter 
summarized by 
José Caiado 
The presentation is an attempt to bring economic analysis to the study of 
international customary law (CIL). It conjectures that CIL deals basically 
with coordination problems, in which cooperation is only possible if in-
formation regarding past behavior is available, and argues that CIL pro-
vides for such information, as each actor in the international community 
can observe and register the behavior of other actors. Important concepts at 
this point are (i) mutual observation, and (ii) its transformation in expecta-
tion of behavior.  
These elements lead to reductions in information and decision costs, and 
fewer securities are needed to invest in cooperation, thereby improving 
efficiency in international coordination. But still, how does that work? 
There is no clear compliance, there is tit for tat retaliation, and there must 
be something else behind this. One could argue, following Guzman, that 
reputation fulfills this role. If a state invests in building social capital, you 
have a trend to avoid actions that affect this social capital represented by 
reputation. To investigate every past behavior of a state would be absurdly 
expensive, so the legal rule provides a cheaper tool to represent those pat-
terns. As a consequence, CIL facilitates coordination between states. This 
is the general outset.  
Discussions followed on the issue of whether the evolution of CIL 
should be understood as a result of passive state interaction, or of “premed-
itated” action by some states trying to impose a certain law over others. It 
was argued that states interested in having their idea prevail over others 
could use two strategies – one is by signing a treaty with a subset of states, 
like the EU and USA signing an agreement and pragmatically forcing oth-
ers to adopt the same standards; the other way is through the use of courts, 
as states respect courts because they know the courts will reach decisions 
that are not fully based on CIL; these elements might explain why strong 
states initially accepted the idea of CIL.  
As a conclusion, the author stressed that it is possible to explain CIL as 
coordination game of long-term interaction. Interaction leads to behavior 
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regularities that in a certain moment lead to expectations, which then facil-
itate transaction by reducing uncertainties about behavior and also lower 
transaction costs. If states accept these expectations, and communicate to 
others, CIL might emerge. 
 
The Economics of Informal International Law – 






Informal international lawmaking is becoming more prevalent. To the ex-
tent it overlaps with the notion of soft law, it has been the subject of nu-
merous debates concerning its effects, its effectiveness, and its legitimacy. 
Soft law and the related move from parliaments to the executive when it 
comes to international cooperation are not new; they have been around for 
a long time. It has also been a problem for a long time. Decades ago, then-
chairman of the United States (US) Senate Foreign Relations Committee J. 
William Fulbright (D-Arkansas) complained: ‘The Senate is asked to con-
vene solemnly to approve by a two-thirds vote a treaty to preserve cultural 
artefacts in a friendly neighboring country. At the same time, the chief 
executive is moving military men and material around the globe like so 
many pawns in a chess game’.1 Similarly, the US Foreign Relations Com-
mittee complained in a formal report in 1969: ‘We have come close to re-
versing the traditional distinction between the treaty as an instrument of a 
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major commitment and the executive agreement as the instrument of a mi-
nor one’.2 
Members of the legislature are thus concerned about potential misuse of 
international agreements by the executive. They fear that international 
agreements could shift power in favour of the executive, and to their own 
detriment. ‘Treaties’ in the sense of Article II of the US Constitution must 
be adopted by a two-thirds majority in the US Senate; ‘international 
agreements’, in contrast, are either adopted by simple majority in both 
houses of the US Congress (both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, e.g., in the case of congressional-executive agreements) or, in the 
case of pure executive agreements, by the US executive alone.3 Although 
‘treaties’ and ‘international agreements’ are, thereby, different for internal, 
US law purposes, public international law does not distinguish between 
them: both are legally binding under international law. In 1972, the Case-
Zablocki Act was passed, which stipulates that the State Department must 
publish the text of any ‘international agreement’ other than a ‘treaty’ (as 
defined under US law) to which the US is a party no later than 60 days 
after having entered into force. All agreements covered by the Act and 
entered into since 1981 are readily available on the Internet, creating a 
very valuable database that covers all international agreements entered into 
by one very powerful country. This chapter analyses all 2,289 agreements 
entered into over the 30-year period, thus making it possible to evaluate 
the use of international agreements in a more systematic fashion than pre-
viously undertaken. 
The dataset enables answering a number of important questions in the 
realm of informal international lawmaking: (1) Has the use of ‘internation-
al agreements’ (as opposed to the more formal ‘treaties’) truly increased, 
as is often presumed? (2) What are the policy areas that are primarily tack-
led by this less formal form of international law? (3) Are international 
agreements used primarily between two States (bilaterally) or by more 
States (multilaterally)? (4)Which actors use international agreements? Is it 
primarily the traditional actors that also enter into treaties, i.e., heads of 
State and/or the foreign ministries, or is this type of lawmaking the arena 
of other ministries or even independent government agencies? 
With regard to the US, our results show that (1) the number of interna-
tional agreements concluded did indeed increase dramatically until around 
2006. Since then, its use has declined almost as dramatically. (2) Around 
two-thirds of all international agreements are concerned with only three 
policy areas: the military, science and technology, and aid. (3) More than 
90% of all international agreements are conducted bilaterally. (4) Around 




 See O. Hathaway (2008). 
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40% of all agreements are concluded by a non-traditional actor on the US 
side, i.e., an actor other than the President or the Secretary of State. Study-
ing data from just one country (the US) does not allow generalisation of 
conclusions, of course, but such a systematic analysis of the practice over a 
30-year period does permit to reveal some interesting insights. A follow-up 
paper comparing the use of international agreements on a cross-country 
basis and explicitly taking potentially relevant institutional factors into 
account that might be causing the cross-country variance is an obvious 
next step. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section B intro-
duces the key terms used in this study. Section C develops a number of 
conjectures concerning the use of informal instruments, which deal with 
the circumstances under which governments prefer, in this particular case, 
international agreements to more formal international lawmaking. Tools 
developed in the field of institutional economics are employed to find an 
answer. Section D describes the practices of the US regarding international 
agreements over the last 30 years. Section E previews possible future re-
search by presenting several conjectures regarding variance in the use of 
informal instruments among nation-States. Section F concludes. 
B. Defining the key terms 
Some governments see the main difference between formal and informal 
international lawmaking as the consequent obligations: formal lawmaking 
creates legal obligations; informal lawmaking results only in ‘moral or 
political commitments’.4 From an economic point of view, this distinction 
is of limited value as it is unclear, at least ex ante, whether there are sys-
tematic differences in the costs of non-compliance with these different 
kinds of obligation. 
Pauwelyn identifies three possible dimensions of informality: the actors 
participating in its creation, the process by which informal law is generat-
ed, and the outcome or output of such process.5 To qualify as informal in-
ternational law (IN-LAW), informality in any of these three dimensions is 
sufficient. He proposes the following definition: ‘Cross-border cooperation 
between public authorities, with or without the participation of private ac-
tors and/or international organisations, in a forum other than a traditional 
international organisation (process informality), and/or as between actors 
other than traditional diplomatic actors (such as regulators or agencies) 
                                                 
4
 See Canada Treaty Information (2011); For a near identical formulation, see also: 
US Department of State (2011). 
5
 See J. Pauwelyn (2012). 
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(actor informality), and/or which does not result in a formal treaty or legal-
ly enforceable commitment (output informality).’6 
In the empirical section below (Section D), the international agreements 
concluded between the US and its partners are analysed. Following Pau-
welyn7, at least some of these agreements can be classified as informal 
international law due to actor informality (around 40% of all agreements 
are concluded by a non-traditional actor on the US side). Giving the term 
process informality a domestic rather than international twist, slightly dif-
ferent from how it was intended by Pauwelyn,8 process informality is also 
present because domestic legislatures do not need to consent to the crea-
tion of certain international agreements, namely so-called executive 
agreements which are adopted by the US executive alone. Moreover, as 
indicated earlier, all international agreements also escape the two-thirds 
majority requirement for treaties (as referred to in Article II of the US 
Constitution), thereby avoiding a formal requirement under domestic law 
and making international agreements also in this sense less formal as com-
pared to treaties. In this chapter, the criterion separating formal from in-
formal international law is, in other words, focused on the domestic pro-
cess used to generate and adopt or ratify these respective kinds of law 
(rather than on whether the instrument is legally binding under internation-
al law; as pointed out earlier, both ‘treaties’ and ‘international agreements’ 
are legally binding under international law). 
I propose to think of various forms of international cooperation in terms 
of governance structures, as proposed by Williamson. Williamson points 
out that exchange cannot only be accomplished by the market (short-term 
on-the-spot cash for goods exchanges contracts) and the firm (i.e., hierar-
chical organisations) but also by an infinite number of hybrids such as 
long-term contracts, joint ventures, and franchise agreements.9 Similarly, 
one can rank-order various forms of international cooperation by their de-
gree of formality. For example, comity, defined as gestures or courtesies 
exchanged between governments of sovereign nation-States, is less formal 
than international lawmaking; indeed, comity does not appear to have any-
thing to do with law at all, and yet its presence can have far-reaching con-
sequences for international relations. The formal ratification of treaties, on 
the other hand, is perceived as the formal creation of international law. The 
                                                 
6
 In an early contribution on the topic, Lipson (1991) suggests thinking of informality 
as a matter of degree and along two principal dimensions: (1) the government level in-
volved in its creation and (2) the form used to generate informal international law (me n-
tioning written documents, the exchange of notes, joint communiqués, oral bargains, and 
tacit bargains). 
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creation of an international organisation (IO) is even more formal yet if 
one thinks of an organisation as a treaty endowed with permanent staff 
who can monitor compliance with its terms and have at least some en-
forcement power. 
To this point, the governance structures discussed are ones that can de-
liberately be created (or, in the case of comity, at least carried out). Cus-
tomary international law (CIL), however, is different: it is never explicitly 
or intentionally created but is instead the consequence of State practice. In 
other words, informal international law can be created purposefully; CIL 
tends to evolve. 
C. Some theory: on the benefits and costs of informal 
international law 
This section discusses the costs and benefits of informal international law. 
More specifically, we are interested in identifying the conditions under 
which governments prefer informal international law over formal interna-
tional law (i.e., formal treaties that need to be ratified domestically) and 
vice versa. Governments are assumed to be rational utility-maximisers. 
Based on insights from the new institutional economics, we deduce a num-
ber of concrete cost-benefit considerations comparing the making of in-
formal international law with more formal treaty making. But first, we 
briefly review Lipson’s work on this topic.10 
Lipson states that informal agreements are more flexible than formal 
ones, make fewer informational demands on the parties, and can be con-
cluded and implemented more quickly than formal ones. Moreover, they 
are less public and less prominent than formal agreements. Consequently, 
they should also be less subject to slack because they can be controlled by 
the (executive) agency that created them, which is equivalent to having a 
shorter principal-agent chain. As a cost, Lipson mentions that they can also 
be more easily abandoned.11 In summarizing his conclusions, Lipson 
writes: ‘These costs and benefits suggest the basic reasons for choosing 
informal agreements: (1) the desire to avoid formal and visible pledges, (2) 
the desire to avoid ratification, (3) the ability to renegotiate or modify as 
circumstances change, or (4) the need to reach agreements quickly.’ 12 
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I.  Differences in transaction costs 
Coase13 was interested in the economic rationale behind the existence of 
firms. Many economists are convinced that markets are the best available 
allocation mechanism, so why are firms founded and why do they survive? 
Coase introduced a cost category known as transaction costs. These are the 
costs of using the market, i.e., the costs incurred in finding interaction 
partners, negotiating contract details with them, and monitoring compli-
ance with the contract. If transaction costs are high but the cost of organis-
ing some activities within a hierarchy are relatively low, then a firm could 
be more cost effective than the market. Transaction costs are also incurred 
in both informal and formal international lawmaking. However, the cost 
differentials between these two forms of cooperation might differ. I pro-
pose a number of relevant transaction cost categories here and combine 
them with a conjecture concerning their relative importance. Analysing 
cost differences between hard and soft law will enable us to make predic-
tions concerning government choices. 
Relevant transaction cost categories include the following: 
Negotiation costs: Given that formal law constrains governments more 
than informal law, governments can be expected to invest more time into 
the precise wording of formal law. We, hence, assume that cf > ci.14 
Ratification costs: Formal law needs to be formally ratified domestical-
ly. Often, many actors need to consent, quite frequently with super-
majorities. None of this applies to informal law, implying that cf > ci.  
Monitoring costs: International agreements are concluded to induce a 
specific behaviour by the contracting parties.15 Monitoring is needed to 
ascertain whether parties comply with the agreements they have concluded. 
Formal treaties are often accompanied by the creation of IOs, one of the 
main tasks of which is to collect information on the behaviour of ratifying 
States. Monitoring is often centralised and its costs shared among States. 
This is, however, usually not the case with informal international law. This 
implies that cf < ci. 
Enforcement costs: The possibility of appealing to a third party in case 
of a conflict over the appropriate interpretation of an agreement is unusual 
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 See R. Coase (1937). 
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 Given that there is no difference between formal and informal law as to their bene-
fits, rational utility-maximisers would opt in favour of informal law. Yet, there might be 
substantial differences in benefits, and these need to be taken explicitly into account 
before a rational decision can be made. It is not excluded that bureaucrats will take the 
same level of care in negotiating agreements no matter whether formal or informal. The 
cost advantage of informal law in terms of negotiation costs might, hence, only be 
miniscule. 
15
 Or, in the event they are already behaving in accordance with an agreement even 
before it is put in place, to make their behaviour more certain. 
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in case of informal international law. Such procedures, however, are often 
a part of formal law. The availability of such procedures implies that cf < 
ci. 
Modification costs: Sometimes agreements have unintended effects and 
at least one partner will want to modify the original agreement. Given the 
higher degree of formality under formal law making, informal law making 
should be less costly in such a case, such that cf > ci. 
Exit costs: If the results attained by an international agreement are com-
pletely unsatisfactory, the parties may desire to abandon the agreement 
altogether. Informal international law would seem to have a cost advantage 
over formal law is such a case, hence cf > ci. 
It is noteworthy that formal lawmaking is conjectured to have cost ad-
vantages regarding both monitoring and enforcement, leading to a hypoth-
esis regarding the choice of lawmaking: ceteris paribus, i.e., under given 
benefits, rational law-makers will prefer informal international law to more 
formal law if neither monitoring nor enforcement cause substantial prob-
lems. This could be the case, for example, if an agreement is self-
enforcing, i.e., there are no incentives for unilateral defection.16 
II.  The choice of law as the choice of governance structure 
According to Williamson, the choice of governance structures should be 
determined by (1) the frequency with which partners interact, (2) the asset 
specificity necessary for carrying out the agreement, and (3) the degree of 
uncertainty present.17 Low frequency combined with a low degree of asset 
specificity would lead to choosing market exchange, whereas high fre-
quency combined with a high degree of asset specificity would lead to uni-
fied governance. The third dimension, uncertainty, becomes relevant only 
when there is a high degree of asset specificity, in which case higher de-
grees of uncertainty would lead to more unified forms of governance.18 Is it 
possible to meaningfully apply these dimensions to the choice of govern-
ance structures in international lawmaking? 
Regarding frequency, Williamson makes a distinction between ‘some-
times’ and ‘regularly’. One could argue that almost all States interact 
sometimes, e.g., at the UN General Assembly and similar meetings. More 
                                                 
16
 See K. Abbott and D. Snidal (2000). They conjecture that formal law reduces the 
transaction costs of subsequent interactions more than informal law. In conjunction with 
our considerations, their argument implies a trade-off: the higher costs of formal lawmak-
ing must be weighed against the lower costs of structuring interactions under it. Hence, to 
identify the optimal choice for a given government, its time preference needs to be taken 
into account. 
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 (n. 9). 
18
 (n. 9), 79. 
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regular interaction could be the consequence of geography; externalities 
could result in higher frequency. It is not obvious how to translate asset 
specificity to agreements between nation-States. One way to think about it, 
though, is to ask whether specific investments by private actors residing in 
the States that agree on some interaction are likely to follow suit. Agreeing 
on a certain standard could be followed by investments that pay off only 
given that the standard will be used. Asset specificity implies a hold-up 
risk, and this risk would be borne by private law subjects residing in the 
interacting States, not by the States themselves. Given that agreements are 
reciprocal, the hold-up problem does not seem that severe, though. 
Given a mixed degree of asset specificity, Williamson argues that for 
partners who interact only ‘sometimes’ trilateral governance would be 
best, whereas for partners who interact ‘regularly’, bilateral governance, in 
the sense of relational contracts, would be optimal. Trilateral governance 
implies drawing on some arbitration or mediation mechanism in case of 
conflict, whereas relational contracts are based on the idea that the rela-
tionship is ongoing and that the net advantages of an ongoing relationship 
do not need to be perfectly balanced at each point in time. 
 
Figure 1:   Efficient governance structures according to Williamson 
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Analogising from the choice of firm structures to the choice of internation-
al law, one could argue that the equivalent of bilateral governance is in-
formal international law, whereas the equivalent of trilateral governance is 
formal law. The choice of either form is primarily determined by the fre-
quency of interaction. Thus, in attempting to explain government choices, 
it might be helpful to take frequency of interaction explicitly into account. 
Comparison of various transaction cost categories as well as comparison of 
factors determining choice of governance structures are both based on a 
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decision-theoretic framework: the acting government assumes its environ-
ment to be exogenously given; hence, strategic interaction is assumed to be 
absent. 
This is somewhat unsatisfactory, however, as international law, both 
formal and informal, is the outcome of an exchange between government 
representatives of at least two countries. Game theory provides an appro-
priate framework for dealing with strategic interactions, and is discussed 
next. 
III.  Mutual cooperation in the prisoners’ dilemma 
There is an important body of literature that deals with the possibility of 
reaching mutual cooperation in the prisoners’ dilemma (PD) in the absence 
of a centralised authority with the power to enforce previously made prom-
ises.19 Information about past behaviour of actors is a crucial factor: given 
that an actor has always behaved as previously promised, they enjoy a 
good reputation that allows them to find partners for interaction in the fu-
ture.20 However, if they have not behaved as promised and provided that 
this is common knowledge, finding partners to interact with will be much 
more difficult. In other words, reaching mutual cooperation in PDs without 
centralised enforcement depends, amongst others, on the availability of 
information regarding the past behaviour of all actors involved. Past be-
haviour can be evaluated only if the agreements the relevant actors have 
entered into are also known. 
IV.  Hypotheses 
I now translate the insights drawn from Coase, Williamson, and the PD 
into several hypotheses. Drawing on Coase, I conjecture that informal law 
is more likely to be used in interaction situations when monitoring and 
enforcement are not a huge problem. 
H1: informal international law will be primarily used in coordination 
games, whereas formal law will be used to deal with games involving a 
higher amount of conflict. 
Assume that all games can be ranked by the degree of conflict inherent 
in them (i.e., from pure coordination to zero-sum games). To solve pure 
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 See e.g., R. Axelrod (1984); A. Greif (2006); P. Milgrom, D. North and B. Weingast 
(1990); A. Guzman (2008). 
20
 Other factors determining the likelihood of managing mutual cooperation are (1) 
the likelihood of meeting again and (2) the time-discount rates of the parties. 
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coordination games, creation of a focal point or a salient solution21 is suffi-
cient as no single actor can benefit from unilateral defection. The incentive 
to defect increases as the conflict element increases; to guard oneself 
against being taken advantage of, States might try to insure themselves via 
more formal deals. 
According to Williamson, regular interaction is a precondition for rela-
tional contracts. Translated into the realm of international law, I conjec-
ture: 
H2: The more regularly the relevant countries interact, the more likely 
are they to resort to informal law to structure their interactions.22 
This hypothesis takes into account that repetition is key to maintaining 
the mutually cooperative solution. The central insight regarding the mutu-
ally cooperative solution in PDs played in the absence of a central authori-
ty is that common knowledge of previous behaviour of the actors is cru-
cial. A low degree of publicness, however, is the norm in informal 
international law. Some of the agreements are not even in writing, which 
limits the degree to which they can be publicly known. This observation is 
the basis of a third hypothesis: 
H3: Due to its limited publicness, informal international law is unlikely 
to structure interaction situations that are characterised by the PD; it is 
more likely to structure coordination games in which there are no incen-
tives for unilateral defection. 
Sometimes, governments have an interest in making their (domestic) 
policy promises more credible: for example, governments trying to attract 
foreign direct investment have a substantial interest in making credible 
their promise to protect private property rights. It is argued that govern-
ments use international agreements to enhance the credibility of their 
promises.23 If that is indeed the government’s goal, then formal lawmaking 
will be more beneficial than informal law as its binding quality is much 
stronger. Credibility can also be signalled by securing the support of many 
domestic veto players in favour of a piece of specific legislation; this can 
be interpreted as a signal of the earnestness of the government’s intentions. 
Since it is less costly to pass informal than formal law, the signal produced 
by informal international law is less valuable than that produced by pass-
ing formal law. 
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 See T. Schelling (1960). 
22
 Abbott and Snidal (n. 16), 448, formulate a similar hypothesis, but based on of a 
different argument. They argue that powerful States are most concerned with delegation 
as it can entail considerable sovereignty costs, which they would prefer not to incur. 
From this it would seem to follow that powerful States prefer soft law ( inter se but also 
with less powerful ones; since they are powerful, they should be able to secure their most 
preferred form of legalisation) but powerless States would agree on hard law inter se. 
23
 See B. Levy and P. Spiller (1994); A. Dreher and S. Voigt (2011). 
 The Economics of Informal International Law – An Empirical Assessment 43 
From this observation, it seems reasonable to expect that States that do not 
enjoy a good reputation – and that thus could be searching for a way of 
making credible commitments – will prefer formal over informal agree-
ments because only the former will build credibility. We would hence ex-
pect that informal law is primarily used as an instrument for coordinating 
behaviour between parties that have long-established ties and whose rela-
tionship can be characterised as well-functioning. 
H4: Governments prefer formal law over informal law if they are inter-
ested in improving their credibility. 
This is a very general hypothesis. I propose to narrow it by highlighting 
specific country types that might have an interest in more formal agree-
ments: 
H4a: Young States are expected to prefer formal lawmaking to informal 
law.24 
H4b: States undergoing extensive transitions are expected to prefer 
formal to informal law. 
Alternatively: 
H4c: informal law will be primarily used by States already enjoying a 
good reputation. 
These hypotheses put a high premium on credibility, but there are situa-
tions making it more likely that young countries will prefer informal law. 
For example, given that highly qualified diplomats are scarce, the lower 
costs incurred by informal international law could well lead some (likely 
younger) governments to prefer informal over more formal law. 
     One way to enforce contracts in the absence of a central enforcement 
authority is by the exchange of collateral or hostages.25 Compliance with 
the agreement is secured because the other party has in its possession 
something valued by the first party. In case of non-compliance with the 
agreement, the other party could threaten to destroy the hostage, sell it to a 
third party, etc. Given that the secrecy of informal law is one of its chief 
attractions, revealing its existence could pose such a credible threat. In 
other words: the secret is the hostage. It would be very interesting to dis-
cover whether, and if so, the consequence of such a threat has ever been 
made a reality.26 
International agreements can be concluded between just two States or 
involve a great many States. Generally speaking, the more States partici-
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 Note that this does not necessarily imply that young States will indeed rely more on 
formal law than older countries. The actual choice is determined by all partners. If the 
hypothesis is correct, however, we should observe an above-average reliance on formal 
law when young countries enter into agreements inter se. 
25
 See A. Kronman (1985). 
26
 Given that the US regularly publishes its informal agreements, we will not be able 
to test this conjecture with our dataset. 
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pate in an agreement, the higher the monitoring costs. Substantial monitor-
ing costs may make it very desirable to set up an international secretariat to 
perform that task. Establishing such secretariats, however, entails a certain 
degree of formality. We thus conjecture: 
H5: Due to increasing monitoring costs, informal law is likely to be 
agreed upon among a limited number of participants, most likely only 
two.27 
This hypothesis may need to be more precise. Both negotiation and 
monitoring costs increase with the number of participants. Thus, the opti-
mal governance structure also depends on which transaction cost category 
grows faster. If negotiation costs grow faster than monitoring costs, it 
could well be that informal law is agreed upon by a number of States larger 
than two. 
International lawmaking can be unpopular with the general public, for 
example, if it is viewed as reducing domestic sovereignty. If this is the 
case, politicians might prefer informal law as long as they think they can 
hide it.28 Similarly, if politicians are interested in not being too strictly 
bound, they might prefer informal over formal law. This might be the case 
if one party had a strong interest in an international agreement, but its 
partner would prefer no agreement at all.29 
H6: Politicians will prefer informal over more formal law if the agree-
ment is unpopular among their constituents. 
Another reason international lawmaking could be unpopular among 
large parts of the population is because it privileges a limited few. If it is 
lobbied for by interest groups that make large donations or confer other 
advantages on politicians, politicians might try to square the circle – i.e., 
staying popular with the voters whilst maintaining the support of specific 
interest groups – by passing agreements that are largely hidden from the 
                                                 
27
 Abbott and Snidal (n. 16), 445, argue the exact opposite. They construct a trade-off 
between many participants and soft law on the one hand, and a small number of partic i-
pants and harder law on the other. Empirical analysis is needed to ascertain which hy-
pothesis is supported by the facts. 
28
 If this does indeed describe politicians’ preferences, the above argument according 
to which publication of a hitherto hidden agreement constitutes a credible threat is appl i-
cable. This sort of action can be described as something such as: this is highly unpopular, 
we only do it because nobody knows, whereas the well-known scapegoat function of 
international agreements works in an almost opposite way: this is highly unpopular, we 
do it because some IO forces us to. The scapegoat tactic is unlikely to be effective in 
bilateral relationships, however. It is more likely to be effective in very firmly estab-
lished multilateral settings such as the EU. 
29
 Indeed, power differences between countries could be a determinant of informal 
law. Assume a weak state is being forced to accept a solution largely unfavourable to it. 
It might only be willing to agree informally, for the very purpose of preventing domestic 
opposition.  
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public. In such a case, informal law will be preferred over more formal 
agreements.30 
The cost of non-compliance could be higher under formal law. Breaking 
a legal obligation is likely to harm one’s reputation more than breaking 
political and/or moral obligations. 
We now turn to situations in which formal lawmaking would seem to be 
more beneficial than informal law. Governments that expect to lose up-
coming elections are assumed to implement measures that may protect 
their own policies against future policy reversals.31 This argument has been 
applied to independent domestic players such as the judiciary: that is, when 
a government expects to lose power, it might increase judicial independ-
ence to reduce the likelihood that the successor government can implement 
far-reaching policy reversals.32 Entering into international agreements 
might also be a way of binding successor governments. Since the binding 
quality of formal law exceeds that of informal law, governments on their 
way out are expected to prefer the former over the latter. 
H7: Governments prefer formal over informal law if they expect to lose 
the next election and they aim at constraining the successor government. 
The political or moral obligation produced by informal law might bind 
only those politicians (governments) that entered into it. Subsequent gov-
ernments might not feel bound by it. This implies that uncertainty regard-
ing the behavioural effects of informal law is higher than under formal 
law. If the reduction of uncertainty in a specific policy area is of para-
mount importance, governments are expected to prefer formal over infor-
mal lawmaking. 
Drawing largely on tools used in institutional economics, this section 
has developed a number of hypotheses regarding the use of informal law. 
In the interests of simplicity, we have assumed throughout that the choice 
is binary: either informal or formal law. However, Abbott and Snidal show 
that the choice can be perceived on a continuum, with obligation, preci-
sion, and delegation as three dimensions.33 
Furthermore, I implicitly assumed that the choice between hard and soft 
law is a choice of substitutes. Kiwit and Voigt show and discuss at consid-
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 Thus, informal law can be conceptualised as the result of successful rent-seeking by 
lobbying groups. This leads directly to the next question: Under what conditions will 
lobby groups opt in favour of informal law and under what conditions will they prefer 
more formal agreements? Answering this question is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
one step in that direction might be to look at an analogous choice in the domestic realm: 
Under what conditions do such groups prefer constitutional law over ordinary law? For a 
treatment of this issue, see D. Boudreaux and A.C. Pritchard (1993). 
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 See e.g., T. Moe (1990); T. Persson, and L. Svensson (1989); A. Alesina and G. Ta-
bellini (1990); G. Tabellini and A. Alesina (1990). 
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 See M. Ramseyer (1994); T. Ginsburg (2002). 
33
 (n. 16). 
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erable length four possible relationships between institutions.34 They can 
have a not only a substitutive relationship, but also complement each other, 
be neutral, or conflict. Shaffer and Pollack have recently focused on this 
last relationship, which they call antagonistic.35 They expect conflicting 
relationships under fragmented legal systems and when important distribu-
tive issues are at stake. 
Finally, we have been relying primarily on a decision-theoretic ra-
tionale, i.e., a single government deciding in isolation about its optimal 
behaviour, and assuming that the decisions of all other actors are exoge-
nously given. In reality, of course, at least two governments need to agree 
on the form of cooperation. In future work, it might be appropriate to give 
more attention to bargaining theory. However, given that the US is a very 
powerful actor, relying primarily on decision theory seems justified here.  
D. Taking Stock 
In Annex C of its Policy on Tabling of Treaties in Parliament, the Canadi-
an government states: “If a matter is of a routine or technical nature, or 
appears to fall entirely within the existing mandate and responsibility of a 
department or agency, and if it does not contain substantive matter which 
should be legally binding in public international law, it is often preferable 
to deal with the matter through the use of a non-legally binding instrument. 
[…] Memoranda of Understanding and similar arrangements can be be-
tween Canada and another sovereign state, but much more commonly are 
between a Canadian Government department, an agency, or a province, or 
other sub-national government, or para-statal organisation, and a similar 
body in another country.”36 
Are these statements indications that informal law has become more rel-
evant relative to formal international law over time? Which actors use it 
most? Is it used more in structuring bilateral or multilateral relationships? 
What are the main policy areas covered by informal law? These are some 
of the questions that will be answered in this section. Ideally, we would 
like to base our answers on the complete stock of informal law in the world 
today. Unfortunately, there is no central database that collects all such 
agreements. Often, informal law is not even systematically collected at the 
country level.37 A systematic analysis of informal law runs into several 
other obstacles, too. Informal law might not be in writing and thus will not 
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 See D. Kiwit and S. Voigt (1998). 
35
 See G. Schaffer and M. Pollack (2010). 
36
 See Canada Treaty Information (n. 4). 
37
 For example, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (2004) stipulates that memoran-
da of understanding are usually not published. 
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show up in any statistic. There is no established convention in terminolo-
gy. Even countries using the same official language might use different 
words to describe it. For example, in English, informal law is variously 
known as a gentlemen’s agreement, an executive agreement, or a memo-
randum of understanding, to name but a few of many descriptions. What is 
more, informal law does not occur only between nation-State governments, 
so even if all these governments had complete databases, we still could 
miss informal law produced by other actors, such as IOs or even non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). 
Given the numerous barriers to analyzing the stock of informal law 
across countries, we decided to conduct a detailed analysis of certain in-
formal international lawmaking activities (as we re-defined above) of one 
single country. We chose the US for a number of reasons. The US passed 
the Case-Zablocki Act in 1972, which requires the Department of State to 
report international agreements to Congress no later than 60 days after they 
enter into force.38 All agreements entered since 1981 are available online, 
making systematic analysis convenient.  39 Additionally, our conjecture that 
young States that have recently undergone fundamental change and have 
not been able to build up a reputation as promise-keepers, are less likely to 
draw on informal international law makes the United States a good choice 
because it holds the record for the world’s longest established, uninterrup t-
ed democracy, and it enjoys an excellent overall reputation. On the one 
hand, this might bias the results in favour of informal international law 
(redefined and narrowed down here to ‘international agreements’ as op-
posed to ‘treaties’); on the other hand, this is likely to give us an unusually 
broad database for analysis. 
There are some drawbacks, of course, to confining an analysis of infor-
mal international lawmaking to a single country. The most serious of these 
is that conjectures as to certain country characteristics cannot be tested 
(e.g., the US is neither young nor has it undergone a substantial transition 
recently, so hypotheses as to those characteristics cannot be tested). Fur-
ther, the Case-Zablocki Act explicitly exempts a number of agreements 
from publication. Among these are ‘specified military exercises’ and 
agreements ‘that have been given a national security classification’, as well 
as a number of coordination agreements (between postal administrations 
and aviation agencies), and agreements involving bilateral assistance for 
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 The text of the Act is available online http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/t/text/text-
idx?c=ecfr&tpl=/ecfrbrowse/Title22/22cfr181_main_02.tpl accessed 19 October 2011. 
39
 The 2,289 items covering the period from 1981 until 2010 do not only include many 
kinds of agreements but also Memoranda of Understanding, agreements, Memoranda of 
Agreements, letters of agreement, arrangements, technical exchanges, protocols, and the 
like. 
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counter-narcotics and other anti-crime purposes.40 Most importantly, it in-
cludes only ‘international agreements’ that are legally binding under inter-
national law, thereby excluding all informal international lawmaking that 
is not legally binding under international law (such as non-binding guide-
lines or standards). 
The first aspect analysed is the number of international agreements pro-
duced annually over the last 30 years. The absolute numbers provide a first 
indication of whether informal lawmaking (in the sense of a shift from 
formal ‘treaties’ to less formal ‘international agreements’) has really so 
dramatically increased as sometimes insinuated. A dramatic increase in 
international agreements did occur following the first half of the 1990s. In 
1995, six international agreements were reported. This number rose to 86 
in 1999 and to 318 in 2006, but fell to only 113 agreements in 2010.41 
This simple series allows us to answer a number of additional questions. 
For example, are Republican administrations more (or less) likely to rely 
on informal law than Democratic-led ones? Since both the rise and fall in 
international agreements occurred during the presidency of George W. 
Bush, no such preference seems identifiable: informal law dramatically 
increased during his first term; most of its decline took place during his 
second term. Between 2003 and 2006, the Republicans had a majority in 
both houses. During this time, passing formal law should have been rela-
tively easy, implying that informal law should have been relatively less 
attractive. But this is not what happened: during the period in which the 
Republicans enjoyed a majority in both houses, as well as there being a 
Republican president, they used more informal law than ever before.  42 
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 The last type of agreement could be motivated by a desire not to make the partner 
government unpopular domestically; hence, its revelation would be a credible threat in 
the hands of the US government. 
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 Frequently, agreements are not posted within the mandated 60-day period. At times, 
the delay can be months or even years. This implies that numbers for the last couple of 
years might need a minor upward adjustment; however, this is unlikely to lead to any 
changes in the trends observed here. 
The absolute numbers might be misleading: if other kinds of international agreements 
have increased at an even faster rate, the relative importance of informal law would actu-
ally have decreased. But comparing the number of informal international agreements 
reported under Case-Zablocki to the number of formal treaties ratified by the US might 
result in a skewed picture as the number of newly-ratified treaties is very low (it ranges 
between two in both 2007 and 2008 and six in both 2004 and 2005). This is also true for 
the number of IOs to which the US belonged in the respective year. Moreover, the IO 
membership data reports a net effect (entry minus exit), whereas our data on informal 
describe raw events. (Data on both treaties and IO membership are taken from A. Dreher, 
(2006).) 
42
 Eyal Benvenisti who commented upon this chapter at a workshop suspects that the 
US National Security Strategy of 2006 is the reason for the turning point. In its report on 
strategy, the US government explains that it seeks partnerships with countries in Latin 
America and the former Soviet Union but also with non-State actors. To be convincing, 
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Figure 2:  Publicly documented ‘international agreements’ by the  
     US between 1981 and 2010 
 
 
Source: Own calculations based on U.S. Department of State (2011). 
 
If governments attempt to use international agreements as a means of bind-
ing successor governments and formal lawmaking is better suited to 
achieve this purpose than informal international law (as hypothesised 
above), informal international law should be relatively less frequent in the 
years immediately preceding elections than in other years.43 The Republi-
cans lost both houses in 2007, so we should have observed relatively less 
informal international law in 2006. Again, this conjecture finds no support 
in the data and Hypothesis 7 is refuted with regard to the US. 
Informal international law could be especially appealing to the admin-
istration during periods when the legislative majority and the president 
belong to different parties. Ratification of formal treaties will be particu-
larly difficult for the administration and it thus might resort to informal 
                                                 
 
the composition of countries entering into agreements before 2006 should be markedly 
different from that after 2006. This is, however, not the case. 
43
 Given the highly debatable assumption that politicians have perfect foresight and 
know who will win future elections. 
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international law. Again, however, the data show no support for this con-
jecture. 
International agreements might be used by the administration not only 
as a tool to circumvent the legislature; it might also be employed to change 
the balance of power within the administration itself. Enactment of formal 
law requires the explicit consent of the minister of foreign affairs; in the 
US, this is the Secretary of State. No such consent is needed in the case of 
informal law. Thus, it is of interest to ascertain what percentage of infor-
mal law is concluded by actors other than the state department. These need 
not be other government departments; they could be independent agencies. 
Our results show that more than 40% of all international agreements are 
signed by an actor other than the traditional ones (namely, the head of gov-
ernment and/or the department of state). In the US, about half of these 
agreements are signed by other departments, another half by others such as 
independent agencies. In other countries, this share is less than one-
seventh of all agreements (13.9%), a difference possibly due to the rela-
tively large number of independent agencies in the US, or because other 
countries have mechanisms making it more difficult for independent agen-
cies to conclude informal law on their own. 
Table 1:  Identity of actors signing informal law
44
 
Informal law signed by US Partner 
Head of Executive 38.1% 40.8% 
Department of State/Embassy 19.9% 15.4% 
Other Ministries 21.7% 29.9% 
Others 20.3% 13.9% 
Source: Own calculations based on U.S. Department of State (2011). 
 
Evaluating these numbers is subject to ambivalence: delegation of compe-
tence is always subject to drift.45 The longer the relevant principal-agent 
chain, the more severe the drift. If independent agencies enter into agree-
ments with their foreign counterparts, they have an interest in the terms of 
the agreement being kept, and drift could thus be expected to be low. On 
the other hand, agreements entered into by independent agencies are far 
from the supreme democratic principals – the citizen-voters. 
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 In the event the agreement involved more than one partner, the first partner was 
coded (less than 3% of all international agreements are concluded between more than two 
parties). 
45
 See e.g., D.R. Kiewiet and M. McCubbins, (1991). 
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Above, it was argued that informal international law is expected to be pri-
marily bilateral, not multilateral. The Case-Zablocki data allow us to test 
this hypothesis on the basis of the agreements entered into by the US. Fig-
ure 3 shows that the overwhelming number of international agreements is 
concluded with just one other party.46 
We are also interested in the geographic distribution of the US partners 
in international agreements. In the theoretical section, it is argued that fre-
quent interactions are likely to be highly correlated with informal law. 
There are many interactions with one’s direct neighbours. There will be 
many issues concerning border-crossing externalities. Therefore, it would 
be less than surprising to find that geographic proximity is correlated with 
a high number of international agreements. 
Figure 3:  Number of countries involved in US ‘international  
  agreements’ (including the US) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on U.S. Department of State (2011). 
 
Based on a delineation that distinguishes between ten geographic regions, 
the region that the US has the most agreements with is composed of West-
ern Europe and North America (including Australia and New Zealand), 
namely, 20.5%. Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican 
Republic) is a close runner-up with 20.4%, followed by Eastern Europe 
and the post-Soviet Union countries (including Central Asia) with 17.1%. 
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 Simple comparisons between the number of bilateral and multilateral agreements 
might lead to a bias picture as a single multilateral agreement could weigh as little as two 
bilateral agreements (if an agreement is concluded between the US and two other coun-
tries) or as much as 200 bilateral agreements (if the agreement is concluded amongst 201 
countries). Weighing multilateral agreements with the number of participants, however, 
does not lead to dramatic changes in the results: the non-weighted percentage of multilat-
eral agreements is 3.15%, whereas the weighted one amounts to 12.68%. 
52 Stefan Voigt 
One of the hypotheses developed in Section C is that frequent interactions 
will increase the propensity to resort to informal international law. Interac-
tions should be most frequent with those countries that share a border with 
the United States: Canada and Mexico. In our dataset, we identified 93 
such agreements with Canada (i.e., 3.7% of the entire sample) and 43 with 
Mexico (1.7% of the whole sample). If we compare these numbers with the 
number of agreements between the United States and two of its major trad-
ing partners – China and Japan – our conjecture seems to find at least some 
support: there are only 35 recorded agreements with China (i.e. , 1.4% of 
the entire sample) and 63 with Japan (2.5%). 
Table 2 
Region Share in% 
Western Europe and North America (including Australia and 
New Zealand) 
20.5 
Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican 
Republic) 
20.4 
Eastern Europe and post Soviet Union (including Central 
Asia) 
17.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 10.6 
North Africa & the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey, 
and Cyprus) 
8.2 
East Asia (including Japan and Mongolia) 7.3 
South Asia 6.5 
Southeast Asia 5.7 
The Pacific (excluding Australia and New Zealand) 1.9 
The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana, and Suriname, but 
excluding Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic) 
1.8 
Source: Own calculations based on U.S. Department of State (2011). 
 
It is also interesting to see in which policy areas most informal internation-
al law falls. Interestingly, Brummer compares the propensity to enter into 
soft law regarding trade issues with that involving finance and develops 
the following claims. (1) Trade liberalisation is fragile; to safeguard it, 
hard law is needed. (2) Financial markets evolve very quickly. Adequate 
regulation of these markets thus also needs to be able to adapt quickly, 
implying that international law on financial issues ought to be soft rather 
than hard. (3) Finance markets are often regulated by independent bodies 
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such as central banks and supervisory authorities; however, these bodies 




Policy Area Share in % 
Military 30.5 
Science and technology 19.9 
Aid 14.7 
Crime prevention and anti-terrorism 7.2 
Economic (goods and services) 6.1 
Foreign relations 5.3 
Transportation 5.3 
Agriculture and environment 3.8 
Culture and education 3.2 
Economic (financial capital) 2.3 
Other 1.9 
Source: Own calculations based on U.S. Department of State (2011). 
 
With regard to the US, we find that almost two-thirds of all international 
agreements falls into three policy areas: military agreements (30.5%), 
agreements regarding science and technology (19.9%), and agreements on 
aid (14.7%). To get a more concrete picture of whether the US uses inter-
national agreements based on a more formal framework (such as NATO) 
or on a more ad hoc basis, comparing the agreements concluded with 
NATO members and non-member countries might be illuminating: only 
8.3% of all military agreements have been concluded with NATO partners. 
If informal lawmaking by U.S. authorities is taken as the basis, then 
Brummer’s conjecture is not confirmed by the data48: according to our 
count, 6.1% of all agreements deal with goods and services; only 2.3% 
involve financial capital.49 
A number of papers show that temporary membership on the UN Secu-
rity Council can be very valuable because the US is willing to support a 
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 On the other hand, these are absolute numbers and to really test the Brummer hy-
pothesis, we would need to analyse the ratio between soft and hard law in both policy 
areas. 
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member country in exchange for voting in line with it on Security Council 
matters.50 Given that informal agreements are rather opaque, we propose to 
discover whether countries receiving any kind of support from the US be-
longed to the Security Council at the time the informal agreements were 
concluded.51 
E. Comparing the stock across countries:  
domestic institutions as determinants of the choice  
between formal and informal law 
Section D provided an overview of all types of international agreements 
entered into by the US over the last 30 years. However, the US is only one 
of many countries, and decisions about entering into either formal or in-
formal law might vary markedly among countries. In this chapter, I only 
develop conjectures on this issue; empirical tests will have to wait for a 
sequel. 
Compare the way two major West European countries deal with infor-
mal law. In Germany, the federal ministries have joint by-laws (ge-
meinsame Geschäftsordnung52), which in §72(1) stipulate: ‘Before interna-
tional law treaties (interstate treaties, memoranda of understanding, 
agreements between ministers, exchange of notes and letters) are elaborat-
ed on and concluded, the ministry in charge must check whether a binding 
contract under international law is irrefutable or whether the same goal 
may also be attained through other means, especially through understand-
ings which are below the threshold of an international agreement.’53 In 
France, a 1997 Circular of the Prime Minister emphasises that arrange-
ments administratifs should be resorted to only in exceptional circum-
stances given their uncertain effects. Moreover, arrangements administrat-
ifs are not even registered by the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
which not only makes monitoring of them by the French legislature very 
difficult but also prevents empirical research into their use in France.  Thus, 
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 See I. Kuziemko and E. Werker (2006). 
51
 Note, however, that at least two possible areas of support are exempt from the r e-
porting requirement: rescheduling of intergovernmental debt payments and some agre e-
ments concluded with USAID. 
52
 See Bundesregierung (2009). 
53
 Author’s translation. The original text reads: ‘Vor der Ausarbeitung und dem Ab-
schluss völkerrechtlicher Verträge (Staatsverträge, Regierungsübereinkünfte, Ressortab-
kommen, Noten- und Briefwechsel) hat das federführende Bundesministerium stets zu 
prüfen, ob eine völkervertragliche Regelung unabweisbar ist oder ob der verfolgte Zweck 
auch mit anderen Mitteln erreicht werden kann, insbesondere auch mit Absprachen un-
terhalb der Schwelle eines völkerrechtlichen Vertrags.’ 
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the approaches to informal law taken in Germany and France seem to be 
completely opposite. Why? This section develops a number of conjectures 
that make these choices – and those taken by other States – understanda-
ble. 
Given that a government desires to enter into an international agree-
ment, its choice regarding formality will depend on the relative costs of 
informal versus formal agreements. Procedures for ratifying formal law 
vary widely among countries. One important cost component is therefore 
determined by the institutional prerequisites for passing formal law. Two 
hypotheses can be derived: 
H1: The higher the number of players that need to consent to ratify for-
mal international law domestically, the higher the proportion of informal 
law. 
Additionally, the majorities required within the respective houses are 
conjectured to have an effect: 
H2: The higher the required majorities needed to ratify formal interna-
tional law domestically, the higher the proportion of informal law. 
The first two hypotheses focus on the institutional structure of a coun-
try. The bliss points of the actors enjoying a majority in the various houses 
are also conjectured to play a role. A higher degree of ideological hetero-
geneity will make it more difficult to reach the required majorities. Hence: 
H3: The higher the degree of ideological heterogeneity among the veto 
players, the higher the proportion of informal law. 
Above, it was mentioned that an advantage of informal law is that it is 
relatively cheap to amend or even abolish. In contrast, amending or abol-
ishing formal international treaties can be very costly. Forward-looking 
politicians might take this into account. Formulated as a hypothesis: 
H4: The more costly it is to abolish formal treaty law (in terms of the 
number of players who have to consent and/or the required majorities), the 
higher the proportion of informal law.54 
States have developed different approaches for dealing with the rela-
tionship between national and international law. In some, both types of law 
are assumed to form a uniform legal order (monism); in others, it is as-
sumed that the two create two different legal orders (dualism). The chosen 
approach could be relevant to the form of international agreements chosen 
depending on whether national or international law commands supremacy 
in case the two types of law conflict. Agreeing on formal international 
agreements is more costly in countries in which international law assumes 
supremacy over domestic law. The corresponding hypothesis reads: 
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 If one assumes that all relevant actors discount the future, the costs of exiting 
should be less important than the costs of ratification. 
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H5: Countries in which formal international law assumes supremacy 
over domestic law will pass relatively less formal international law than 
countries in which the inverse holds, ceteris paribus. 
Passing formal international law can also strengthen a domestic veto 
player, namely, the judiciary. Given that the domestic judiciary has the 
power to apply international law directly, this can imply additional con-
straints for domestic governments. Given that governments do not like to 
be constrained, this would mean that: 
H6: If the domestic judiciary has the power to apply formal internation-
al law directly, a higher proportion of informal law will be used than in 
countries in which the direct application is not possible. 
In the last couple of hypotheses, we implicitly assumed that govern-
ments prefer not to be bound by international constraints. However, this 
assumption might be wrong. Hence, it is important to control for whether 
governments are afraid of losing upcoming elections and thus attempt to 
bind successor governments (see Section C). 
The form of government might also be an important determinant of the 
choice between formal and informal law. In parliamentary systems, the 
executive’s survival depends on maintaining the confidence of the legisla-
ture. This is not the case in presidential systems. This institutional differ-
ence has a number of implications. First, the number of veto players is 
higher under presidential systems than under parliamentary ones. In line 
with the above hypotheses, this implies that we should expect less formal 
lawmaking under presidential systems than under parliamentary ones. 
Formulated differently: 
H7: Cp, presidential systems will resort to informal law more often than 
parliamentary systems. 
If the executive passes a great deal of informal law, i.e., legislates with-
out the legislature’s approval and sometimes without the legislature even 
being informed of it (either before international agreements are concluded 
or even after), the legislature may have an incentive to change this state of 
affairs. Under presidential systems, the executive’s survival does not de-
pend on retaining the confidence of the legislature. Therefore, the execu-
tive can be expected to implement informal law that is not entirely in line 
with the preferences of the legislature. Consequently, the legislature has an 
incentive to create legislation aimed at somehow monitoring the executive. 
Under parliamentary systems, the executive’s survival does depend on the 
continued confidence of the legislature. Therefore, the executive has an 
incentive to take the legislature’s preferences into account when agreeing 
upon informal international law. This leads us to the following hypothesis:  
H8: Cp, legislatures under presidential systems are more likely to pass 
legislation aimed at monitoring informal law-making than are legislatures 
under parliamentary systems. 
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Minnich argues that the type of electoral system can have an influence on 
the propensity of nation-State governments to enter international agree-
ments. He argues that governments under proportional rule systems are 
more likely to enter into such agreements than are governments under first -
past-the-post systems because under the latter, it is unlikely that interna-
tional agreements deliver benefits to specific constituents.55 Assuming that 
this argument is correct, the following hypothesis is offered: 
H9: Governments under MR systems are more likely than governments 
under PR systems to draw on informal law because agreements are less 
visible. 
Above, it was argued that recent transitions of a political system are 
more likely to make its government seek formal, rather than informal, in-
ternational agreements. Various hypotheses can be derived from this: 
H10a: The longer a country has been sovereign, the higher the propen-
sity of its government to resort to informal law. 
H10b: The longer a country has been democratic without interruption, 
the higher the propensity of its government to resort to informal law. 
F. Open questions: possible next steps 
This is the first paper to empirically analyse the choice of informal interna-
tional law. Based on all publicly available international agreements entered 
into by the US since 1981, the main findings are as follows: (1) Informal 
international lawmaking (defined here as the conclusion of ‘international 
agreements’ rather than more formal ‘treaties’ in the sense of the US Con-
stitution) did increase dramatically until around 2006. Since then, its use 
has declined almost as dramatically. (2) Around two-thirds of all interna-
tional agreements are concerned with only three policy areas: the military, 
science and technology, and aid. (3) More than 90% of all international 
agreements are conducted bilaterally. (4) More than 40% of all agreements 
are concluded by a non-traditional actor on the US side, i.e., an actor other 
than the President or the Secretary of State. 
This chapter has answered some questions and given rise to others. 
There are at least five issues waiting in the wings for their chance at centre 
stage. Some of the central characteristics of informal law could be de-
scribed in more detail. Is informal law primarily created to order one-shot 
interactions, or is it created as the foundation for a multitude of single in-
teractions in later periods? Does informal law contain sunset clauses? Does 
it contain rules on how to renegotiate if necessary? Does it contain explicit 
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sanctions in the event of non-compliance? Does it involve reliance on third 
parties for its enforcement? How frequently is it abolished? 
What do we know about compliance with informal law? Are all agree-
ments equally likely to be complied with or are there systematic differ-
ences? 
(1) Can we discern any systematic pattern in the development of infor-
mal law over time? Under what circumstances does informal law constitute 
a first step toward formal law? Under what circumstances does it comple-
ment hard law? 
(2) Section E contains hypotheses that can be tested only on a cross-
country basis, which will entail considerable effort in collecting and cod-
ing data. Two levels can be distinguished here: the first one deals with the 
kind and frequency of informal law being chosen under various institution-
al constraints. The second one deals with attempts to set up institutions to 
monitor informal law in a systematic fashion. 
(3) In this chapter, choice of informal law has been described from a 
decision-theoretic angle. However, informal law is not chosen in isolation 
by any single government; at least two governments have to come to an 
agreement on the issue. Which government will prevail if their preferences 
on soft versus hard law conflict? (For example, in the case of Germany and 
France, who have such opposite views of informal law, which government 
will prevail?). What role do power differences play? If one wants to model 
this as a bargaining game, it might make sense to distinguish between two 
dimensions, namely, content and form. Is soft law a likely compromise if 
one government wants hard law whereas the other would prefer no agree-
ment at all? 
(4) Finally, it is well-known that IOs play an important role in the crea-
tion of international law. (Shanks et al. estimate that IOs are involved in 
some way in two-thirds of all newly-created international law.56) It would 
be interesting to learn more about the ways that IOs are involved in the 
creation of informal law. For example, have IOs established monitoring 
mechanisms to alleviate their own principal-agent problems? Pari passu, 
the same questions could be asked with regard to (International) NGOs. 
Both the analysis contained in this chapter and the proposed next steps 
have been primarily positive. Obviously, important normative issues need 
to be dealt with concerning informal law. These include both the legitima-
cy of informal law, as well as the accountability of those who create it. The 
Case-Zablocki Act can be perceived as one way to increase accountability. 
If a distinction is made between ex ante and ex post accountability, which 
one is more effective? Is ex post accountability sufficient or is there also a 
                                                 
56
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need for ex ante accountability, according to which parliament would need 
to be informed before informal law is created? 
These questions can be answered only after a number of other issues 
have been dealt with adequately. Among them are the costs and benefits of 
non-accountability, and the delineation of policy areas that should be sub-
ject to a high degree of accountability and those for which a low degree is 
deemed sufficient. A very fundamental question is whether a combination 
of a high degree of accountability and informal law even makes sense: 
Could it be that precisely that characteristic of informal law which makes 
it attractive is that its creators are somewhat less accountable? 
There is much to be learned, much to be done. It is hoped that this chap-
ter will provide the point of departure. 
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Comment on Stefan Voigt 
The Economics of Informal International Law – 




The paper by Stefan Voigt provides both an analytical and an empirical 
account of informal international law – with regard to its empirical nature. 
It is the first article on the subject. Chapeau for this achievement! 
The paper defines “informal international law” (avoiding the connota-
tions of “soft law”) by reference to the domestic process employed to gen-
erate, adopt or modify the respective legal instruments. An agreement is 
thus deemed informal if it does not require the consent of domestic legisla-
tors. Although this definition is not without its problems (see infra II.), it 
may serve as a starting point for further analysis. 
The first part of the paper provides an analytical explanation of informal 
international law and it does so through the “lens” of transaction costs and 
new institutional economics. The starting point for this analysis is quite 
straightforward: if (political) actors may choose between different instru-
ments of international law (formal and informal) and if these choice pat-
terns differ (either over time or depending on the subject matter involved), 
the economist will explain these shifts in terms of the differences in the 
underlying costs and benefits. The paper goes beyond a mere (i) transac-
tion cost perspective, employing the tools of (ii) governance structure 
analysis in the Williamson sense and also looking to the (iii) substantive 
characteristics of the underlying choice settings, namely their prisoners’ 
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dilemma or coordination game structure. Whereas the legal literature1 has 
also explained the growing importance of “soft law” with reference to the 
transaction costs involved, to adaptability, to flexibility and to the potential 
for confidence building, all this has been done in very general terms. The 
paper by Professor Voigt goes far beyond such conceptual reasoning and 
formulates, in the light of this analytical approach, a whole set of concrete, 
testable hypotheses. 
The empirical part of the paper is not immediately connected to these 
hypotheses. It addresses the issue from the somewhat different angle of the 
data set of (informal) US international agreements2, as published under the 
Case-Sablocki Act of 1972. Despite the obvious limitations of any such 
analysis (one country, one institutional background, limited time period, 
etc.), the data set allows for some informative, perhaps even puzzling re-
sults. Among those is the finding that the production of informal interna-
tional law per annum rose between 2002 and 2006, peaked in 2006 and 
declined sharply thereafter. These figures are intriguing all the more since 
both the sharp increase and decrease of newly approved international in-
formal commitments occurred during the George W. Bush administration. 
The paper also shows that the largest portion of these informal internation-
al instruments falls within three categories only (military, science and 
technology, and aid). The paper also presents a breakdown of these agree-
ments by region of the contracting partner, showing the “western coun-
tries” in the lead, closely followed by Latin America, and the Asian coun-
tries lagging far behind. 
The paper promises to pursue and refine its pioneering analysis in sub-
sequent follow-up work. 
B. Key Features from Voigt  
The paper tackles an important legal phenomenon and deserves credit for 
its attempt to systematically study the underlying costs and benefits and to 
provide a first empirical assessment. Let me consider a few aspects that 
may deserve further reflection; first to the legal questions involved, second 
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 See, e.g., Hafner, The Effect of Soft Law on International Economic Relations, in: 
Griller (ed.), International Economic Governance and Non-Economic Concerns (2002) 
149, at 160 et seq. 
2
 As to be distinguished from “treaties”. 
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I. Legal Questions 
First, with regard to the distinction between formal treaties and informal 
agreements, the paper relies on the involvement of the legislator in the law 
production process. It seems, however, that this criterion is not ideally 
chosen.  
Historically, the “treaty-making power” was perceived as an essential 
part of the executive branch of government (in earlier times, the king’s 
monarchic powers), and as such it did not require any parliamentarian in-
volvement. Most of the pertinent constitutional developments of the last 
150 years revolve around the constitutional “taming” of these executive 
powers. The bottom line of this development was to require parliamentari-
an approval if the respective international acts, in substance, amount to 
law-making in the material sense.3 In that regard, one can also speak of an 
elimination of a “democratic deficit”. This constitutional development 
overlaps with a further – albeit distinct – conceptual development, namely 
that of “dualism”. This concept sees international law and “inner-state 
law” as two separate bodies of law, such that provisions of international 
agreement require some (not necessarily step-by-step) translation into na-
tional law to become mandatory on this level as well. 
Having said that, international agreements conceptually require the in-
volvement of the lawmaker only to the extent that they, in substance, touch 
upon lawmakers’ issues. The paper makes it clear that international agree-
ments may be concluded by the executive branch alone in two different 
cases. On the one hand, “executive agreements” do not require the legisla-
tor’s involvement if they remain “underneath” the level of the lawmaker 
(covering only issues of an “administrative nature”). On the other hand, 
legislators’ consent may not be needed because the respective covenants 
are, in substance, too soft to be considered law.4 Note that in the first case 
these international agreements can be very detailed and technical, as is the 
case with many of the so-called “administrative agreements/acts”. It is 
perhaps not obvious why these agreements are also considered “informal” 
for the purposes of the paper. 
The above question is not only a terminological one, but the constitu-
tional checks and balances at issue reflect the underlying “principal-agent” 
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 It shall therefore not come as a surprise that also historically the early cases of par-
liamentarian involvement in the conclusion of treaties has concerned those instances, 
where the treaties were likely to affect basic constitutional liberties of the constituency 
(liberty, property). This idea was more generalised in the French constitutions of the 
French revolution and the Belgian constitution of 1831 that required consent by the pa r-
liament, if the international treaty imposes burdens either on the state or on any of its 
citizens. 
4
 Still, the legislator may decide to enact provisions under national law to comply 
with the non-binding rules of soft law agreements, as is de facto very often the case.  
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relationship between the parliament and the executive branch. In particu-
lar, it has been stressed in the literature on the subject that soft law pro-
vides a tool for the executive to escape the otherwise required internal pro-
cedures of seeking legislators’ consent5. 
Moreover, the exact borderline between formal and informal agreements 
may be questionable to the extent that the constitutional framework pro-
vides for different degrees of legislators’ involvement. The paper itself 
refers to Article II of the US Constitution whereby a “treaty” in the formal 
sense requires a 2/3 majority of the Senate. However, this does not mean 
that for all other “international agreements” there would be no involvement 
by the legislator. American constitutional law knows a further category of 
international agreements that (albeit seemingly counted as “informal” in 
the paper) require a simple majority of both the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives. 
A further, albeit distinct, aspect of these constitutional checks and bal-
ances concerns the question of whether the executive branch is empowered 
to sign constitution-amending agreements (which would, of course, require 
the approval of the lawmaker). Austrian constitutional law has changed in 
this respect (in 2008) and has shifted material powers to the legislator. 
Whereas under the previous constitution, the (here: constitutional) law-
maker was reduced to a veto-role after the conclusion of the treaty (name-
ly, to approve or not to approve), the amended rules provide for prior con-
stitutional change by the lawmaker. On the basis of the thus amended 
constitution, the international agreement (no longer constitution changing 
in itself) may well be concluded. 
II. Analytics 
Second, to the analytical part. Whereas it seems straightforward to develop 
the hypotheses, as presented in the paper, based on a broadly-conceived 
transaction cost perspective, it seems less obvious whether a “market ver-
sus hierarchy” view can add too much. With regard to international infor-
mal law, hardly any agreement concerns a “spot market exchange” in the 
sense of an immediate one shot interaction. Both formal and informal 
agreements typically concern ongoing interaction and obligations (“Dau-
erschuldverhältnisse”). Moreover, it seems unclear whether the primary 
research question should be whether states with a higher frequency of in-
teraction shift to informal instruments of international law, but rather why 
the same states (with a given frequency of interaction) choose formal in-
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 See, e.g., Schreuer, Die innerstaatliche Anwendung von internationalem “soft law” 
aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht, Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht und 
Völkerrecht 34 (1983) 243. 
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struments to govern certain international topics on some occasions and 
informal instruments on others. 
III. Empirical Findings 
As for the empirical part, the most puzzling result is seemingly the sharp 
increase and sharp decline of newly approved informal agreements under 
the Bush administration. Of course, it would be interesting to compare 
these figures with those for formal agreements to check for a similarity of 
movements. Even considered in themselves, however, the figures appear 
ambiguous. It seems as if the respective numbers reflect the newly con-
cluded agreements, not the aggregate figures. In this light, it is certainly 
possible (depending on whether some agreements had expired) that the 
number of informal agreements increased through the entire period and 
that figures simply show a decline in the growth rate, not a decline in the 
absolute number. Such a flattening out of the growth rate would not come 
as a surprise in a second presidential term. The new government may have 
entered office with new priorities and may have concluded most of the 
envisaged agreements already during its first term; in this respect, the sec-
ond term may basically cover follow-up agreements and a certain number 
of new issues, altogether being of minor quantitative importance. 
A further point: multilateral agreements and decisions by international 
associations/organisations are, at least to some extent, functional substi-
tutes. The same countries may, for example, deal with a certain issue, un-
der regular international law by multilateral agreement or on the European 
institutional level by the respective (formal or informal) instruments. The 
number of (formal and informal) international agreements may, therefore, 
depend on the availability of institutional alternatives under the respective 
association or organisational structure. 
C. Conclusion 
Finally, a word on the paper’s focus on bilateral agreements. This focus is, 
at least from a lawyer’s perspective, somewhat surprising. Informal inter-
national law is predominantly a phenomenon of multilateral agreements 
and international organisations, not so much of bilateral agreements. Soft 
law instruments cover a huge spectrum of acts/documents, inter alia reso-
lutions of international organisations (or even international conferences), 
declarations, statements, conclusions, and recommendations.6 One may 
only think of the various recommendations in the framework of the OSCE 
                                                 
6
 See, e.g., Hafner ibid, also for possible reasons for soft law; and Schreuer ibid. 
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or the framework of the WTO dispute settlement procedures. The reasons 
for the adoption of informal rules (“soft law”) in multilateral environments 
are manifold, but they have to do with the specific functional task of inter-
national law between politics and power. Soft law instruments are there-
fore, for example, used to direct the international communities’ attention to 
new problems, to express concern about them, to change certain basic rules 
of international relations, to test the acceptance of certain rules, to demon-
strate opinio iuris or even to specify pre-normative rules with the prospect 
of development into binding rules.  
It seems worthwhile to extend the analysis developed in this paper to 
these phenomena as well, since the organisational features of these instru-
ments allow for an even more immediate application of the respective 
transaction cost-based and governance structure-based analysis. A pursuit 
of the paper with a particular focus on the soft law of international organi-
zations is, therefore, not only welcome, but highly promising. 
Discussion on Stefan Voigt  
The Economics of Informal International Law – 
An Empirical Assessment 
by 
Christoph Kimmerle 
The discussion of “The economic analysis of international law making – an 
empirical assessment” mainly involved comments on the following issues: 
the conceptualization of the term “soft law” in the paper, the empirical data 
set chosen, the overall relevance of soft law in the international sphere, and 
the use of transaction cost theory. 
During the discussion, several participants described alternative options 
for defining the term soft law and argued that the definition proposed in 
the paper could be improved in terms of conceptual clarity. Contrary to the 
author’s argument that most (US) soft law works on a bilateral basis, some 
participants argued that soft law is mainly employed in multilateral coop-
eration. Accordingly, soft law was seen as an instrument mainly used by 
international organizations. The international organizations turn to soft law 
in the form of written standards to overcome the coordination problem 
while allowing them to benefit from the flexibility and changeability of-
fered by these softer agreements. Generally, the question arose which kind 
of agreements could be qualified as belonging to the category of soft law. 
Some participants argued that, in their view, the US Executive Agree-
ments, in the paper defined as falling into the realm of soft law, actually 
classify as hard law. They came to this contrary assessment because these 
agreements were seen to be binding international treaties from an interna-
tional law perspective. 
In the course of the discussion, attention focused on the empirical basis 
of the paper. The participants asked whether the three policy areas in 
which executive agreements were mainly employed had something in 
common. In addition, one participant found that the present incentives 
would also merit closer attention: he wondered whether the tendency of the 
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US executive agreements between 2000 and 2006 could also be explained 
by other surrounding conditions specific to this time span. The participants 
then asked whether soft law in contrast to hard law might be an instrument 
predominantly used by developed democracies as opposed to dictatorships. 
They reasoned that this could be due to the fact that the legal foundations 
of longstanding democracies such as the US are more developed, so that 
soft law might be perceived as a tool to fill the remaining gaps. Moreover, 
a country-by-country comparison was suggested to identify the actual rele-
vance of soft law in the US compared to other countries. 
One attendee then addressed the question of whether soft law really 
could be seen as less politically relevant. It was argued that at least for 
some soft law, for instance in case of particular technical standards, this is 
not the case. These soft laws, although non-binding, usually have a great 
impact on state behavior. (The author replied that his paper asks why the 
term soft law has become so popular recently and does not analyze the po-
litical impact of different types of soft law or of soft vs. hard law). Another 
attendee argued that the mentioned principal-agent relationship between 
the legislative and executive branch only holds if treaty making were to lie 
within the powers of the former. However, in his point of view, this is not 
the case as international treaty making actually falls within the realm of the 
executive branch. 
The discussion then turned to the application of transaction cost theory 
in hypothesizing the employment of international soft law. One participant 
asked for the meaning of modification costs. His understanding of modifi-
cation costs was in terms of the difficulties in changing softer law. The 
author’s reply was that the category of modification costs in the paper ad-
dresses the procedure of ratification, i.e., if ratification is needed, modif i-
cation becomes relatively costly. Another attendee was interested in the 
actual relevance of the different categories of soft law in more general 
terms. He questioned the explanation of diverging degrees of legal impact 
due to the classification into different categories of law. Additionally, he 
was interested in existing empirical evidence of the explained phenomena. 
Moreover, he discussed the interaction of the different types of transaction 
cost. In particular, he wondered whether cases exist in which a relative 
decrease (or increase) in one specific category of transaction cost had led 
to an increase (or decrease) in the use of informal cooperation. Additional-
ly, this participant suggested thinking of law-making as a specific invest-
ment. He also concluded that the more specific such an investment, the 
greater the likelihood of the relevant actors to turn to relatively harder law.  





With technological advancements, the frequency of global data processing 
has increased dramatically in recent years and the amount of personal data 
that crosses national borders has increased significantly as well. As tech-
nology advances, there is a growing concern related to the collection and 
use of personal data and there also is a growing need to provide adequate 
protection to personal data and privacy.1 Addressing issues on data privacy 
requires a multi-disciplinary approach involving various stakeholders with 
divergent interests.  
Perhaps reflecting the growing need to address data privacy issues, a 
growing number of countries have recently enacted or amended their laws 
and, in some other countries, active debates are taking place with proposed 
legislative bills.2 Indeed, considering the pace of innovations and techno-
* Professor, Seoul National University School of Law, Korea. The author is grateful 
for the helpful comments received from the participants at the Travemünde Symposium 
on the Economic Analysis of Law, at Hamburg Lecture, and at ETH Zurich seminar, and 
in particular from Prof. Dr. Michael Fehling. The author is also thankful to Alan Lee and 
Sangmin Lee for their valuable research assistance. A slightly revised version will appear 
in the Asian Journal of Law and Economics. This research was supported by the National 
Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2012-
S1A5A2A0-1016128). 
1 Several terms are used to refer to similar issues. ‘Data protection’ is the term that 
tends to be used more commonly in Europe, while ‘privacy’ tends to be used more fre-
quently outside Europe. Some other terms are also used such as ‘data privacy’ and ‘in-
formation privacy’. ‘Data protection’ and ‘privacy’ do not necessarily have the same 
meaning, although there is a significant overlap. See, for comparison of these terms, 
Kuner (2011), 10; Bygrave (2010), 166. For the purposes of this article, there is no need 
to distinguish these terms. In this article, the term ‘data privacy’ is used. 
2 Kuner (2009), 301, estimates that there are approximately 50 to 60 countries with 
laws on data privacy issues. This estimate is regarding the situation around 2008, and the 
number would be considerably higher today.  
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logical developments, it is perhaps inevitable and indeed necessary not 
only to promulgate laws and regulations in relevant areas but also to revise 
them on a regular basis. Significantly, in early 2012, regulators in both the 
E.U. and the U.S. announced major reform proposals to streamline and 
overhaul existing laws and regulations in their respective jurisdictions.  
These legislative and reform activities obviously reflect the recognition 
on the significance of issues related to data privacy in many countries and 
jurisdictions. A natural ramification of these legislative and reform efforts 
would be the vulcanization of laws and regulations on data privacy. Vul-
canization would be problematic in many areas of law but it could be espe-
cially problematic in the area related to data privacy due to the inter-
connected and open-ended nature of the Internet. With the increasing use 
of cloud computing, which requires using data and other resources located 
in many different parts of the world, the problem would become even more 
serious, as data processing and computing activities would constantly and 
simultaneously take place in multiple jurisdictions.3  
At the same time, it is not clear if most of these laws and reform pro-
posals were prepared based on a thorough and careful examination of the 
actual behaviour of Internet users and data subjects. There is also a lack of 
systematic understanding as to how data controllers acquire data and how 
they use or analyze the data. This article thus calls for careful review and 
examination regarding the behaviour of data subjects and also about data 
controllers’ use of data. It is argued that information asymmetry and uncer-
tainty surrounding data subjects and their information is a main cause for 
the problem and that a systematic understanding of the ‘life-cycle’ of the 
information gathered from data subjects should take place before serious 
discussions are made about various reform efforts.  
 More fundamentally, it is noted that the fragmented nature of legisla-
tive, administrative, and enforcement activities on data privacy could hin-
der the free flow of legitimate information and that an enforcement activity 
could easily have far-reaching repercussions beyond a jurisdiction’s 
boundary. Thus, over-regulation could be a problem in certain situations, 
while under-regulation or the lack of regulation could be a problem in cer-
tain other situations. This article therefore argues for international coopera-
tion and harmonization on data privacy. A simple analytic framework is 
3 Using resources located in multiple jurisdictions would raise a difficult legal and 
regulatory issue. A more difficult problem, however, would be that it may not even be 
possible to delineate the location of specific data. This is because a cloud service provid-
er may make decisions instantaneously and, if and when needed, may move information 
instantly among different pieces of equipment located in different jurisdictions. Under 
this environment, identifying specific locations or jurisdictions which carried out differ-
ent tasks as part of a specific data processing work could be an overly strenuous and 
burdensome process. On cloud computing and data privacy in general, see Gellman 
(2009). 
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presented and it is shown that the fragmented enforcement mechanism 
would result in regulators’ failure to recognize all relevant costs and bene-
fits. 
A first step toward international harmonization and cooperation could 
be to establish a coordinated mechanism for gathering facts and for con-
ducting analyses regarding data subjects and the information gathered 
about them. Given the significance of issues, however, it would be more 
important to establish a mechanism for more substantive harmonization. 
Thus, the article examines and discusses possible options for international 
cooperation and harmonization. These options would range from a simple 
mechanism for information sharing to a significant cooperation to develop 
a substantive international norm or standard. 
The article proceeds as follows. In Section B, tracking technologies that 
are currently used by companies are introduced, with brief discussions on 
the use of the information gathered through tracking. In Section C, regula-
tory responses regarding data privacy issues are summarized, focusing on 
the responses in the E.U. and the U.S. Then, in Section D, it is discussed 
why international cooperation and harmonization would be needed. In Sec-
tion E, possible options for international cooperation and harmonization 
are reviewed. Section F provides conclusive remarks. 
B. Online Tracking 
There are various ways through which companies acquire information on 
their customers and their website users.4 Among these, tracking technolo-
gies used on the Internet are some of the most rapidly changing technology 
areas and are subject to constant controversy. As such, it is helpful to un-
derstand how tracking works and what companies do with the information 
that they acquire through tracking. 5 Below, some of the currently used 
tracking technologies are introduced, including cookies, which is one of 
the most commonly used tracking technologies. Then, companies’ use of 
the information is discussed.6  
4 Different issues arise when companies and individuals involuntarily lose and trans-
fer their information through illicit or even illegal means such as hacking and other data 
security breaches. This article does not explicitly deal with these security-related issues.  
5 A main focus of this article is on websites serving as portals and providing services 
including search, e-mail, e-commerce and social network services. Data privacy could of 
course be an important issue in other contexts as well. For example, see Schwartz (2009) 
for a case study of data privacy issues at several different types of large international 
companies. 
6 See Tene (2010) for discussions of current technologies which have data privacy 
implications. Tene and Polonetsky (2012), 288–307, discuss tracking technologies more 
specifically. For an account of the actual technological methodology employed by 
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I. Tracking Technologies 
In this section, illustrative explanations are made about certain tracking 
technologies that are often used in practice. The technologies mentioned in 
this section are not exhaustive in any sense. It is important to remember 
that technologies change constantly and new tracking methods become 
available on a regular basis. 
1. Cookies 
Cookies are the codes which command users’ computers to send certain 
user information. Cookies, stored in users’ computers in a text file format, 
improve user experience and play a crucial role in making online transac-
tions possible.7 For instance, in online transactions, cookies store shopping 
carts and log-in information. Cookies may, however, also store many other 
types of information that a user may not want to divulge. Doing so is pos-
sible because cookies can easily store a user’s information related to 
his/her visit to a particular website, including, among others, the time of 
the visit, user’s IP (Internet protocol) address, specific pages visited in a 
website, and search queries, if any.  
There are several categories of cookies. ‘First-party cookies’ are the 
cookies which send cookie information exclusively to the server that has 
initially sent the cookies. On the other hand, ‘third-party cookies’ or 
‘tracking cookies’ may send cookie information to the servers that have 
not sent the cookies. In the case of third-party cookies, all websites affili-
ated with a network (e.g., an advertisement network) would share certain 
part of the information that they obtained through their cookies. More 
broadly, several networks could share cookie information together, and 
doing so is called ‘cookie synching’. Obviously, as more companies share 
users’ information, it will be increasingly difficult for users or other out-
siders to control dissemination and use of the collected information. 
Use of cookies is fairly widespread and cookies are a commonly used 
tracking technique. Compared to other tracking techniques, however, users 
can also easily control whether to allow the use of cookies, usually through 
a simple manipulation of the settings on their Internet browsers. By doing 
Google, see Google’s letter to French regulator, Commission nationale de l’informatique 
et des libertés (CNIL), dated April 20, 2012, which was sent in relation to Google’s pro-
posed amendment of its privacy policy, available at https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B8sy 
aai6SSfiSUhFMHVpMmhFUG8/edit?pli=1. 
7 These cookies are more precisely called HTTP cookies. They are different from 
Flash cookies (discussed below). See Debusseré (2005), 73–79 for legal issues related to 
HTTP cookies in the E.U.  
                                                 
 
 Law and Technology of Data Privacy: A Case for International Harmonization 73 
so, users can delete the information stored in cookies, or can delete or dis-
able cookies altogether. This can often be done by a few clicks. However, 
not many users do change their browser settings.8  
The following diagram illustrates how cookies work. First, using an In-
ternet browser, a user makes a HTTP request for a website. Then, when the 
website’s server sends the contents of the requested website in response to 
the request, cookie information is sent together in the set-cookie field of 
the HTTP response message. Third, the Internet browser, recognizing the 
information in the set-cookie field, stores the cookie in the user’s computer. 
Fourth, in the event that there are subsequent requests, additional cookie 




8 See, for instance, McDonald and Cranor (2010), 11–15. It is not clear why there are 
not many users who control the use of cookies. Part of the reason would include the in-
convenience that would be incurred by deleting the cookies since user name(s) and other 
useful and convenient information could also be deleted when cookies are deleted. On the 
other hand, users’ lack of information or behavioural inertia could be at work as well. If 
the latter is an important reason, then how to set the default on the use of cookies for 
Internet browsers also becomes an important issue. 
Browser Server 
GET /index.html  
HTTP/1.1 
Host: www.example.org 
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2. Other Tracking Methods  
While cookies are commonly used for tracking, there are other tracking 
methods, of course. Some of these methods are summarized below. 
(a) Flash Cookies. Flash cookies, which are also called as ‘local shared 
objects’, refer to cookies that utilize the Flash Player. In functionality, they 
are similar to HTTP cookies and store user preferences and other infor-
mation. These cookies, however, are capable of carrying much more user 
information than HTTP cookies. Further, they are in general more resilient 
and are harder to delete.9 
 (b) Browser Fingerprinting. Browser fingerprinting is a technique 
which is used to enable identifying and tracking a user through a combina-
tion of various elements of user information such as operating system, 
browser type and version, plug-ins, and languages. Small pieces of infor-
mation about users may be trivial and may have little value by themselves, 
commercial or otherwise. With a combination of these small pieces of in-
formation, however, users may be identified and tracked. From users’ per-
spective, there could be additional concerns since it is in general very dif-
ficult to detect and control browser fingerprinting. 
(c) Deep Packet Inspection. Deep packet inspection is a method of in-
specting contents of Internet usage of a user. Initially this method was used 
by Internet service providers for security and maintenance reasons and for 
the management of Internet traffic. If access is granted, however, advertis-
ers could obtain extremely detailed information through this method about 
a user’s activities on the Internet. 
(d) Web Bugs. A web bug is an object embedded in a website or e-mail, 
which allows monitoring of user behaviour such as whether a user viewed 
the website or checked his/her e-mail. Using a web bug, certain infor-
mation on computer usage can be gathered, including, among others, the 
date and time of access to a particular website, the information as to 
whether a particular webpage or e-mail was accessed, the IP address of the 
computer, and the type of the web browser. 
 (e) Tracking for Mobile Devices. Compared to the ‘desk-top’ or ‘note-
book’ environment, widespread use of mobile devices, in particular so-
9 Flash cookies will not be erased by erasing HTTP cookies, and their whereabouts 
may not be obvious to a casual computer user. There were even allegations that Flash 
cookies could sometimes restore deleted HTTP cookies. See Ayenson et al. (2012) for a 
survey regarding the current tracking use of Flash cookies as well as certain other local 
storage devices such as ETags and HTML5. A data privacy concern regarding the devel-
opment of new local storage devices and other technologies is that they in general collect 
and store a large amount of information and that, moreover, there may be little transpar-
ency and control granted to users in the process of collecting and storing information. In 
response to user complaints and lawsuits related to this resilience and intrusiveness, 
Adobe Systems has made some changes to the functionality of Flash cookies. 
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called ‘smart phones’, presents a new set of additional issues related to 
tracking. First, users typically carry mobile devices at all times and the 
users’ whereabouts could constantly be located. Location-based services 
provide various benefits to users which were previously not available but, 
at the same time, location tracking raises a new layer of privacy concerns. 
Second, mobile devices usually contain extensive personal information 
such as the user’s personal contacts. Thus, unwanted disclosure of personal 
information contained in a mobile device could have even more serious 
ramifications. Third, use of mobile application software (so-called ‘app’) 
does not require Internet browsers and, for general users, it is more diffi-
cult to make an informed consent about privacy policy when downloading 
an app. More generally, considering the technical, physical and other envi-
ronments that a user would be in when using a mobile device, it would 
often be very difficult for a user to read a notice on data privacy policy and 
to give a genuine informed consent. These additional issues make tracking 
of mobile devices a more delicate and sensitive problem. When it comes to 
tracking and data privacy, it can be said that, with mobile devices, the level 
of transparency is in general fairly low, and that user control is very diffi-
cult and limited. 
II. Use of Tracked Information 
Information gathered through tracking is extremely valuable for companies. 
In particular, for marketing and advertisement purposes, it provides a rich 
source of information regarding their current and prospective customers. 
After analyzing the user information, companies could send targeted and 
tailored advertisements, which would result in heightened effectiveness.10 
Companies can also easily conduct experiments on different advertisement 
methods and can measure their effectiveness. Tracking, in essence, func-
tions as a key pillar for the advertisement-based Internet social network 
and portal ecosystem.11 
10 See Goldfarb and Tucker (2011) for an analysis of the impact of the E.U. e-Privacy 
Directive on advertising performance, showing that companies’ ability to send targeted 
advertisements can enhance their effectiveness dramatically. 
11 A related concern is that, with the information on customers’ purchase history, 
companies may engage in dynamic or discriminatory pricing behaviour, which can be 
referred to as a form of ex post opportunistic behaviour. For instance, in a well-known 
notorious example, Amazon.com was criticized for charging different prices for a same 
item between a known visitor and an anonymous visitor, a practice which the company 
swore that it would discontinue. D. Streitfeld, ‘On the Web, Price Tags Blur: What You 
Pay Could Depend on Who You Are’, Washington Post (September 27, 2000). Today, 
certain online retailers take advantage of the software which enables them to offer different 
prices to different customers based on their analysis of prospective customers’ online activi-
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1. Tracking and Analytics 
Tracking is used by companies to enable and/or to facilitate their provision 
of services. To a certain extent, tracking is necessary and often desirable in 
the context of Internet transactions. This is so because tracking allows re-
tention of the information that is necessary for transactions to take place 
such as the information on log-in, shopping carts, and billing. Tracking 
also makes it possible to provide personalized services such as making 
product recommendations based on users’ professed preferences and/or on 
past browsing and purchase history. 
In order to provide personalized services, companies engage in traffic 
analytics. Through this, companies analyze a user’s activities on the Inter-
net. The information to be analyzed would include general information 
such as the visit frequency of a particular website, frequently viewed web 
pages within a website, domains and countries of origin, and the operating 
system and browser used. Further, the information that is gathered and 
analyzed may often contain much more detailed user information.12 
2. Advertisement 
With tracking and analytics, advertisement can become much more effec-
tive. A main reason why, relative to conventional methods of advertise-
ment, Internet advertisement could be more effective is because detailed 
targeting and measurement is possible when advertisement is done through 
the Internet. In turn, in order for targeting and measurement to be possible, 
advertisers should be able to conduct tracking and analytics. 
With targeting, first, advertisers can specify a select group of potential 
customers and show online advertisements only to them. For instance, ad-
vertisers can analyse Facebook user profiles and activity history, and send 
advertisements only to targeted individuals in a targeted and tailored man-
ner, possibly using different platforms. With abundant data on actual and 
potential customers, companies would engage in extensive data mining and 
try to identify patterns that they can utilize usefully. For instance, a large 
retail chain could analyze their customers’ purchasing behaviour and try to 
ties. ‘How deep are your pockets? Businesses are offered software that spots which customers 
will pay more’, The Economist (June 30, 2012). 
12 For instance, a major U.S. data company was reported to be maintaining large data 
bases which contain about 1,500 data points per person for about 500 million people and 
which include, among others, information on an individual’s age, race, sex, weight, 
height, marital status, education level, politics, buying habits, household health worries, 
and vacation dreams. See N. Singer, ‘You for Sale: Mapping, and Sharing, the Consumer 
Genome’, New York Times (June 16, 2012). 
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identify pregnant female customers at an early stage, with a view to woo-
ing them with promotional materials specifically targeted to them.13 This 
type of data analytics is often conducted without the knowledge of users. 
That is, while users would have the general knowledge that certain infor-
mation on them would be collected, they would not know precisely what 
type of information is collected and, once collected, how the information is 
analysed.14  
Data availability is a major contributor which has made targeting possi-
ble. That is, advertisers can now collect a huge amount of detailed data 
without having to incur much cost. And with targeting, advertisers can not 
only send tailored advertisements to a specified group of individuals but 
also, even for the same group of individuals, deliver different versions of 
advertisements, depending on device, time, location and other factors.  
While tracking can be used to deliver targeted and tailored advertise-
ments, it can also be used to measure the effectiveness of such advertise-
ments. Through tracking, companies can measure how many consumers 
purchased a particular product after seeing advertisements for the product. 
Companies can also measure and analyze broader categories of infor-
mation on consumers, including page views, number of unique visitors, 
entry pages and exit pages, referral pages, and clickthrough rates. Further, 
various tests and experiments can be conducted about consumer behaviour 
and advertisement effectiveness. For instance, using tracking technologies, 
randomized field tests, known as a/b tests, can be conducted.15 Through all 
this, advertisers can obtain detailed information as to what types of users 
13 This was in fact a case that took place with Target, a large U.S. retail chain. In an 
incident, this retail chain learned about a teenager’s pregnancy even before her parent 
realized. This was made possible through the detailed predictive analytics that the com-
pany conducted based on the information on purchasing behaviour of its customers. See 
C. Duhigg, ‘How Companies Learn Your Secrets’, New York Times (February 16, 2012). 
14 Thus, for instance, in Target’s case, noted above, a customer would not know that 
the information on her purchase history would collectively enable Target to learn about 
her pregnancy. That is, while purchasing a large quantity of unscented lotion (beginning 
of 2nd trimester), nutrition supplements (such as calcium, magnesium, and zinc; middle of 
2nd trimester), and/or a large quantity of unscented soap, hand sanitizers and/or cotton 
balls (close to delivery), such a customer might have thought that she was making the 
purchase at the whim of the moment or that no one would carefully examine her purchase 
history to conduct an in-depth analysis. However, the company in fact put together dif-
ferent pieces of information and conducted predictive analytics in order to draw conclu-
sions on her characteristics as a customer. 
15 a/b tests refer to tests commonly conducted in marketing by which a baseline con-
trol group is compared to a variety of test groups in order to obtain improved responses 
and to test various marketing strategies. As potential testing groups become larger, con-
ducting these tests would in general become easier and the results would become more 
accurate. 
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are interested in their products and the circumstances under which their 
products draw attention and lead to actual purchasing behaviour.  
3. Other Uses 
Tracking technologies can be used for other purposes, including non-
commercial purposes. First of all, tracking may be needed to ensure net-
work security. That is, websites and Internet service providers may need to 
track Internet traffic in order to prevent malicious activities such as hack-
ers’ attacks and efforts to spread viruses. More broadly, tracking may be 
sometimes needed and justified for law enforcement reasons. Thus, laws 
and regulations may allow or, under certain circumstances, may even re-
quire tracking for law enforcement purposes in order to prevent criminal 
activities such as activities related to frauds or money-laundering, or in 
order to prevent activities that could be a threat to national security.  
C. Regulatory Responses 
I. Concerns over Data Privacy 
The above discussions on tracking technologies suggest that the use of 
tracking devices, in whichever form, is widespread and will continue to be 
so. This is partly because tracking is inevitable in order to maintain the 
current Internet infrastructure and ecosystem, which tend not to charge 
individual users for their use of e-mail, search, and other services. At the 
same time, general users show continuous concerns and anxieties over data 
privacy.16 If these concerns and anxieties are genuine, then policy measures 
would need to be taken in order to deal with the problem. To do so, how-
ever, it is necessary to investigate and identify what the problem is and 
what the sources of the problem are.  
From the perspective of general users, information asymmetry and un-
certainty are two of the main issues at work regarding the data privacy 
problem related to tracking. First, there is a serious information asymmetry 
between users and data controllers. Since intrusions on data privacy are 
usually invisible and ubiquitous, users may not know how their infor-
mation is collected. More seriously, users also do not know, once infor-
mation is collected, how the information will be analyzed and utilized. 
Further, users do not know how long the information will be stored and 
16 See, for example, Hoofnagle et al. (2010) for a survey result in the U.S. 
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how it will be used not just in the primary market but also, if any, in the 
secondary market.  
Second, there is a great deal of uncertainty as to the usage of personal 
data and information. Users do not know and often cannot predict in any 
systematic way how their information will be used by data controllers. In 
fact, it may well be that data controllers are themselves in a difficult posi-
tion to make a reasoned prediction. This is because data controllers may 
only have general ideas as to the future use of the information that they 
gather and they may engage in various phases of trials and errors of data 
mining and analytics in order to extract useful information. Thus, there is 
always a possibility that the information could be used in a completely 
unexpected and unwanted manner. 17 The problem could be exacerbated 
since data controllers, who often possess users’ information for an indefi-
nite period of time, may periodically and repeatedly try to engage in ana-
lytics as technologies develop and new methodologies become available. 
Overall, information asymmetry combined with uncertainty would conflate 
and exacerbate users’ concerns and anxieties, which could justify legal 
intervention on related issues.  
II. Current Regulations 
A significant number of countries and jurisdictions currently have laws on 
data privacy and, considering active legislative discussions taking place in 
many jurisdictions, the number is likely to increase continuously in the 
near future. 18 Among these, jurisdictions with relatively long history of 
legislation and rigorous enforcement experience include the E.U. and the 
U.S., in addition to certain individual countries in Europe. In Europe, indi-
vidual countries began enacting laws as early as 1970s,19 and the E.U. level 
directive on data protection, commonly called the Data Protection Di-
rective, was announced in 1995.20 
 Outside the U.S. and Europe, activities in Asia Pacific are noteworthy. 
The APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Privacy Framework was 
adopted in 2004, and subsequently a considerable number of countries in 
the region enacted or amended laws on data privacy. In Asia, however, 
17 For instance, in the Target’s case, noted above, while the retail chain realized the 
significant value of identifying pregnant women at an early stage, actually identifying 
them through predictive analytics took many phases of internal trials and errors.  
18 See Bygrave (2010); OECD (2011b). 
19 For instance, at a local government level within a country, in Germany, the Hesse 
Parliament adopted the Data Protection Act in 1970 and, at a national level, Sweden 
enacted the Data Act in 1973. OECD (2011b), 8. 
20 Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regards to the Processing 
of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data. 
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laws were enacted only recently in many cases and the related enforcement 
experience is thus limited. Due to the lack of legislative and enforcement 
history, implications that can generally be drawn from the experience in 
Asia are limited as yet.21 Other than the countries and jurisdictions already 
mentioned, some countries in North America, South America, and Oceania 
are also relatively active, and all regions of the world now have at least one 
country with data privacy law. Brief discussion below on legal issues is 
mostly about the E.U. and the U.S., which have distinctive traditions and 
unique characteristics. 
1. The E.U.: Data Protection Directive and Other Directives 
In the E.U., the European Commission is given a general mandate to regu-
late data privacy issues, while most of the relevant legislative and en-
forcement activities are carried out by authorities in individual countries. 
The E.U. adopted several directives on data privacy, and among these, the 
most significant is the Data Protection Directive of 1995. The Data Protec-
tion Directive has a binding effect on E.U. member states and also on cer-
tain non-member states that are parties to the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area (E.E.A.), with several qualifications. It provides a regula-
tory framework on the collection, processing, storage, and transfer of per-
sonal data. The Data Protection Directive has also exerted a considerable 
influence over third-party countries. This is not only due to its history of 
rigorous enforcement but also due to its extraterritorial effect. That is, un-
der the Data Protection Directive, it is not allowed to transfer personal data 
to a third country unless such third country provides ‘adequate’ levels of 
data protection.22  
While the Data Protection Directive serves as an overarching directive 
on general data privacy issues, there are other directives which deal with 
narrower, sector-specific issues. Regarding data privacy issues, certain 
directives on electronic communications are most relevant, including in 
particular the Directive 2002/58/EC Concerning the Processing of Personal 
Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sec-
tor (the “e-Privacy Directive”). 23 The e-Privacy Directive regulates data 
21 See Bygrave (2010), 199–200; Kuner (2011), 17. 
22 E.U. Data Protection Directive, Articles 25–26. 
23 This Directive was preceded by Directive 97/66/EC Concerning the Processing of 
Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector. The e-
Privacy Directive was subsequently partly amended by Directive 2006/24/EC on the 
Retention of Data Generated or Processed in Connection with the Provision of Publicly 
Available Electronic Communications Services or of Public Communications Networks 
and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC. The e-Privacy Directive was further partly amend-
ed by Directive 2009/136/EC amending Directive 2002/22/EC on universal service and 
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privacy on communication networks concerning, among others, confidenti-
ality of communication, regulation of spam, use of cookies, and treatment 
of traffic data. 
2. The U.S. Regulatory Framework 
Contrary to the E.U., in the U.S., there is no uniform regulatory framework 
or omnibus legislation which comprehensively deals with data privacy is-
sues. Instead, different industries or sectors are subject to different regula-
tions and, as a general matter, online behavioural tracking is largely self-
regulated. And, while the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) serves as a 
major regulator, it does not have a specified mandate on data privacy is-
sues.24  
About gathering user information online, the FTC has so far mostly re-
lied on a self-regulatory ‘notice and choice’ model. Under this model, 
companies are expected to provide a clear and detailed online privacy poli-
cy to users and ask them to make an informed choice.25 After the FTC 
made it clear that it would rely on a self-regulatory notice-and-choice 
model, several proposals for professional codes of conducts and online 
guidelines have been made by professional associations from advertising 
and other industries.26 
III. Reform Proposals: the E.U. and the U.S. 
Active discussions are currently taking place in the E.U., the U.S., and 
many parts of the world regarding data privacy issues. As part of these 
active discussions, competing reform proposals have been made by author-
ities in both the E.U. and the U.S. in early 2012. 
users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, Directive 
2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in 
the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No 2006/2004 on cooperation 
between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of consumer protection laws. 
24 The FTC’s mandate is based on a broad authority to regulate ‘unfair and deceptive 
trade practices’ that is granted to the FTC pursuant to Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a). 
25 The E.U. also employs a model similar to a notice and choice model.  
26 For instance, proposals were announced by, among others, Network Advertising In-
itiative (NAI), Interactive Advertising Bureau (IAB), and European Advertising Stand-
ards Alliance (EASA). 
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In the E.U., a major reform proposal was announced in January 2012 by 
the European Commission.27 Through this proposed reform, the European 
Commission is seeking to overhaul the existing regulatory framework. In 
order to do so, it recommends establishing a new European Data Protection 
Board, which would oversee the overall data privacy issues in the E.U. At 
the same time, the reform proposal proposes reinforcing protective 
measures by granting users such rights as the right to be forgotten, the 
right to access users’ own data, and the right to data portability. Also, data 
controllers would have to comply with strengthened regulatory measures 
including a duty to report breach within 24 hours.  
Different from this, in the U.S., while various reports were issued and 
reform measures have been proposed, a sector-specific and self-regulatory 
approach is still the prevailing norm. Significantly among the reform ef-
forts, in February 2012, the White House announced a reform proposal.28 
While the White House report generally maintained the existing policy 
stance of the U.S. government, the report was noted for proposing what is 
called the ‘Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights’, which proclaimed basic prin-
ciples of better consumer control of data, increased transparency, secure 
and accountable handling of data, and flexibility. 
Separately, the FTC also released a report with a reform proposal in 
March 2012 after a long period of study on privacy issues and after releas-
ing a preliminary report in December 2010.29 The FTC placed an emphasis 
on such concepts as privacy by design, simplified choice, and increased 
transparency. It maintained its general support for industry-led efforts, 
including the development and implementation of the ‘Do-Not-Track’ 
(DNT) mechanism. 30  At the same time, recognizing the limits of self-
regulation, it made an arduous effort arguing for the legislation of a base-
line privacy law.  
27 See the European Commission press release entitled ‘Commission proposes a com-
prehensive reform of data protection rules to increase users’ control of their data and to 
cut costs for businesses’ (January 25, 2012) and other related materials available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/data-protection/news/120125_en.htm. 
28 See White House, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework for 
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy (February 
2012). 
29 See Federal Trade Commission, Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid 
Change: Recommendations for Businesses and Policymakers (March 2012). 
30 The Do-Not-Track mechanism is a mechanism that is proposed to protect users’ 
right to choose whether to allow tracking by websites. There is no consensus yet as to 
what this mechanism precisely means in practicality or how this mechanism could be 
implemented. See Tene and Polonetsky (2012), 320–27, for discussions on this mecha-
nism.  
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D. International Harmonization 
I. Divergent Interests 
Brief discussions on legislative and reform activities in various jurisdic-
tions above, most notably in the E.U. and the U.S., indicate that there are 
divergent regulatory approaches currently under way. There are also possi-
bilities of overlapping and conflicting jurisdictions. Thus, from companies’ 
perspectives, doing business in multiple jurisdictions means being subject 
to multiple and possibly conflicting laws and regulations in different juris-
dictions. Regulation by individual authorities in different jurisdictions 
could also be problematic from a global welfare point of view in part be-
cause, in their assessments of regulatory impact, they would not normally 
consider ramifications of their decisions that would fall outside their juris-
dictional boundaries. This is, in a nutshell, a failure to internalize all rele-
vant costs and benefits in the regulatory decision-making process. This 
failure to internalize would be particularly problematic for many technolo-
gy companies because their businesses often show network externalities 
and their business models are developed to make use of resources at multi-
ple locations for the efficient and effective provision of data processing 
and computation services.  
From the perspective of individual regulators, however, it is inevitable 
and indeed only natural that they do not consider all international effects 
since doing so is normally not part of their mandates. Below, we try to 
delineate the problem arising from this failure to internalize through a sim-
ple analytic framework. 31 For expositional simplicity, it is assumed that 
individual regulators do not consider costs and benefits outside their juris-
dictions.  
When policymakers and regulators consider specific rules to regulate 
data privacy, they would weigh the merits of such rules against potential 
costs. Merits would mostly come from enhanced protection of data privacy 
of data subjects in their jurisdictions, and related costs would include lost 
opportunities for the provision of innovative and efficient services. For 
instance, while imposing restrictions on companies’ capability to use cook-
ies to track Internet users would give rise to a certain level of psychologi-
cal and other comforts to Internet users, it would at the same time reduce 
companies’ capability to analyze users’ behaviour and to provide useful 
services tailored to users’ needs. Regulators would then try to find a bal-
31 What appears below in this section is an extension from a standard international 
economic theory. In particular, Guzman (1998), albeit on antitrust issues, provides a 
useful framework, which is employed in this section as well. 
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ance and allow only those activities which show net benefits. Thus, if there 
is a hypothetical global regulator, such a regulator would weigh the ex-
pected ramifications to all companies (data controllers) and also to all us-
ers (data subjects) in making its decisions.32  
Now, in order to see how fragmented regulation by individual regulators 
can distort policy decisions, consider countries with different economic 
structures. First, suppose a case where a country (Country 1) has multiple 
technology companies which generate most of their revenues from their 
international operations. If these companies engage in activities that can be 
considered harmful to general users, most of the harm would fall on users 
located in foreign countries, while these companies would reap most of the 
associated benefits. And, in this context, domestic regulators, having only 
to look to domestic costs and benefits when making a policy assessment, 
would thus ignore the interests of foreign users and would show favourable 
attitude towards the interests of companies over the interests of users.33 
On the other hand, if a country (Country 2) does not have many domes-
tic technology companies and instead users employ services provided by 
mostly foreign companies, such importation of services could generate 
analogous but opposite distortions. That is, domestic regulators would 
make an assessment based on domestic costs and benefits, thus ignoring 
much of companies’ interests as a whole. The result would be favourable 
attitude towards the interests of users over the interests of companies.34  
32 An implicit assumption in the argument here is that, in making decisions, regulators 
consider benefits to the companies (in the form of producer surplus) and to the general 
users (in the form of consumer surplus) only. Other possible policy objectives are not 
considered. An implication that will be drawn is that, even if regulators across different 
jurisdictions pursue common policy objectives, their decisions will vary and could be 
sub-optimal. In arithmetic form, if we use the notations of ‘PS’ for the expected producer 
surplus and ‘CS’ for the expected consumer surplus, regulators will allow companies’ 
activities if and only if ∆PS + ∆CS >  0. This would be, in economics terms, the deci-
sion of the ‘social planner’. 
33 This is based on the assumption that regulators cannot impose different regulations 
depending on whether a company is domestic or foreign based. About the situation de-
scribed in the text, in an extreme case, if the impact on domestic consumers is negligible 
and thus can be ignored by the regulator, companies’ activities will be allowed in this 
country if and only if ∆PS1 > 0, where PS1 is the expected producer surplus in Country 1. 
Now suppose that a situation arises where ∆PS1 > 0 and ∆PS + ∆CS <  0. That would be 
a situation where proposed business activities will enhance the producer surplus in Coun-
try 1 but, at the same time, reduce the overall producer surplus and consumer surplus 
globally. While the regulator in this country would allow these activities, the (global) 
social planner would not. 
34 In an extreme case, if the companies’ interest can be ignored in making policy deci-
sions, companies’ activities will be allowed if and only if ∆CS2 > 0, where CS2  is the 
expected consumer surplus in Country 2. If a situation arises such that ∆CS2 <  0 and 
∆PS +  ∆CS >  0, then a proposed activity will not be permitted even if it would generate 
overall net benefits on a global level. 
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More generally, assume that the companies in a country (Country 3) ac-
count for α percent of the global market and that they explain α percent of 
the global producer surplus. At the same time, suppose that the same coun-
try’s users account for β percent of the relevant global market and the same 
β percent of the global consumer surplus. Then, the regulator in that coun-
try will naturally consider the impact on the α percent of the global pro-
ducer surplus and β percent of the global consumer surplus when it con-
templates introducing new regulations or revising existing regulations. The 
net impact of a country’s regulation will then depend on the country’s 
share in the global provision of services and the country’s share in the 
global consumption.35 If the country is a net exporter (i.e., α > β), then the 
country’s regulator would give a relatively high weight on the impact on 
producer surplus in devising regulatory measures.36 This would mean that, 
compared to a closed-economy situation, the country’s regulator would 
give a favourable consideration to the interests of its companies. If the 
country is a net importer (i.e., α < β), on the other hand, the opposite will 
be true. Thus, in that case, relatively stricter rules on data privacy against 
companies’ interests will be applied compared to the closed-economy situ-
ation.  
This simple exposition illustrates how policymaking would be different 
if we consider the open-ended and inter-connected nature of the Internet. 
Compared to the closed-economy case, a rational regulator’s decision-
making would take into account only a part of the interests of all stake-
holders, while the resulting regulatory measures would show an extraterri-
torial effect. Both the regulator in a net exporter country and the regulator 
in a net importer country would have biased assessment criteria and fail to 
consider the impact of their decisions on third country data controllers and 
data subjects. These deviations of regulatory measures from the optimal 
situation would reflect the degree of externalities caused by partial consid-
eration of all relevant costs and benefits. 
II.  Divergent Regulatory Approaches 
In light of the divergent interests of different regulators in different coun-
tries, it is hardly surprising that the current level of international coopera-
tion and harmonization is only very modest. The E.U. and the U.S., two of 
the most significant jurisdictions with active enforcement activities and 
with possibly overlapping jurisdictions on many issues, averted the prob-
35  In such a case, companies’ activities will be allowed if and only if 
α∆PS3 + β∆CS3 > 0, where PS3 and CS3 are the expected producer surplus and expected 
consumer surplus in Country 3, respectively.  
36 Assessment will also change depending on the size of PS3 and CS3. 
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lem of regulatory divergence by establishing and maintaining a ‘Safe Har-
bor’ framework.37 Although the Safe Harbor framework may not be able to 
provide a permanent solution to the current and future differences in regu-
lations between the two jurisdictions, it at least provides an ad hoc solution 
for the time being.  
From a global perspective, perhaps more troublesome are cases of 
smaller jurisdictions. That is, companies in smaller jurisdictions are not 
given opportunities to avail themselves of a safe harbor or similar frame-
work. Rather, they would have to comply with the applicable regulations in 
all the jurisdictions where they do their business or, if not, they would 
eventually have to withdraw their business in some jurisdictions. In addi-
tion, in the case of the E.U., there is a third alternative. That is, the Euro-
pean Commission can issue findings regarding adequate protection of data 
privacy in foreign jurisdictions and, if a country is deemed to provide ade-
quate protection, then the companies from such a country can do business 
without worrying about violating EU-specific data privacy regulations. 
However, the fact that not too many countries have so far been able to take 
advantage of this mechanism suggests that adopting such a mechanism 
may not provide a practicable solution for many countries, which they can 
utilize in an expeditious and effective manner.38 An end result from this 
fragmented enforcement mechanism would be a mixture of over-regulation 
in some situations and under-regulation in some other situations.39 
Over-regulation may take place when multiple regulators exercise juris-
dictions over inherently the same business activities. For instance, consider 
a proposed change of privacy policy by a major social network service 
provider which does business in many jurisdictions around the world, in-
cluding the U.S., the E.U., and certain other smaller jurisdictions. If any of 
the regulators in major jurisdictions such as the U.S. and the E.U. prohibits 
the proposed change, it is unlikely that the change of privacy policy would 
in fact take place as proposed.40 Alternatively, if a regulator requests cer-
37 The Safe Harbor framework is a streamlined framework for U.S. organisations, 
which allows them to comply with the E.U. Data Protection Directive without having to 
deal with European regulators directly. U.S. organisations are given a choice to opt in to 
the framework through the U.S. government, certifying their adherence to the Directive’s 
principles.  
38 See Bygrave (2010), 200.  
39 Over-regulation may mean overlapping regulation or overly stringent regulation, 
while under-regulation may mean the opposite. No clear distinction needs to be made for 
purposes of this article. 
40 This is based on the assumption that the privacy policy of this social network ser-
vice provider is the same or substantially similar across different jurisdictions. This ap-
pears to be the case in reality with many technology companies. If different terms of use 
are offered in different countries, some users may try to find technological means to 
bypass what is deemed to be overly restrictive, while some other users may determine not 
to use the service any more. For instance, when the Korean government introduced a 
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tain modifications in the proposed change of privacy policy and if the ser-
vice provider accommodates such a request from the regulator, then these 
modifications will be globally applied. More generally, considering that 
legal rules vary across jurisdictions, application of different rules in differ-
ent jurisdictions would result in the application of the most stringent ele-
ments among different sets of rules.  
On the other hand, if the proposed change is blocked in less significant 
smaller jurisdictions, then the social network service provider would con-
sider whether to comply with the regulatory requirements in such jurisdic-
tions or otherwise whether to withdraw from the market in these jurisdic-
tions.41 Seen from the perspective of the regulators in these jurisdictions, if 
they realize that the service provider may discontinue its service, in whole 
or in part, in response to stringent and rigorous enforcement activities, then 
they may be pressured not to exercise their regulatory power or simply 
adopt less stringent rules. Further, in these jurisdictions, if companies ac-
tively provide their services in foreign markets, as discussed in the above 
section, existing rules may in any event favour companies’ interests rela-
tive to the interests of users without regard to the size of the domestic mar-
ket and practical enforceability of their domestic rules against large inter-
national companies. 
The above discussions indicate that, on the whole, small open econo-
mies will tend to have less stringent data privacy regulations. This is in 
part due to their internal policy consideration giving a relatively heavy 
weight to the interests of companies and, at the same, due to the reality that, 
even if they apply stringent rules, large international companies may 
choose to ignore and may even shun the provision of their services in these 
markets.  
In contrast, large open economies may simply impose stringent regula-
tions, depending on their economic structures and the resulting policy con-
siderations. Currently, among major jurisdictions, the E.U. is in particular 
regulation requiring Internet users to use their real names when uploading and adding 
comments, Google declined to comply and instead disenabled the uploading and com-
menting features on its Korean YouTube site. Some Korean users, however, bypassed the 
regulation by changing their country settings. See M. Williams, ‘Google Disables Up-
loads, Comments on YouTube Korea’, PC World (April 13, 2009). 
41 Although a multitude of complex issues appear to be involved including data priva-
cy issues, there have been reports regarding Google’s difficulties in dealing with Chinese 
authorities and regarding possibilities of Google’s withdrawal from the Chinese market, 
at least in part. About the accessibility of Google’s products in China, see Google’s 
‘Transparency Report’ on China, available at http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/ 
traffic/?r=CN. Of course, the Chinese market is by no means insignificant but, nonethe-
less, an implicit threat of withdrawal may have been a serious option that Google consid-
ered. 
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noteworthy for its relatively stringent rules and well-established enforce-
ment mechanism. Also, in the U.S., rigorous regulations could be in place, 
depending on specific industry sectors and other circumstances. Thus, 
companies with active business operations in the E.U. and in the U.S. – 
perhaps most of large international technology companies – are subject to 
the regulatory jurisdictions of the E.U. and the U.S. and, as such, regulato-
ry rules in these jurisdictions practically shape the general contour of the 
global regulatory regime.  
Overall, however, it is not clear if regulations in major jurisdictions 
such as the E.U. and the U.S. are overly stringent and if regulations in 
smaller jurisdictions are overly lenient. What is clear nonetheless is that 
regulators in all jurisdictions, whether in major jurisdictions or not, con-
sider only what is at stake within their respective jurisdictions and do not 
necessarily consider third-party ramifications outside their jurisdictions. 
The resulting mixture of different attitudes is obviously suboptimal from a 
global perspective.42  
E. Options for Cooperation and Harmonization 
While the externality argument provides a strong and clear case for inter-
national harmonization, in reality, it is hard to witness a palpable sign of 
major progress on international harmonization. This suggests that there 
may be serious impediments to international harmonization, other than 
different economic structures and different assessment criteria applied in 
different jurisdictions, as discussed above. Among these impediments, dif-
ferent policy goals pursued in different jurisdictions may be a particularly 
important factor. 
The differences in policy goals would reflect different legal and cultural 
traditions as well as different policy priorities in different jurisdictions. 
When it comes to the differences between the E.U. and the U.S., one of the 
most commonly observed differences lies in defining and understanding 
the concept of data protection and privacy itself. While privacy is often 
explained as liberty in the U.S., dignity of individuals is considered a key 
underlying attribute in the E.U. when considering data protection.43 Thus, 
42 Further, as noted above, since net exporting countries tend to have lenient rules, 
while net importing countries stringent rules, there will be difficulties when these differ-
ent types of countries negotiate in order to achieve international harmonization. This is 
because a harmonised rule may well mean a less stringent rule compared to the then de 
facto prevailing rule, which net exporting countries would prefer and which net import-
ing countries would not. On the other hand, in the absence of international harmonization, 
stringent rules would prevail. 
43 See Whitman (2004). 
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different from the U.S., data protection is perceived to constitute a funda-
mental human right in the E.U. There may also be other notable differ-
ences between the E.U. and the U.S. (and among different jurisdictions).44 
These differences would include different attitudes toward market’s self-
correction capabilities, which can be summarized as the emphasis on regu-
lation and paternalism, as opposed to the emphasis on self-regulation, in-
novation, and entrepreneurship. With this backdrop, we now consider what 
kind of international cooperation and harmonization would be possible. 
On a broad conceptual level, there could be three categories of interna-
tional cooperation and harmonization that can be considered. First is gen-
erally about soft law aspects such as sharing information and establishing 
international guidelines. The second category is on procedural aspects and 
would include international cooperation establishing choice of law rules 
and coordinating on the enforcement front. And, the third category would 
encompass various efforts to build substantive rules with binding effects. 
Effective regulation of data privacy issues on a global level will after all 
require serious efforts for harmonization of substantive rules, although 
harmonization of substantive rules could be a cumbersome process. It 
should be noted that, while these categories can be distinguished conceptu-
ally and may serve useful analytic purposes, their boundaries may not be 
clear and that there would be overlaps among different categories.  
I. ‘Soft’ Cooperation 
With the continuing increase in international data flows, individual domes-
tic regulators are pressured to adopt measures for international cooperation 
for practical reasons. At a minimum, without establishing a mechanism to 
share information among regulators, it could sometimes be difficult to 
build the requisite know-how and skills for effective regulatory enforce-
ment and investigation. Sharing information in this context does not have 
to be specifically about on-going cases or investigations. Instead, sharing 
of non-case specific information such as sharing information on technical 
expertise and investigative methods would be helpful for many regulators. 
In the Internet arena, in particular, once a service becomes available in a 
jurisdiction, such a service often becomes available in many other jurisdic-
tions as well, using the same or similar technologies and invoking similar 
data privacy issues across various jurisdictions. This implies that once a 
legal problem on data privacy arises in a jurisdiction, similar legal prob-
lems may well arise in other jurisdictions in due course. For instance, legal 
44 For an example of a regulatory paradigm that appears to be at least partially outside 
the paradigms dominated by the perspectives from Europe and the U.S., see Chesterman 
(2012), which discusses the experience of Singapore. 
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issues surrounding Google’s Street View project would be a case in point, 
as we witness similar legal issues developing in multiple jurisdictions re-
garding similar factual and technological issues.45  
A serious limitation of soft cooperation in general is that cooperation 
typically takes place on a voluntary basis and that the level of cooperation 
could vary depending on the participants’ good-will and self-interest. Also, 
no penalties can usually be imposed for a breach of duties, other than the 
harm on the breaching party’s reputation. Nonetheless, soft cooperation 
could make a significant contribution under certain circumstances, enhanc-
ing common understanding of relevant issues and providing a shared or 
standardized regulatory platform. In that respect, two specific areas for 
collaborative efforts are worth mentioning. One is about exerting collective 
research efforts in order to better understand in a systematic way the deci-
sion-making process of individuals in choosing to hide or divulge their 
personal information. The other area is regarding enhancing the collective 
understanding about companies’ behaviour, that is, as to how companies 
gather information from individuals, what the specific substance and na-
ture of the collected information is, and how the companies analyze and 
use the information.  
First, one area which collective research efforts could yield useful re-
sults is the one concerning individuals’ choices whether to divulge or 
withdraw personal information. In particular, it has been reported that in-
dividuals’ choices on data privacy may not be rational at all times and that 
instead individuals’ choices are context-dependent. That is, individuals 
tend to make different decisions, depending on the context under which 
data privacy issues are presented and on various other factors. These fac-
tors include: whether the personal information at issue is presented in a 
45 Google Street View is a feature available for Google Map and other Google prod-
ucts, which provides panoramic photo images of streets. Data privacy issues were raised 
mainly on two fronts: first, about the process of taking the photographs and about using 
the photographs themselves and, second and more recently, about collecting and storing 
what is called payload data while taking these photographs. These data privacy issues 
were raised by regulators in several counties, although factual and technological circum-
stances were generally similar. The U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
issued a report in April 2012 about Google’s conduct in relation to the collection of pay-
load data and also in relation to FCC’s investigation of the related data privacy issues. 
See Federal Communications Commission, Notice of Apparent Liability for Forfeiture, In 
the Matter of Google Inc. (April 13, 2012). Issuance of the FCC report prompted renewed 
interests about the case among certain third country regulators. See D. Streitfeld and K.J. 
O’Brien, ‘Google Privacy Inquiries Get Little Cooperation’, New York Times (May 22, 
2012); K.J. O’Brien, ‘European Regulators May Reopen Street View Inquires’, New 
York Times (May 2, 2012); E. Wyatt, ‘Denials Over Google Street View’, New York 
Times (June 12, 2012). It is, however, unclear if regulators in these jurisdictions have 
any formal mechanism to share information on this case or any other specific cases. 
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loss frame or a gain frame; 46 whether the website looks professional or 
unprofessional;47 whether and how confidentiality assurance is presented;48 
how reasons for obtaining personal information are presented; and the or-
der that the requests for information is presented.  
 In addition to these, there is also a phenomenon called the paradox of 
control. It refers to the phenomenon which shows that the perception of 
more user control over disclosure of private information increases revela-
tion, while the perception of less control reduces revelation. 49  Further, 
there is a problem called privacy paradox, which is about the discrepancy 
between individuals’ professed preferences and values and their actual 
decision-making regarding data privacy.50 Thus, while individuals say that 
they want privacy, they may not want to pay to protect their privacy and 
may even be willing to disclose sensitive personal information for a very 
small reward. 
Overall, what is summarized above about the behaviour of users is cur-
rently an active area of research, and efforts are being made in order to 
understand the actual behaviour of users in a systematic manner. Thus, 
while this line of research has shed an invaluable light in advancing our 
understanding of individuals’ privacy choices, no general conclusions on 
related issues have been reached. At the same time, problems arise because 
regulators are forced to make rules and pronounce guidelines regardless of 
whether they have sufficient information and systematic understanding on 
individuals’ decision-making processes. For instance, a notice and choice 
regime may have been employed in many jurisdictions without a concrete 
understanding on the effectiveness of such a regime or without analyzing 
sufficiently as to how to make it more effective.51  
Second, the level of the current understanding about the way companies 
collect personal information and analyze the collected information is very 
limited, and there is a need to enhance collective understanding in this area. 
This is related to the recognition that one of the most difficult problems in 
46 See Acquisti et al. (2010). 
47 See John et al. (2011). 
48 Ibid. 
49 See Tucker (2011); Brandimarte et al. (2010). 
50 See, for instance, Acquisti and Grossklags (2005). 
51 For an example of a critical account in this regard, see Barocas and Nissenbaum 
(2009). This implies that the notice and consent regime, which is used in many jurisdic-
tions, may have serious limitations. First of all, not many users read notice. Second, even 
if efforts are made to enhance readability, such efforts may not be successful in increas-
ing the instances of genuine informed consents. For instance, while a notice can be given 
prominence, prominence itself could have little effect on readership. Further, even those 
who read notice may well consent regardless of the substance or one-sidedness. Marotta-
Wurgler (2012) provides interesting insights on these issues in the context of executing 
software license agreement. 
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assessing current regulatory frameworks and reform proposals lies in the 
fact that there is a general lack of knowledge regarding how personal in-
formation is collected and used. Psychological and subjective costs of in-
formation disclosure would mainly arise due to users’ anxiety over the 
possibility of embarrassing disclosure or unanticipated use of their infor-
mation and also due to the concern coming from the perception that they 
are being observed and analyzed. In this context, current reform proposals 
will not be much helpful in alleviating users’ concerns. Efforts for fact-
gathering should be done first prior to putting forth serious reform pro-
posals. Specifically, there is a need to gather facts as to the life-cycle of 
the user information.  
While underlying studies in this context would need to be conducted 
through individual research efforts, their results should be discussed and 
shared among various stakeholders. This undertaking – discussing and 
sharing – is crucial considering its policy ramifications at an international 
level, and efforts made in this context could signal the embarkation of a 
major step toward international cooperation and harmonization. This could 
also entail discussions of certain key terms and concepts that often appear 
in data privacy laws (sometimes with variations) such as ‘personal data’ 
and ‘data controller’. Discussions in this context could eventually lead to a 
uniform and harmonized understanding of these terms and concepts across 
jurisdictions and, that way, common understanding and common platform 
could be established. In all, the final results of these studies and other soft 
cooperation could be influential. For instance, the OECD Privacy Guide-
lines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
of 1980, although not legally binding, has served as a model for legisla-
tions in many countries and still remains highly influential.  
II. Procedural Cooperation  
While information sharing and other soft cooperation has its own merits, it 
also has clear limitations, including the lack of binding effect and enforce-
ability. A step further in the direction of tightening cooperation would be 
to establish rules for choice-of-law decisions and for enforcement coopera-
tion.52 First of all, facilitating international cooperation at the enforcement 
level would have obvious benefits since many of the business activities 
with data privacy implications easily cross jurisdictional boundaries and 
52 In a related context, Kuner notes an increasing tension between the geography-
cased regulatory approach and the organisationally-based regulatory approach. Kuner 
(2011), 20–21. 
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cooperation among enforcement authorities could often be tremendously 
helpful or even be required for the effective enforcement of laws.53  
This has indeed been an area with relatively active discussions. For in-
stance, there are repeated calls made for international cooperation at the 
annual International Conferences of Data Protection and Privacy Commis-
sioners, and often these calls are focused on enforcement issues.54 Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which has 
led early efforts on data privacy issues and is continuing to lead related 
discussions, is also actively promoting cooperation on enforcement.55 
About choice-of-law issues, adopting coherent and standard rules would 
enhance efficiency by reducing incidences of conflicting, overlapping, or 
sometimes confusing jurisdictions and by reducing conflicts over govern-
ing-law decisions. 56  This will in turn enhance clarity and transparency 
about jurisdiction and applicable law, and thus raise predictability of legal 
ramifications of various activities which have data privacy connotations.57 
53 There is a duty to cooperate within the E.U., although how cooperation is conduct-
ed in practice is unclear. ‘The supervisory authorities shall cooperate with one another to 
the extent necessary for the performance of their duties, in particular by exchanging all 
useful information.’ E.U. Data Protection Directive, Article 28(6). 
54 As an example, after the 2011 International Conferences of Data Protection and 
Privacy Commissioners, which was held in Mexico, a working group was formed in order 
to discuss possibilities for enforcement cooperation. See S. Paluck-Bastien, ‘Think local-
ly, act globally: Data protection authorities from around the globe meet in Montreal to 
discuss enforcement co-operation’, The Privacy Advisor (May 24, 2012), available at 
https://www.privacyassociation.org/publications/2012_05_24_think_locally_act_globally. 
55 The OECD Council adopted a formal recommendation in 2007, calling for interna-
tional enforcement cooperation. See OECD (2007). Subsequently, the OECD published a 
report on the implementation of the 2007 recommendation. The report provides detailed 
information regarding what has been accomplished during the previous several years 
such as building a website, establishing national contact points and networks, and devel-
oping a form for assistance request. However, the report admits that, about handling 
specific cases, cross-border cooperation appears to be more the exception than the rule. 
See OECD (2011a). 
56 Rules on applicable law and jurisdiction about data privacy issues are ‘notoriously 
unclear’. Kuner (2011), 25. Further, the problem can become even murkier since “[s]tates 
seem more concerned about protecting their citizens, residents and companies against 
improper data processing carried out abroad than about avoiding jurisdictional conflicts 
with other States”. Kuner (2010), 246. 
57 For instance, in the E.U., a Member State law would be applied to a data controller 
not established in the E.U., if such data controller makes use of the ‘equipment’ located 
in the Member State in order to process personal data. E.U. Data Protection Directive, 
Article 4(1)(c). There are debates as to whether this provision grants an exorbitant juris-
diction to an E.U. Member State and also as to what this provision, including the word 
equipment, means precisely. See Kuner (2010), 228–229; 239–240. Also, the influential 
Article 29 Working Group, composed of members from national data protection authori-
ties in the E.U. established pursuant to Article 29 of the Data Protection Directive, is of 
the opinion that a Member State law would be applicable if data processing took place 
based on the information gathered through cookies sent from a non-Member State to 
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Establishing these rules, however, does not mean that, once relevant rules 
are adopted, there would no longer be over-regulation or under-regulation. 
Also, in reality, assigning jurisdiction to a single state would simply not be 
feasible, unless a consensus is reached over other related issues, including 
applicable substantive and procedural laws.  
On the other hand, for regulators in small open economies, achieving in-
ternational cooperation on procedural issues could enhance their capability 
to enforce laws and could give better opportunities for them to bring cases. 
This is so because, with international procedural cooperation, obtaining 
evidence and other useful information could become easier for these regu-
lators. Also, large international companies may become less inclined to 
ignore regulators in smaller jurisdiction in light of the cross-jurisdictional 
ramifications of an enforcement case. 
International cooperation on a procedural level, however, would inevi-
tably have limitations. With procedural cooperation, laws will be better 
enforced and there will be savings in the enforcement costs. However, the 
inherent problem of the failure to internalize, discussed above, will not be 
cured. 
III. Substantive Harmonization 
Given the desirability of international harmonization and the limits of 
weaker level cooperation, it would only be natural to consider harmoniza-
tion at a more substantive level. Substantive level cooperation is indeed 
what would be required in order to eliminate the externality problem aris-
ing from fragmented legal regimes. That way, different interests among 
different regulators and the resulting different considerations will be han-
dled adequately and the failure to internalize will be prevented. Also, 
through substantive cooperation, existing problems arising from the lack of 
legislation or from inadequate legislation could be cured, while the prob-
lem of overlapping jurisdictions could be avoided at the same time. 
In this context, we consider possible options for substantive cooperation. 
In broad terms, possible regulatory instruments can be grouped into two 
categories, that is, first, measures to reach a multilateral consensus and to 
prepare an international convention involving many countries and, second, 
measures to harmonize domestic laws and regulations themselves.  
First, reaching an agreement through an international convention would 
bring in a great degree of harmonization. This is simply because adopting 
an international convention would mean that the same legal principles will 
computers in Member States. Article 29 Working Party, ‘Privacy on the Internet: A 
Comprehensive EU Approach to Online Data Protection’ (WP 37, November 21, 2000). 
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be applied across all signatory states. However, even among international 
conventions, there are many possibilities in terms of the degree of enforce-
ability and binding effect. For instance, Council of Europe Convention for 
the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Per-
sonal Data of 1981 (“Council of Europe Convention 108”), which is one of 
the few and earliest international conventions on data privacy, explicitly 
permits derogations and does not have a strong binding effect.58 
One major difficulty with the efforts to adopt an international conven-
tion is that it usually takes a long period of time to reach a consensus, if a 
consensus can be reached at all. At the same time, once an international 
convention is adopted, it is difficult to make an amendment. Difficulty of 
making a timely amendment could be especially problematic considering 
the current pace of technological changes related to data privacy. 
There have been some suggestions calling for the adoption of an inter-
national convention.59 There have also been efforts made at regional levels. 
A notable example is the legislation at the E.U. level, including the Coun-
cil of Europe Convention 108. There are other initiatives such as the APEC 
Privacy Framework. However, except for the E.U., attempts in other re-
gions have shown only limited results. Also, a regional approach has a risk 
of facilitating the formation of regional blocs and making consensus-
building at an international level even more difficult. If so, regional con-
ventions could possibly lead to the slivering of world jurisdictions into 
several geographic areas, instead of promoting global harmonization. In 
the case of the E.U. Data Protection Directive, the European Commission 
is given authority to regulate the transfer of personal data to countries out-
side the E.U. and is asked to make decisions as to whether such third coun-
tries are providing ‘adequate level of data protection’. If regulators in other 
major jurisdictions are given similar authorities, a result could be a com-
plicated web of decision-making processes across jurisdictions about the 
adequacy of data privacy regulation in other jurisdictions.60 
Additionally, although not harmonization per se, adopting and promot-
ing a model law could also be considered. This could in effect be similar to 
adopting an international standard in the realm of data privacy regulation. 
Establishing a model law could be in particular useful considering that so 
58 For example, see Article 13(3). Although this is a European convention, it is open 
to ratification by non-European states. 
59 In particular noteworthy would be the efforts made so far at the annual International 
Conferences of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, where proposals are made 
periodically for international harmonization and adoption of an international convention. 
‘The Madrid Resolution’ of 2009 is an example, which proposed rules on ‘international 
standards on the protection of personal data and privacy’.  
60 At the extreme, the resulting effect would be similar to the one commonly observed 
in a trading bloc, where there is non-discrimination among members of a bloc, while non-
members are subject to a high degree of discrimination. 
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far only a limited number of countries have laws dealing with data privacy 
issues and that, for these countries contemplating enactment, such a model 
law could serve as a template. Having a model law would enhance aware-
ness and could encourage legislation, which could in turn prompt efforts 
for international harmonization.61 Related to this, adopting and disseminat-
ing technical and regulatory standards through international standard set-
ting organizations such as International Telecommunication Union (ITU), 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and World Wide Web 
Consortium (W3C) could show similar effects. Standards established at 
such standard setting organizations normally are not given legally binding 
effect as such but, nonetheless, they are often extremely influential in prac-
tice and set prevailing rules.  
F. Conclusion 
Data crosses national borders routinely. And any regulation by a national 
authority could easily have ramifications beyond its jurisdictional bounda-
ry. This article laid out some of the relevant issues and provided an argu-
ment for international efforts for coordination and harmonization of rules 
on data privacy. 
On a broad level, different countries and jurisdictions have very differ-
ent rules. The E.U. and the U.S. would be notable examples showing 
markedly different attitudes. When different rules are applied on data pri-
vacy issues in different jurisdictions, an end result would be that the most 
stringent elements of such rules would become de facto prevailing global 
rules. In that respect, the current controversy involving reform proposals 
made both in the E.U. and in the U.S. deserves a close attention. This is 
partly because strict elements of the resulting reforms in both jurisdictions 
are likely to reverberate and define the contour of regulations not just in 
these jurisdictions but also around the world. 
Other than the E.U. and the U.S., many ‘small open economies’ have 
problems with extraterritorial enforceability of their rules. At least regard-
ing data privacy issues, these economies do not have many choices other 
than adopting similar rules that are applied in ‘large open economies’. The 
problem, however, is that, without international harmonization, rules 
adopted in individual jurisdictions would fail to consider ramifications 
outside their jurisdictional borders. This is particularly problematic in data 
privacy and other Internet-related areas. Therefore, there is a great and 
urgent need for discussions on international cooperation and harmonization.  
61 For instance, in the case of arbitration, adopting a model law was influential in 
making many countries to adopt new laws or revise existing laws modelled after the 
model law. 
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Comment on Haksoo Ko 
Evolving Law and Economics of Internet Privacy 





My colleague Haksoo Ko has presented to us a really enlightening over-
view. I fully agree with him that there is a strong case for international 
harmonization concerning internet privacy. But I will stress the point that 
strategies of regulated self-regulation play a prominent role in the interna-
tional coordination of data protection regimes. In part I share Professor 
Ko’s view on the lack of knowledge as a major obstacle to an appropriate 
legal regime. However, stricter legal rules to enhance transparency of data 
usage might help to narrow both the information asymmetry and the uncer-
tainty. Simultaneously, such rules might enhance the rationality of individ-
uals’ choices whether to divulge or withdraw personal information. Under 
the current legal regime the rationality of such decisions of the consumers 
must be doubted as Professor Ko has convincingly explained in detail. 
In this short comment I can pick up only a few issues. I will concentrate 
more on the substantive law as it is and as it should be from a law-and-
economics point of view. In doing so, I will argue that informed consent to 
the usage of data is the cornerstone of internet privacy both in an economic 
and a legal context. 
First, I will deal with the conceptional background of economic analysis 
and examine how it might be linked to the legal rationale of data protection 
on the internet. I will concentrate on European and on German law with 
only some short remarks on the differences to the U.S. 
∗ Special thanks to my research assistant Manuel Waldmann for his valuable support, 
especially with the references. 
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Second, I will argue for the best strategy for consumer protection with re-
gard to data transfer on the internet. From an economic perspective, a sort 
of libertarian paternalism might be preferable, and I will try to show that 
this idea is helpful to understand and to further develop the legal instru-
ments as well. 
Third and last, I will take up the harmonization issue and look at the in-
terdependency of the international, the European and the national level of 
regulation to protect privacy on the internet. On these different levels a 
different mixture of regulatory strategies might be appropriate, ranging 
from self-regulation to command and control. 
B. Economic and Legal Foundations of Internet Privacy 
I. In search for a rationale of data protection on the internet  
According to Professor Ko, privacy is often explained as liberty in the U.S. 
while in the EU dignity of the individual is considered a key underlying 
attribute.1 This comparison might be a bit simplified because this contrast 
is not absolute and both rationales are often closely linked. Furthermore, 
we find different approaches in Europe as well. They are very much dis-
cussed in the German context but can be identified on the European level, 
too. 
The first approach looks at privacy – and on personal data in particular 
– as a form of property rights. This seems to be the predominant point of 
view in economics.2 Therefore, the consumer can (and should) deal with 
his data as with other economic goods in the most efficient way to maxim-
ize his individual welfare. The jurisprudence of the German Constitutional 
Court and relating legal literature on the fundamental right of information-
al self-determination as a part of the personality-right, Art. 2 (1), Art. 1 (1) 
of the German Constitution (Grundgesetz – GG), arguably point in a simi-
lar direction. The Court identifies a constitutional right to a free decision 
about sharing his or her own data with others and about the way others 
may use his or her data.3 This also includes that everybody is entitled to 
sell his or her data (but not the personality-right itself) to commercial en-
terprises.4 The right to a free decision on the use of personal data is not 
1 Drawing on Whitman (2004), 1161. 
2 Prominently Posner (1978); compare more recently Murphy (1996); Varian (1996). 
3  Decisions of the German Federal Constitutional Court, Official Documentation 
(BVerfGE) vol. 65, 1, 42, 43; excerpts in English in Kommers (1997), 323–326. This is 
not a genuine German innovation, for a similar approach see already Westin (1967), 7. 
4 For details see Weichert (2001), 1467, who, however, simultaneously warns against 
undue commercialisation of the right of informational self-determination, ibid., 1469; 
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meant as a property right in the more narrow sense of the fundamental 
right of property (Art. 14 GG), but it might be understood as a property 
right in a broader economic meaning. In the U.S., the right to privacy in 
general (not relating to personal data) is even seen as a Fourth Amendment 
matter which closely links this right to the sanctity of the home.5 
The second approach might be labeled dignitarian because it points to 
the roots of informational self-determination in human dignity. This link-
age is rarely mentioned in the U.S.6 but becomes clear already in the legal 
foundation the Constitutional Court gives for this fundamental right: 
Art. 1 (1) GG explicitly names human dignity as the basis of the constitu-
tional legal order.7 The legal discussion has refined this rationale by point-
ing out that data protection is not a virtue in itself but a necessary precon-
dition for individual freedom in many contexts in a social environment. If 
a person does not know what others know about him or her, this might 
have a chilling effect on free interaction with others. The protection of an 
area of privacy – which is, at least in part, self-defined – is a precondition 
for enhancing his or her own personality. This dignitarian approach focus-
es much more on the social context of information than the property rights-
approach does.8 It is important to note, however, that in social interaction 
not only protecting private data from others but also sharing privacy rele-
vant information with others is an essential prerequisite of personal free-
dom. This double-sidedness becomes especially clear within Art. 16 TFEU 
which both mentions the right to data protection and the free flow of data 
within the European Union.9 
In an economic analysis this double rationale could be reflected in the 
analytical framework of optimizing central constitutional values. 10  The 
“capability approach” developed by Nobel laureate Amartya Sen might be 
even better suited for the analysis because this approach draws on substan-
tial freedoms to realize alternative combinations of different so called 
Britz (2010), 587, even argues for Art. 14 GG as the appropriate constitutional founda-
tion of this right to self-commercialisation of one’s personal data. 
5 For an overview see Whitman (2004), 1211–1216; compare Slobogin (2011), 467, 
who shows the limitations of this approach if there is no physical intrusion but only a 
technological one. 
6 The famous starting point was Warren/Brandeis (1890), see on the reception of this 
article Whitman (2004), 1204–1208; in the Supreme Court jurisprudence Schmerber v. 
California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966), describes the Fourth Amendment as protecting 
“privacy and dignity against unwarranted intrusion by the State”; furthermore cf. Law-
rence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003) on homosexuality. 
7 BVerfGE 65, 1, 42–43; BVerfGE 120, 351, 359–360. 
8 Compare Britz (2010), 568–569, 573, who looks at informational self-determination 
as a means to secure freedom in various contexts rather than an end in itself. 
9 Short remarks by Schneider (2011), 519. 
10 According to van Aaken (2003), 315–333. 
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“functionings”. 11  In this framework the right to informational self-
determination should be construed in such a way that the individual can 
interact most freely with others, taking into account both his or her interest 
in privacy as a requisite of freedom and his or her interest in sharing in-
formation in social networks or business contacts on the internet. This per-
spective does not exempt from the necessity to weigh the benefits (merits) 
of enhanced data protection against the related costs of lost private and 
business opportunities. But it shifts the point of view of his analysis from 
economic efficiency (as in the neoclassical approach) to the maximisation 
of capabilities. While most aspects of efficiency can be implemented in the 
capability approach as well, this approach helps to broaden the perspective 
in cost-benefit analysis.12 
II. The right of privacy between private parties 
Taking fundamental rights as the starting point of our analysis leads us to 
the question whether such rights are applicable in (business) contacts of 
private parties on the internet. In the U.S. the constitutional right to priva-
cy, deriving from the Fourth Amendment, is protected only – at least in 
general – against state action.13 This might explain why data protection in 
the private sector seems to be so much weaker in the U.S., based primarily 
on tort law14, than in Germany and the European Union. 
In German doctrine, constitutional rights do not only serve as individual 
rights against the state but – as a reaction to Nazism – also as an objective 
order of values which influence the whole legal order including the rela-
tionship between private individuals themselves.15 Therefore, the state (in 
particular the legislator) has a constitutional duty to protect the individu-
al’s fundamental rights against other private parties so far as the individual 
11  Theoretical foundations by Sen (1985); contrasted with traditional cost-benefit-
analysis by Sen (1999), 54–86; in the context on human rights Sen (2004), 332–338; for 
an critical discussion see e.g., Alkire (2005); Robeyns (2005); used in practice for exam-
ple in the Report to the French President by Stiglitz/Sen/Fitoussi (2009), 15 – Recom-
mendation 6. 
12 For an more detailed discussion see Fehling (2011), 49–51; intimated in a different 
context (environmental protection) in passing by Kaplow (2007), 116; Kysar (2010), 106. 
13 Whitman (2004), 1161, 1213–1216. The leading case on informational privacy is 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977). 
14 Tene/Polonetsky (2012), 337, pointing to Restatement (second) of Torts, § 652D 
(1977). 
15 BVerfGE 7, 195, 205–207; published in English in Mitglieder des Bundesverfas-
sungsgericht (1998), 1, 5–6; excerpts in English in Kommers (1997), 361–368, for the 
concept of a “radiating effect” of basic rights on third parties see ibid., 48–49; in the 
context of informational self-determination (concerning a renting contract) BVerfGE 84, 
192, 194–195; Kühling/Seidel/Sivridis (2011), 54. 
 
                                                 
  Comment on Haksoo Ko 103 
is not able to protect himself or herself. Such inability might be caused by 
overwhelming market power of the opponent or by severe information 
asymmetry. In our context, this means that legal institutions must be estab-
lished and guaranteed to empower the individual (quite often, but not nec-
essarily in the role of the consumer) in such a way that he or she can freely 
choose his or her appropriate level of privacy and openness on the inter-
net.16 I think that a similar conclusion should be possible in the analytical 
framework of institutional economics. Such a duty to protect – and corre-
spondingly: such an individual right to get protection – is recognized for 
the right to privacy under Art. 8 ECHR, too.17 There is less doctrinal cer-
tainty about the interpretation of the new Art. 8 of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights (and the similar Art. 16 TFEU), but it seems fair to 
say that there is such a right to privacy protection on the internet on the 
level of the European Union as well. At least, the European Directive on 
Privacy and Electronic Communications,18 which draws on Art. 7 and 8 of 
the Charter, addresses these issues in internet communications between 
private parties. 
III. Necessary level of protection 
In a rational choice model the consumer is seen as a completely rational 
actor maximizing his or her individual welfare in internet transactions. 
From such a point of view, more information about each other helps pri-
vate parties to create contracts on the internet which serve both parties 
best. If this were true, the protection of privacy might – according to Pos-
ner and others – even be a source of inefficiency.19 There would be no need 
for time consuming and costly legal barriers against an easy flow of infor-
mation. 
16 From a constitutional law point of view compare Bäcker (2012), 99–111; Albers 
(2005), 562–582. 
17 See Meyer-Ladewig (2011), Art. 8 para. 2, 4, 8; O’Boyle/Harris (2009), pp. 362, 
369, 382; Ehlers (2007), § 2 para. 16, § 3 para. 26. 
18 Directive 2009/136/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 No-
vember 2009 Amending Directive 2002/22/EC on Universal Service and Users’ Rights 
Relating to Electronic Communications Networks and Services, Directive 2002/58/EC 
Concerning the Processing of Personal data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electron-
ic Communications Sector and Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 on Cooperation Between 
National Authorities Responsible for the Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws, O.J. 
L 337 of 18 December 2009, 11. 
19 Posner (1978), 397–401; similarly Stigler (1980), especially at 628–633; Calzola-
ri/Pavan (2006); more nuanced Murphy (1996), 2385–2388, who endorses Posner’s view 
regarding claims for the protection of a mere reputation but differs regarding privacy 
claims based on subjective privacy preferences other than manipulating reputation. 
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But even from a rational choice point of view, one might reach a different 
conclusion when taking into account transaction costs: Because it takes too 
much time to read and trying to understand the privacy policy of undertak-
ings on the internet, it might be rational to ignore the more or less hypo-
thetical risks to privacy in internet communication. Regulation should then 
enhance the information companies are obliged to give to consumers about 
the processing of their data, in particular making the statements more com-
prehensive and better understandable. 
Professor Ko showed us that the context (framing effect), the paradox of 
control and the privacy paradox influence consumers’ privacy decisions.20 
Therefore, behavioural law and economics might give us a more realistic 
picture of such decisions in internet communication. Consumers might 
overvalue short term benefits of information disclosure to less visible long 
term risks. Because of peer group pressure this might be even more the 
case in social networks than in pure business contacts. In this model, regu-
lation should not only reduce information asymmetries on the usage of 
personal data but must also help the consumers to properly weigh the pro 
and cons of giving away parts of their privacy. 
Although European and German law on data protection do not com-
pletely endorse the idea of bounded rationality,21 the law at least recogniz-
es that there are severe information asymmetries which might cause severe 
problems to reach a truly informed consent:22 On the one hand, the lack of 
knowledge about the further processing of one’s data might result in con-
sumers’ annoyance or overconfidence in dealing with personal data.23 But 
the perception of less control over the usage of private data might also – 
the other way round – have a chilling effect on the enhancement of one’s 
personality. Unlike Posner, the fundamental right to informational self-
determination recognizes the psychological costs – that is, the possibly 
chilling effect which unknown risks to privacy may have on personal and 
business relationships24 – as a completely rational motive for rules of data 
protection. As risks to privacy are part of a social context even the pre-
sumption of such severe risks endangers the level of freedom in social rela-
tionships not only on an individual level but also in society as a whole.25 
20 For example, John/Acquisti/Loewenstein (2011), 868; also compare Tene/ 
Polonetsky (2012), 333, noting that consumers often express a strong interest in privacy 
and aversion towards online behavioural tracking but refrain from taking any step, no 
matter how trivial and costless, to prevent tracking. 
21 Compare Britz (2010), 587–588, drawing on BVerfGE 9, 353, 358, noting that in 
the first place everybody has to protect himself by making informed decisions about 
privacy relevant information. 
22 This has already been noted by Simitis (1987), 736–737, compare ibid., 733–734. 
23 Compare Tene/Polonetsky (2012), 335, 338; more sceptical Britz (2010), 592. 
24 BVerfGE 65, 1, 42–43; compare Britz (2010), 569–570. 
25 Weichert (2001), 1469, emphatically endorses this view. 
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Therefore, legislation has to build trust in the protection of privacy in the 
electronic information infrastructure even if losses in freedom according to 
reduced privacy cannot be completely tracked down to quantified and 
monetized individual costs.26 
C. Strategies of consumer protection of privacy 
 in internet communication 
I. The appropriate scope of paternalism in the law 
From a rational choice perspective, it would be easy to dismiss every sort 
of paternalism concerning the disclosure of personal data. But the picture 
changes if we take into account bounded rationality, framing effects and 
context dependency, hyperbolic discounting and other behavioural biases27 
which hinder rational decision making regarding privacy. To overcome 
such tendencies, regulatory measures against information asymmetry are 
necessary but not sufficient. This is even more the case considering exter-
nal effects on freedom in social interaction in general (as mentioned 
above); such effects can be accelerated by peer pressure or even herd be-
havior in social networks like Facebook, etc. The problem further increases 
when dealing not with adults but with young people. 
Because the protection of privacy is a necessary prerequisite of the free 
enhancement of one’s personality, it would be wrong to label every pater-
nalistic approach from the outright as “anti-freedom”. Certainly, a strong 
form of paternalism would neglect that it is an essential part of liberty to 
individually and freely balance costs and benefits of disclosure of private 
information. But a weaker “libertarian paternalism”28, which only frames 
the balancing process to enhance rationality, is in accordance both with the 
insights of bounded rationality and the doctrine of the fundamental right to 
privacy.29 
 
26 For a discussion of the means to ascertain the “value of privacy” to individuals, see 
Acquisti et al. (2009). 
27 See in general, in the context of cost-benefit-analysis, Sunstein (2005), 65–69; Ad-
ler/E. Posner (2006), 124–153. 
28  Sunstein/Thaler (2003); Thaler/Sunstein (2008), similar Camerer et al. (2003); 
more sceptical because of the difficulties to distinguish this approach from “stronger” 
paternalism Schäfer/Ott (2010), chapter 4.3.1. 
29 Compare Acquisti (2009), describing the benefits of a soft paternalistic approach of 
“nudging” privacy; Tene/Polonetsky (2012), 347, citing Thaler/Sunstein (2008), 1–4. 
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II. Judging legislation on internet privacy from this perspective 
Legislative measures must – first of all – reduce transaction costs for pro-
tecting private information taking into account the framing effect and other 
features of consumers’ bounded rationality. In accordance with libertarian 
paternalism there should be a strict regime of data protection in general 
with the opportunity to waive this protection by positive action. Therefore, 
the opportunity for opting-out might not be sufficient. Prior consent in data 
processing as a form of opting-in is necessary, if data processing is more 
than minimally intrusive and not clearly socially desirable.30 In addition, 
measures have to be taken to overcome the information asymmetry so that 
an informed consent is really possible. Too much information is not 
enough information. Therefore, the information about storage and usage of 
personal data should be accompanied by a short and easy-to-read sum-
mary, preferably using standardized symbols.31 The last proposal has been 
broadly discussed – but unfortunately not realized – for disclosing nutri-
tional values of food;32 the arguments are nearly the same. In more general 
terms: If the way notice is given takes into account cognitive limitations 
then transparency can be both a means for achieving consent and an inde-
pendent policy goal which serves personal autonomy and dignity.33 
Second, specific legislative safeguards are necessary to limit the scope 
of data processing even after collecting data on the basis of an informed 
consent. Thus, there should always be a right to revoke consent for the 
future (not for the past). The legislator should even think about a general 
time limitation for such a consent,34 so that, unless the consumer has ex-
plicitly allowed otherwise (libertarian paternalism!), information in social 
networks must be deleted after a certain period35 – which of course might 
not hinder the fact that such information might be still accessible some-
where else on the internet. A change of purpose for using and processing 
of data must be forbidden without a special (second) consent for this.  
30 See Tene/Polonetsky (2012), 341; compare furthermore ibid., 334, noting that the 
decision between opt-in or opt-out, which requires a value judgement, determines the 
level of privacy protection as well as the fate of entire business models. 
31 For a detailed discussion of “non-linguistic notice”, “privacy nutrition labels” and 
“behavioural tracking icons” see Tene/Polonetsky (2012), 344–346 with further refer-
ences. 
32 For some aspects of the discussion see Behnsen (2009); Sosnitza (2010); in the U.S. 
compare Kelley et al. (2010); Hill (2011). 
33 Tene/Polonetsky (2012), 343, citing Calo (2012). 
34 The German Bundesrat proposed such a time limitation in its comment on the EU-
proposal for a new General Data Protection Regulation, see BR-Drucks. 52/12 (2) of 30 
March 2012, no. 23. 
35 Similar, Tene/Polonetsky (2012), 354, argue for a “regular deletion period”. 
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Third, in principle a company should not be allowed to refuse a business 
contract (or the participation in a social network) simply for the reason that 
the user does not agree with the usage of his or her data for purposes not 
directly linked to the contract. Instead, the company could charge an (ade-
quate) small compensation fee if using and selling privacy-relevant infor-
mation is part of its business calculation. 
Fourth and last, legal remedies must be construed in a way to reduce 
transaction costs as well. There must be an adequate mixture of private 
enforcement and state control. 
III. The legal framework on data protection 
European and German law on data protection have implemented some but 
not all of these features. 
In general – there are exemptions – a prior consent of the data subject is 
needed for collecting and processing his or her personal data (Art. 7 lit. a 
of the current EU-Data Protection Directive [DPD]36; §§ 4, 4a Federal Data 
Protection Act – Bundesdatenschutzgesetz [BDSG]). But the wording does 
not tell us exactly what is necessary for a legally valuable consent (com-
pare the definition in Art. 2 lit. h DPD “freely given, specific and in-
formed”; § 4a Sec. 1 S. 1 BDSG: “freie Entscheidung” – free decision). In 
the proposal for a new European General Data Protection Regulation37 a bit 
more can be found – but still only general terms open for judicial interpre-
tation. In particular, Art. 7 Sec. 4 of the draft regulation states that “con-
sent shall not provide a legal basis for the processing, where there is a sig-
nificant imbalance between the position of the data subject and the 
controller”. Taken literally, this would be regularly true in internet com-
merce and in social networks due to the information asymmetries between 
the private party and the multinational company. This can hardly be in-
tended.38  
36 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 24 October 1995 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, O.J. L 281 of 23 November 1995, 3111, amended by Regu-
lation (EC) No. 1882/2003 of the European Parliament and the Council of 29 September 
2003, O.J. L 284, 1; for an overview see Charlesworth (2003). 
37 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council on the pro-
tection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), COM(2012) 11 final; for 
an analysis see Härting (2012). 
38 In fact, recital 34 of the proposal itself states that a “clear imbalance” is namely 
given in circumstances “where the data subject is in a situation of dependence from the 
controller”, as can be the case “in the employment context”, or, “where the controller is a 
public authority, (…) where [it] can impose an obligation by virtue of its relevant public 
powers (…)”. 
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Even more problematic is the legal provision dealing with the information 
necessary for an informed consent. According to Art. 11 of the current Di-
rective (similar § 4 Sec. 3 BDSG) a data subject must be provided with the 
purpose for which the data are intended and the recipients of the data. In 
addition, “any information” has to be given in so far as it is necessary, with 
regard to the specific circumstances. Art. 11 of the proposed regulation 
tells us much more but is in itself very difficult to read. The information 
given according to this article might not be easier to understand. 
Up to now, there is no explicit right to revoke the consent – this may not 
be confused with the data subject’s right to object on compelling legitimate 
ground to a particular processing of data for which a consent is not needed 
(Art. 14 DPD). But at least the German doctrine recognizes such a right if 
executed in good faith.39 A time limitation (limited period of validity) for 
the consent does not exist at all. In this regard, the proposed European 
Regulation would – as already mentioned by Professor Ko – bring some 
progress with a “right to be forgotten and erasure” (Art. 15 of the draft); it 
is explicitly mentioned that the storage of data might be consented for a 
fixed period of time and that the data subject is entitled to withdraw con-
sent on which the processing is based (both Sec. 1 lit. b). But there is still 
no time limitation in general. 
According to German law (§ 28 Sec. 3b S. 1 BDSG), a company may 
not refuse a contract only for the reason that the consumer does not agree 
to the usage of his or her data, if there is no feasible alternative for the 
consumer, for example contracting with a competing company. But this 
obligation to contract has been construed narrowly.40 In particular, the con-
sumer has no right to pay a modest fee instead of giving away private in-
formation. 
Closely related to the necessity of an informed consent, there is a sec-
ond cornerstone of data protection law. Personal data must only be used 
and processed for the specified purposes on which the data subject has giv-
en his or her consent and must not be further processed in a way incompat-
ible with these purposes (Art. 6 Sec. 1 lit. a DPD; compare for the public 
sector § 14 BDSG – “Zweckbindungsgrundsatz”, for the private sector 
compare in particular § 28 and § 31 BDSG). But this is only a very weak 
protection against the abuse of personal data on the internet, because – as 
pointed out by Professor Ko – the person affected typically will not know 
about the exact processing of his or her data due to the technical complexi-
ty.  
Of course, every person has the right to obtain “confirmation as to 
whether or not data relating to him are being processed” and to know “the 
39 For details see Kühling/Seidel/Sivridis (2011), 126–127. 
40 For a detailed discussion see Kühling/Seidel/Sivridis (2011), 117–121. 
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purposes of the processing, the categories of data concerned and the recipi-
ents to whom the data are disclosed” (Art. 12 lit. a DPD). But few people 
will bear the transaction costs without probable cause or even strong suspi-
cion. And very few will be able to estimate whether they have been in-
formed correctly or not. 
There are many provisions for building trust in the technical infor-
mation infrastructure41 to make sure that manipulations do not take place 
on the technical level. This is the major subject of the Directive on Privacy 
and Electronic Communications, which in Art. 5 Sec. 3 also deals with 
cookies, calling in principle for opt-in consent but with several unclear 
exceptions.42 But again safeguards against technical manipulations do not 
help much against the abuse and unlawful transmission of data which a 
company got lawfully in the first place. 
D. Protecting privacy in a multi-level regulatory network 
I. Transnational problems, national law 
In data protection there again is the well-known problem that we have to 
deal with trans-border affairs predominantly within national law. 
Although the World Wide Web does not stay within national borders, 
there is no general and concise legal regime of data protection on the inter-
national level. We only find a few international treaties on data transfer 
and data protection in special areas of the law – probably most well-known 
on data retention in air traffic between the European Union and the U.S.43 
There are negotiations between the EU and the U.S. about common mini-
mal standards,44 and already some safe-harbour rules based on regulated 
self-regulation,45 but it is doubtful whether Professor Ko’s proposals for 
more international harmonization, although convincing in theory, will find 
sufficient political support, taking into account the different cultures on 
privacy. 
41 The underlying rationale has been discussed in detail by Britz (2010), 588–591. 
42 Detailed discussion by Tene/Polonetsky (2012), 307–313; concerning the flaws of 
the earlier version of 2002 compare Debusseré (2005), 80–97. 
43 Agreement between the United States of America and the European Union on the 
use and transfer of Passenger Name Records to the United States Department of Home-
land Security, COM(2011) 807 final (initial legislative proposal; the legislative proce-
dure is already completed, but the legislation is, as of July 2012, awaiting publication). 
44 Explicitly supported by the German Bundesrat, BR-Drucks. 52/12 (2) of 30 March 
2012, no. 6. 
45 See for more details infra II. with infra note 52. 
 
                                                 
110 Michael Fehling 
 
Even the European Union has unchallenged power to create a legal regime 
directly applicable for data processing only for its own European affairs 
and agencies. For data protection between private parties within the mem-
ber states the Union has issued a directive which has to be transformed into 
national law. This applies even with regard to data transfer to third coun-
tries outside of the European Union (compare Art. 25, 26 DSD). In the 
future, the directive should be replaced by the already mentioned46 new 
regulation (for the data transfer to third parties see Art. 37-44 of the draft) 
but it is doubtful whether the European Union has power to do so based on 
Art. 16 Sec. 2 TFEU.47 The regulation shall apply even if a company has 
no seat in the EU but sells its products or delivers its services on the Euro-
pean market.48 
So in the end, at least today, the major burden is on national law to deal 
with the data flow in e-commerce and in social networks on the internet. In 
accordance with the current European Directive, § 4b Sec. 2, 3 BDSG pro-
vide that the data transfer can principally take place only if the third coun-
try ensures an adequate level of protection; this shall be assessed in the 
light of all the circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation. But 
this would be completely unrealistic in the World Wide Web; even in the 
U.S. it is doubtful whether there is a level of protection similar to the one 
in the European Union concerning the data. So European (Art. 26 DPD) as 
well as German law (§ 4c BDSG) derogates from this principle in several 
variations: First, if the data subject has given his consent to the proposed 
transfer (Sec. 1 lit. a respectively Sec. 1 no. 1). Second and even more im-
portant – because often there will be no consent which unambiguously co-
vers the data transfer in such a “risky” third country, too – where the con-
troller adduces adequate safeguards for the protection of privacy; such 
safeguards may in particular result from appropriate contract clauses (Sec. 
2). This opens up the way for Codes of Conduct, Codes of Privacy and 
similar Global Privacy Policies which a multinational company can use to 
secure a worldwide similar level of protection.49 The new draft for an EU-




46 See supra note 37. 
47 The German Bundesrat issued a subsidiarity complaint according to Art. 12 lit. b 
TFEU, BR-Drucks. 52/12 and BR-Drucks 52/12 (2), both of 30 March 2012. 
48 The German Bundesrat has explicitly welcomed this, se BR-Drucks. 52/12 (2) of 30 
March 2012, no. 7. 
49 See Kühling/Seidel/Sivridis (2011), 132. 
50 Compare the complaints of the German Bundesrat against Art. 44 of the proposed 
regulation, BR-Drucks. 52/12 (2) of 30 March 2012, no. 45. 
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II. The legal solution: “Regulated Self-Regulation” 
Regulated self-regulation is a mixture between self-regulation of the com-
panies and State regulation.51 Companies offer a sort of privacy govern-
ance, perhaps even combined with an audit procedure. The European au-
thorities supervise the companies’ Codes of Privacy and issue “safe-
harbour” principles which are most important in relationship to the U.S.52 
If the standards are inadequate, the Member States will block transnational 
data transfer or at least would not enforce contracts on the basis of inade-
quate privacy standards. Ideally, this should combine the advantages of 
both regulatory strategies. On the one hand, self-regulation ensures flexi-
bility and makes up to the fact that on the international level a legal author-
ity is more or less lacking. On the other hand, State control should assure 
that the companies set up adequate privacy policies and adhere to them in 
practice, too. 
But the catastrophe on the financial markets teaches us that more or less 
informal international standards might be much to lax, if there is not 
enough pressure from the people and the governments. The risk seems to 
be high in particular because of the lack of transparency and the infor-
mation asymmetry which tends to render the State control toothless.  
Global Privacy Policies might hopefully induce a sort of international 
harmonization of privacy standards at least within the private sector. The 
alternative to harmonization would be a more active role of some coun-
tries, hoping for the – in economic terms – “California Effect”53. But even 
the European Union with its large Common Market today seems too weak 
to force other countries to comply with the Union’s own – far from perfect 
– privacy standards.54 
III. The problem of enforcement 
So the lack of effective enforcement-mechanisms is the major obstacle to 
an adequate protection of privacy in internet commerce and in social net-
works.  
51 Hoffmann-Riem (1996), 300–303; Schmidt-Aßmann (2001), 254–255; Schulz/Held 
(2001), 5–6. 
52 Decision of the EU-Commission 2000/520/EG and its appendices I and II, O.J. 
L 215, 7. For a short overview see Debusseré (2005), 95–96; Kühling/Seidel/Sivridis 
(2011), 31–32. 
53 Named after the state that has often been on the cunning edge of environmental 
regulation, see Vogel (1995), 6; for a critical discussion of this phenomenon see Swire 
(1996), 80–87. 
54 Schneider (2011), 522 points in the same direction. 
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Data protection law relies to a great extent on private enforcement. Every 
data subject has the right to, as appropriate, the rectification, erasure or 
blocking of data the processing of which does not comply with the law (see 
§§ 6, 34, 35 BDSG, Art. 12 lit. b DPD). But this does not help much be-
cause of the lack of transparency and the transaction costs which are typi-
cally too high to bear for individual claimants – even more, if the company 
is located in a different country. In addition, tort claims (compare § 7 
BDSG) are bound to fail because it typically is not possible to prove a 
monetary damage.55 
So we probably need a compound administration (Verwaltungsverbund), 
a network of national authorities working together. This is the well-known 
concept within the European Union,56 not only in data protection. The Eu-
ropean Commission is acting as coordinator (“Spinne im Netz”). This 
model is laid down in Art. 26 Sec. 3, 4 DPD: If a Member State authorizes 
a transfer of data to a third country which does not ensures an adequate 
level of protection, the Member State shall inform the Commission and the 
other Member States. If a Member State or the Commission objects on 
justified grounds involving the protection of privacy, the Commission shall 
take appropriate measures agreed upon in a committee-procedure (compare 
Art. 31 Sec. 2 DPD). Where the Commission decides, assisted by the 
Committee, that certain standard contractual clauses offer sufficient safe-
guards, Member States shall take the necessary measures to comply with 
the Commission’s decision. But this network of national administrations 
ends at the borders of Europe; there is nothing similar on the international 
level, only some soft law as described in detail by Professor Ko. 
Even so, the chances for a better enforcement on the national level 
should not be underestimated. In Germany, the Data Protection Commis-
sioners (Datenschutzbeauftragte) on Federal and on Länder-level, acting as 
a sort of ombudsman, can make a lot of publicity. They can combine in-
formal administrative action (negotiations with international companies) 
with an information policy (press releases about the deficits in data protec-
tion – “naming and shaming”).57 In a long run, this might even hurt inter-
national companies like Facebook or Google, because they are dependent 
on a good reputation. 
55 See Weichert (2001), 1466. 
56 For a short description in English see Ruffert (2011), 2–3; in more detail Siegel 
(2009), Danwitz (2008), 616–634. 
57 A good example is the strategy of the Data Protection Commissioner of the German 
State Schleswig-Holstein, Thilo Weichert against Facebook, talking to the press about the 
difficult negotiations, see press release of 30 September 2011, https://www.date 
nschutzzentrum.de/presse/20110930-facebook-datenschutz-durchsetzen.html. 
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E. Conclusion  
Let me finish with quite a paradox observation: The protection of privacy 
on the internet shows some shortcomings both of law and of economics. 
But at the same time it is a very good example for the analytical value of 
law and economics. 
On the one hand, most traditional legal instruments render toothless on 
the international level; neither private nor public law is able to overcome a 
significant imbalance in power based on information asymmetries between 
citizens or consumers and international companies. Regulated self-
regulation does not work if the state oversight is too weak. On the econom-
ic side of the issue, a property rights approach, even if combined with the 
idea of bounded rationality, is not sufficient for explaining the necessity of 
data protection on the internet. 
On the other hand, a refined economic analysis, combining Sen’s capa-
bility approach with behavioral law and economics, can at least uncover 
these shortcomings. It also points to the center of the problems, the lack of 
transparency and the information asymmetry in data processing on the in-
ternet. Informal administrative action on national and European level 
might help to reduce these difficulties, but will not be able to overcome 
them. 
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Discussion on Haksoo Ko 
summarized by 
José Caiado 
Legal systems will have to deal with two typical privacy issues. One prob-
lem relates to standard and complex consumer contracts to which one 
agrees by simply clicking on the “Agree” button. In reality, however, very 
few people read the terms that are being agreed to. Another problem is the 
use of web searches as an advertisement tool. One interesting example is 
the advertisement of medicine. Google will map certain regions and know 
in advance where there is an outbreak of the flu, and they will use this to 
advertise certain products to those people.  
The view of the Chicago School is that privacy is a source of inefficien-
cy, generating problems of signaling. This interpretation comes from pre-
internet times, covering situations such as a job applicant hiding infor-
mation. Further developments relate to (i) negative externalities (the con-
sumer does not benefit from its data, only the company), (ii) behavior eco-
nomics, which raised problems of overconfidence and optimism bias, (iii) 
research about “users’ decisions being context dependent”, and also (iv) 
the “paradox of control” in which individuals say they want privacy, but 
they are not willing to pay for it, so they reveal sensitive information for a 
very low price. During the discussions, however, it was argued that from a 
rational choice point of view, one might reach a different conclusion. If 
one takes into consideration transaction costs, it might be rational for con-
sumers simply to ignore the agreements. Also, behavior studies indicated 
that consumers might need some protection. This leads us to a “necessary 
level of protection”. It has also been argued that paternalism might be a 
solution to deal with bounded rationality, especially in its form of “liber-
tarian paternalism”. Under this perspective, a legal guideline should re-
quire consent in data processing, showing consumers summaries and sym-
bols; there should be a right to revoke consent, and also of a limited period 
of validity, among others. In German and European law, there are rules on 
how to limit and define legally valuable consent, how to inform consum-
ers, and there is no limited period of validity of the consent.  
118 José Caiado 
The EU has regulations in place, such as the Data Protection Directive, 
while the US has no uniform framework, having only some instruments 
regulated by the FTC that focus on self-regulation. Some proposals for 
reform include EU proposal for data protection with the “right to be forgot-
ten”. In the US there is the implementation of the “do not track” mode.  
An interesting way to structure the regulatory responses to these new is-
sues of privacy is to understand the problem in terms of costs and benefits. 
The main benefit to companies is marketing, which can be very effective. 
Costs to users can be represented by the unwanted use of information. The 
real challenge becomes then to determine how the costs and benefits of 
privacy information disclosure must be balanced. 
 
 
Private Military Contractors –  





Politics and academia have now intensely discussed the phenomenon of 
military contractors for approximately two decades. 1  In the context of 
controversial activities of private military contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan 2 , the issue occasionally ranked prominently in a variety of 
forums, with extensive media coverage. Meanwhile a number of political and 
legal issues related to private military contractors seem to have been settled. 
There is also less public debate and contractors, governments, and 
commentators have moved back to normal. Today’s “business as usual” is, 
however, different from the pre-1990s: First, notwithstanding criticism and 
scepticism, private military contractors today have consolidated their share in 
providing national and international security; second, states, reluctant to adopt 
new binding rules, largely agree on how, in principle, to address these 
contractors from the perspective of international human rights and 
humanitarian law; third, contractors, governments, and civil society have 
jointly developed soft law approaches to improving oversight of the security 
industry. 
Understanding and explaining the factual and legal differences in dealing 
with private military contractors between the pre-1990s and today is not an 
easy exercise. Indeed, when the topic had become a prominent issue for 
politics, law, and the media, some commentators had expected that 
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contractors would be a short-lived phenomenon, others had hoped for the 
acceptance of new, possibly stricter, international legally binding rules, and 
few had foreseen the development of international soft law standards and 
institutions. 3  Perhaps this is due to the fact that the potential of private 
military contractors and their impact on international security have been 
overestimated not only at the beginning but also during the two decades-long 
debates. On the one hand, industry promoters of private military contractors 
had hoped for higher returns and government sponsors had expected less 
public expenditure. On the other hand, critiques of private military contractors 
had hoped for a stronger legislative and regulatory response at the national 
and international level. 
This paper does not aim at providing a comprehensive explanation for the 
above-mentioned differences. It will present the situation of private military 
contractors from the perspective of public international law as of today, and it 
will provide some insights into possible reasons for these developments, 
contributing thereby to the law and economics debate on private military 
contractors. 
A. Drivers for the Use of Private Military Contractors 
Private military contractors do not deploy themselves. They are called in and 
employed by other actors. These have, primarily, been governments, but also 
other actors, including non-governmental parties to non-international conflicts 
and international organizations. 4  Even though commentators increasingly 
question the role of the state not only in international relations generally but 
in particular in international security, largely referring to the notion of 
privatisation of international security5, states have been and continue to be the 
primary entities who rely upon private military contractors. Rather than 
focusing on the sheer number of private military contractors deployed and 
rather than reconstructing the whole of international relations and 
international law6, it seems to be more plausible first to look into the reasons 
for states making use of private military contractors. In this context it is very 
important to note that private military contractors have replaced parts of the 
armed forces and of other civil servants; this means that contractors do not 
normally act on their own initiative but are agents of governments (or other 
actors). States (or other traditional actors) have remained and continue to be 
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the principals, making use of private contractors as their agents.7 The main 
question in order to understand the increased use of private military 
contractors today is why states no longer exclusively rely upon their military 
and police forces in providing internal and external security but have 
outsourced parts of the implementation of their security-related foreign 
policy. 
I. Effectiveness or Efficiency?  
A first aspect to be taken up in trying to answer this question is the 
relationship between governments and military/police forces on the one hand 
and between governments and private contractors on the other hand. Military 
and police forces are state organs. They form part of the executive branch of 
governments. With the inherent hierarchy in such forms of traditional 
governance, political decisions can be implemented in a straightforward way, 
i.e., in the absence of transaction costs it is plausible and likely that such 
implementation will be effective. However, while command and control 
structures in foreign and security policy promise a high degree of 
effectiveness, they entail overall the responsibility of governments: not only 
are governments in charge of personnel, equipment and budget, the actions of 
their military and police forces are directly attributable to governments, i.e., 
governments will be easily held responsible for any misconduct that may 
occur. 
Moving from police and military forces to private contractors may at first 
sight reduce the potential for effective foreign and security policy action since 
such private contractors are not subject to direct orders of the government but 
only to the terms of the contract entered into with the government. Within the 
framework of such contracts private military companies enjoy a degree of, at 
least organisational, autonomy. Such organisational autonomy may contribute 
to increased efficiency; it reduces governmental responsibility for personnel, 
equipment and budget, and it will also limit state responsibility for 
misconduct, which may occur. In essence, the move from military and police 
forces to private military contractors is a move from command and control 
strategies to more indirect, largely incentive-based approaches in the 
implementation of foreign and security policy.8 The legal rules applicable to 
civil servants on the one hand and to contractors on the other, nationally and 
internationally, are different, and a lot of the debate about private military 
contractors has, from a legal perspective, focused upon questions related to 
what are the applicable rules. 
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II. An Ideological Turn 
Looking into the motives for governments to move from the use of military 
and police forces to the use of private military contractors, one of the original 
and in the early days perhaps dominating factors was the ideological turn 
linked to the end of the Cold War.9 These changes did not come along as a 
total surprise, since a lot of these tendencies had already developed in the 
West in the 1980s. Rather than relying exclusively upon the government to 
provide a number of public services, political decision-makers were 
increasingly convinced or at least hoped that the marketplace might similarly 
or better meet public needs. 10  This move from government action to the 
marketplace led to the outsourcing of a number of public services and to 
deregulation, and it contributed to the development of new industries. 
Governments, on the other hand, got rid of the number of responsibilities, 
setting off part of the public service workforce and making them available to 
these new industries. Many governments hoped that this would lead to less 
public expenditure, to efficiency gains, and to economic growth. This overall 
political environment, which has often been labelled as neoliberal, also 
affected the conduct of foreign relations and security policy. With the end of 
the Cold War, there was a lot of talk about a peace dividend 11 , and 
governments came under pressure to reduce their military. Indeed, a number 
of armed forces were dramatically reduced in size, setting off a number of 
highly qualified staff members. 
III. Flexibility in Addressing a New Security Environment 
With the changes in the global security environment12, military involvement 
of governments outside their own countries changed. New threat perceptions, 
linked to organised crime, piracy, and terrorism, provided an incentive for 
governments to increasingly move from open military involvement to covert 
action, which could not be easily attributed to a particular state or 
government. Moreover, private contractors seemed to be more flexible for ad 
hoc deployment, and perhaps even better trained for a broad variety of 
military and police activities.13 Whether or not the question of lower or less 
strict standards and escaping direct responsibility was also the matter to 
employ private military contractors instead of armed forces is debatable but 
hardly to be proven. Another factor that may play a certain role is the 
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readiness to take certain risks, which may be higher in the case of private 
contractors than in the case of police and armed forces, in particular in light of 
the fact that democracies our increasingly faced with problems if they get 
involved in armed conflicts if this at the same time means that the population 
has to pay a prize in terms of lives of soldiers. Public perception may be very 
different if a soldier gets killed compared to a private military contractors 
getting killed.14 
IV. Some Figures 
Now coming to numerical data, figures do not necessarily provide 
explanations for developments, but they can be highly illustrative. In 2008, 
the size of the private military and security services industry was valued at 
more than $ 200 billion annually.15 In March 2010, there were 150,000 troops 
– but 200,000 private contractors – involved in the conflicts in Afghanistan 
and Iraq.16 The Chairperson of the Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries 
as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impeding the Exercise of the 
Right of Peoples to Self-Determination, in a presentation at the Human Rights 
Council in September 2010, pointed out that “Group4Securior”, an 
internationally recognized provider of military and security services, has 
become the second largest employer world-wide. 17  Thus, in terms of the 
personnel involved and compared to traditional armed forces, private military 
contractors have become sizeable and cannot be ignored. Whether, however, 
it is appropriate to talk about “an explosive growth in the privatization of 
international, and domestic, security forces”18, may be debatable. 
B. The Applicable Law – Not in Need for New Standards? 
The law applicable to the activities of private military contractors largely 
depends on their activities. If employed in situations of armed conflict, 
including situations of military occupation, the law of armed conflict will 
apply, among others the Geneva Conventions of 1949 19  (GC) and their 
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85; Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, UNTS 75, 135; Geneva 
Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, UNTS 75, 287. 
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Additional Protocols20 (AP) as well as customary international law.21 To the 
extent that international human rights law remains applicable in situations of 
armed conflict22, these rules may also be relevant to the conduct of private 
military contractors. Outside such situations, general public international law 
will have to be borne in mind, in particular international human rights law. In 
so far as private military contractors are not as such addressees of pertinent 
rules of public international law, the law of state responsibility contributes to 
establishing a link between these contractors and the states employing them, 
with the conduct of private military contractors being indirectly affected by 
human rights and international humanitarian law standards. 
I. Inadequacy of the Mercenary Definition 
While there is no international agreement specifically addressing private 
military contractors as such23, one might consider whether they qualify as 
mercenaries. Indeed, in light of the fact that private military contractors are 
being paid for their involvement in armed conflicts, it has been discussed 
whether they fall under the international law definition of mercenaries given 
the profits they receive for their operations.24 There are three more or less 
identical definitions of a mercenary in public international law. They are 
included in Article 47 AP I, adopted on 8 June 1977 25 , in the OAU 
(Organization of African Unity) Convention for the Elimination of 
Mercenarism in Africa of 3 July 197726, and in the International Convention 
against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries of 4 
December 1989.27 Article 47 (1) AP I, by stating that a “mercenary shall not 
have the right to be a combatant or a prisoner of war” implicitly confirms that 
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civilians participating directly in hostilities are not entitled to prisoner of war 
status28. 
The three definitions share some basic criteria29: The person qualifying as a 
mercenary must be “specially recruited ... to fight in an armed conflict”30; he 
or she “is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for 
private gain”31; a mercenary “is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor 
a resident of territory controlled by a Party to the conflict” 32 ; also, a 
mercenary “is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict”33; 
and finally, the person qualifying as a mercenary “has not been sent by a State 
which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as a member of its armed 
forces”. 34  Given the fact that these definitional requirements are not only 
numerous but can be easily circumvented, none of the above legal instruments 
has had a major impact on international legal practice, nor can these 
provisions effectively be applied to private military contractors, unless in 
exceptional cases.35 
II. The Status of Contractors in Armed Conflicts 
If taking part in international armed conflicts, as defined by common Article 2 
(1) GC and Article 1 (3) AP I or in a situation of occupation, as defined by 
common Article 2 (2) GC and Article 1 (3) AP I, private military contractors 
will be subject to the basic distinction between combatants and civilians.36 
Only if they qualify as combatants, they are entitled to take a direct part in the 
hostilities without being prosecuted for doing so (unless having committed 
violations of the laws of war), and they will be granted prisoner of war status 
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if captured by enemy forces.37 If they do not qualify as combatants, they will 
be treated as civilians. In other words, they do not have the right to participate 
directly in the hostilities, and – as long as they do not actually participate – 
they will be protected from attack by enemy forces. Should they, however, 
participate directly in the hostilities, they may be treated as criminals by the 
enemy if captured, unless they qualify, among others, as civilians 
accompanying the armed forces according to Article 4 (A) (4) of GC III, or a 
similar subcategory of civilian. 
Private military contractors, apart from being civilians accompanying the 
armed forces, may, however, become de facto combatants 38  according to 
Article 4 (A) 2 GC III and Article 43 (1) AP I if they are incorporated into the 
armed forces. Even though this seems to “contradict the very rationale of 
outsourcing military tasks”39 as private military contractors normally operate 
separately from the military hierarchy these provisions provide a special 
status to “(m)embers of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, 
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to 
the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory” (Article 4 (A) 2 
GC III), subject to several conditions40: It requires an organized armed group 
(a condition, which contractors should easily meet), belonging to a party of 
the conflict (a condition, which, even though this view is sometimes disputed, 
can be met by a contract between the state party and the company, as well as 
by tacit agreement, but not by simply fighting on one side or the other), and 
the following additional criteria: being subjected to a responsible commander, 
wearing distinctive signs, carrying arms openly (criteria slightly modified and 
loosened by Article 44 (3) AP I)41, and conducting operations in accordance 
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 Article 4 (A) (2) GC III reads as follows: “Members of other militias and members of 
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responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a 
distance; (c) that of carrying arms openly; (d) that of conducting their operations in 
accordance with the laws and customs of war.” 
41
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population from the effects of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves 
from the civilian population while they are engaged in an attack or in a military operation 
preparatory to an attack. Recognizing, however, that there are situations in armed conflicts 
where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed combatant cannot so distinguish 
himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in such situations, he carries 
his arms openly:  (a) during each military engagement, and  (b) during such time as he is 
visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching 
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with the laws and customs of war. The most difficult criterion obviously is the 
“belonging to a party”. As mentioned above, mere fighting will not be 
sufficient as proof for such a link to one of the parties to the conflict. Rather, 
the views of the state contracting a private military company must be taken 
into account.42 
Indeed, state practice points in this direction: Both the United States and 
the United Kingdom have frequently contracted private military companies. 
However, as a matter of routine, contractors were given the status of civilians 
accompanying the armed force, as provided for in Article 4 (A) (4) Geneva 
Convention III.43 This means that contractors were not authorized to fight, but 
they obtained a status, which effectively protected them as prisoners of war if 
captured an enemy party. It can be taken from this practice that authorization 
to fight may qualify contractors as combatants, but not the mere fact of taking 
part in hostilities.44 Even if contracted to fight, it is important to note that 
contractors must meet the other requirements mentioned above. 
In international armed conflicts, there are thus three possibilities to qualify 
contractors: (1) If contracted to fight (and if meeting the pertinent criteria), 
they constitute de facto combatants; if not contracted to fight but for other 
purposes, they will (2) either be civilians accompanying the armed forces (3) 
or they will be civilians. In none of the two latter cases they have the right to 
directly participate in hostilities. If, this notwithstanding, they participate 
directly in hostilities, they will be considered as unprivileged belligerents.45 
In non-international armed conflicts, there is less clarity since the rules are 
much less detailed. Common Article 3 GC and AP II do not answer the 
question of whether a person is a combatant or otherwise entitled to fight. As 
a consequence, the issue of the combatant status is normally a non-issue in 
non-international armed conflicts46, and private military contractors will thus 
be subject to the domestic law of the territorial state. Minimum protection for 
contractors is provided by common Article 3 (1) GC, and, to the extent 
applicable, Article 4 AP II. 
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III. Direct Participation of Contractors in Hostilities 
As private military contractors, if involved in situations of an armed conflict 
as civilians, will lose this status in case of direct participation, it is important 
to take a closer look at Article 51 (3) AP I47 and Article 13 (3) AP II48, dealing 
with direct participation. The most serious consequences of direct 
participation are the possibility of being directly attacked according to the 
same rules and principles as combatants and the loss of combatant privilege 
upon capture (i.e., they will be treated as criminals under the domestic law of 
the captor).49 The question arises, what direct participation means. Neither 
treaty law nor State practice or international jurisprudence provide a precise 
definition of what conduct amounts to direct participation in hostilities. 
This means that the notion of direct participation in hostilities must be 
interpreted according to the general rules on treaty interpretation, i.e., in good 
faith and on the basis of the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms in their 
context and in the light of the object and purpose of AP I, AP II and other 
pertinent rules of the law of armed conflict. The rules on treaty interpretation 
are included in Article 31 (1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties and are considered to be customary international law. 50  The 
application of these rules to Article 51 (3) AP I and Article 13 (3) AP II was 
the aim of a clarification process led by the ICRC between 2003 and 2009, the 
outcome of which, while not being uncontroversial, resulted in a publication, 
providing “interpretative guidance” on the interpretation of the notion of 
direct participation in hostilities in contemporary armed conflicts. 51  This 
process has been paralleled by similar discussions in legal doctrine and in 
domestic courts.52 
There is general agreement that the qualification of civilian conduct as 
direct participation in hostilities must be judged on a case-by-case basis. The 
interpretative guidance, however, on the basis of a solid analysis of treaty law, 
pertinent state practice, jurisprudence, and legal doctrine suggests that the 
following criteria are cumulative requirements53: 
First, there must be a belligerent nexus, i.e., conduct occurring outside 
situations of armed conflict (or within such situations but unrelated to the 
conflict) does not amount to direct participation. 
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 Article 51 (3) AP I stipulates: “Civilians shall enjoy the protection afforded by this 
Section, unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities”.
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Second, there must be harm above a certain threshold resulting from such 
direct participation, not limited to death and injury of military personnel or 
damage to military objects, but also including the capture of such personnel or 
the exercise of control over military objects. 
Third, there must be a direct causal link between conduct and harm, 
however, handled in a flexible manner in order “to include civilian conduct 
causing harm only in conjunction with other acts”. 54  While typically an 
agreement can be reached in respect of the qualification of combat operations, 
disputes continue to occur about preparatory and supportive activities. 
Civilians only lose their protection “for such time” that they engage in 
direct participation in hostilities. This means that they are suspended from 
protection but they regain such protection as civilians, once direct 
participation comes to an end.55 While this “revolving door”-approach has 
been subject to some criticism, others have rightly argued that such enhanced 
(and flexible) protection of civilians helps “to avoid erroneous and arbitrary 
attacks against peaceful civilians in situations where doubt, suspicion, and 
uncertainty are endemic”.56 In the case of private military contractors, direct 
participation may take the form of organized participation, where contractors 
assume “a continuous combat function … in the conduct of hostilities”57; then 
they will lose their protection on a continuous basis and they “are held to 
regain protection against direct attack only once they surrender, fall hors de 
combat or affirmatively disengage from the group in question in a manner 
recognizable to the adversary”.58 It is argued, however, that in situations of 
doubt the “presumption of civilian protection should … apply”.59 Not only 
governments employing private military contractors but even more these 
contractors themselves must be aware of the intricacies of Article 51 (3) AP I 
and Article 13 (3) AP II and the notion of direct participation. 
IV. Issues of International Human Rights Law 
Should private military contractors be employed outside situations of armed 
conflict, and thereby perform functions assigned to them by governments, the 
question arises to what extent these contractors are bound by international 
human rights law. According to traditional doctrine, private military 
contractors as such are not addressees of international human rights law. 
However, home and host states involved in the employment and deployment 
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of private military contractors are subject to numerous human rights 
obligations.60 
Addressing the home state of a private military contractor, its 
responsibility for human rights violations connected to the conduct of such a 
contractor may be direct or indirect in nature, or – in other words – negative 
and positive.  
First, the home state will bear responsibility for the human rights violations 
by private military contractors, if the contractor is integrated into the national 
armed forces. Then the contractor may even be considered to be acting as an 
organ of the state61, in particular, if the government has assigned the exercise 
of governmental authority to the contractor either operating in or outside its 
territory. These are all situations of direct responsibility, and they involve the 
state’s negative human rights violations. While the exercise of combat 
functions may only entail governmental responsibility to the extent that 
international human rights law is applicable in addition to the law of armed 
conflict, human rights will be relevant, among others, in post-conflict 
situations in the case of powers of arrest, interrogation services, and other law 
enforcement functions as well as in the context of managing detention 
facilities.62 
Second, if the home state does not integrate contractors into its governance 
machinery, but only loosely establishes links with the contractors, then its 
positive obligations come into play.63 Indeed, the home state cannot escape its 
responsibility for misconduct by outsourcing governmental functions to 
private contractors. This will even apply if the contractor only acts under 
indirect control of its home state.64 
If private contractors are employed by business entities or other non-
governmental actors, responsibility of the home state is even more difficult to 
establish. 65  It may then be argued that the home state is under a general 
obligation to prevent or at least minimize human rights violations by 
contractors established or licensed under its authority. This will also entail the 
responsibility to impose criminal sanctions on perpetrators in case of human 
rights violations and to make available civil remedies to potential victims.66 
Similar obligations may apply to the host state. Its jurisdiction will 
normally be established on the basis of the territoriality principle, and may 
thus exist on parallel tracks to the (extraterritorial) jurisdiction of the home 
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state of a contractor.67 There may be cases of shared responsibility between 
the two states involved, the home and the host state of a private military 
contractor.68 
While it is thus possible to establish international human rights 
responsibility of host and home state of private military contractors, such 
responsibility of the home state, compare to its responsibility for a traditional 
soldier, demonstrates a gap69, unless the contractor is fully incorporated. As 
has rightly been argued, “the state will always face less responsibility for acts 
of those persons than for acts of soldiers, and its responsibility will be harder 
to prove”.70 This gap materializes in a responsibility for off-duty human rights 
violations as well as in the case of ultra vires or uncontrolled conduct of 
contractors exercising coercive services. States will typically exploit such 
options to minimize their international responsibility. 71  Efforts to narrow 
down such responsibility gaps must focus on duties to vet, train, instruct, and 
report, and possibly to prevent known violations. 
This analysis already points to the conclusion that rather than focusing on 
the conduct of private military contractors as such, supervision of these actors 
seems to be the greater challenge and of utmost importance. 
V. Towards New Treaty Law? 
As early as 1987, at a time when the International Convention against the 
Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries had not yet been 
adopted, the UN Commission on Human Rights decided to appoint a Special 
Rapporteur on the use of mercenaries as a means of violating human rights 
and impeding the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination.72 The 
mandate of the special rapporteur initially focused on mercenaries, and the 
Commission decided in 2004 that the Special Rapporteur “pay(s) particular 
attention to the impact of the activities of private companies offering military 
assistance, consultancy and security services on the international market on 
the exercise of the right of peoples to self-determination”.73 
In 2005, the Commission decided to end the mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur and instead established a Working Group, consisting of five 
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independent experts. 74  The Working Group is mandated to monitor and 
research mercenaries and mercenary-related activities in all manifestations, 
including private military and security companies.75 Apart from conducting 
country visits, receiving individual complaints, publishing reports, studies and 
articles, the Group has developed guidelines and presented proposals to 
enhance the protection of human rights in the context of mercenary activities 
and of the conduct of private military contractors.76 Currently, the Group is 
mandated, among others, “(t)o elaborate and present concrete proposals on 
possible complementary and new standards aimed at filling existing gaps, as 
well as general guidelines or basic principles encouraging the further 
protection of human rights, in particular the right of peoples to self-
determination, while facing current and emergent threats posed by 
mercenaries or mercenary-related activities”.77 
In 2010, the Human Rights Council established an open-ended 
intergovernmental working group78 to consider the possibility of elaborating 
an international regulatory framework on the regulation, monitoring and 
oversight of the activities of private military and security companies. An 
optional starting point of their work was and is the “Draft of a possible 
Convention on Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) for 
consideration and action by the Human Rights Council”79, prepared by the 
Working Group. The main elements of the proposed Convention reaffirm the 
state monopoly on the legitimate use of force, identify governmental 
functions that cannot be outsourced to private military contractors; and apply 
international human rights standards to regulate the use of force and firearms 
by private contractors. 
C. Supervision of Private Military Contractors:  
The Potential of Soft Law 
Long before the UN human rights framework, as just discussed, came forward 
with concrete proposals for the development of treaty-based human rights 
standards for private military contractors, the Swiss government, the ICRC 
and the private sector had initiated a number of soft law processes aimed at 
supervising private military contractors and their conduct. The choice for a 
soft law approach cannot only be attributed to its non-legally binding 
character and to the fact that states will more easily reach a politically binding 
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than a legally binding agreement. Instead, a number of other factors have to 
be borne in mind. Confirming the existence and applicability of existing 
rather than the need for new rules is easier to achieve by way of a soft law 
agreement; furthermore, this process is much faster in producing outcomes 
since it does not necessitate parliamentary approval or other constitutional 
requirements. Furthermore, the inclusion of non-state actors, in particular, of 
business actors, is facilitated by not relying upon formal processes of law. 
And finally, innovative approaches towards cooperative supervision can much 
easier be tested based on soft rather than hard law. 
I. The Montreux Document 
In terms of its political and legal relevance, one of the most important soft law 
documents negotiated and adopted with regard to private military contractors 
is the so-called Montreux Document.80 It constitutes the outcome of a process 
of intergovernmental consultations initiated by the Swiss Federal Department 
of Foreign Affairs in late 2005, with the cooperation of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross. 81  Based upon extensive consultation with 
industry and civil society actors, five intergovernmental and four expert 
meetings were held, leading to the endorsement of the “Montreux Document 
on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States 
related to Operations of Private Military and Security Companies during 
Armed Conflict” (which is the full title of the Montreux Document) on 17 
September 2008. 
The first part of the Montreux Document restates international 
humanitarian law and human rights law as it applies to the activities of private 
military contractors during armed conflict. 82  As has been argued, the 
Document is “a very public reaffirmation by a diverse group of states, 
including the United States, of the applicability of international humanitarian 
law (IHL) and human rights to contemporary armed conflict”. 83  By re-
affirming existing international law obligations of states to protect human 
rights and to ensure respect for international humanitarian law, the first part of 
the Montreux Document can be perceived as a common understanding of all 
states signatories of their perception of the law as it stands; one might even 
argue that this amounts to an expression of opinio iuris with regard to states’ 
obligations in respect of private military contractors, since the Document 
“clearly sets out the specific obligations of individual states under treaty and 
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customary law”.84 The first part of the Montreux Document thus does not at 
all develop new law but restates the capacity of existing law to address the 
phenomenon of military contractors. 
The second part of the Montreux Document goes beyond such restatement. 
It is less a step towards developing new standards but rather a specification of 
how to apply the rules spelled out in the first part of the Document. To this 
end the second part of the Document compiles good practices and aims at 
assisting states in implementing their international legal obligations.85  The 
sub-sections of the second part of the Document address, among others, the 
use of force by private military contractors, the issue of direct participation in 
hostilities, the vetting and training of their personnel, obligations of 
accountability and, finally, immunities of private contractors from foreign 
jurisdiction. 
The Montreux Document is broad, but it is by no means perfect. It was 
never intended to be all-inclusive, but it is one step towards international 
agreement on how to deal with private contractors, and as such it also 
provides guidance to these contractors. With its best practice approach, it 
necessarily entails some lacunae; also, it does not fully spell out the 
implications of states’ obligations to apply a due diligence standard towards 
supervising private military contractors; and finally, remedies for those 
affected by unlawful conduct will necessitate further clarification as the 
Document remains fragmented in this regard.86 While these deficiencies can 
and should not be ignored, it has rightly been praised that the Montreux 
Document “offers a highly credible set of standards, which can … be adapted 
and implemented through a wide array of regulatory arrangements. What is 
called for is a mixture of pragmatism and entrepreneurialism, innovation and 
risk management, by both public and private actors alike”.87 
II. The International Code of Conduct for  
Private Security Service Providers 
Linked to the process leading up to the Montreux Document, the Swiss 
government encouraged further discussions about soft law standards by the 
military and security services industry. In parallel to the adoption of the 
Montreux Document, the Swiss government supported the development of an 
International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers as a 
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multi-stakeholder initiative.88 It pursues a two-fold objective: First, it defines 
principles and standards for the military and the security services industry, 
based on international human rights and humanitarian law; second, it seeks to 
improve the industry’s accountability, moving towards the establishment of 
an oversight mechanism.89 
The articulation of the set of standards is a way to bridge the gap between 
states as norm addressees of human rights and international humanitarian law, 
and private military contractors as an important group of actors in situations 
of conflict, which, even though not directly addressed by rules of public 
international law, are – one might say on the basis of self-regulation – brought 
into this normative framework by signing the Code of Conduct. Indeed, the 
Code, once signed, requires its participating contractors to comply with the 
standards included therein, irrespective of the national laws and the legal 
situation in their home and host countries. With negotiations finalized, private 
contractors began to sign the document in late 2010.90 
The Code of Conduct builds upon a mix of certification, auditing, 
monitoring and reporting. Certification is defined as “a process through which 
the governance and oversight mechanism will certify that a Company’s 
systems and policies meet the Code’s principles and the standards derived 
from the Code and that a Company is undergoing Monitoring, Auditing, and 
verification, including in the field, by the governance and oversight 
mechanism. Certification is one element of a larger effort needed to ensure the 
credibility of any Implementation and oversight initiative”.91 According to the 
Code, signatory contractors accept to be certified on the basis of an 
independent auditing and verification by the governance and oversight 
mechanism established under the Code.92 Handled by a mix of stakeholders, 
including signatory companies, governments and civil society, this 
mechanism is decisive for the functioning of the Code. Auditing will be 
conducted by independent auditors, accredited by the mechanism 93, and it 
includes on-site audits on a periodic basis for the purpose of gathering data. 
These data will then be reported to the governance and oversight mechanism. 
It is up to this mechanism to verify whether a signatory is meeting the 
requirements of the Code. Should this not be the case, the mechanism may 
decide on what remediation is required. 
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III. Draft Charter for the Oversight Mechanism of the International 
Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers 
In order to enhance the functioning of the above-outlined Code of Conduct, 
the stakeholders involved in the Code of Conduct began to negotiate a Draft 
Charter for the Oversight Mechanism of the International Code of Conduct 
for Private Security Service Providers.94 This Charter proposes the overall 
structure and scope of responsibilities for the mechanism envisaged under the 
Code of Conduct. The content of the Draft Charter was developed by the 
multi-stakeholder Temporary Steering Committee established under the Code. 
It is a consensus-based document among the various representatives 
participating in the Temporary Steering Committee.95 The Draft Charter was 
first released in early 2012, inviting a process of stakeholder review and 
comments on the Draft. 
The Draft, again, provides an interesting public-private approach to the 
regulation of private military contractors. Institutionally, it provides for three 
organs of the mechanism: a plenary, a board, and a secretariat.96 The plenary 
includes representatives from industry, civil society, and governments, as well 
as private sector clients and other interested parties, but voting is limited to 
industry. Voting powers cover amendments to the Code of Conduct and to the 
Oversight Mechanism. The board is deemed to be the primary decision-
making body of the Mechanism. It is intended to consist of 12 representatives, 
with industry, civil society and governments being entitled to select four each. 
The powers of the board will include overseeing the operations of the 
secretariat, and this will also cover the secretariat’s operation of the oversight 
process. It is interesting to note that the Draft provides that particularly 
important decisions of the board require a vote of no less than eight members, 
including at least two members from each of the three stakeholder groups, 
ensuring that the whole process remains inclusive. Finally, the secretariat will 
be in charge of administering the Code and it will execute the decisions of the 
board. Among others, the secretariat will include a full-time executive 
director. 
Stakeholder participation in the oversight mechanism will depend on 
compliance with a number of criteria to ensure the credibility of all 
participants. 
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The negotiating process has not yet come to an end. A number of delays have 
occurred, due also to the complexity of the mechanism, and – which is no 
surprise – to the innovative composition of its organs. 
IV. The Potential of Soft Law Approaches 
This chapter does not address all soft law approaches that have been 
developed for the regulation of private military contractors. In particular, it 
does not cover a number of national or fully private self-regulatory 
approaches, which have gained some prominence 97, in particular, in some 
common law countries, first and foremost the United Kingdom. This chapter 
has focused on those soft law mechanisms that comprise governmental actors. 
It is still too early to assess the overall contribution of such soft law 
approaches to the regulation of private military contractors. It is, however, 
clear that even beyond the hard law that has been outlined in the second sub-
section of this chapter, private military contractors are not outside the scope 
of law. 
The very existence and the use of soft law in this particular context should 
not be understood as an argument eliminating the distinction between law and 
non-law. This dualism “can be decisive for the implementation of, and the 
compliance with, the norm”. 98  Neither does soft law as such broaden the 
concept of international law; it cannot “be added as an additional source to the 
three traditional sources of international law”. 99  However, it can easily 
contribute to the purposeful interpretation of existing public international law, 
indicating more precisely the object and purpose of existing rules with regard 
to a particular context. The Montreux Document can easily serve as an 
example whereby states indicate their perception with regard to a number of 
existing rules of international humanitarian law in respect of the operations of 
private military contractors. 
Another important aspect in soft law approaches to the regulation of 
private military contractors is the potential of these instruments to contribute 
to the further development of hard law.100 As has been pointed out, soft law 
can contribute to the development of treaty law, of customary international 
law, and of municipal law. At the least it can be a source of inspiration for 
those in charge of law-making stricto sensu. Indeed, “(t)he mere existence of 
norms in international relations – whether binding or not – allows the world 
players to refer immediately to these norms, thus avoiding some of the 
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lengthy discussions necessitated by every law-making process. Soft law can 
thus be considered the result of a consultation process preceding legislation 
proper”. 101  In addition, “soft law has a complementing and strengthening 
function within the international legal order”.102 
It is exactly this potential of soft law approaches that may be particularly 
useful for the regulation of private military contractors. Given the fact that 
there is established (hard) law that can be easily applied to the involvement of 
private military contractors in various situations, extending from combat to 
support operations, soft law can be used to fill the gaps and to help in the 
interpretation of hard law. 
D. Is Established Law Adequate?  
This leads to a number of conclusions on the adequacy of established law 
addressing private military contractors. 
There is an inherent tendency in responses by policymakers, whether 
private or public, civil society and academia in particular to address new 
challenges by proposing new laws. If this process is left to uncritically 
develop itself, this will lead to an ever-growing body of public international 
law and municipal law, which may not necessarily improve the situation on 
the ground. The steering effect of legal rules does not only depend on their 
comprehensiveness but perhaps even more on their clarity. 
So far, the law of armed conflict and in particular international 
humanitarian law has benefited from being much clearer than a lot of other 
areas of public international law. Such clarity has been decisive because – 
even though addressed to states (and – to a limited extent – to non-state 
parties to armed conflicts) – individuals, both civilians and members of the 
armed forces, were able to read, to understand and to apply bees and worms to 
the individual behaviour. Decision-making on the battlefield can be traced 
back to governmental entities, but it will always be linked to individuals who 
bear responsibility based on their function. Taking into account this beneficial 
clarity of the law of armed conflict and international humanitarian law, there 
is a need to critically assess to what extent there is a lack of clarity with 
regards to employing and overseeing the activities of private military 
contractors in situations of armed conflict. One of the problems outlined 
above is the notion of direct participation in hostilities. In this regard, indeed, 
there still is a need for clarification. However, the processes conducted so far 
in order to achieve such clarification have only been successful to a limited 
extent, as has been illustrated by reference to the interpretative guidance 
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adopted by the ICRC. The Montreux Document as well as the other soft law 
instruments referred to above may help to contribute a certain (limited) 
amount of clarity to the conduct of operations by private military contractors 
in situations of armed conflict, not alone based on the restatement of the law, 
but primarily on the good practice examples included in the second part of the 
Document. Thereby soft law can contribute to a purposeful interpretation of 
pertinent rules of international humanitarian law and of state responsibility. 
The situation is much more difficult outside the scope of armed conflicts. 
The application of international human rights law to and respect for 
international human rights law by private military contractors is a difficult 
effort. This is largely due to the fact that international human rights law is less 
detailed than international humanitarian law and is much more open to 
interpretation. Moreover, while it is not disputed that international human 
rights law is directly applicable to government actors; it is much more 
difficult to bridge the gap between governmental addressees and private 
contractors. Recently, there have been attempts to develop soft law standards 
further towards the applicability of human rights law to business activities.103 
However, these standards have not yet become hard law. In a similar way, the 
above-mentioned code of conduct and the attached oversight mechanism 
might contribute to a better and then enhanced application of human rights 
law to the conduct of private military contractors outside armed conflicts, in 
particular if involved in police activities or in the management of detention 
facilities. 
Simply aiming at the development of new hard law will not necessarily 
meet the requirements on the ground. New standards may easily contradict 
existing standards and thereby weaken rather than strengthen existing rules. 
The development of soft law standards in this field avoids the trap of 
weakening existing rules by accepting the prevalence of these rules and 
simply filling in the gaps with (secondary) rules. This may not necessarily be 
a complete and coherent answer to the debate about the so-called 
accountability gap with regard to the conduct of operations by private military 
contractors.104 However, notwithstanding efforts to bridge the accountability 
gap it is necessary and important to apply existing rules at this moment in 
time and not postponing the solution of the problem to a near or remote 
future. Furthermore, all debates about making private entities addressees of 
human rights entail the risk of weakening rather than strengthening the law. 
The role of the state in public international at the interface between the 
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international and municipal level, at the interface between governmental and 
private actors, has changed and has become more complex but it has remained 
as important as it has been in the past. 
As has been outlined in the first subsection of this chapter, it is not 
primarily private contractors who are the driving forces for their own 
deployment. Rather it is necessary to address the motives and incentives for 
governments to transfer the fulfilment of certain public tasks to private actors, 
and the (legal and political) consequences of such outsourcing. Such 
approaches have to take into account that private military contractors have 
become important actors in international security matters. Public international 
law should not focus on the ethics or the morality of individuals working with 
the inland as part of private military contractors. Public international law 
should instead be concerned with a practical solution of the problems arising 
out of a new actor becoming part of the scenery. As this chapter has pointed 
out, many problems can be solidly addressed on the basis of existing law, and 
the remaining problems can largely be settled by making use of and further 
developing the soft law instruments outlined above. Governments, the private 
security industry and large parts of civil society have opted for a rational 
approach to settle the problem related to private military contractors, rather 
than following a grand ethical design with little practical consequences.  
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Discussion on Thilo Marauhn 
summarized by 
Jerg Gutmann 
Michael Fehling starts the discussion, asking whether the threshold for 
initiating military aggression can be expected to be lower as a consequence of 
the availability of private military contractors. Thilo Marauhn replies that only 
a low share of private military contractors’ activities is directly of military 
nature. While international organizations require more policing activities, 
states hesitate to use private military contractors for their classical core 
military activities. Eyal Benvenisti warns that self-regulation might simply be 
a means to prevent competition. Thilo Marauhn responds it is evident that 
even formerly sceptical governments are today in favour of self-regulation. 
Yet, support for Benvenisti’s hypothesis might come from the case of the 
United Kingdom. 
Peter Lewisch asks the author what governance rule should be used to 
achieve compliance, liability rules or due standards of behaviour. Thilo 
Marauhn questions the effectiveness of a weak ex-post evaluation and 
favours, instead, a code of conduct in combination with oversight. Stefan 
Oeter is sceptical about the role of self-regulation, which can be a way of 
avoiding even stronger government regulation. Thilo Marauhn describes a 
slow, gradual move towards government regulation, as self-regulation is 
increasingly seen sceptical. 
Birgit Feldmann tries to distinguish the need for regulation depending on 
the initiator, which e.g., in case of piracy does not have to be the state. The 
author agrees that the initiator is decisive for the need for regulation. Dieter 
Schmidtchen points out the economic perspective that regulation should focus 
on enhancing the effective cooperation between publicly and privately owned 
firms. Finally, Florian Jeßberger poses the question whether the making of 
international law just tries to control excesses. 
 
 






Comity is the deference one State shows to the decisions of another State. As 
explained by the United States Supreme Court in Hilton v. Guyot: 
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, 
nor of mere courtesy and goodwill, upon the other.  But it is the recognition which one 
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another 
nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience and to the rights of 




Comity is manifested in an array of judicial doctrines, such as the presump-
tion against the extraterritorial application of statutes and the presumption in 
favor of recognition of foreign judgments. Comity does not require a State to 
defer in every case (it is not “a matter of absolute obligation”), but determin-
ing when comity requires deference poses difficult doctrinal and theoretical 
issues. 
This paper offers some observations on the economics of comity in an at-
tempt to provide insights into those issues. It first describes the (largely unsat-
isfactory) attempts to define comity and identifies the various judicial doc-
trines that are based on comity. Generalizing from the existing literature, 
which uses game theory (most commonly the prisoners’ dilemma game) to 
analyze legal doctrines based on comity, the paper then sets out a basic and 
tentative economic analysis of comity. Comity often serves a cooperative 
function: courts rely on comity as the basis for doctrines that enhance cooper-
ation with other States. In such cases, refusing to grant comity to a decision of 
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another State constitutes defection from the cooperative solution. But if the 
original decision itself constitutes defection – such as a State opportunistically 
entering a judgment against a foreign citizen – refusing to grant comity would 
not be defection but would instead be an attempt to sanction the other State’s 
defection. Thus, the central inquiry when a court decides whether to grant 
comity can be framed as whether the State decision being examined consti-
tutes cooperation or defection. Further, given the uncertainty courts face in 
making such a determination, comity itself then can be seen as establishing a 
default presumption that a particular type of State decision constitutes cooper-
ation (or, in cases in which courts refuse to grant comity, as a default pre-
sumption of defection). 
The paper then argues that any rule a court adopts on the basis of comity 
should be treated as a default rule rather than a mandatory rule. The argument 
in favor of default rules over mandatory rules is a familiar one, and seems to 
apply well here. Thus, as U.S. and U.K. courts have held – but contrary to 
decisions of the European Court of Justice – comity concerns should not pre-
clude a court specified in an exclusive forum selection clause from entering 
an anti-suit injunction against foreign court litigation. An arbitration clause, 
by comparison, provides a much weaker case for finding that the parties con-
tracted around the comity-based default. Finally, the paper suggests possible 
avenues for future research: in particular, examining the importance of rent-
seeking and judicial incentives in the economics of comity. 
One final note: my focus is principally (although not exclusively) on court 
cases from the United States because that is the legal system with which I am 
most familiar. But similar issues arise in other legal systems, and my hope is 
that the analysis here may help in understanding approaches from those legal 
systems as well. 
B. What is Comity? 
United States courts have repeatedly noted the difficulty of providing a work-
able definition of comity. In Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World 
Airlines, the D.C. Circuit stated that “[c]omity summarizes in a brief word a 
complex and elusive concept, the degree of deference that a domestic forum 
must pay to the act of a foreign government not otherwise binding on the fo-
rum.”2
 
The Second Circuit has described comity in equally general terms: 
comity is “concerned with maintaining amicable working relationships be-
tween nations, a shorthand for good neighborliness, common courtesy and 
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mutual respect between those who labor in adjoining judicial vineyards.”3 
Consistent with these vague definitions, Michael D. Ramsey concludes that 
“there is no coherent generalized doctrine of ‘comity’ that informs how and 
when foreign acts are to be given effect in federal court.”4 
Scholarly commentators have attempted to define the concept more pre-
cisely, but with only limited success. According to Eleanor Fox, “[c]omity is a 
horizontal, nation-to-nation concept, seeking – by reciprocal deference – to 
maximize the joint interests of the affected nations by splitting their differ-
ences or otherwise dissipating conflict in view of repeated interactions ex-
pected to occur.”5 Joel Paul concludes that comity involves a balancing of 
“competing public and private interests in a manner that takes into account 
any conflict between the public policies of domestic and foreign sovereigns.”6 
But despite the greater precision of these formulations (at least compared to 
formulations by the courts), they remain vague in providing guidance as to 
how the doctrine should be applied. 
European commentators have distinguished comity from what appears to 
be the broader notion of “mutual trust” under EU law. In a series of decisions 
dealing with application of the Council Regulation No. 44/2001,7 the Europe-
an Court of Justice (ECJ) has held that the courts of one member State cannot 
enter an anti-suit injunction against an action brought in the courts of another 
member State, even if the action is brought in bad faith or in violation of a 
forum selection clause or arbitration agreement.8 As the ECJ explained in Er-
ich Gasser GmbH v. MISAT Srl: 
[T]he Brussels Convention is necessarily based on the trust which the Contracting States 
accord to each other’s legal systems and judicial institutions. It is that mutual trust which 
has enabled a compulsory system of jurisdiction to be established, which all the courts 
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So formulated, mutual trust goes beyond comity. Comity counsels for defer-
ence to a decision by another State, but it permits a court to refuse to defer 
under appropriate circumstances. Mutual trust, as applied by the ECJ, appears 
to be a “matter of absolute obligation.”10 As stated by Thalia Kruger: “Mutual 
trust goes further than comity: it is the implication that the Member States of 
the European Union not only have respect, but also blind trust in each other’s 
courts.”11 Regardless of the surrounding circumstances, then, “mutual trust” 
requires a State to defer to the other. 
C. When Do Courts Use Comity? 
Rather than trying to develop a general definition of comity, it may be more 
helpful to identify the types of cases in which courts in one State show comity 
to decisions of other States. Table 1 sets out a classification scheme developed 
by William Dodge that usefully highlights the main uses of comity in U.S. 
law.12 
Dodge distinguishes (along the vertical axis) “based on the foreign actor to 
whom deference is shown.” Thus, “prescriptive comity” involves deference to 
foreign lawmakers, “adjudicatory comity” is deference to foreign tribunals,13 
and “sovereign party comity” is deference to foreign sovereigns as litigants in 
a court proceeding. He then (along the horizontal axis) distinguishes between 
ways in which comity is used: 
I distinguish between the operation of comity as a “principle of recognition” – that is, as 
a means of recognizing foreign law, foreign judgments, and foreign sovereigns as 
litigants – and the operation of comity as a “principle of restraint” – that is, as a means of 
restraining the reach of American law, the jurisdiction of American courts, and more 




Dodge then proceeds to identify a number of U.S. doctrines based in part on 
comity and to classify them according to his scheme. 
This paper focuses on adjudicatory comity, and more specifically on two 
doctrines that Dodge classifies as involving adjudicatory comity (because the 
literature is relatively well developed as to those two doctrines). One is the 
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recognition of foreign judgments – whether and the extent to which courts 
from one State will give legal force to court judgments from another State. 
Dodge classifies the recognition of foreign judgments as involving the princi-
ple of recognition because courts are recognizing the judgment of a court in a 
foreign State. The other is anti-suit injunctions – whether and the extent to 
which courts from one State will enter an injunction directed at a party to a 
court action in another State ordering that party not to proceed with its suit. 
Dodge classifies anti-suit injunctions as involving the principle of restraint 
because courts that refuse to issue anti-suit injunctions because of comity are 
restraining the reach of American law.  
 
Table 1:      Uses of International Comity in the United States 
 Principle of  
Recognition 




Conflict of laws Presumption against extraterrito-
riality 
 
Balancing under Restatement 
(Third) § 403 
Adjudicatory  
Comity 
Recognition of  
foreign judgments 
International comity abstention 
 
Enforcement of forum selection 
and arbitration clauses 
 
Reasonableness under Asahi 
 




Foreign discovery under Aerospa-
tiale  
Sovereign Party  
Comity 
Privilege of  
bringing suit 
Foreign sovereign immunity 
 
Not all jurisdictions recognize all of the doctrines identified by Dodge in Ta-
ble 1. As one example, while courts in common law countries have the power 
to enter anti-suit injunctions, courts in civil law jurisdictions do not (as a gen-
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eral matter) issue such injunctions.15 Moreover, as noted above, the ECJ has 
ruled that member states within the EU – even common law jurisdictions that 
otherwise would permit the grant of anti-suit injunctions – may not issue such 
injunctions against parties litigating in the courts of other member states.16 
D. Comity, Cooperation, and Defection 
A common theme in discussions of comity is that comity promotes coopera-
tion among States. Consistent with that theme, a number of scholars have 
used game theory to analyze rules based on comity principles.17 This part de-
scribes and expands on those analyses.  
In the rest of this part, I follow Andrew Guzman and assume that States are 
“rational, self-interested, and able to identify and pursue their interests.18 
Those interests are a function of state preferences, which are assumed to be 
exogenous and fixed. States do not concern themselves with the welfare of 
other states but instead seek to maximize their own gains or payoffs.” As 
Guzman notes, these assumptions “are standard assumptions among social 
scientists and many international law scholars” and “[t]hey imply that states 
will only cooperate when doing so increases their own payoffs.”19 
I. Granting Comity as Cooperation 
The most common view treats comity-based deference to another State’s de-
cision as cooperative behavior. Conversely, when courts refuse to defer (not 
granting comity), they are defecting from the cooperative solution.  
The scholarly literature on the recognition of foreign judgments illustrates 
this view. The usual starting point is the assumption that mutual recognition 
of judgments is the optimal solution – that States in the aggregate benefit most 
if they recognize each other’s judgments. But individually, each State prefers 
that judgments in favor of its nationals be recognized and that judgments 
against its nationals be denied recognition. Based on these assumptions, for-
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eign judgment recognition can be modeled as a prisoners’ dilemma game. 
Table 2 shows the payoffs. 
State A prefers to defect regardless of whether State B cooperates or de-
fects. Likewise, State B prefers to defect regardless of whether State A coop-
erates or defects. Even though collectively they would be better off cooperat-
ing – i.e., recognizing the other’s judgments on the basis of comity – the 
equilibrium outcome is that both defect. 
 
Table 2:       Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
  State B 
  Cooperate Defect 
State A 
Cooperate 4, 4 0, 6 
Defect 6, 0 2, 2 
 
As is well known, this outcome holds only in the case of a one-shot game. In 
an iterated prisoners’ dilemma game, States may be able to reach the optimal 
solution by cooperating (perhaps using a tit-for-tat strategy and enforcing for-
eign judgments only on the basis of reciprocity).20 The broader point for the 
economics of comity is that on these assumptions, granting comity by recog-
nizing foreign judgments is the cooperative outcome. Refusing to grant comi-
ty (refusing to recognize foreign judgments) is defection. 
An alternative view is that cooperation might in fact be individually ration-
al for a State – that is, the game might be an assurance game or “stag hunt” 
rather than a prisoners’ dilemma.21 If, for example, the cost savings of not 
relitigating the dispute resolved in a foreign judgment are sufficiently high, or 
“[i]f judgment enforcement is appropriately considered an issue of free 
movement of economic rights” such that the theory of comparative advantage 
applies, then a State may individually have the incentive to cooperate rather 
than defect.22 The payoffs for such a game are shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3:       Assurance or “Stag Hunt” Game 
  State B 
  Cooperate Defect 
State A 
Cooperate 4, 4 0, 2 
Defect 2, 0 3, 3 
 
An assurance game differs from a prisoners’ dilemma game because it is no 
longer the case that each State individually has the incentive to defect. In-
stead, the game has dual equilibria (cooperate/cooperate and defect/defect) 
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and the problem becomes one of coordination. In this setting, comity might be 
“cheap talk” that enables States to coordinate on the optimal solution of coop-
eration.23 
This usual analysis implicitly assumes that all foreign judgments are ones 
that should be enforced. But what if the foreign judgment is not one that nor-
matively should be enforced? What if the entry of judgment in the first place 
is an opportunistic attempt by a State to benefit its own citizen at the expense 
of a citizen of a foreign State? If so, then recognizing that judgment would be 
rewarding defection by the State that entered the judgment. By refusing to 
recognize the opportunistic foreign judgment, a State is not defecting but ra-
ther is sanctioning (or at least not rewarding) defection by the other State.24 
On this view, the grounds for denying recognition of foreign judgments can 
be understood as identifying circumstances in which denying recognition 
would be sanctioning the other State’s defection rather than itself being defec-
tion. 
II. Refusing Comity as a Sanction for Defection 
Not all cases in which a court declines to grant comity necessarily involve 
defection by that court. To the contrary, if the foreign State itself is defecting, 
a refusal to grant comity (refusing to defer to the other State’s action) can be a 
form of sanction imposed on the defecting State.25 One example, noted above, 
is when a court refuses to recognize a foreign judgment on one of the standard 
grounds.26 Another might be when a court enters an anti-suit injunction 
against litigation in a foreign court. The court of appeals in Laker Airways 
stated the point well:  
When the foreign act is inherently inconsistent with the policies underlying comity, 
domestic recognition could tend either to legitimize the aberration or to encourage 




With this latter example, examining the economics of comity provides insight 
into when a grant of an anti-suit injunction might be appropriate. 
                                                 
23
 McAdams (2009), 233–35. 
24
 Whincop (1999), 426 (“[I]t is no surprise that the common law required that the 
judgment court be jurisdictionally competent in a common law sense.  This permits the 
recognising court to deter cheating by credibly threatening punishment on a tit -for-tat 
(case-by-case) basis.”). 
25
 Whincop (1999), 426 (“Courts can perform these disciplinary functions in another 
way – by grant of an anti-suit injunction restraining a plaintiff from invoking the exorbi-
tant jurisdiction.”). 
26
 See sub-part D(I). 
27
 Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d, 909, 937 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
 Some Observations on the Economics of Comity 155 
Commentators have identified three circumstances in which courts are willing 
to grant anti-suit injunctions: 
[C]ourts have directed anti-suit injunctions at proceedings in other jurisdictions in order 
to achieve one of three broadly stated objectives: the prevention of highly inconvenient 
or vexatious litigation, the vindication of a prior and independent obligation not to sue, 
and preservation of the enjoining court’s own jurisdiction or other local policy-based 




Taking them in reverse order: the third objective – preserving the enjoining 
court’s own jurisdiction – reasonably could be construed as seeking to identi-
fy cases in which the foreign court is acting opportunistically (defecting). The 
second objective – vindicating a prior and independent obligation not to sue – 
is addressed in sub-part E.  
The first objective – preventing inconvenient or vexatious litigation – is the 
most difficult to evaluate. This objective seems to focus on the behavior of the 
parties rather than on the behavior of the foreign court. As such, it does not 
itself provide a reason to believe that the foreign court is acting opportunisti-
cally. On the other hand, if the foreign court is facilitating the vexatious litiga-
tion, that fact would provide evidence of opportunistic behavior such that 
comity would not preclude issuing an anti-suit injunction.29 But what if the 
party is merely taking advantage of a structural characteristic of the foreign 
court system that makes the litigation vexatious (such as lengthy delays in 
resolving cases, so that even if the foreign court sought to restrain the alleged-
ly vexatious litigation it would take years before it could do so)?30 In such a 
case, my tentative view is that the failure or inability to provide sufficient 
procedural protections for foreign litigants could be viewed as defection by 
the foreign State such that comity would not preclude the grant of an anti-suit 
injunction. 
III. Comity and Uncertainty 
The preceding two sections assume that a court can determine with certainty 
whether a foreign State is acting opportunistically. But that, of course, is not 
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 Bermann (1990), 608.  
29
 Although the case ultimately was decided based on the existence of an exclusive fo-
rum selection clause, the facts of E&J Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores S.A., 446 F.3d 984 
(9
th
 Cir. 2006) – in which the foreign court appointed a guardian for the American com-
pany without giving it notice – provide a possible illustration of opportunistic behavior 
by the foreign State.  
30
 Hartley (2005), 815–21. 
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the case. Whenever a court decides whether to grant comity to the decision of 
a foreign State, it is deciding in the absence of complete information.31 
As such, comity can be seen as reflecting a court’s default presumption as 
to whether foreign States are likely to cooperate or defect. Accordingly, if the 
court is unable to determine whether to defer using the usual doctrinal means 
(that is, using proxies to identify cooperation or defection), it then grants com-
ity if its default presumption is that foreign States likely are cooperating or 
refuses to grant comity if its default presumption is that foreign States likely 
are defecting. 
The competing approaches of the U.S. circuit courts to the issuance of anti-
suit injunctions illustrate the point.32 Courts that follow the so-called “con-
servative” standard are reluctant to grant anti-suit injunctions, relying heavily 
on comity concerns as the rationale. Courts following the “liberal” standard 
are much more willing to grant anti-suit injunctions and place less weight on 
comity. Other courts follow an intermediate standard that takes a middle 
ground between the two extremes. By comparison, as noted above, the ECJ 
has construed Brussels Regulation 44/2001 as based on “mutual trust” such 
that the courts of one EU member State may never enter an anti-suit injunc-
tion against litigation in the courts of another EU member State.33 
Courts following the conservative standard (those less willing to grant anti-
suit injunctions) adopt the default presumption that foreign States likely are 
cooperating, while those following the liberal standard (those more willing to 
grant anti-suit injunctions) adopt the default presumption that foreign States 
likely are defecting. The ECJ’s “mutual trust” standard, by comparison, is a 
conclusive presumption that other EU member states are cooperating. This 
distinction among the various standards then can be evaluated empirically: if 
foreign lawsuits tend to reflect opportunism by the foreign States in certain 
circumstances, the liberal standard is more appropriate; if foreign lawsuits 
tend not to reflect opportunism by foreign States, the conservative standard is 
more appropriate; and if such suits never reflect opportunism by foreign 
States (in the case of EU member States), then the ECJ approach is more ap-
propriate.34 
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 I appreciate Dieter Schmidtchen for highlighting this issue. 
32
 Ali et al. (2008).  
33
 See sub-part B. 
34
 Another consideration, of course, is administrative costs, which I do not analyze at 
length here. But if the likelihood of State opportunism (i.e., defection) is sufficiently low, 
and the costs of identifying such opportunism sufficiently high, a “mutual trust” standard 
may be appropriate even if there is some non-zero likelihood of opportunism. 
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E. Comity and Contract 
Many cases raising issues of comity involve transnational contracts, and many 
of those contracts include either forum selection clauses or arbitration claus-
es.35 This part considers how those contract provisions affect the economics of 
comity. It argues that any rule courts adopt on the basis of comity should be 
treated as a default rule that parties can contract around rather than as a man-
datory rule, and then analyzes whether and when forum selection clauses and 
arbitration clauses contract around those default rules.36 
I. Comity and Default Rules 
The argument in favor of contractual default rules is a familiar one.37 Default 
rules avoid locking parties in to inefficient outcomes by permitting them to 
contract for a different rule that would make the parties jointly better off. On-
ly when contracts give rise to significant externalities (which seems unlikely 
here) or when one party to a contract needs to be protected from a bad bargain 
(again unlikely given that parties to international commercial contracts are 
usually sophisticated parties capable of protecting themselves) is a mandatory 
rule required.38   
In this context, comity considerations would at most be relevant for estab-
lishing a default rule setting out how the courts of one State will deal with the 
courts of another State. Whatever that rule is – such as that the court will rec-
ognize foreign court judgments or will issue or not issue an anti-suit injunc-
tion – it would only be a default rule. If the parties contracted around the de-
fault rule, a court that enforced the parties’ contract would not be defecting, 
since its decision was in accord with the parties’ bargain. But a State that re-
fused to enforce or abide by the contract would be defecting, such that an anti-
suit injunction to enforce the contract would be consistent with comity. 
Assuming that comity establishes default rules rather than mandatory rules, 
how do parties contract around those defaults? The next two sections address 
forum selection clauses (both exclusive and nonexclusive) and arbitration 
clauses. 
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 Drahozal & Ware (2010), 433 (finding arbitration clauses in 71% of sample of in-
ternational joint venture agreements); Eisenberg & Miller (2009), 1503–05 (finding fo-
rum selection clause in 39% of sample of corporate transaction and lending contracts). 
36
 This approach is analogous to one I have suggested previously for determining 
when a court should enforce an arbitration award that has been vacated in the arbitral 
seat. Drahozal (2000). Several commentators have similarly argued for enforcement of 
choice-of-law agreements as a way of contracting around default rules. O’Hara &. Rib-
stein (2000); Whincop & Keyes (1997). 
37
 Ayres & Gertner (1989); Ayres & Gertner (1992); Ayres (1998). 
38
 Ayres & Gertner (1989); Ayres (1998). 
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II. Comity and Forum Selection Clauses 
Courts should treat an exclusive forum selection clause as contracting around 
a comity-based default rule. By agreeing to an exclusive forum selection 
clause, the parties agree to have a particular court as the proper – and only 
proper – forum for resolving their dispute. The court chosen by the parties in 
the forum selection clause should not be constrained by comity principles 
from resolving the parties’ dispute. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took an approach 
consistent with the suggestion here in E&J Gallo Winery v. Andina Licores 
S.A.39 In Gallo, a California winery entered into a distributorship agreement 
with an Ecuadorian wine distributor. The agreement included a clause speci-
fying California courts as the exclusive forum for dispute resolution. Despite 
the forum selection clause, the Ecuadorian distributor filed suit in Ecuador 
challenging the legality of the distributorship agreement under local law. The 
California winery sought to enjoin the distributor from pursuing its suit in 
Ecuador, which the district court denied based on comity considerations. 
The Ninth Circuit reversed and held that the injunction should have been 
granted. When the parties have contracted for an exclusive forum for resolv-
ing their dispute, actions by that forum to do so are consistent with comity. As 
the court of appeals explained: 
In a situation like this one, where private parties have previously agreed to litigate their 
disputes in a certain forum, one party’s filing first in a different forum would not 
implicate comity at all. No public international law issue is raised in this case. There is 
no indication that the government of Ecuador is involved in the litigation.  Andina is a 
private party in a contractual dispute with Gallo, another private party.  The case before 
us deals with enforcing a contract and giving effect to substantive rights. This is no way 




Stated otherwise, whatever rule that comity might have required was only a 
default rule, which the parties contracted around by agreeing to an exclusive 
forum selection clause. 
British courts likewise have held that they have the authority to enter anti-
suit injunctions against foreign litigation when the parties have agreed to the 
U.K. as the exclusive forum for resolving disputes.41 By comparison, the ECJ 
has concluded that Brussels Regulation 44/2001 and its underlying principle 
of “mutual trust” preclude one EU member State from issuing an anti-suit 
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 446 F.3d 984 (9
th
 Cir. 2006). 
40
 Ibid. at 994. 
41
 Donohue v. Armco Inc., [2002] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 425, 432-33 (H.L.); Continental 
Bank v. Aeakos Compania Noviera SA, [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 505, 512 (Eng. C.A.). 
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injunction against litigation in another EU member State.42 The analysis here 
counsels against such an approach. So applied, mutual trust makes the rule a 
mandatory rule rather than a default rule; regardless of what the parties’ con-
tract provides, injunctive relief is not available. Instead, the parties should be 
permitted to contract for the availability of an anti-suit injunction. 
By comparison, a nonexclusive forum selection clause should not be con-
strued as contracting around comity, in its entirety at least. Unlike an exclu-
sive forum selection clause, a nonexclusive forum selection clause merely 
identifies a permissible court in which the parties can resolve their dispute. It 
does not specify the only court in which the parties can resolve their dispute. 
Accordingly, comity considerations in deciding among permissible courts 
remain in play.  
III. Comity and Arbitration Clauses 
The analysis is less clear for arbitration clauses. By including an arbitration 
clause in their contract, the parties agree to have a private judge resolve any 
dispute that may arise. Litigation in a foreign court over the dispute would be 
inconsistent with the arbitration clause, as with an exclusive forum selection 
clause. (Indeed, litigation over the dispute in any court would be inconsistent 
with the arbitration clause.) But unless the arbitration clause also includes an 
exclusive forum selection clause – providing that any court proceedings with 
respect to the arbitration must take place only in a specified court – the arbi-
tration clause itself does not in every case determine the proper forum in 
which a court action related to the arbitration should be brought. As a result, 
an arbitration clause contracts around some comity-based default rules but not 
others. 
The State chosen as the arbitral seat – the legal or juridical “home” of the 
arbitration – plays a central role in connection with the arbitration proceeding. 
Parties either agree on the seat directly or by agreeing on a provider (which 
selects the seat). The arbitral seat is the sole jurisdiction43 with the authority to 
vacate an award or to supervise an ongoing arbitration proceeding.44 Thus, by 
agreeing on the seat, the parties are implicitly agreeing on the exclusive court 
to serve those functions in connection with the arbitration. But the seat is not 
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 Case C-185/07, Allianz SpA v. West Tankers Inc., 3 W.L.R. 696 (2009); Case C-
159/02, Turner v. Grovit, 2004 E.C.R. 1-3565; Case C-116/02, Erich Gasser GmbH v. 
MISAT Srl, 2003 E.C.R. 1-14693. 
43
 With one exception: when the parties have agreed in their arbitration clause that the 
arbitration law of another jurisdiction governs. Such contract provisions are exceedingly 
rare. Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 
F.3d 274, 291 (5th Cir. 2004).  
44
 Restatement (Third) of the U.S. Law of International Commercial Arbitration § 4-2 
& reporters’ note to Comment b (2012). 
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the sole jurisdiction with authority to enforce the arbitration agreement by 
compelling parties to arbitrate,45 nor is it the sole jurisdiction in which an arbi-
tration award can be enforced.46 As to those functions, the choice of the seat 
acts more like a nonexclusive forum selection clause: it identifies a permissi-
ble court but not an exclusive court. Accordingly, arbitration clauses contract 
around comity only in part. 
F. Comity, Rent-Seeking, and Judicial Incentives 
Underlying this paper are two additional (and so far implicit) assumptions: 
first, that the State’s preferences for whether to cooperate or defect accurately 
reflect the preferences of its citizens; and, second, that judges accurately re-
flect the preferences of the State in their decisions. Both assumptions are sub-
ject to question. 
First, the State’s preferences may be the result of rent-seeking behavior by 
businesses, lawyers,47 and others within the State (such as prospective arbitra-
tors48). The concentrated economic interests of such parties may result in State 
preferences for cooperation or defection that are less than optimal for the 
State as a whole. 
Second, the incentives of judges in a State may result in decisions that di-
verge from the preferences of the State itself. The extent of the divergence 
depends on the means by which judges are selected and the model of the judi-
cial utility function used. Elected judges (like legislators) may be more sub-
ject to rent-seeking behavior than appointed judges.49 Appointed judges may 
make decisions based on their own ideological views, desire for promotion, or 
preference for leisure.50 
Future research could usefully examine the effect of rent-seeking and judi-
cial incentives on the economics of comity. 
G. Conclusion 
This paper has offered some tentative insights into the economics of comity. 
First, comity can serve a cooperative function by providing the basis for doc-
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 Born (2009), 306.  
46
 Drahozal (2000), 468–70. 
47
 Whincop (1999) 421 (“If lawyers are an effective political interest group in the 
formulation of a jurisdiction’s private international law, they may have incentives to 
favour non-recognition by their states. A jurisdiction that refuses to enforce foreign 
judgments arguably increases the incentive of plaintiffs to choose it as a forum.”).  
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 Drahozal (2005).  
49
 Hansen (1999). 
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 Posner (1993). 
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trines that enhance cooperation with other States. On this view, a State that 
refuses to grant comity is defecting rather than cooperating. But if the original 
decision itself constitutes defection, refusing to grant comity is not defection 
but is instead an attempt to sanction the other State’s defection. Thus, a 
court’s decision whether to grant comity can be framed as based on whether 
the State decision being examined constitutes cooperation or defection. Sec-
ond, given the uncertainty courts face in determining whether a foreign State 
is cooperating or defecting, comity itself can be seen as establishing a default 
presumption that a particular type of State decision constitutes cooperation 
(or, in cases in which courts refuse to grant comity, as a default presumption 
of defection). Third, rules derived from comity principles should be treated as 
default rules rather than mandatory rules. Thus, as U.S. and U.K. courts have 
held – but contrary to decisions of the European Court of Justice – comity 
concerns should not preclude a court specified in an exclusive forum selection 
clause from entering an anti-suit injunction against foreign court litigation. 
Finally, the paper suggests examining the importance of rent-seeking and ju-
dicial incentives as possible avenues for future research on the economics of 
comity.  
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Comment on Christopher R. Drahozal 
The Economics of Comity 
by 
Dieter Schmidtchen  
A. Overview 
Comity is one of the important governing principles underlying interna-
tional law. In very general terms, comity can be defined as a respect shown 
by one state to foreign lawmakers (“prescriptive comity”, Dodge 2009), 
foreign tribunals (“adjudicatory comity”, Dodge 2009) and foreign sover-
eigns as litigants in a court proceeding. (“sovereign party comity”, Dodge 
2009). Since comity does not require deference of a State in every case, 
“determining when comity requires deference poses difficult doctrinal and 
theoretical issues” (Drahozal 2012: 1). By examining the economics of 
comity, Drahozal hopes to provide some insight into those issues (Drahoz-
al 2012: 1). 
The paper focuses on adjudicatory (judicial) comity. It distinguishes be-
tween two ways in which judicial comity is used: On the one hand, it can 
operate as a principle of recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments;1 on the other hand it can operate as a principle of restraining the 
reach of jurisdiction of home courts, if an issue is already being tried in a 
court of another jurisdiction. As for the latter principle the paper discusses 
anti-suit injunctions. One might call – following Lee – the principle of 
recognition and enforcement “active comity” and the principle of restraint 
“passive comity” (Lee 2006: 110). 
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 But note: “States have valid reasons to deny foreign judgments the same force they 
grant their own judgments since the foreign procedure may be viewed as deficient, or the 
outcome of the foreign litigation may be viewed as objectionable” (Michaels 2009: 1, 
para. 1). 
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Looking at comity as “the basis for doctrines that enhance cooperation 
with other states” (Drahozal 2012: 1) the central question is whether a 
“State decision being examined constitutes cooperation or defection” 
(Drahozal 2012: 1). 
Following Guzman (2008) States are assumed to be “rational, self-
interested, and able to identify and pursue their interests. Those interests 
are a function of state preferences, which are assumed to be exogenous and 
fixed. States do not concern themselves with the welfare of other states but 
instead seek to maximize their own gains or payoffs” (Drahozal 2012: 6). 
There are two other assumptions underlying the paper: “first, that the 
State’s “preferences for whether to cooperate or defect accurately reflect 
the preferences of its citizens”; and, second, that judges accurately reflect 
the preferences of the State in their decisions” (Drahozal 2012: 14). As 
mentioned: “Both assumptions are subject to question” (Drahozal 2012: 
14). Rent-seeking behaviour by businesses, lawyers or prospective arbitra-
tors “may result in State preferences for cooperation or defection that are 
less than optimal for the State as a whole” (Drahozal 2012: 14). The incen-
tives of judges might also be misaligned, causing decisions not in line with 
the preferences of the State itself: “Elected judges (like legislators) may 
more subject to rent-seeking behaviour than appointed judges. Appointed 
judges may make decisions based on their own ideological views, desire 
for promotion, or preference for leisure” (Drahozal 2012: 14). 
Under the heading “comity and cooperation”, the paper presents two 
different games. Following the existing game theoretic literature on the 
topic, the interaction of States is modelled as a two-player prisoners’ di-
lemma game or, alternatively, as an assurance or “stag hunt” game, with 
each player having two strategies: cooperate and defect.  
Finally, discussing forum selection clauses and arbitration clauses, the 
paper argues that “comity-based rules should be treated as default rules 
rather than mandatory rules” (Drahozal 2012: 1). 
B. Discussion 
This is an interesting and thought-provoking paper which addresses im-
portant aspects of comity. Since the economic analysis of the topic is still 
in its infancy, the paper is likely to be welcomed.  
The arguments in the paper are well presented and it provides new in-
sights into the economics of comity. I largely agree with what is said in the 
paper. Nevertheless, I would like to make some additional remarks that 
will mainly be of a complementary character and might be relevant for 
future research. 
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1. The cooperative function of comity is at the heart of Drahozal’s paper: 
“Comity often serves a cooperative function: courts rely on comity as the 
basis for doctrines that enhance cooperation with other States” (Drahozal 
2012: 1). Several questions come to mind: 
Positive question: Is comity considered by lawyers and judges in ren-
dering their legal judgment a bright line rule, a vague standard, a policy or 
a kind of Dworkinean principle (“optimization precept”)?2  
If comity were considered a rule, in the sense law and economic schol-
ars define the term, “mutual trust” under EU law would – contrary to what 
is claimed in the paper (Drahozal 2012: 3) – not go beyond comity. Mutual 
trust simply reflects the comity norm which manifests itself in EU law. By 
the way, comity as a bright line rule is similar to a per-se rule in antitrust; 
and comity as a standard or Dworkinian principle looks like a rule-of-
reason. 
Normative question: How should comity be considered? A bright line 
rule, a standard, a policy or a Dworkinian principle?  
Of course, the answer depends on the goals comity should help to real-
ize. A pertinent economic goal would be maximizing the joint wealth of 
the nations. 
Does a concept of comity help identifying cooperative or defective be-
haviour?  
Maybe it does. But as an economist I would hold that we don’t need it if 
we have clearly defined common interests of the community of States.  
Do we need comity in order to explain why States behave cooperative-
ly?  
As an economist I would say no. Relying on it is pointless. At least if 
we look at matters from the point of view of an iterated prisoners’ dilemma 
game. If the strategy of cooperation is payoff maximizing than States will 
cooperate. If not they will defect.  
Thus, if we want to understand why States cooperate or defect it suffic-
es to look at the game that States play and derive the equilibria. I suspect 
                                                 
2
 Dworkin, in criticizing H.L.A. Hart’s position of legal positivism, defines the terms 
“policy” and “principle” as follows: “I call a ‘policy’ that kind of standard that sets out a 
goal to be reached, generally an improvement in some economic, political,  or social fea-
ture of the community. I call a ‘principle’ a standard that is to be observed, not because it 
will advance or secure an economic, political, or social situation deemed desirable, but 
because it is a requirement of justice or fairness or some other dimension of morality” 
(Dworkin 1977: 22). Robert Alexy further elaborates on Dworkin’s distinction: “By con-
trast [with the strict nature of rules in the positivistic sense], principles are optimizing 
commands. As such, they are norms commanding that something be realized to the great-
est possible extent relative to the factual and legal possibilities at hand. This means that 
principles can be realized to varying degrees and that the commanded extent of their 
realization is dependent on not only factual potential but also legal potential” (Alexy 
2002: 70). 
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that legal scholars need the concept of comity in order to explain matters 
which economists explain with the help of game theoretical tools. 
2. Things look different if we assume that the game States play is an as-
surance or “stag hunt” game. Reasons are mentioned in the paper (Drahoz-
al 2012: 7). Those games have several equilibria and the question arises 
how to coordinate on the efficient equilibrium. Here comity might serve as 
an equilibrium selection device. As mentioned in the paper: “(C)omity 
might be ‘cheap talk’ that enables States to coordinate on the optimal solu-
tion of cooperation” (Drahozal 2012: 8). 
But note: Neither the “stag hunt” game nor the prisoners’ dilemma 
game delivers an answer to the question whether a State’s behaviour is 
actually cooperative or defective. 
How to get an answer? 
There are two avenues to find an answer: One utilitarian and one con-
tractarian.  
The focal point of the utilitarian approach is the maximization of the 
States’ joint payoffs resulting from an optimal international division of 
labour. A cooperative strategy maximizes the joint payoffs; a defective 
strategy does not. 
The contractarian approach results in so-called standard grounds legiti-
mizing refusal of recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment. 
Hence, we have a new game concerned with the problem of determining 
generally accepted grounds. May be that international conventions – con-
tracts among States (see Michaels 2009) – indicate the solution to these 
games.3  
Clearly, both the content and the formation of conventions is an im-
portant topic for the economic analysis of comity, although I doubt, 
whether a recourse to the comity concept itself helps to determine the 
standard grounds.  
3. What is often overlooked in the game-theoretically inspired literature 
on comity, but explicitly dealt with in the paper, is an implicit assumption: 
“all foreign judgments are ones that should be enforced” (Drahozal 2012: 
8).  
But what if the judgment is the result of a defection by the State enter-
ing the judgment? Of course, as is rightly mentioned in the paper: “By re-
fusing to recognize the opportunistic foreign judgment, a State is not de-
fecting but rather is sanctioning (or at least not rewarding) defection by the 
other State. On this view, the grounds for denying recognition of foreign 
judgments can be understood as identifying circumstances in which deny-
                                                 
3 But note that international conventions are incomplete contracts opening up new av-
enues for opportunistic behaviour. 
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ing recognition would be sanctioning the other State’s defection rather than 
itself being defection” (Drahozal 2012: 8). 
Obviously, the games presented in the literature on comity do not deal 
with this important issue. Information is assumed to be symmetric and 
complete. Neither party can commit errors. But nobody is perfect. For ex-
ample, a court rendering a judgment might truly believe that it is of a good 
quality, i.e., in accordance with comity, but actually it is not. Or the recog-
nition court believes that the decision being examined is defective, where-
as it is actually cooperative. 
What we need are dynamic games of asymmetric and incomplete infor-
mation, which require for their solution more sophisticated equilibrium 
concepts than simple Nash. Those games exist in the literature (see, for 
example, Osborne 2004) but are not applied to the comity area, yet. 
4. In the literature, in particular the literature applying the prisoners’ di-
lemma framework, we can find the opinion that becoming a recognition 
haven, i.e., being reluctant to defer to the decisions of another state, could 
be a rational strategy of a State.  
The reasoning runs as follows: Becoming a recognition haven pays off, 
since potential defendants will move assets to this state which furthers its 
economic prosperity. With competition between civil justice systems this 
incentive sets off a race to the bottom. Wagner (2011: 28-30) shows that 
this might happen with unilateral competition between civil justice sys-
tems. In unilateral competition only plaintiffs represent the demand side in 
the market for dispute resolution (Wagner 2012: 11). However, with bilat-
eral competition, i.e., competition in which both parties to a dispute repre-
sent the demand side, things look different.  
Consider, for example contract disputes. Conjectures or assumptions of 
a race to the bottom neglect the incentives of sophisticated international 
traders. The ex ante interests of the parties to a contract is to maximize 
joint benefit from their contract. From this it follows that parties are inter-
ested in socially optimal courts, i.e., courts which are considered by both 
sides as delivering accurate recognition and enforcement (see Wagner 
2011: 33–36). Thus, instead of having a race to the bottom, we would have 
a race to the top. 
At the minimum, the potentially disadvantaged party – the judgment 
creditor – will try to readjust the terms of trade or reject trading at all with 
a party profiting from the defective behaviour of a State. Another possibil-
ity is reference to a forum selection clause as a means expanding the 
recognition of judgments (Whincop 1999: 15). Still another possibility 
might be to get an “anti-suit injunction restraining a plaintiff from invok-
ing the exorbitant jurisdiction” (Whincop 1999: 14)  
To analyse these issues properly, we would have to set up a 4-player 
game, with 2 trading parties and at least 2 states. 
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Here is a suggestion how to improve insights into the working properties 
of comity: 
Set up a 2-stage game with a contract stage, a litigation stage and an en-
forcement stage. The parties will look ahead and reason back when con-
cluding a contract and agreeing on the terms of trade (see Schmidtchen et 
al. 2012). 
5. How important is the adjudicatory comity issue for international 
commerce? Since the amount of international transactions (movement of 
goods, capital and persons across borders), is growing exponentially, the 
likelihood of legal disputes might increase; which, in turn, might increase 
the demand for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments 
(Michaels 2009).4 It is my feeling that legal scholars are used to overem-
phasize the relevance of the issue. 
I should like to illustrate this by drawing on the New Institutional Eco-
nomics of International Transaction and empirical evidence. Theory and 
empirical evidence suggest that rational parties to international transac-
tions will not rely on court ordering alone to overcome contractual hazards 
in international trade, but will additionally apply means of private order-
ing.  
Private ordering refers to self-help, hostage giving, relational contracts 
(contracts as governance structures built for long-term relationships), con-
ventions and agreements on rules for settling disputes that could otherwise 
be brought to court (see Rühl 2010; Schmidt-Trenz and Schmidtchen 1991; 
Schmidtchen and Schmidt-Trenz 2006). The multinational firm and verti-
cal integration across borders are further examples of private ordering. 
The reason why private ordering plays an important role in doing inter-
national business is a phenomenon labelled constitutional uncertainty.  
Due to the complexities of international procedural law as well as the 
rules of conflict of laws it is far from clear which court has jurisdiction and 
which law applies. In addition, the determination of the value at stake 
might differ as might be the case for the breach remedies (expectation 
damages, reliance damages or restitution damages – whatever the court 
awards). Even if the parties to the contract write breach remedies into their 
contract, courts do not always enforce what players write into their con-
tracts. They often impose transfers on the basis of certain legal principles.  
For these reasons, a specific form of uncertainty in the domain of pri-
vate foreign trade relationships emerges, which is called constitutional 
uncertainty. This constitutional uncertainty, which can be traced back to 
problems in rendering and executing judgments, creates contracting prob-
lems that are reflected by transactions costs for international economic 
actors. The question arises whether and how far comity can contribute to a 
                                                 
4
 I don’t know of any empirical evidence regarding the validity of this presumption. 
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reduction of those transaction costs. This might also be the question around 
which the economics of comity can be built.  
Although the paper has not explicitly posed this question, it seems to 
me that it is right to the point. 
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Discussion on Christopher R. Drahozal 
summarized by  
Jan Engelmann 
The papers served as a starting point for an active discussion. There was 
widespread agreement with the author’s approach to build a bridge be-
tween the legal concept of comity and game theoretical analysis. 
A desire for differentiated empirical evidence for the role that comity 
plays revealed itself during the discussion. This interest was mentioned in 
relation to the role played by the general institutional setting of states in-
volved in decisions influenced by comity, in relation to the informal insti-
tutions within which those decisions might be taken and in relation to the 
language used by the judges relying on comity. A thorough empirical anal-
ysis was noted to enable a fruitful application of game theory to the phe-
nomenon of comity.  
In this instance, a discussant presented examples in relation to the extra-
territorial application of decisions taken by different anti-trust agencies. 
For those agencies, comity seems to function as a broad rule in relation to 
which informal institutions are developed that guide their behaviour. The 
importance of the institutional setting was also underlined in relation to the 





Circuit adopt towards rendering anti-suit injunctions. The different institu-
tional settings of the foreign states rendering the judgments these courts 
typically deal with seems to influence their individual approaches. 
Much discussion focused on the application of game theory and how it 
can be improved and extended. Since judges are not dealing with questions 
related to comity on a day-to-day basis, it was questioned whether the time 
lags between the rounds played in the respective games call for a change of 
the games used in the analysis. A related remark drew attention to the need 
for more complex game theoretic modelling taking into account asymmet-
ric and incomplete information. A sound understanding of the role played 
by the spontaneously developed informal institutions would especially re-
quire an application of evolutionary game theory. 
Furthermore, it was mentioned that the interests at play where comity is 
applied should be addressed explicitly in order to clarify the sometimes 
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implicit assumptions. This concern was voiced mainly regarding judges 
but also lawyers and parties. In further comments, discussants brought up 
the relation between comity and the ordre public’s role as one of the 
standard grounds of refusing enforcement of a foreign judgement. In this 
regard, the economic discussion should focus on delineating ordre public 
from comity.  
Lastly, the interrelation between comity and reciprocity as a threshold 
for mutual recognition of judgments was discussed. In a game theoretical 
setting, reciprocity’s role resembles a tit-for-tat strategy in an iterated pris-
oners’ dilemma. The fact that the concept of reciprocity has lost much of 
its importance in enforcing judgments seems to indicate that reaching co-
operative solutions has become possible through other mechanisms. 
 
 
Fighting Maritime Piracy – On Possible Actions 
and Consequences 
by 
Birgit Feldtmann  
A. Introduction 
Judge Moore stated in 1927 in the Lotus-case that maritime piracy is an 
offence against the law of nations and that the pirate 
  
“(...) is denied the protection of the flag which he may carry, and is treated as an outlaw, 
as the enemy of all mankind – hostis humani generis – whom any nation may in the 
interest of all capture and punish.”
1 
Today the notion of a pirate being an “enemy of mankind” might seem 
quite extreme, however the main thrust of Judges Moore’s considerations 
are undoubtedly part of international law: Art. 100 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Laws of the Seas (UNCLOS) emphasises that it is the 
duty of all nations to cooperate in fighting maritime piracy: 
 
“All states shall cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy (...)” 
Furthermore, UNCLOS as well as other international legislation, such as 
the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the 
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention), provides the legal basis 
for various actions against (suspected) pirates, including the capturing and 
punishing by national forces and courts.2 
The framework for operations and specific actions against maritime pi-
racy in international law is currently being put to the test in different re-
gions of the world. However, the Horn of Africa/Indian Ocean region is 
the main focus of international attention and a number of states are cur-
                                                 
1
 The Case of the S.S. Lotus (France vs. Turkey), P.C.I.J. 1927 (Judgment No.9 of 7
th
 
September 1927), Dissenting Opinion by Mr. Moore, par. 249. 
2
 See under C and D below. 
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rently engaged in different counter-piracy activities and operations in the 
region. 
This article looks at the question of how the international community 
reacts to the problem of maritime piracy. Firstly, the article takes a brief 
look at the general problem of maritime piracy; specifically in the Horn of 
Africa/Indian Ocean region and looks at counter-piracy activities taken by 
the international community. However, the impact of those activities has 
been debated and one of the questions that the debate raises is the question 
of whether or not the legal framework is sufficient. This question forms the 
background of the article, which in its second part analyses the legal 
framework for counter-piracy enforcement under international law. The 
third part of the article examines the question of how this legal framework 
is implemented in national legislation and guidelines, as well as how it is 
actually used in different contexts. This is illustrated by two examples, one 
concerning the question of prosecution (or often rather non-prosecution) of 
suspected pirates arrested by States engaging in counter-piracy operations, 
the other concerning the issue of Rules of Engagement (RoE) for the effec-
tiveness of counter-piracy activities. Finally, the article moves to the ques-
tion of what the consequences of the approaches chosen by the states in 
question might be. 
B. The problem 
Piracy is possibly one of the oldest occupations and has for centuries been 
a challenge to seafarers. Today, pirate activities are being registered in a 
number of the world’s regions, such as, for example, off the coast of West 
Africa (Gulf of Guinea) and in East Asian waters (Malacca Straits)3. While 
the situation in West Africa is seen in particular by the shipping industry4 
as a growing major concern, international focus still rests on the situation 
in the region of the Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean. The reasons for 
focusing on piracy in this area may vary but three main reasons seem to be 
dominant. The first of these reasons is the modus operandi of the pirates in 
the region. Piracy in this region does not only mean different forms of vio-
lence and robbery against ships and crews but usually includes hijacking 
the attacked vessel and taking the crew hostage with the aim of securing 
the payment of a substantial ransom by the ship owner/manager. 5 The sec-
ond reason is that Somalia, the costal state where the pirates are based and 
from where they launch their operations, can be categorised as a “failed 
                                                 
3
 See IMB, Piracy Map 2012: http://www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-
piracy-map (last visited 15.7.2012). 
4
 See Jyllandsposten, 1.3.2012, 1 and §2, 6–7. 
5
 See Struwe (2009), 16 f. and Feldtmann (2010), 107 f.  
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state”6, which in the context of the problem of piracy means that Somalia, 
even if regional differences and certain positive developments on shore are 
taken into account, is basically unable to guard its coast or to prevent its 
citizens from committing acts of piracy and is unable to initiate acceptable 
criminal proceedings against suspected pirates.7 The final reason is that 
Somali pirates operate in a region that has one of the world’s most crucial 
maritime routes8 – the passage from Asia to Europe through the Suez Ca-
nal, which is used by an average of 1,700–2,000 vessels a month.9 
In December 2010, it was reported that since January 2007, 2,600 sea-
farers have been held hostage by Somali pirates.10 The problem of “Somali 
piracy” seems to have peaked at the beginning of 2011 when the Interna-
tional Maritime Bureau (IMB) registered 32 vessels hijacked by Somali 
pirates and 746 seafarers held hostage.11 More than a year and a half later 
the numbers are down to 11 vessels and 188 hostages (registered on 30 
August 2012).12 The decrease in vessels and hostages held by Somali pi-
rates is linked to the fact that the number of (successful) pirate attacks has 
fallen. The reasons for the fall in the number of attempted hijackings are 
complex and may vary, the most prominent being named in the interna-
tional debate are the efforts of the different counter-piracy operations and 
the factor that the majority of vessels today are following the recommenda-
tions and Best Management Practises (BMPs) to prevent hijackings. Fur-
thermore, there has been slow but positive progress in different regions of 
Somalia and this has also been pointed out as a relevant factor. In addition, 
there has been a general improvement in security measures on board ves-
sels sailing in the area, including the use of (private) armed guards. It has 
been claimed that there has not been a successful hijacking of any vessel 
that had armed guards at its disposal.13 
The problem of piracy committed by Somali pirates has, as mentioned 
above, been met by the international community by encouraging and initi-
ating a number of anti-piracy operations in the region with the participa-
                                                 
6
 See Silva (2009), 3 ff.  
7
 See Pham (2010), 31 ff. who also gives an insight in the complex internal structure 
of Somalia, the role of clan-structure and the diversion between different regions.  
8
 Pham (2010), 42.  
9
 Struwe (2009), 2 and 9 f. 
10
 BIMCO, 500 Seafarers held hostage by pirates at Christmas: https://www.bim 
co.org/Members/News/2010/2010/12/21_500_seafarers.aspx (last visited 15.7.2012). 
11
 IMB, Piracy news & facts (21.01.2011): http://www.icc-ccs.org/home/piracyreporti 
ng-centre/piracynewsafigures. 
12
 IMB, Piracy news & facts (30.08.2012): http://www.icc-ccs.org/home/piracyreporti 
ng-centre/piracynewsafigures. 
13
 The Economist, Piracy and armed security; Laws and guns; armed guards on ships 
deter pirates. But who says they are legal: http://www.economist.com/node/21552553 
(last visited 30.08.2012). 
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tion of various nations.14 Today three major international military opera-
tions are (partly or fully) aimed at counter-piracy: The “alliance of the 
willing” CTF 151 under the United States led Combined Maritime Forces, 
NATO’s Operation Ocean Shield and EU NAVFOR’s Operation Atalan-
ta.15 Furthermore, a number of nations, such as China and India, are engag-
ing in their own counter-piracy activities in the region, without formally 
participating in any international operation.  
The background and the specific mandate for each of the different coun-
ter-piracy operations varies, which means for example, that certain 
measures against suspected pirates and their property may be used by one 
naval force acting under one of the international operations, while the same 
measures may not be used by another naval force operating under the rules 
of another operation.16 The fact that the efforts of counter-piracy activities 
are fragmented and are not organised into one collective international op-
eration has led to a number of practical, operational and organisational 
challenges, for example in connection with the issue of cooperation in 
connection with specific operations and information sharing. Today many 
of those problems and challenges have been addressed and practical ap-
proaches have been developed, with the result that fragmentation of the 
counter-piracy operations no longer substantially jeopardises the success of 
the efforts at sea. 
However, the improved cooperation of nations and international opera-
tions in counter-piracy is most likely an important factor in the above-
mentioned decrease in piracy attacks but it has not been able to put an end 
to the problem of piracy in the region: Somali pirates still account for a 
considerable amount of registered attacks on vessels17 and the radius of the 
area in which the Somali pirates operate has grown considerably: 18 in 2007 
acts of piracy were mainly reported from the Gulf of Aden and close to 
Somalia’s coast. Today piracy concerns the wider Horn of Africa region, 
including large parts of the Indian Ocean and up to the Red Sea. To illus-
trate the scale of the radius of piracy attacks: NATO’s Operation Ocean 
Shield now covers an area of about 6.5 million nautical square miles – an  
 
                                                 
14
 See Struwe (2009), 10 ff. and Guilfoyle (2010a), 141 ff. (145 ff.).  
15
 See Taylor (2012), 337 f. and Geiss/Petrig (2011), 17 ff. 
16
 See below D. 
17
 On 20.11.2012 71 piracy incidents were reported for Somalia in 2012, with 13 h i-
jackings and 212 hostages: IMB, Piracy news & facts (20.11.2012): http://www.icc-
ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures 
18
 IMB, Hostage-taking at sea rises to record levels says IMB: http://www.iccccs.org/ 
news/429-hostage-taking-at-sea-rises-to-record-levels-says-imb (last visited 30.8. 2012). 
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area that is about half the size of the territory of the United States of Amer-
ica.19  
While Somali pirates have been widening their area of operation, it has 
also become obvious that the vast space of the Indian Ocean cannot suc-
cessfully be fully monitored and secured against pirate attacks. The prob-
lem caused by Somali pirates is not a brief episode and will continue to 
provide challenges to the international community and to maritime traffic. 
Furthermore, the problem of Somali piracy has also had a substantial eco-
nomic impact: piracy is a “big business”. The average ransom paid for the 
release of a vessel and its crew was estimated to be about USD 5.4 million 
in 2010 while the “unofficial record” for the payment of ransom to Somali 
pirates was reported to be USD 9.5 million20 in November 2010. The costs 
caused by Somali piracy are estimated to have been USD 7 billion in 
2011.21 However, the economic aspect is one side of the effects of maritime 
piracy, another side is the question of human cost and the impact the threat 
of piracy has on seafarers and their families.22  
C. The legal framework for counter-piracy enforcement 
The legal framework setting out counter-piracy enforcement powers can be 
described as fragmented due to the fact that it consists of different legal 
acts and it leaves certain unanswered questions. However, it can be argued 
that UNCLOS is the rather solid “legal backbone” of counter-piracy, set-
ting out the main scope of counter-piracy enforcement powers.  
I. UNCLOS definition of piracy  
As mentioned above, international law considers piracy an unlawful act 
and expects all states to engage and cooperate in the “repression of piracy 
                                                 
19
 Søværnet; Søværnets Operative Kommando, Fakta om Nato’s anti-pirateri opera-
tion Operation Ocean Shield: http://forsvaret.dk/SOK/Internationalt/OCEAN/Pages/defau 
lt.aspx (last visited 30.8.2012). 
20
 BBC, Special report: Pirates hoist ransoms for hijacked ships: http://www.upi.co 
m/Top_News/Special/2011/01/19/Pirates-hoist-ransoms-for-hijacked-ships/UPI96711295 
459904/ (last visited 30.8.2012). 
21
 One Earth Future/Oceans Beyond Piracy, The Economic Costs of Somali Piracy: 
http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/economic_cost_of_piracy_2011.pdf  (last 
visited 20.9.2012). 
22
 The question of the human cost of Somali piracy is analysed in the following r e-
port: International Maritime Bureau/Oceans Beyond Piracy, The Human Cost of Somali 
Piracy 2011, 2012: http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/hcop_2011_vers 
ion1_4_2.pdf (last visited 20.9.2012). 
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on the high seas” (art. 100 UNCLOS). The act of piracy is defined in arti-
cle 101 UNCLOS: 
 
“Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on 
board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 
(a) or (b).” 
In its essence, piracy consists of a number of illegal acts (violence, deten-
tion or acts of deprivation) committed against a ship and its 
crew/passengers. The wording in article 101 in connection with the use of 
plural (e.g., “illegal acts of violence”) and singular (e.g., “any act of dep-
redation”) has raised the question of whether one of those acts is sufficient 
to define an act of piracy or if more than one act has to be committed be-
fore an attack against a vessel is understood as piracy. Furthermore the 
question has been asked which legal system defines whether such an act is 
illegal.23 Those questions seem, however, to be mostly of academic rele-
vance as there is no serious doubt in the legal debate that the attacks com-
mitted against vessels in the Horn of Africa region should be categorised 
as acts of piracy. 
Piracy is committed “on the high sea” or “outside the jurisdiction of any 
state”. This leads to the question of whether acts committed in the Exclu-
sive Economic Zone (EEZ) are acts of piracy under UNCLOS. Guilfoyle 
argues in this context that the UNCLOS provisions on the high sea regime 
(including the provisions concerning piracy) apply to the EEZ as long as 
those are not incompatible with the UNCLOS provisions on the EEZ. As 
this is not the case, due to the fact that the specific EEZ regime is mainly 
focusing on exploiting, conserving and managing natural resources, the 
geographical limitation of the UNCLOS definition of piracy should be un-
derstood as acts committed anywhere seawards beyond the territorial sea, 
e.g., including acts committed in the EEZ.24  
Concerning piracy, the geographical limitation of UNCLOS means that 
the above-mentioned acts against vessels in territorial waters fall outside 
the UNCLOS definition of piracy. Such acts may be covered by other in-
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 Guilfoyle (2009), 3 and Geiss/Petrig (2011), 60. 
24
 Guilfoyle (2009), 2. 
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ternational legislation (see below) and are usually referred to as “armed 
robbery at sea”, “armed robbery against ships”25 or similar expressions. 
The use of language concerning acts similar to piracy but committed in 
territorial waters is not consistent, relevant Security Council resolutions 
use for example different expressions and the intended, or not-indented, 
implications of the different terminology remains unclear.26 However, in 
the context of the general legal framework for counter-piracy activities it is 
sensible to use consistent language by referring to acts covered by UN-
CLOS article 101 as “piracy” and to similar acts in territorial waters as 
“armed robbery at sea”.27  
Another element of the UNCLOS definition of piracy is the so-called 
“two-ship-requirement”. Acts of piracy are committed from one (private) 
vessel to another. Internal attacks, for example conducted by terrorist pos-
ing as passengers of a vessel as occurred in the Achille Lauro incident in 
1985, are not within the scope of the UNCLOS definition of piracy, but are 
currently covered by the SUA Convention (see below).28  
Furthermore, as stated above, the vessel from which the act of piracy is 
launched has to be a private vessel and UNCLOS requires that the acts are 
“committed for private ends”. The interpretation of this requirement has 
triggered a substantial legal debate in which it is for example argued that 
the wording “for private ends” excludes all acts committed for political 
reasons and therefore acts of terrorism cannot be piracy.29 This is currently 
the position of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO). 30 Guilfoyle 
argues, however, that the interpretation of “private ends” should distin-
guish between acts sanctioned by State authorities (e.g., not for private 
ends) and non-state sanctioned acts (e.g., for private ends). According to 
this reasoning, the correct dichotomy in connection with the “for private 
ends” criteria is “private/public” and not “private/political”.31 
In the context of Somali piracy, the pirates usually launch their attacks 
from smaller vessels (so-called “skiffs”) with the aim of hijacking a vessel 
and its crew for the purposes of receiving a substantial ransom and today it 
is widely accepted that the attacks against vessels in the Horn of Africa/ 
Indian Ocean Region usually fall under the UNCLOS definition of piracy, 
as long as the attacks are conducted outside territorial waters.32  
                                                 
25
 See Murphy (2007), 155, 64. and Guilfoyle (2010a), 144. 
26
 See Gleiss/Petrig (2010), 72 ff. 
27
 Gleiss/Petrig (2010), 75. 
28
 Geiss/ Petrig (2011), 62 and Guilfoyle (2010b), 128. 
29
 On this debate see Geiss/ Petrig (2011), 61 with further references. 
30
 IMO Doc. LEG 98/8 2011, par. 14.  
31
 Guilfoyle (2010a), 143. 
32
 Feldtmann (2010), 103 ff. and Guilfoyle (2010a), 142 ff. 
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II. On the scope of counter-piracy enforcement powers  
granted by UNCLOS 
In cases of (suspicion of) piracy, UNCLOS provides the contracting states 
with a range of counter-piracy enforcement powers. Article 110 (1) a) 
UNCLOS grants a right of visit of foreign flagged vessels in order to veri-
fy an initial suspicion of piracy, the threshold to this right is “reasonable 
ground for suspecting” that a ship is engaging in piracy. The right to visit 
granted in article 110 is an exception to the general regime on the high 
seas where state vessels (war ships) are not allowed to interfere with ves-
sels flagged in another state.33 When a “suspicion remains after the docu-
ments have been checked”, the investigating state vessel has the right to 
“proceed to a further examination on board the ship” (article 110 (2) UN-
CLOS). The wording in article 110 (2) indicates that the powers given by 
UNCLOS extend proportionally while the initial suspicion is gradually 
sustained.34 If the suspicion is proved to be unfounded no further actions 
may be taken and compensation for any lost or damage shall be provided 
(article 110 (3) UNCLOS). 
The powers granted by article 110 UNCLOS are aimed at confirming 
that the vessel in question is a “pirate ship” in accordance with article 103 
UNCLOS. A “pirate ship” according to this provision is either a vessel 
intended to be used for acts of piracy as defined in article 101 or a vessel 
which has been used for such acts and which is still under the control of 
the persons who have committed those acts.35 
If the suspicion that a vessel is either a “pirate ship” or a vessel that has 
been taken over by piracy and is still under the control of pirates is con-
firmed, further enforcement powers are granted by article 105. According 
to this provision any state may seize a pirate ship (or ship under the control 
of pirates), arrest the suspected pirates and seize the property on board. 
Consequently, any governmental vessel which meets pirates in internation-
al waters has the right to take the necessary action concerning pirate 
equipment and arrest the (suspected) pirates. Concerning the disposal of 
pirate equipment (including the sinking of pirate ships), article 105 grants 
the courts of the seizing state to decide on what to do with pirate equip-
ment and ships.36  
Article 105 does not elaborate on the question of the use of (lethal) 
force under counter-piracy operations. The question of the use of force is 
not directly addressed anywhere in UNCLOS but is it is argued that UN-
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CLOS implicitly permits the use of force as a last resource.37 This opinion 
was confirmed by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 
which The M/V “Saiga” (No.2) Case pointed out that the use of force must 
“be avoided as far as possible” but also accepted that the use of force may 
in certain circumstances be “unavoidable”. If unavoidable force is used the 
court requires that “it must not go beyond what is reasonable and neces-
sary in the circumstances” and “Considerations of humanity must apply”.38 
Guilfoyle points out that the use of force is also supported by the UN Basic 
principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Offi-
cials, which permits the use of firearms in cases of self-defence or in de-
fence of others and to prevent “the perpetration of a particular serious 
crime involving grave threat to life”.39 He argues that in certain circum-
stances lethal force as a first resource (for example without first firing 
warning shots) under counter-piracy enforcement may be unavoidable, for 
example when attempting to free hostages.40 Situations where lethal force 
seems to be the only resource might occur but this should remain an excep-
tion. It is therefore important to stress that the use of force in most cases 
will only be the last resource, after other, less intrusive means have failed, 
and the principle of proportionality must be obeyed.41 The use of lethal 
force in counter-piracy operations is to be avoided if other, less harmful, 
means are available in the specific situation. 
In addition to the above-mentioned counter-piracy measures, article 105 
also clarifies that: 
 
“(...) The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties 
to be imposed (...).” 
This means that the State seizing the pirates has the right to exercise crim-
inal jurisdiction in connection with piracy. It is argued that UNCLOS art i-
cle 101 in conjunction with article 105 enables any State (not only the seiz-
ing state) to implement universal jurisdiction for piracy.42 This question is 
rather crucial in the context of Somali piracy because several navies en-
gaging in counter-piracy enforcement have, after the initial seizing of the 
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suspected pirates, been transferring suspected pirates for prosecution to 
countries in the region, for example Kenya or the Seychelles, without any 
nexus between the piracy incident or the arrest of the suspected pirates and 
the receiving/prosecuting state.43 If the wording in article 105 would ex-
clude others then the seizing state from initiating criminal proceedings this 
practice would be in conflict with international law. The legal debate con-
cerning this question raises a number of points and legal arguments: going 
from the position that article 105 contains a “limited universality princi-
ple” (meaning that only the seizing state is competent to exercise universal 
jurisdiction), to the argument that the provision only provides a “conflict-
of-law rule” and to the position that the notion in article 105 only reaffirms 
that prosecution is based on domestic criminal law, to name some major 
points.44 The interpretation that article 105 does not grant the seizing state 
the exclusive right to prosecute is most convincing, not only because the 
opposite position is not in accordance with the general intention of the 
provisions on piracy and the idea of customary international law (and later 
codification) that all states are granted piracy enforcement powers and uni-
versal jurisdiction45 over pirates. Furthermore, such a position would be in 
conflict with other regulations in international law granting to right to ex-
ercise domestic jurisdiction due for example to the flag state principle.46  
Article 105 does not express a general obligation of the seizing (or other 
states) to prosecute pirates. The wording in article 105 (“may”) is too weak 
to establish any obligation to subject suspected pirates to criminal proceed-
ings. Also article 105 in conjunction with the general obligation to repress 
piracy as stated in the above mentioned article 100 (which is using the im-
perative “shall”) establishes no explicit (or intended) general obligation to 
either subject suspected pirates to domestic criminal proceedings or to ex-
tradite a suspected pirate to criminal proceedings in the receiving coun-
try.47  
III. Other relevant international legislation  
in connection with counter-piracy enforcement 
The relevant provisions of UNCLOS are supplemented by other interna-
tional legislation such as the above-mentioned SUA Convention and the 
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Hostage Convention. The Hostage Convention might be relevant due to the 
mentioned modus operandi of Somali pirates, which includes the hostage 
taking of the crew. However, in the context of the Somali problem of pira-
cy, the relevance of the Hostage Convention is limited and adds little con-
cerning further enforcement powers, beside other reasons, because the ter-
ritoriality and active personality principles do not work in the Somali 
context due to the fact that Somalia is not a party to the Hostage Conven-
tion.48 
The drafting of the SUA Convention was initiated in connection with 
the above-mentioned “Achille Lauro” incident, which revealed some gaps 
and limitations in UNCLOS piracy rules.49 Furthermore, the SUA Conven-
tion was inspired by the United Nations General Assembly’s considera-
tions concerning terrorism and terrorist attacks against ships.50 This does, 
however, not mean that the provisions of the SUA Convention are limited 
to acts of terrorism; terrorism is only mentioned in the preamble and is not 
an express element of the unlawful acts defined in the SUA Convention’s 
provisions.51 
As indicated above, the SUA Convention does not focus on the problem 
of piracy nor does it deal directly with piracy in the UNCLOS sense, but 
rather it deals generally with unlawful attacks against vessels and maritime 
navigation. In article 5, the SUA Convention obliges the contracting states 
to criminalise certain specific acts against ships and their crews and pas-
sengers defined in article 3. Those acts can be acts of piracy as defined in 
UNCLOS article 101 but also, for example, internal attacks on board a 
single vessel or acts committed in territorial waters as long as the attacked 
vessel has been or intended to navigate beyond a single state’s territorial 
waters.52 Certain acts of piracy as defined by UNCLOS are outside the 
scope of the unlawful acts defined in the SUA Convention, for example 
simple acts of theft from one vessel to another which are not interfering 
with the safety of navigation.53 
The signatory states of the SUA Convention have the obligation to en-
sure the legal basis for prosecuting such acts in their own legal system by 
establishing domestic criminal jurisdiction if they are committed against a 
ship sailing under the state’s flag, if the acts are committed in the state’s 
territorial waters or if they are committed by a citizen of the state (article 6 
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(1)). Furthermore, the SUA Convention enables – but does not obliges – 
states to have jurisdiction in a number of other situations (article 6(2)), for 
example when a national of the state was “seized, threatened, injured or 
killed” under the unlawful attack.54  
The master of a vessel on which a person suspected of having commit-
ted illegal acts as defined in the SUA Conventions article 3 is present  “may 
deliver” him55 to a contracting state, for example the nearest port state (ar-
ticle 8 (1)). 
The clear intention of the SUA Convention is that attacks against ships 
and maritime navigation should not only be criminalised on paper, but also 
that such acts should be prosecuted in domestic courts if a suspected perpe-
trator is found in a contracting state. This intention is codified as an “ex-
tradite or prosecute obligation” in the SUA Convention – however, the 
implications of this obligation are not quite clear and strongly debated.56 
One of the main questions in the debate is whether article 10 (in conjunc-
tion with article 6 (4)) generally obliges states to prosecute or if the obliga-
tion is only triggered in situations when another state is requesting the ex-
tradition and the state in which the suspect is present is denying the 
extradition.57 Geiss/Petrig interpret the relevant provisions in the SUA 
Convention as following the so-called “Hague Model”58, which means that 
the obligation to prosecute is not dependent on an extradition request by 
another state and its denial by the state in which the suspect is present. 59 
They argue further that even if the SUA Convention did not anticipate the 
situation where a suspect is not present at shore but on board of the state’s 
warships the obligation also in those situations remains.60 
This understanding of the SUA Conventions provision on the “extradite 
or prosecute obligation” is challenged and furthermore, state practice in 
connection with the Somali problem of piracy indicates that many states 
engaging in counter-piracy do not accept the concept of a general obliga-
tion to prosecute.61 
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IV. The extension of enforcement powers by  
UN Security Council Resolution 
In the case of the problem of Somali piracy, the general legal framework 
for counter- piracy enforcement in international law is supplemented by a 
number of specific UN Security Council resolutions. In the context of this 
article, two central aspects in particular should be mentioned: Firstly, pro-
visions concerning the extension of the geographical scope of counter-
piracy enforcement and secondly, provisions concerning the disposal of 
pirate equipment and “pirate ships”. 
A number of UN Security Council authorise counter-piracy enforcement 
(and enforcement against “armed robbery at sea”62) within Somalia’s terri-
torial sea, airspace and land territory. The precondition for the use of this 
authority is that the consent of the Transitional Federal Government has 
been obtained and that the UN Secretary-General63 has been notified of this 
consent. The relevant resolutions make reference to the use of “all neces-
sary means” in counter-piracy enforcement.64 This wording leads to the 
question whether this could be interpreted as an extension of powers, for 
example concerning the question of the use of (military) force beyond the 
regime of UNCLOS.65 Geiss/Petrig assume that the answer to this question 
depends on the Security Council resolution in question: SC Res. 1846 
(2008) (which grants counter-piracy enforcement measures in the territori-
al sea of Somalia) does not widen the scope of powers due to the fact that 
the resolution at the same time is clearly emphasising that the powers 
granted are to be conducted “in a manner consistent with such action per-
mitted on the high seas with respect to piracy under relevant international 
law”.66 Concerning SC Res. 1851 (2008) (which permits counter-piracy 
enforcement “in Somalia”, e.g., also on land territory67) both authors argue 
that the Security Council is indeed widening the scope of powers beyond 
UNCLOS’ regime, including military force.68 However, this does not mean 
that with this resolution the Security Council has declared international 
humanitarian law applicable in the context of Somali piracy; counter-
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piracy enforcement on the high seas and on Somali land and sea territory is 
based on and limited by human rights law.69  
As mentioned above, article 105 UNCLOS enables courts to decide on 
the disposal of “pirate ships” and equipment. In addition a number of Se-
curity Council resolutions allow states (without the involvement of courts) 
the “disposition of boats, vessels, arms and other related equipment used 
in the commission of piracy and armed robbery at sea”. The threshold for 
this is that there are “reasonable grounds for suspecting” the use of those 
items for piracy.70 States engaging in counter-piracy have under those reso-
lutions the right to summarily dispose of piracy equipment, including the 
sinking of pirate vessels, beyond the provision of article 105 UNCLOS.71 
V. Brief conclusion on the legal framework  
for counter-piracy enforcement 
In the context of Somalia piracy the legal framework for counter-piracy 
enforcement granted to states may be fragmented and certain aspects may 
be disputed, but the general conclusion should be that it is rather robust. 
Many of the gaps which are present under the UNCLOS regime have been 
addressed and states are granted a range of powers against suspected pi-
rates and their equipment, including the use of force. The geographical 
scope for counter-piracy operations is not necessarily limited to the high 
seas and in the context of the Somali situation, the difference between pi-
racy and “armed robbery at sea” is of less relevance. Counter-piracy en-
forcement may include the arrest of suspected pirates and the prosecution 
in domestic courts. 
However, the use of the powers granted by international law is not 
without limitations. It is limited by the framework of human rights. The 
implications of human rights on counter-piracy enforcement raise a num-
ber of questions, for example in connection with the detention of suspected 
pirates on board warships or in connection with the question of the transfer 
of suspected pirates to countries willing to initiate criminal proceedings. 72 
In the context of this article, those questions are not in the focus but it is 
enough to note at this point that the range of enforcement powers must be 
used in accordance with the human rights regime.  
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D. On the use of the legal framework  
for counter-piracy activities 
When following the media coverage on the problem of Somali piracy and 
the efforts of counter-piracy during the last few years, one might easily be 
left with the impression that the law is complex and jeopardises the success 
of the efforts at sea. Just to name one example: In May 2010, the BBC re-
ported the release of a group of suspected pirates arrested during the de-
fence of a Russian oil tanker. The release was according to Russian offi-
cials due to “imperfections in international law” and to “an incomplete 
international legal basis”.73 The conclusion in this article does not support 
this impression; as stated above, the legal framework is rather robust and 
international law grants states the right to subject suspected pirates to do-
mestic criminal proceedings. 
This leads to the question why there is this impression that international 
law is a problem? The assumption of this article is that this impression 
might be connected to the use of the legal framework by the states engag-
ing in counter-piracy enforcement. To illustrate this assumption, two ex-
amples are highlighted in the following text. 
I. The question of prosecution or non-prosecution  
of suspected pirates 
One of the issues where possible shortcomings of counter-piracy enforce-
ment are discussed is the question of prosecution or non-prosecution of 
suspected pirates.  
When talking about the question of prosecution in connection with pira-
cy, two situations must be distinguished:74 The first situation concerns the 
question of initiating an investigation (and subsequently the prosecution of 
suspected perpetrators if they can be identified and captured) after a “suc-
cessful” hijacking and the release of the vessel after the payment of a ran-
som (for example, “CEC Future case”75). The second situation concerns the 
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seizure of suspected pirates by navies during counter-piracy operations (for 
example the “Absalon situation”76). The challenge of this situation is often 
that there is no direct nexus between the capturing state and the acts of 
piracy: for example when the Danish navy arrests Somali pirates during an 
attempt to hijack a vessel from the Dutch Antilles (with seafarers on board 
with different, non-Danish, nationalities)77 or when they seize a so-called 
“mother ship”, for example a local “dhow” under the control of pirates 
with Pakistani and Iranian seafarers held as hostages78.  
Both situations have their own legal challenges and practical issues. 
However, in the context of this article, the focus rests on the latter situation 
because this is the situation that has repeatedly been under the attention of 
the public eye and it has been criticised that states are practicing too often 
a “catch and release” (also called “deter and disrupt”) strategy in this situa-
tion.79  
The question of strategies concerning the prosecution of suspected pi-
rates encountered by navies has been particular debated after UN Special 
advisor Jack Lang submitted his Report of the Special Advisor to the Sec-
retary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia  
(in short: the Lang Report) in January 2011 in which the “seriousness of 
the situation” is emphasised and it is claimed that “more than 90 per cent 
of the pirates apprehended by States patrolling the seas will be released 
without being prosecuted”.80 
The notion that 9 out of 10 suspected pirates encountered by the navies 
are released without any legal consequences has since been challenged; 
partly on the basis of the Lang Report itself, which at the same time claims 
that since December 2008 over 2,000 pirates have been apprehended and 
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that at time of the report’s publication, 738 pirates had been submitted to 
criminal proceedings in 13 countries.81 
From the Danish perspective, the question of the prosecution rate has 
been a debated issue as well. In summer 2012, it was reported that since 
the autumn of 2008 when the Danish navy had started its engagement in 
counter-piracy operations, a total of 286 suspected pirates had been de-
tained in connection with counter-piracy enforcement. Of those, 41 were 
transferred for prosecution to countries like the Netherlands, The Sey-
chelles, and Kenya.82 This meant that 245 suspected pirates were subse-
quently released without any further consequences.  
When considering the question of those releases, it is important to real-
ise that the reasons for such conduct might differ and that some of those 
releases were based on what can be called “legitimate rule-of-law consid-
erations”.83 To put this argument to the point: Somali seafarers are innocent 
until proven guilty, i.e., the burden of proof must also be lifted in cases of 
suspicion of piracy. This can be challenging in situations where the sus-
pected pirates are not apprehended in the act of attacking a specific vessel 
but for example, are found carrying arms in a suspicious vessel. It might 
seem like common sense to conclude that persons found in this setting in a 
piracy high risk area are indeed pirates, but it must also be considered that 
in this part of the world some people not engaged in piracy (for example, 
fishermen) carry weapons to protect themselves.84 Another legal challenge 
is the question of criminalisation: If the suspected pirates were not engaged 
in a specific attack, there is the question of whether the domestic legal sys-
tem in question has criminalised the act of “cruising with piracy equipment 
with the intention to attack vessels” as a punishable crime.85  
However, even if the above-mentioned obstacles can be met (e.g., it can 
be proven that the suspected pirates have committed an act criminalised in 
domestic criminal law), state practice indicates that this does not ensure 
that suspected pirates are submitted to criminal proceedings; when naval 
forces encounter suspected pirates, four options are open:86 1) The national 
legal system of the seizing state prosecutes the suspected pirates, 2) The 
suspected pirates are transferred to a domestic legal system with a direct 
nexus to the piracy incident (for example, the flag state of the attacked 
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vessel), 3) The suspected pirates are transferred to the domestic legal sys-
tem of a state in the region with no direct nexus to the incident (for exam-
ple, to Kenya on the basis of transfer-agreements87) or 4) The suspected 
pirates are released as no national legal system is able and willing to pros-
ecute. 
Many seizing states seem to avoid the first option: the fact that interna-
tional law does not include a clear general obligation to codify and exer-
cise universal jurisdiction in cases of piracy means that there are several 
approaches concerning the question of jurisdiction for piracy in national 
systems of criminal justice. Some legal systems have chosen universal ju-
risdiction for piracy (for example, the Netherlands) in their domestic crim-
inal law. Others have chosen only to have criminal jurisdiction regarding 
cases of piracy with a direct connection to the state (e.g., its ships or citi-
zens) and for situations where international law clearly obligates the state 
to have jurisdiction – this is the approach Denmark has chosen.88 This 
means that when the Danish navy encounters suspected pirates and there is 
no connection to Danish interests, the domestic rules on criminal jurisdic-
tion do not allow for proceeding with the case in Denmark.89 But even 
countries that have codified universal jurisdiction in cases of piracy in 
their domestic criminal law seem to be unwilling to use those provisions 
when capturing suspected pirates, at least when there is no nexus to own 
interests.90 
Also concerning the second option, state practice indicates that there is 
a difference between what is legally possible and the willingness to initiate 
criminal proceedings. Under the regime of the SUA Convention, as men-
tioned above, the flag state is obliged to criminalise certain attacks against 
ships. However, some flag states seem to show very little interest in re-
ceiving suspected pirates from other nation’s navies.91 
The scenario preferred by many seizing states seems to be the third op-
tion: the transfer of the suspected pirates to a country that is willing and 
able to prosecute either under a transfer agreement92 or on the basis of an 
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ad hoc agreement.93 Denmark, for example, stresses in its “Strategy con-
cerning the Danish efforts in counter-piracy 2011-2014” from May 2011, 
its intention to establish transfer agreements with “willing states” in the 
region.94 The scenario of pre-trial transfer is, however, only partly a solu-
tion to the problem at hand, as the problem is not necessarily to find a 
country willing to prosecute, but to find a country which is willing to exe-
cute the sentence given by the court.95 However, the Danish example shows 
that this option of transfer to a “willing” country in the region is not al-
ways accessible.96 Furthermore, the scenario of transferring suspected pi-
rates to a “willing” country in the region raises a number of questions, 
such as those regarding legal and physical capacity to deal with piracy cas-
es and often human rights issues, to mention only two.97  
When the first three options are not possible or not chosen for other rea-
sons, the fourth option, the release of the suspected pirates, remains and as 
mentioned above, this option has been used in a considerable number of 
cases.  
This “catch and release” practice is, as shown above, in some situations 
unavoidable, for example when the burden of proof cannot be lifted. How-
ever, in other situations non-prosecution is the result of an unwillingness to 
fully use the legal framework, for example because of domestic considera-
tions. A recent debate in Denmark shows that there is no political desire to 
bring suspected Somali pirates to Denmark for prosecution, also in situa-
tions where a direct nexus between the piracy incident and Danish interest 
exists. The basis for this lack of political desire includes the fear that con-
victed Somali pirates will not be able to be transferred back to the unstable 
situation in Somalia after they have served their sentences in Denmark. 98 
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 This practice has for example been used by the Danish authorities, see 
http://forsvaret.dk/SOK/Nyt%20og%20Presse/pirateri/Pages/12formodedepiraterersatilan
d.aspx (both last visited 30.10.2012). 
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 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark (and others), Strategi for den danske 
indsats mod pirateri 2011-2014, 24. (Strategy for the Danish efforts against piracy) 
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 See Guilfoyle (2012), 777. 
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 Some of the challenges connected with prosecution the region are shown by Ken-
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 The recent debate was trigged by a statement by a Danish politician who in the light 
of yet another case of releases of suspected pirates suggested that in the future the Danish 
navy will refrain from trying to arrest pirates. As a result of this statement the Danish 
union for shipmasters and other maritime officers, “Søfartens Ledere”, conducted a sur-
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II. The question of limitation of counter-piracy measures  
by Rules of Engagement (RoE) 
Another point of criticism in connection with counter-piracy efforts is that 
the action taken by the some of the countries participating in the different 
naval operations is not “robust” enough compared to other nations that 
have taken a tougher approach. According to a British House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee report, some nations, for example Russia, India 
and China, “have taken a particularly uncompromising line against pirate 
vessels”. This “uncompromising line” is seen in contrast with other na-
tions’ approach, which is categorised as “a more cautious line”.99  
The question of different approaches named in the report of the Foreign 
Affairs Committee is linked to the question of the specific Rules of En-
gagement (RoE) that are utilised by different naval operations. RoE govern 
the limits of naval action; they are drawn up on the basis of international 
and domestic law and on the basis of the specific mandate for the operation 
as well as on limitations laid down by national mandate. The RoE of dif-
ferent counter-piracy operations are not published and are not commented 
on in detail by officials.100 However, some (limited) information about RoE 
connected with counter-piracy is in the public domain. One example in this 
connection concerns EU’s counter-piracy operation, EU NAVFOR’s Oper-
ation Atalanta. In March 2012, the European Union announced that it 
would prolong Operation Atalanta for two more years (until December 
2014) and that the range of the operation would be extended “to include 
Somali coastal territory”.101  
As mentioned above, since 2008, SC Res. 1851 has permitted counter-
piracy enforcement “in Somalia”, e.g., also on land territory, under certain 
conditions. However, this option was not granted by Atalanta’s RoE before 
                                                 
 
vey on the issue attitudes towards the question of prosecution of Somali pirates with 
representatives from all political parties present in the Danish parliament. The results of 
this survey show that there is little willingness to use existing means to prosecute Somali 
pirates in Danish courts, even if there is a direct link to Denmark (e.g. the suspected p i-
rate for example attacked a Danish vessel). The results of the survey were published in 
Søfartens Ledere 3/2012, The elephant in the room, 24 ff.  
99
 House of Commons; Foreign Affairs Committee – Tenth report; Piracy off the coast 
of Somalia, 20.12.2011, par. 59 f.: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201 
012/cmselect/cmfaff/1318/131802.htm (last visited 20.9.2012) 
100
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March 2012. The question of engaging in counter-piracy enforcement not 
only at sea but also on land is of course connected to a number of very 
legitimate considerations and reservations,102 but the result of the approach 
prior to March 2012 also had some interesting implications, which can be 
illustrated by the following example103:  
One of the approaches used by naval forces is to destroy piracy equip-
ment from the air, for example by shooting holes in small pirate vessels 
(“skiffs”) “parked” at the Somali coastline with the objective of making 
those vessels unusable: 
 
   
 
The former RoE for Operation Atalanta only granted operations in Soma-
lia’s territorial and internal waters, but not at shore.104 This means that ves-
sel 1 on the illustration above105 clearly was beyond Operation Atalanta’s 
reach. The question concerning vessel 2 and 3 was more challenging and 
hotly debated, as parts of those vessels are situated on shore, i.e. , on Soma-
li soil. Only vessel 4 in the above illustration is unquestionably a legitimate 
target under the former RoE of Operation Atalanta. 
The example shows that the limitations laid down by a RoE can lead to 
situations which may give the impression of a “half hearted” approach. 
Under the new RoE, all four vessels in the illustration would be legitimate 
targets for Operation Atalanta forces. This has been indirectly confirmed 
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 See Ehrhart/Petretto (2012). 
103
 The example used here was discussed under the “Maritime Legal Dimensions Sem-
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by an EU official, who according to the news agency Reuters, explained 
that “the force would still only operate at sea and in the air, though could 
now target pirates’ weaponry and other equipment on land”.106 
III. Some concluding remarks on the two examples  
The two examples briefly touched on here raise a number of questions and 
considerations, though there is not enough space in this article to cover all 
of them. In connection with the question of prosecution, it is for example 
asked what an increase in the prosecution rate really would achieve and 
more specifically whether more prosecutions would have a deterrent ef-
fect.107 It is widely accepted that the long-term solution to Somali piracy 
depends on sustainable improvements on shore and not individual punish-
ment. Another aspect in this context is whether it really would be a sensi-
ble solution to prosecute suspected pirates far away from their country of 
origin and in a legal system they most likely will have no understanding 
of.108  
In addition, the decision to use RoE that do not to grant all of the 
measures permitted by international law may be based on legitimate con-
siderations and the states engaging in counter-piracy have to navigate 
through a complex environment of national and international law, human 
rights, “rule of law” considerations and potential limitations laid down by 
the specific nation state’s domestic democratic process.  
The argument put forward in this article is therefore not that every na-
tion should use the legal framework in the most extensive way possible, 
nor is its intention to advocate a “particularly uncompromising line”, 
which some countries actively pursue. Concerning the Russian approach, it 
has for example been reported that a Russian naval vessel seized a group of 
pirates after they had tried to attack a Russian flagged vessel. The pirates were 
subsequently “released” in a small boat without means of navigation and far 
away from shore. After the incident, Russian officials declared that they ex-
pected the pirates had been lost at sea.109 Such an approach is, not only from 
a legal point of view, unacceptable in the 21
st
 century. 
The argument in this article is that the more restrictive approaches cho-
sen by some countries might be based on legitimate considerations, but at 
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the same time could they lead to certain outcomes that were not necessarily 
intended or desirable.  
E. Reflections and some concluding remarks 
As mentioned above, the public debate concerning counter-piracy en-
forcement reveals a perception that it is not robust enough. This perception 
seemed to be shared by relevant stakeholders, such as the shipping indus-
try. To name an example: Mr. Per Gullestrup, CEO of Clipper Group, 
which in 2008-2009 had to deal with the hijacking of their vessel M/V 
CEC Future by Somali pirates,110 argued in November 2011 in the Danish 
Maritime Magazine that the “international community has fully shown it 
incompetence by being unable to solve this problem”. In his opinion the 
shipping companies had borne the burden of their responsibility and were 
spending “fortunes on protection” while at the same time the current ef-
forts by the international community were only treating the symptoms.  111  
Another example of the stakeholder’s perception is the perspective of 
seafarers, who are the potential and in over 2,600 cases112 real victims of 
Somali pirates. The “catch and release” approach has left the impression 
that crimes against seafarers are not taken seriously enough by the coun-
tries who are engaged in counter-piracy and that piracy is a crime without 
consequences for the perpetrator.113 
The notion of an ineffective counter-piracy effort is questionable, taking 
the above mentioned significant fall in piracy attacks into account, but it 
should also be remembered that the fall in piracy attacks is due to a num-
ber of factors.114 However when the Lang Report was presented in the be-
ginning of 2011, over 700 seafarers were in the hands of Somali pirates 
and the perception of the situation was rather pessimistic.  
The perception of the stakeholders at that time is relevant because it can 
be expected that this influenced the decisions taken at the time. The as-
sumption of this article is that at the beginning of 2011, stakeholders had 
the impression that counter-piracy operations were somewhat ineffective 
and that to some extent they were left alone with the problem.115 This as-
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sumption can be based on statements like the above mentioned by repre-
sentatives of the shipping industry and can further can be illustrated by a 
Danish example: In 2009, the Danish Shipowner Association (Danmarks 
Rederiforening) clearly ruled out the use of private armed guards (or Pri-
vately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) as they are formally 
termed) on Danish vessels. The reasons for this included the consideration 
that ships are workplaces and there was a risk of escalating the situation. 
Furthermore, the argument was put forward that the protection of vessels 
ought to be a state responsibility.116 
In 2011, the situation had changed completely and the same organisa-
tion advocated for a change in the Danish regulation of weapons with the 
aim of giving smooth access to PCASP. This development was supported 
by representatives for seafarers and in the summer of 2012, the Danish 
legislation on weapons (våbenloven) was drastically changed; giving ship 
owners relatively easy access to put weapons (and PCASP) on board their 
vessels.117  
This move towards a privatisation of maritime security has not only 
been taken place in Denmark, but also in other countries affected by the 
problem of piracy.118 The wish to protect vessels is understandable, but the 
movement towards the extended use of PCASP is not without challenges. 
One of these challenges is the question of the legal framework for PCASP 
and their actions under domestic and international law, but also in coastal 
or port states which are visited by vessels that have PCASP. Another chal-
lenge is the question of quality of private providers of maritime security 
and the question of control. Finally the question of the framework for the 
use of (lethal) force by private actors in self-defence (or defence of others) 
is rather crucial. 
The question is no longer whether there is a move towards extended 
private security as (one) answer towards the problem of maritime piracy, 
but rather how this development can be conducted and controlled in a sen-
sible way, governed by the principles of the “rule of law”. Recent incidents 
including the shooting of Indian fishermen (in the particular case by Italian 
naval personnel put on a merchant vessel)119 and the release of a video 
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showing a rather unrestricted use of lethal force by PCASPs120 indicate that 
the development towards armed protection of ships has to be monitored 
closely. It is crucial that the high seas do not turn into a kind of “wild 
west”-area, governed by the law of the gun. 
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Comment on Birgit Feldtmann 





Piracy has become a focus of the public since attacks of Somali pirates 
have drastically increased in 2008. The international community seemed to 
be incapable of dealing with the problem, as the attacks continued to rise 
although a number of operations had been sanctioned. To this day more 
than 3.000 seafarers have been held hostage by Somali pirates, while, in 
addition to the human suffering, losses caused by piracy have also hit 
maritime actors. The rises in ransom payments, insurance and wage premi-
ums but also costs of re-routing and increased speed harm ship-owners 
severely. In addition, ship-owners face high costs during long-lasting ne-
gotiations with pirates until their vessels are set free. Secure maritime 
routes at the Horn of Africa are not only essential for crews and ship-
owners but also for maritime transport. A blockade of the Suez Canal 
would implicitly increase the shipping distance for many bilateral trade 
relations. Unquestionably, longer trade distances will have a negative ef-
fect on the volume of trade.1 According to Feyrer (2009) roughly 20 per-
cent of the bilateral trade patterns depend on the Suez Canal. In 2011 
17.799 ships with a dead weight tonnage of 929 billion tons have passed 
the channel which accounts to 11 percent of total seaborne trade in the 
same year.2  
The persistence of political instability and poor living conditions in So-
malia have made people increasingly willing to resort to forms of violence; 
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thus creating a breeding ground for piracy. Another result of the state fai l-
ure is that Somalia is not able to enforce, prosecute or guard its coast on its 
own. The various anti-piracy operations of the international community 
can at best be described as fragmented and were not able to prevent mer-
chant ships from getting hijacked.3 The most effective protection seems to 
be employing armed security guards onboard because down to the present 
day not a single ship with armed security onboard has been reported hi-
jacked. 
In her article, Birgit Feldtmann discusses how the international commu-
nity reacts to the problem of maritime piracy. She first gives a brief over-
view of the general problem of maritime piracy and analyses the counter-
piracy activities around the Horn of Africa/Indian Ocean region taken by 
the international community. There have been concerns whether the legal 
framework is sufficient to fight piracy, as the success of these actions was 
only limited. The most relevant international legislation in connection with 
counter-piracy enforcement is the United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA Convention). In the 
present case, the latter is of less relevance because Somalia is not part of it. 
However, as she points out, the legal framework is rather robust and coun-
ter-piracy enforcement may include the use of force (based on and limited 
by human rights), the arrest of suspected pirates and the prosecution in 
domestic courts. Against this background, it is still unclear whether it is 
allowed to transfer suspected pirates to other countries and to take suspects 
into custody on warships without a trial. The article further analyses the 
legal framework for counter-piracy enforcement under international law 
and how it is implemented in national legislation and how it is interpreted 
in different contexts. She addresses these issues with two examples, the 
Rules of Engagement (RoE), which is the extent to which force is used to 
fight piracy, and the question of prosecution or non-prosecution. She con-
cludes with the analysis of the consequences connected to the different 
actions chosen by the states affected by the problem. 
It is not the goal of this paper to deepen the legal analysis, but to rather 
view some of Birgit Feldtmann’s arguments in the context of simple mi-
croeconomic considerations of representative ship-owners and pirates. The 
effectiveness of the legal framework may be limited if the agents’ deci-
sions are not affected by the legal system. To evaluate possible actions and 
opportunities by the international community from an economic point of 
view, one can be making use of the assumptions of a representative agent 
in a simple rent-seeking model. Using the model, changes in ransom de-
mand, penalties and sovereign protection can be analyzed. From a microe-
                                                 
3
 Leeson (2009). 
 Comment on Birgit Feldtmann    201 
 
conomic perspective, actions only alter decisions made by the agents, if 
these actions are credible and affect expected payoffs. This is only the case 
if pirates believe they will be prosecuted and sentenced. As Birgit 
Feldtmann points out, the legal framework is rather robust and states are 
granted rights to use force to fight piracy and to prosecute suspects. Still, 
the use of the legal framework is far away from universal jurisdiction. She 
further states that most states follow a catch and release approach, where 
pirates are only prosecuted if there is a connection to the seizing state or 
where international law clearly obligates a prosecution. Therefore, as long 
as the states do not exhaust the legal framework and avoid prosecution of 
suspected pirates, the deterring effect from prosecution is diminished. The 
threat of law enforcement loses credibility, too. As a result, the level of 
penalty becomes irrelevant. However, in the context of the model it be-
comes clear that prosecution and law enforcement are not the most effi-
cient variables to eliminate piracy from an economic point of view. They 
are effective in the short term, but only if the level of penalty outweighs 
prospective returns from piracy. If this is not the case, it is shown that 
ship-owners may even be worse off. The most efficient implication is to 
raise opportunity costs of the pirate. Higher domestic income levels make 
piracy less attractive and reduce rent-seeking costs. 
It is the aim of this paper to point out the economic interaction between 
pirates and ship-owners in a rent-seeking context and to show how these 
microeconomic motives may lead to an escalation of violence. In order to 
motivate the model, relevant background information is presented in the 
next section. In Section C the model is explained, changes in exogenous 
variables are analyzed, and policy implications are derived. Finally, the 
results are summarized and are set in comparison to the results derived by 
Birgit Feldtmann. 
B. Background 
The piracy problem at the Horn of Africa can be distinguished from earlier 
forms of piracy by its modus operandi, in particular by the kidnap & ran-
som model. Between 2006 and 2010, worldwide acts of maritime piracy 
significantly increased from 239 attacks to 445 attacks in 2010. Almost the 
entire increase is attributed to the increasing activity of Somali pirates. The 
share of worldwide attacks involving firearms was 22 percent (53 inci-
dents) in 2006 and increased to more than 50 percent (243 incidents) in 
2010.4 Only looking at African pirates, the use of guns has increased from 
around 30 percent in 2002 to more than 90 percent in 2010 (Bowden, 
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2011). Obviously a significant armament has taken place during these 
years. According to the International Maritime Bureau (IMB), Somali pi-
rates fire automatic weapons and Rocket Propelled Grenades (RPG) in or-
der to board and hijack vessels. The fact that pirates have more often at-
tacked steaming ships and that they have increased their scope of action as 
far as 1000 nautical miles away from the coast is evidence for an increas-
ing degree of professionalism, which requires certain investments like 
mother-ships, speedboats, larger teams, etc. There is no reliable data on 
ransom payments; however, total ransom payments are estimated to be 
US$ 159.62 million in 2011 with an average ransom of around US$ 5 mil-
lion.5 It is not quite clear how these ransoms are split up in the value chain 
between actual pirates and financiers, sponsors, government officials and 
other interest groups. Based on rough estimates, it is assumed that pirates 
are only able to keep about 30 percent of the revenue from piracy, whereas 
up to 70 percent is distributed among the people involved ashore and there-
fore is disposable for further piracy operations.6 Independently of the value 
chain split, the ransom payments should be sufficient to finance piracy 
investments. In contrast, such amounts of money are obviously a great 
threat to the shipping industry. Apart from ransom payments, ship-owners 
need to account for higher insurance premiums, higher labor costs, the cost 
of re-routing, the cost of increased speed and all costs related to security 
and defense measures.  
Besides these economic factors the human factor should not be forgot-
ten, as the lives of many seafarers are at stake. Sovereign protection for 
merchant ships around the Horn of Africa is provided through the EU 
NAVFOR Somalia – Operation Atalanta and the Combined Maritime 
Forces. These counter-piracy operations are coordinated through the 
monthly Shared Awareness and Deconfliction (SHADE) meetings in Bah-
rain, with representatives from more than 25 countries.7 Although the naval 
operations were not completely ineffective, piracy was not reduced.8 To 
this day ships are still getting attacked and kidnapped by pirates in the 
whole Indian Ocean even though the growth rate of pirate attacks has de-
creased in 2011 and 2012.9 Because of the size of the Indian Ocean, it is 
more or less impossible to patrol the Indian Ocean with sovereign forces. It 
is therefore inevitably up to the ship-owners to protect their ships inde-
pendently. Considering that the shipping industry has focused on non-
lethal defense measures during the first years of the piracy problem at the 
Horn of Africa, the activity level of pirates and their increasing tendency to 
                                                 
5
 Bowden (2011). 
6
 Geopolicity (2011). 
7
 Combined Maritime Forces (2011). 
8
 Shortland & Vothknecht (2011). 
9
 IMB (2013). 
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violence is now combated with a noticeable shift towards more robust de-
fense measures. Shipping industry organizations responded to this threat 
by developing guidelines called Best Management Practices (BMP) in or-
der to support ships to deter and defend pirate attacks in close co-operation 
with interested international shipping and trading organizations including 
the EU, NATO and the International Maritime Bureau. The 4
th
 edition has 
been released in 2011 and among other things it is now recommended to 
have armed security guards onboard when travelling through high risk are-
as.10 As Birgit Feldtmann has mentioned as well, politics have reacted on 
the current demand for more intense defense measures. The prime minister 
of the U.K., David Cameron, announced on October 30th 2011 that private 
armed guards will be allowed to operate on U.K.-flagged ships so as to 
defend pirate attacks.11 Similar developments have taken place in other 
countries, too. The next section sheds some light on these developments 
from a microeconomic perspective. 
C. A Rent-Seeking Model of Piracy 
The model is set up in the framework of a simple coordination game in 
order to illustrate the danger of an escalation of violence between ship-
owners and pirates: Following both Becker (1968) and Brown and Reyn-
olds (1973), an average utility maximizing pirate and an average utility 
maximizing ship-owner, have the opportunity to either avoid a confronta-
tion or to risk a clash. Although the modeling of a single representative 
pirate does not reflect the multi-stage hierarchy of the Somali piracy busi-
ness,12 it is still useful to analyze the strategic interaction and the armament 
on both sides. Due to a number of reasons the shipping industry is in praxis 
not able to avoid the Suez Chanel. Still, there exists a theoretical threshold 
where the shipping industry cannot bear the risk of piracy any longer and 
is forced to re-route or even establish new maritime trade patterns.  
The pirate is willing to give up piracy if the autonomous legal income 
   makes him better off compared to the uncertain potential income 
  from piracy. He does not know whether he will be successful with the 
attack and will get a ransom or whether he will fail and face a penalty. On 
the other side there is an average ship-owner who owns only one ship. 
Revenue is assumed to be constant and exogenous. Freight rates, good 
prices and output of shipping services are ignored as well as variable costs 
which depend on the amount of freight transported. Security can be re-
garded as a public good and should therefore be provided by the state. In 
                                                 
10
 BMP4 (2011). 
11
 House of Commons – Foreign Affairs Committee (2011). 
12
 Leeson (2007). 
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the case of piracy, it is difficult to define a single state which is responsible 
for the provision of security in international waters, as Birgit Feldtmann 
pointed out. However, in the case of an economic theoretical model it is 
legitimate to simplify and think of the international union as the sovereign 
agent. The sovereign does not have any other (economic or political) moti-
vations affecting its actions, e.g., tax-income or tariffs on international 
trade are ignored and its actions are not modeled endogenously. In order to 
combat piracy, the sovereign agent has can affect the outcome of the model 
in different ways: It can increase the penalties a perpetrator has to implici t-
ly pay when getting convicted or it can choose to increase sovereign pro-
tection by financing security measures which aim to reduce piracy, for ex-
ample by increasing the number of marine ships, marine patrol aircrafts or 
by sending sovereign security forces on board of merchant ships.13 
I. Route Choice 
Let     be the ship-owner’s profit from choosing the direct route. If the 
ship-owner avoids the piracy area his profits decrease due to higher costs 
and foregone profits from trade with adjacent states. These profits of the 
alternative route are labeled    . When both players enter piracy, it is as-
sumed that the pirate will always find a ship to attack.14 The outcome, 
however, is uncertain for both agents, as neither of the players knows, 
whether he will prevail. 
 
Figure 1:   Normal Form Representation 
Ship-Owner 
Pirate 
Direct Route (DR) Alternative Route (AR) 
Piracy (P)  [ (  )] ;  (   ) 0 ;     
Legal Alternative (LA)  (   ) ;      (   ) ;     
 
The optimal strategy of the pirate then depends on whether his expected 
utility out of piracy is larger than his utility out of legal income. As long as  
 
 [ (  )]   (   ) (1) 
holds, the pirate is worse off choosing legal alternative income opportuni-
ties. Similarly, the optimal strategy of the ship-owner depends on his ex-
                                                 
13
 In the framework of the model, there are also other possible policy instruments to 
think of, however at this point, it makes sense to simplify.  
14
 This assumption is plausible, due to the amount of ships travelling through the Gulf 
of Aden. 
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pected profits from choosing the direct route and on his secure profits 
when avoiding piracy. If and only if 
 
 (  )      (2) 
holds, the ship-owner chooses the direct route. Independently of the pi-
rate’s strategy there is no Nash equilibrium where condition (2) is violated. 
The pirate will not be able to generate any income, if the ship-owner 
avoids the piracy region. Suppose the pirate is active in the legal sector. In 
this case, the ship-owner does not have to worry about piracy and is better 
of choosing the direct route with higher profits. Therefore this game has 
two possible Nash equilibria in pure strategies.15 If condition (1) and (2) 
hold neither of the players has any incentive to deviate. The ship-owner 
will choose the direct route and the pirate will attack the ship. If condition 
(1) is violated but condition (2) holds, working in the legal sector and 
choosing the direct route is a Nash equilibrium. Whether conditions (1) 
and (2) hold depends on the probability, the profit and the utility. Howev-
er, by investing into crime or defense, respectively, each agent can influ-
ence the probability to his advantage. For example, buying weapons, at-
tacking with larger teams or more ships increase the pirate’s chances to 
prevail. As the investment decisions affect the probability and hence ex-
pected profits and expected utility and thus the Nash equilibrium in the 
game, the utility or profit maximization under uncertainty needs to be ana-
lyzed in greater detail. 
II. Probability function 
The probability   describes the likelihood of a pirate attack resulting in 
failure. Consequently     reflects the probability of the pirate being suc-
cessful with the attack. According to Tullock (1980) the probability is en-
dogenous to the agents’ investment decision. The higher the ratio of the 
ship-owner’s investment relative to total investment (investment of the 
ship-owner and the pirate), the higher is the probability for the ship-owner 
to successfully defend a pirate attack. Let   be the investment of the ship-
owner and   the investment of the pirate. Following Tullock (1980) the 
probability is modeled as follows:16 
                                                 
15
 For reasons of simplicity we restrict the analysis to Nash equilibria in pure strate-
gies only, although it would make sense to allow for mixed-strategy Nash equilibria. 
Allowing the pirate to randomize over his strategies could very well represent the fact 
that not every ship travelling through the Gulf of Aden gets attacked by pirates.  
16
 As Hirshleifer (1989) points out two-sided peace can never occur in a Nash equilib-
rium if the ratio form is used. Especially in a context with imperfect information, the 
defeated side may have incentives to surrender. When the defeated side does not lose 
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 (   )  
 
   
 (3) 
If      , the probability will always be equal to 0.5. From equation 
(3) it follows that the effect of a marginal change in   on the probability   
is positive, but decreasing with the total amount invested by the pirate and 
the ship-owner. In turn, a marginal change in   affects the probability   
negatively but the effect also decreases with the total amount invested. 
This means, the more is invested by both agents, the smaller is the effect of 
a one unit change in either of the investments on  . In Figure 2 two proba-
bility functions for different levels of total investment are displayed with 
respect to the difference in investment levels. The dashed line represents 
the probability function for a smaller total investment in comparison to the 
solid line. The lower total investment, the steeper the slope of the inflec-
tional tangent of the probability function at     and the faster the con-
vergence of the probability function to its limit values. 
 
Figure 2:   Probability distribution 
 
                                                 
 
everything, although it did not invest at all, the probability may be better described as a 
logistic function of the difference between the agents’ investments. However, in compa r-
ison to a war between nations the booty cannot be split. In addition, it is rather easy for 
the pirate to assess the value of the booty. Therefore the ratio form seems more applic a-
ble in this context. 
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III. Utility and Profit Maximization 
The pirate and the ship-owner maximize utility and profits, respectively, 
by choosing an optimal level of investment. The decision has to be taken 
ex-ante and therefore reduces income in the case of success and in the case 
of failure. The pirate’s utility is modeled as a positive function of income:  
   
  
   (4) 
If the attack is successful the pirate gets the ransom   which is reduced by 
his investment  , so that his utility (  
 )      . If the pirate fails with 
the attack his utility is reduced by his investment and by the penalty   , 
which is the monetary equivalent to the disutility of being imprisoned, pay-
ing a penalty or even death. His utility becomes (  
 )      . Clearly 
the pirate is worse off in the case of failure, as   
  is greater than   
  and 
hence  (  
 ) is greater than (  
 ). From the pirate’s perspective an in-
crease in   increases the chance of getting   
 . However, this investment 
also reduces income in both outcomes to the same extent. In order to max-
imize his expected utility, he needs to choose   with respect to its effect on 
the probability  . Due to the uncertainty of the success of the attack, the 
pirate maximizes his expected utility subject to  , as shown in the follow-
ing expression: 
 
     [ (  )]  (   (   )) [   ]   (   ) [    ] (5) 
There are two possible outcomes for the ship-owner, when choosing the 
direct route. In either case he gets the yield    which is reduced by his in-
vestment into security measures. If the pirates are successful the ship-
owner has to pay a ransom    for his ship and the crew. The factor   de-
termines the ship-owner’s actual cost resulting from a successful pirate 
attack. When a vessel is hijacked ship-owners usually face costs which are 
many times greater than the initial ransom payment, for example due to 
long lasting negotiations with pirates etc. An increase in these costs is im-
plicitly reflected through an increase in . However, ship-owners may also 
reduce potential losses from piracy by buying insurances against piracy. 17 
The cost of the premium is implicitly included in . The total cost of pira-
cy is therefore reflected in terms of  . 
                                                 
17
 In praxis certain areas with high piracy risk are declared as war risk zones and are 
excluded from standard hull and cargo insurance protection. For trips in areas like the 
Gulf of Aden, additional war risk premiums have to be bought per trip and are calculated 
in the short term individually (Engerer & Goessler, 2011). Changes in the risk of piracy 
are therefore reflected in changes in the war risk premium, in this model through changes 
in  .  
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The ship-owner maximizes expected profits subject to  : 
 
     ( )  (   )[       (   )]   [     (   )]. (6) 
The pirate maximizes equation (4) which yields the following first order 
condition: 
 




(   ) 
(   )       (7) 
Analogous to the pirate maximization of the ship-owner’s profit function 
leads to: 
 




(   ) 
        (8) 
By solving equations (7) and (8) for the respective investment variables, a 
quadratic expression of the following form is obtained for the pirate 
 
             (   ) (9) 
and the ship-owner 
 
               . (10) 
Due to the quadratic form of equation (9) and (10) there are two solutions 
for the optimal amount invested. The pirate’s reaction function depends on 
the amount invested by the ship-owner and is positively related to the ran-
som   and the penalty  . The ship-owner’s response depends on the 
amount invested by the pirate and is positively connected to the ransom 
payment and the factor  . As the investment is restricted to positive values 
only, the respective reaction functions can be written as follows: 
 
   (     )      √ (   ) (11) 
 
  (     )      √    (12) 
IV. Cournot Equilibrium and Comparative Statics 
The reaction curves   (     ) and   (     ) are illustrated in Figure 3. 
Let us assume that conditions (1) and (2) hold. The Cournot Nash equilib-
rium is then determined through the intersection of the two reaction curves 
in point A. It is algebraically expressed as follows: 
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(   )(  ) 
(      ) 
     
  (   ) 
(      ) 
 (13) 
The reaction curves of both agents are positively related to their respective 
determinants. As long as     holds,    is greater than    in the Nash 
equilibrium. 
 
Figure 3a and 3b: Reaction Functions and Shifts Associated to Changes in 
Ransom Payments and Level of Penalty 
  
 (     )  Reaction Function of the Ship-owner 
 (     )  Reaction Function of the Pirate 
 
By substituting     and     into (1) the probability   in the Nash equilib-
rium is determined in terms of  ,   and  : 
 
    
  
      
 (14) 
As one can see, the reaction functions, the Nash equilibrium and thus the 
probability of successfully defending an attack only depend on the values 
of  ,  , and  . It is the objective to analyze changes in these exogenous 
variables to see how the outcome of the model is affected. However, we 
restrict our analysis to variables affecting the pirate’s behavior, as we are 
particularly interested in his response to policy interventions. A rise in   
increases the investment of each agent for any given investment of the op-
ponent. Figure 3a shows that higher ransom demands shift the reaction 
curve of the pirate upwards and shift the reaction curve of the ship-owner 
to the right. The Nash equilibrium is characterized by greater investments 
into security and attacking measures and thus potential greater violence. A 
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positive change in   only affects the reaction curve of the pirate and shift it 
upwards as can be seen in Figure 3b. The ship-owner’s profits are not af-
fected by  . His reaction function does not shift. Still, according to his 
reaction function his optimal investment level responds to the change in 
the pirate’s investment.18 Increases in the size of the penalty   decrease   
due to the fact, that the change in the pirate’s investment is greater than the 
response in the ship-owners investment. The pirate is worse off when get-
ting caught and increases his investment in order to maximize his utility 
and to avoid the greater penalty. The ship-owner’s reaction function is not 
affected. Therefore, measures of the international union to combat mari-
time piracy by increasing the penalty for acts of maritime piracy reduce the 
probability of defending a pirate attack in the equilibrium.19 Although the 
increase in   increases the pirate’s optimal investment    and hence his 
chances to be successful with piracy, his expected utility is still reduced, 
because the decrease in income outweighs the effect of the decrease in  .20 
In order to reduce piracy,   needs to be set such that expected utility is 
reduced enough to make income from legal alternatives more attractive. 
Otherwise piracy is not reduced and the equilibrium is characterized with a 
higher total investment into crime and defense. The ship-owner is worse 
off in the Nash equilibrium as his expected profits are reduced due to the 
change in  . 
V. Budget Constraints 
Suppose the ship-owner faces budget constraints and cannot afford 
investing more than in point A in Figure 4. Let point B reflect the Nash 
equilibrium in the absence of binding budget constraints. It is never 
optimal for the pirate to invest as much as to force the ship-owner to 
choose an alternative route because the pirate would deprive himself of his 
own booty. Therefore, from the pirate’s perspective, the point A is always 
optimal, as long as his expected income is greater than his legal income 
opportunities. Suppose now that only the pirate is constraint in his budget 
and that he is not able to afford his optimal investment level in response to 
the ship-owner’s investment. The ship-owner now has an incentive to 
supplant the pirate. Under the assumption that the pirate’s capacities limit 
his investment to point C, the optimal response of the ship-owner 
according to his reaction function lies in point C, too. As long as equation 
                                                 
18
 Similarly,   is only a determinant of the ship-owner’s reaction function. 
19
 First partial derivatives of the probability function in the Nash equilibrium: 
 
    
  
   ; 
    
  
   ; 
    
  
  . 
20
 Independently of the pirate’s investment level, 
  [ ( )]
  
   always holds. 
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(1) holds in point C, piracy is more attractive than the alternative. Let D 
reflect the threshold where a marginal increase in the ship-owner’s security 
measures results in a situation where the pirate is better off earning his 
income through legal activities. The ship-owner’s best response would be 
to invest just as much as to oust the pirate. In this case the Nash 
equilibrium is reflected through the strategies (LA, DR). However this 
equilibrium only holds, if the threat of the shipowner to invest slightly 
more than D is credible. This is true if condition 1 holds. Suppose point D 
reflects the threshold of the pirate and suppose E reflects the threshold of 
the ship-owner such that he is better off choosing the direct route. In this 
case, the ship-owner’s threat of investing more than E is not credible and 
the pirate will not prefer to choose alternative income opportunities. Thus, 
in equilibrium point E reflects the associated investment of both players 
and in the Nash equilibrium piracy occurs.21  
 
Figure 4:   Reaction Functions in the Presence of Budget Constraints 
 (     )  Reaction Function of the Ship-owner 
 (     )  Reaction Function of the Pirate 
                                                 
21
 Note that the pirate does not have any incentive to oust the ship-owner. 
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VI. Implications  
In the framework of the model presented above there are four ways for 
policy makers to combat piracy. First of all, the level of penalty can be 
increased. This will reduce expected utility of the pirate, who will respond 
with higher investments into attacking measures, if affordable. As long as 
his expected utility from piracy is greater than his utility from alternative 
income, the probability of success of an attack changes in his favor and to 
the disadvantage of the ship-owner. Penalties need to be set such that ex-
pected returns from piracy are less attractive than alternative income. Prac-
tically this is hard to implement and does not make much sense, as low per 
capita income and high ransom payments have made pirates already will-
ing to risk their lives. What kind of penalty could be more deterring than 
death? Secondly, the international community could increase the level of 
sovereign protection, either by increasing the size of safety corridors, or by 
providing sovereign security guards onboard of merchant ships. In the 
framework of the model both alternatives could be regarded as a subsidy 
for the ship-owner, because the sovereign protection increases the proba-
bility of successfully defending an attack. Taking this into account the 
ship-owner decreases his investment for a given level of the pirate’s in-
vestment. However, resources are still wasted and the danger of an escala-
tion is not eliminated. The pirate will respond to total security investments, 
thus also to increases in sovereign protection. Thirdly, by regulation the 
state could force the ship-owner to invest more than the optimal level. This 
is very costly for ship-owners and would not deescalate the situation. All 
three points discussed so far have in common, that resources are wasted for 
protecting or robbing existing wealth. Even if the ship-owner’s investment 
forces the pirate to work in the legal sector, the ship-owner needs to main-
tain his credibility by keeping up his level of protection. Although these 
three policy implications bear the risk of an escalation of violence, there 
are not any better solutions to protect ships and crews in the short run. The 
fourth policy implies zero rent-seeking costs, but its impact only becomes 
noticeable in the long run. If alternative legal income opportunities are 
increased such that these are more attractive relative to the expected return 
of piracy, then social welfare is optimized because neither the ship-owner 
nor the pirate have an incentive to waste resources on rent-seeking. Or put 
differently, raising the pirate’s opportunity costs is the most peaceful, sus-
tainable and optimal way to fight piracy, at least from a long-term perspec-
tive.  
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D. Summary and Conclusion 
A rent-seeking model was used to analyze the interaction of pirates and 
ship-owners in a Cournot fashion. The model points out different possibili-
ties to lower the incentives of piracy, such that the decision process of po-
tential pirates based on their economic motives leads to a reduction in pi-
racy. The model is further able to explain the recent decline in attacks as 
well as the escalation of violence in previous years. As long as the domes-
tic income in Somalia is low, as ransoms are high and as long as the re-
spective capacities for investing into attacking or defense measures are 
sufficient on both sides, the danger of an increasing willingness to resort to 
violence exists. In that case law enforcement has no deterring effect. How-
ever, if one of the agents is constrained in his budget such that he is not 
able to optimally react on additional investments by his opponent, his ex-
pected income is reduced and opportunity costs rise as alternative income 
opportunities become more attractive. The recent developments in Somalia 
seem to be in line with this argumentation. It is unlikely that the deterring 
effect of penalties or better legal income opportunities were the reason for 
the recent decline in attacks. Although it is not proven, the increasing secu-
rity measures of the ship-owners in combination with measures of the in-
ternational union seem to be rather causal for the decline. Against this 
background the ship-owners’ call for armed security on board of merchant 
ships is understandable. However, from an economic perspective this situa-
tion is not welfare optimal, because resources are used to secure already 
existing wealth. Furthermore, as Birgit Feldtmann concludes as well, the 
use of private force needs to be monitored closely, in order to prevent the 
disproportionate use of violence. It is to conclude from the microeconomic 
analysis that the most efficient solution to the problem is to raise oppor-
tunity costs of the pirates, namely income out of legal activities, in order to 
make piracy less favorable, e.g., by increasing development aid. This is 
however only true in the long term and is rather difficult in the context of a 
failed state like Somalia. As Leeson (2009) demands, the international 
community must therefore work within an international framework that 
includes military, civilian, academic, private sector, and NGO sources, as 
no single entity or state is able to meet the complex requirements to solve 
the problem by itself. 
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Discussion on Birgit Feldtmann 
summarized by 
Viola Prifti 
A vivid discussion of the paper focused on the prosecution of pirates as a 
means of fighting piracy acts. The debate was initially divided between an 
economic and legal perspective. From a legal standpoint, it was argued that 
applying criminal law sanctions to piracy offences is justified by the acts 
of violence on innocent seafarers. It was specifically underlined that penal 
sanctions aim at avoiding a ‘wild west-style justice’ scenario at sea. On the 
other hand, these measures were not considered to be very effective from 
an economic perspective. The reason behind the economic argumentation 
lied in the public good nature of punishment and the high costs of its pro-
vision. Since these elements are a main cause of free-riding problems 
among states, underprovision of punishment was reckoned as the expected 
outcome. Increasing the cost of investments in piracy by destroying its 
infrastructure was instead suggested as a more viable option. 
In this respect, it was emphasized that counter-piracy activities should 
regard piracy as an organized crime. At this point, there was general 
agreement to attack the organization of the structure rather than focusing 
on individual piracy actions. A related comment called the attention to 
single pirates who act as agents on behalf of the principals’ instructions. 
Therefore, destroying the whole organization was proffered as the most 
effective solution. In addition, it was suggested that counter-piracy actions 
should consider hiring pirates as security guards. This option was men-
tioned to be under discussion for Somali pirates. A toolbox comprising all 
of the above solutions was, consequently, proffered as a comprehensive 
means to fight piracy. 
Lastly, a conclusive remark drew attention to the effectiveness of the 
above recommendations in terms of time horizons. In this regard, it was 
argued that increasing the opportunity costs of piracy will have a short 
term impact. Military intervention, enforcement of the rule of law, and 









Reflections on the First Ten Years 
of the International Criminal Court 
by 
Florian Jeßberger / Julia Geneuss 
On 1 July 2002, the Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) en-
tered into force. The tenth anniversary of the establishment of the first 
permanent international criminal court seems to be a good occasion to look 
back and reflect on achievements and shortcomings. In this paper, this 
stocktaking exercise is supplemented by the attempt to apply some ele-
ments of a law & economics approach to issues of international criminal 
justice in general and the ICC in particular. The latter is done, first and 
foremost, in order to identify topics and themes for a future research agen-
da – and it is warranted precisely because, as will be shown, there still is a 
significant lack of in-depth research concerning basic issues underlying 
and shaping the emerging system of international criminal justice. 
This paper is organized in three parts. The first chapter briefly summa-
rizes the key characteristics of the ICC, its roots and competences, and 
outlines its practice (A.). The second chapter inquires into the roles and 
functions which may be ascribed to the ICC (B.). The third chapter en-
deavours to identify a few, rather arbitrarily chosen issues which may de-
serve further scrutiny from the perspective of law & economics (C.). 
A. The ICC in a Nutshell 
The internationalization of criminal justice through the establishment of 
international enforcement mechanisms is a recent phenomenon. Three 
milestones have marked the path of the emergence of the system of inter-
national criminal justice as we know it today: After World War II, the for-
mation of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg – and its 
‘little sister’, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (IMTFE) 
at Tokyo – set the precedent. For the first time, individuals were actually 
held criminally responsible directly under international law for the atroci-
218 Florian Jeßberger / Julia Geneuss 
 
ties they committed during the war, a revolutionary undertaking at the 
time. Quickly, the so-called Nuremberg Principles were confirmed in reso-
lutions of the UN General Assembly, and refined in drafts and reports by 
the International Law Commission. In addition, numerous international 
treaties, the most important being the Geneva Conventions and the Geno-
cide Convention, tied in with the Nuremberg experience. However, it soon 
turned out that, with powerful states engaged in a cold war, enforcement of 
international criminal law, either through international or national courts, 
would rarely take place. 
This changed in the mid-1990s with the establishment of the ad hoc 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the second milestone in 
the development of international criminal law. Both Tribunals were created 
as subsidiary organs by the UN Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter, i.e., as instruments to restore international peace and security. 
The jurisdiction of the Tribunals is strictly limited in temporal and geo-
graphical terms and only applies to the atrocities committed in the two 
conflicts, the Yugoslavian wars and the Rwandan genocide respectively. 
After nearly 20 years of what has, according to many, to be regarded as 
quite successful operation, the ad hoc Tribunals are about to complete their 
tasks.  
The final and most lasting milestone for international criminal law has 
been the establishment of the permanent International Criminal Court at 
The Hague. In summer 1998, the UN convened a conference in Rome with 
a participation of 160 states, 33 Intergovernmental Organizations and a 
Coalition of more than 200 NGOs. On 17 July 1998, after one month of 
intense discussions, the Statute of the ICC was adopted: 120 states voted in 
favor, 21 abstained, and 7 voted against the Statute – the US, Iraq, Israel, 
China, Yemen, Libya, and Qatar. Just four years later, on 1 July 2002 after 
the 60th ratification, the Rome-Statute – the first comprehensive codifica-
tion of international criminal law – entered into force. As of today, the 
number of states parties stands at 121. Still, powerful and populous states, 
such as the US, China, Russia and India, have not yet ratified (or even 
signed) the Statute. This is one reason why it would be a mistake to regard 
the ICC as a truly universal ‘world criminal court’. 
I.  Institution-Building  
The ICC is established not as an organ of the UN but as an independent 
organization with an independent budget. Thus, in this regard it could only 
marginally draw on the experience of the ad hoc Tribunals. A large part of 
the ICC’s first years were devoted to institution-building from scratch and, 
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despite all of the criticism, it is no surprise that it took some time for the 
Court to become fully functional. 
After the Statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, the Assembly of 
States Parties – the ICC’s ‘management oversight and legislative body’ – 
adopted the budget of the Court, drafted and adopted the ‘Rules of Proce-
dure and Evidence’ and the ‘Elements of Crimes’, and elected the judges, 
the Prosecutor and his two Deputies. In mid-March 2003 the first 18 judges 
of the ICC were sworn in. The first prosecutor of the Court, the Argen-
tinean Luis Moreno-Ocampo, was inaugurated in June 2003. This summer 
he has been succeeded by Fatou Bensouda from Gambia. The judges elect-
ed the Presidency of the Court, which in turn assigned the judges to the 
three different judicial divisions, and recruited and hired legal staff. The 
judges – all from different legal backgrounds, some criminal lawyers, 
some diplomats – drafted and adopted the ‘Regulations of the Court’, es-
tablished the Office of Public Counsel for the Defence, the Office of Pub-
lic Counsel for the Victims, and the Victims Participation and Reparations 
Section. Today approximately 750 staff members are working in The 
Hague, plus numerous interns and academic researchers. In addition, the 
Court operates four field offices in Africa.  
Over the years, the budget of the Court has constantly increased; from 
30 million Euros for the first financial period to approximately 90 million 
in 2008, to 103 million in 2011. The expenses of the Court are provided by 
its member states – with Germany and Japan being the major contributors. 
In addition, at least in theory, according to Article 115(b) of the ICC-
Statute, the UN shall also provide funds ‘in particular in relation to the 
expenses incurred due to referrals by the Security Council’. However, as 
will be explained in more detail below, the UN so far has not contributed 
to any of the Court’s expenses.  
II. Jurisdiction, Triggers, Admissibility 
The Court’s jurisdiction is limited in several ways. Its subject matter juris-
diction (ratione materiae) encompasses the international core crimes only: 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggres-
sion. Its temporal jurisdiction (ratione temporis) is restricted to interna-
tional crimes that were committed after the entry-into-force of the ICC-
Statute on 1 July 2002. Most importantly, the Court’s geographical and 
personal jurisdiction (ratione loci et personae) is limited according to the 
territorial and nationality principles, i.e., the crimes must have been com-
mitted within the territory or by a national of either a state party or a state 
which has accepted the Court’s jurisdiction in a particular case. This is 
another reason why the ICC can hardly be regarded as a universally ac-
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cepted and universally operating institution. There is, however, one notable 
exception to this last mentioned jurisdictional limitation. If the UN Securi-
ty Council refers a situation to the ICC, the Court’s jurisdiction is univer-
sal indeed and does encompass crimes that were committed on the territory 
of non-member states and by non-member state nationals. In this case, the 
Court’s authority flows not from its member states but from the Security 
Council which may take authoritative action with regard to any UN mem-
ber state in order to maintain world peace and international security.  
Once the Court can claim jurisdiction, this jurisdiction needs to be acti-
vated before the Prosecutor can start investigating a specific conflict-
situation. This activation can take place through three different modalities, 
the so-called trigger mechanisms: First, the ICC’s Prosecutor can initiate 
investigations on its own initiative (proprio motu). At the conference in 
Rome this prosecutorial power was one of the most controversial issues, 
since several states feared political abuse. Therefore, as safeguard mecha-
nism according to the Statute the Prosecutor needs the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
approval to initiate investigations. Second, a situation can be referred to 
the Court by a state party, irrespective of whether the state has a connec-
tion to the conflict situation. And finally, as we have already seen, the 
Court’s jurisdiction can be activated by the UN Security Council with the 
referral of a situation according to a Chapter VII resolution. Thus, the Se-
curity Council can use the ICC as a ‘permanent ad hoc court’ in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. As the flip side of the 
coin, the Security Council, again acting under Chapter VII, according to 
Article 16 ICC-Statute can also deactivate the Court’s jurisdiction by re-
questing a (indefinitely renewable) deferral of investigations or prosecu-
tion for a period of 12 months.  
Once the ICC’s jurisdiction has been activated or as a first step as re-
gards her proprio motu powers, the Prosecutor decides to initiate a formal 
investigation of the situation. A situation generally relates to a specific 
conflict and is limited in temporal and geographical, sometimes even per-
sonal boundaries, e.g., the ‘Situation Uganda’ or the ‘Situation Libya’. 
During the formal investigations of the entire conflict situation the Prose-
cutor identifies specific incidents and alleged perpetrators and decides to 
commence the prosecution of a particular individual, i.e., requests the Pre-
Trial Chamber to issue an arrest warrant or a summons to appear. As re-
gards the decision to investigate or prosecute, the issue of admissibility of 
the situation or case before the Court becomes relevant, particularly with 
regard to the much-discussed, core structural principle of complementarity. 
Generally speaking, the principle of complementarity is a conflict rule, 
which regulates the relationship between the ICC and national jurisdictions 
and which distributes the competence to investigate, prosecute and adjudi-
cate. According to this principle, national jurisdictions have (formal) pri-
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macy to investigate, prosecute and punish international crimes. Only when 
they are unable or unwilling to do so in a genuine and effective manner, 
the ICC can step in and take over. It should be noted, however, that it is up 
to the ICC to determine whether any such domestic efforts are sufficient 
with regard to the criteria set out in the Statute. So far, the ICC interpreted 
this admissibility threshold rather strict. 
III. Practice  
Currently, the prosecutor of the ICC is investigating seven situations. Of 
these seven situations, three were referred to the ICC by the state parties 
on whose territory the crimes took place – arguably after the Prosecutor 
solicited them to do so (DR Congo, Uganda, Central African Republic). 
This comparably large number of so-called self-referrals is remarkable and 
the popularity of this instrument was obviously not anticipated by the 
drafters of the Statute. Similarly, in one situation a non-member state ac-
cepted the Courts jurisdiction and the Prosecutor decided to open investi-
gations (Côte d’Ivoire). Two of the seven situations were referred to the 
Court by the UN Security Council (Sudan, Libya). So far, only in one situ-
ation the Prosecutor opened investigations propio motu (Kenya). In addi-
tion to those situations, further eight situations are subject to a preliminary 
examination by the Prosecutor, including Afghanistan, Colombia, Georgia 
and Nigeria. 
With a look at how the different situations came before the Court, the 
widespread criticism of Afro-centricity and neo-imperialism becomes less 
convincing. While all seven situations the Court is currently investigating 
are situated in Africa, three of them were self-referred by the territorial 
state and in one case the non-member territorial state accepted the Court’s 
jurisdiction according to Article 12(3) ICC-Statute. In addition, two other 
conflict situations situated on the African continent were referred to the 
ICC by the Security Council – with the African members of the Council 
voting in favour of the Resolutions. Only in one case – the ‘Situation Ken-
ya’ – did the Prosecutor initiate investigations on his own initiative. 
However, it is also important to mention at least one situation, the one 
concerning Iraq, in which after having received numerous communications 
from NGOs and individuals as regards the alleged commission of crimes 
by UK soldiers, i.e., nationals of a state party (mistreatment of detainees 
and willful killing of civilians), the Prosecutor decided not to initiate a 
formal investigation. The Prosecutor argued that the crimes committed in 
this situation were not grave enough compared to the atrocities committed 
in African countries – a decision that led to broad criticism in public and 
academia. Another delicate issue concerned a statement lodged in January 
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2009 by the Palestinian National Authority under Article 12(3) ICC-Statute 
which allows states not party to the Statute to accept the Court’s jurisdic-
tion. In April 2012, the Office of the Prosecutor finally announced that the 
determination whether Palestine is a ‘state’ in terms of the Statute and 
therefore eligible to make such a declaration goes beyond its mandate and 
should be left to the relevant bodies of the United Nations.  
The Court received its first referral in January 2004 from Uganda, six 
months after the Prosecutor was inaugurated. In April of the same year the 
second self-referral came from the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC). The first warrants of arrests against a particular defendant were 
issued in the Ugandan situation in July 2005. The first person who was 
actually surrendered to the Court was the Congolese Thomas Lubanga Dy-
ilo in January 2006. The trial against Lubanga started in January 2009, six 
and a half years after the establishment of the Court. After several difficul-
ties (relating, in particular, to issues such as victim participation and dis-
closure of evidence), the Court rendered the long-awaited trial judgement 
on 14 March 2012. Trial Chamber I found Lubanga guilty of the war crime 
of conscripting and enlisting children and using them to participate active-
ly in hostilities. On 10 July 2012 Lubanga was sentenced to 14 years of 
imprisonment.  
Besides the Lubanga-trial, there are currently two other ongoing trials 
against three accused. Seven individuals are in custody of the Court await-
ing trial or confirmation of charges. 18 arrest warrants have been issued 
(including two against then sitting heads of state) and nine summonses to 
appear. In three cases (against four defendants) confirmation of charges 
have been declined by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Up to now, the trials alone 
have resulted in a total of 4.200 documents filed by the parties and partici-
pants, with over 2.200 judicial decisions rendered or orders issued, and 
approximately 1.800 victims participating in the proceedings through 
counsel (Ušacka, 2011). 
IV. Much Ado About Nothing? 
There can be no doubt that, during the first decade of its existence, the ICC 
– judges, prosecutors and administration alike – managed to accomplish a 
huge task, which included not only building an international institution 
from scratch but also applying and partly consolidating new and un-tested 
law. Still, many key issues remain either to be determined or highly con-
troversial, such as fundamental questions regarding selection (of situations 
to investigate and cases to prosecute), and interaction (with other interna-
tional tribunals, with the UN, with state parties, with domestic justice sys-
tems). It is striking that the ICC, so far, concentrated on less controversial 
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cases and defendants, in particular cases in which those defendants are not 
supported by their home states and, additionally, there is (more or less) 
broad agreement (or indifference) within the international community 
about the Court’s intervention (Langer 2011).  
It is also true, that in terms of numbers of suspects under investigation, 
not to speak about numbers of convictions, the ICC so far has a rather poor 
output – certainly, if compared to an average criminal court in any domes-
tic system, but also if compared to, say, the ICTY. To many of its support-
ers this observation is sobering, or even disappointing. However, given the 
specific circumstances under which the ICC operates and which differ sig-
nificantly not only from the domestic level but also from the UN backed ad 
hoc Tribunals, this comparison is neither fair nor appropriate.  
So, what makes us think that the ICC so far has been ‘a success’? Or, 
alternatively, what makes us believe, apart from rather simplistic numbers 
counting, that the ICC has not been successful so far? Of course, there are 
different ways to answer these questions. Certainly, any answer has to de-
termine a benchmark for measuring ‘success’ in the first place. In order to 
identify an appropriate benchmark one has to go one step back and try to 
define what exactly is the purpose and function – ‘the job’ – of the ICC.  
B. The ICC Still in a Crisis of Identity:  
Three Courts in One 
According to the Preamble of the ICC-Statute, the Court was established 
first, to put an end to impunity for perpetrators of ‘unimaginable atrocities 
that deeply shock the conscience of humanity’, and second, to contribute to 
the prevention of such crimes. However, it is quite surprising to note that 
even after one decade of existence the ways and means how best to achieve 
these goals, the ICC’s specific role and function within the international 
system, its ‘identity’, are still not fully determined. Traditionally, the ICC 
is regarded as a criminal court proper. By now, however, a growing num-
ber of scholars seem to agree that the Court has a ‘janiform nature’ as an 
ordinary criminal court on the one hand and as a security court on the other 
(Fletcher & Ohlin 2005; Ohlin 2010). But closer scrutiny reveals that the 
ICC’s function may better be described by reference to Chimera, the three-
headed creature of Greek mythology rather than by reference to the Roman 
god Janus. We would submit that it is possible, and necessary, to distin-
guish three functions rather than two, the third being the one of a ‘watch-
dog court’.  
Each of those three, separate functions addresses a different level within 
the multi-levelled system of criminal justice: the individual (perpetrator) 
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level, the international (state) level, and the supranational (international 
community) level. 
I. Determination of Individual Responsibility:  
The ICC as a Criminal Court 
At first glance, the ICC is an ordinary criminal court operating very similar 
to criminal courts existing in any domestic legal system. Its task is to pros-
ecute and, where appropriate, convict individuals for specific crimes under 
its jurisdiction. As a criminal court, the ICC is borne by and derives its 
authority from its member states. Those states, i.e., the 121 states which 
ratified the Statute, delegated part of their criminal jurisdiction to the 
Court which led to a pooling of criminal legal authority.  
It would be even more precise to regard the ICC as a complete criminal 
justice system of its own: comprising not only of a court, but also of a 
prosecutor, a defense unit, and a, rather incomplete though, police unit (by 
proxy of the (member) states’ law enforcement authorities). 
In its function as a criminal court, the ICC is a ‘repressive project’ that 
adjudicates individual guilt and innocence only after the crimes have been 
committed. From a retributive perspective the punishment of the perpetra-
tors of international crimes by the ICC is a good in itself that contributes to 
diminish impunity. Of course, due to resource constraints it is to be feared 
that the Court’s contribution to put an end to impunity will be rather mar-
ginal. The consequentialist approach, on the other hand, where punishment 
of perpetrators is done in order to prevent future criminal acts focusing 
either on the same individual (specific deterrence) or on the society at 
large (general deterrence) is debatable. Many scholars doubt that potential 
perpetrators involved in mass atrocities – in particular leaders of a state or 
an organization – will act rationally, weigh the consequences of their ac-
tions, and take into account a possible indictment by the ICC (Tallgren 
2002). 
II. The Duty to Prosecute and the Principle of Complementarity: 
The ICC as a ‘Watchdog Court’ 
Thus, even when acting as a pure criminal court the ICC’s main addressees 
do not seem to be the individuals as potential defendants. Instead, it may 
be argued that its main purpose is to push states to comply with their inter-
national obligations to investigate, prosecute and punish perpetrators of 
international crimes and, thus, rather indirectly contributes to the overall 
goals of putting an end to impunity and prevent future atrocities. This obl i-
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gation, which is directed first and foremost at the territorial state, has its 
basis in various international treaties as well as in customary international 
law. Through the principle of complementarity the ICC is designed as a 
‘watchdog court’ that monitors the territorial state’s prosecutorial activity. 
Only when the state is unable or unwilling to genuinely prosecute and pun-
ish the perpetrators of international crimes the ICC is competent to do so 
itself. Thus, the ICC’s possible intervention looming over the affected 
states’ reputation serves as a tool to trigger domestic prosecution and is a 
‘catalyst for compliance’ (Stahn 2011). Otherwise put: the ICC increases, 
on the part of the states, the costs of default (Megret 2005).  
But the principle of complementarity is not only used as a ‘stick’ to 
threaten states to comply with their duty to investigate, prosecute and pun-
ish international crimes. In its variant as ‘positive complementarity’ it is 
used by the Prosecutor as ‘carrot’ to proactively engage with, assist and 
encourage states to carry out their primary responsibility of investigating 
and prosecuting crimes and come to terms with their violent past. It is be-
fore this background that the statement of Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo 
must be understood who said that the ICC can be regarded as a ‘major suc-
cess’ when it had no cases to prosecute.  
When making this statement a couple of years ago the Prosecutor, how-
ever, seems to have underestimated the popularity of the so-called self-
referrals, a practice which, ultimately, turns the very idea of complementa-
rity inside out. In these cases, states ‘waive’ their primacy in favor of pros-
ecution by the Court. It is still up for debate whether self-referrals are to be 
regarded as blessing or curse for the ICC. On the one hand, since the ICC 
has no enforcement tools of its own this consensual activity of the Court 
enhances the prospects of the referring state’s cooperation and therewith of 
‘success’ (in the sense of successful accomplishment of investigations, 
prosecutions and possibly trial). On the other hand, those self-referring 
states outsource their international obligations – and the financial (and po-
litical!) burden that comes with it – to investigate, prosecute and punish 
international crimes. With their self-referrals territorial states ‘hijack’ the 
Court and tie up personal and financial resources that could otherwise have 
been used for investigations propio motu. The ICC must be careful not to 
become a ‘lever’, which can be switched on and turned off at the command 
of states (Stahn 2011). 
III. The Court and the Council:  
The ICC as a ‘World Security Court’ 
Reducing the ICC to an ordinary criminal court or to an international insti-
tution stimulating and monitoring domestic justice systems would still not 
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fully capture its role within the international system. When a situation is 
referred to the ICC by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN-
Charter the Council employs the Court as an institution to help restore in-
ternational peace and security with regard to an ongoing conflict between 
different groups (not necessarily states). In this case, the Court’s authority 
flows not from its states parties, but from the Security Council. In this role 
the Court transcends the classic goals of criminal law to adjudicate indi-
vidual guilt (Fletcher & Ohlin 2004; Ohlin 2010). Instead the Court be-
comes a player with primarily preventive functions on the international 
level.  
Before this background it has been argued that the international com-
munity of states might use the ICC as an ‘excuse’ and replace military in-
tervention in ongoing conflicts by a less-costly legal intervention. There is, 
in our view no proof for this assumption (cf. Neumayer 2009). Quite to the 
contrary, in particular after the Libya-referral there seems to be a strong 
tendency to regard the notion of ‘responsibility to protect’ and the legal 
intervention by the ICC as two separate, but closely connected concepts of 
a broader peacebuilding strategy (Stahn 2011). 
This said, it is still questionable whether the intervention of the ICC can 
actually contribute to constrain violence in an ongoing conflict and help 
restore peace between the warring parties. Often the Court is criticized for 
doing more harm than good to peace negotiations when legally intervening 
in ongoing conflicts. There is also, of course, a problem with regard to the 
politicization of the Court when its mandate becomes more ‘diplomatic’. 
And while it might be true that the issuance of an arrest warrant by the ICC 
attaches a stigma to dictators like the Sudanese President Al Bashir  or the 
late Libyan Colonel Gaddafi and leads to some sort of international de-
legitimization – due to problems of cooperation Al Bashir still travels to 
ICC member states without being arrested. 
As regards the Darfur and the Libya referrals, there are two additional 
problems that complicate the relationship between the Court and the Coun-
cil: First, at the initiative of the US according to both Security Council 
resolutions which referred a situation to the ICC and despite Article 115 
ICC-Statute, the UN shall not provide any funds for the expenses incurred 
in relation to the situations referred to the Court. Thus, the Security Coun-
cil ‘free-rides’ the Court shifting the expenses from UN member states to 
the ICC’s states parties. For example, in the budget for 2012 the expenses 
for the investigation of the situation in Libya are estimated to amount to 
7.2 million Euros. As regards these unfunded mandates there has been 
some expression of dissatisfaction by the President of the Assembly of 
States Parties (‘We cannot have situations in which States (including non-
party States) send things to the Court and then don’t pay’). Nonetheless 
both referrals – in particular the Libyan referral which was adopted unani-
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mously by the Council enjoying the support of the non-states parties US, 
Russia, China and India – are generally regarded as highly significant for 
the Court as a permanent fixture within the international system and were 
accepted by the Court without further ado.  
A second problem relates to the exemption of nationals from non-
member states from the jurisdiction of the Court. Again at the initiative of 
the US which feared that members of its military could come under the 
jurisdiction of the Court, according to both Security Council referrals na-
tionals of non-member states do not fall under the Court’s jurisdiction for 
any acts arising out of or related to military operations established or au-
thorized by the Security Council or the African Union. Thus, the Council 
reserves the right to specify in detail the ICC’s jurisdiction ratione perso-
nae. Concerning the principle of equality this approach seems questiona-
ble. In a similar way, again on the initiative of the US in the very first year 
of the Court’s existence the Security Council exercised its powers under 
Article 16 ICC-Statute and exempted non-member state nationals active in 
a (military) operation established or authorized by the UN. This specially 
tailored de-activation of the Court’s jurisdiction was renewed one time for 
another 12 months before the remaining members of the Security Council 
signaled that they would not vote for a second renewal (Werle 2007). 
IV. Benchmarking Success 
It has been shown, that the ICC can be regarded as ‘three courts in one’: In 
its basic function the ICC is a criminal court supported and financed by the 
Assembly of States Parties. At the same time it acts as a ‘watchdog’, per-
haps coming most closely to a truly ‘supranational tribunal’, and serves the 
purpose of making sure that states fulfill their obligations to investigate, 
prosecute and punish international crimes. In addition, the ICC can be re-
garded as a ‘security court’. In this function the Court is more of an organ 
of the UN and – in theory – funded by the UN with the purpose of main-
taining or restoring international peace and security.  
With respect to all these different functions, it is very difficult to empir-
ically measure success and effectiveness of the Court. This is true in par-
ticular as regards its function as a criminal court since this issue relates to 
fundamental and highly disputed questions of the fundamental goals of 
punishment in general and international punishment in particular. As al-
ready mentioned it is doubtful whether the Statute and the ICC can have a 
deterrent effect, not only because of the general insecurities attached to 
this purpose of punishment, but additionally because of the Court’s – geo-
graphic, temporal, cultural, linguistic, etc. – distance from the crimes.  
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Likewise, it is very difficult to assess whether the ICC in its function as a 
‘security court’ did actually contribute to restore peace or at least de-
escalate an ongoing conflict. However, after its first decade of existence it 
can be observed that the Court by now plays an important role on the in-
ternational level, which is even acknowledged by states who cannot be 
considered as belonging to the ICC’s closest circle of friends. Whether this 
politization of the Court is desirable or problematic in the sense that it 
dismisses the Court to a mere ‘bargaining chip’ in the hands of the Securi-
ty Council member states is a different – and difficult – question.  
Thus, maybe the most successful – and maybe empirically best measur-
able – function of the ICC is its role as a ‘watchdog court’. Already in the 
first years of the ICC’s existence, although the Statute does not establish 
any obligations to do so, several states have taken the opportunity and im-
plemented international crimes into their domestic legal order. In view of 
the principle of complementarity, those states are in a better position to 
prosecute their own nationals for international crimes and prevent an inter-
vention by the Court. Thus, the Court by its mere existence changed the 
landscape of international criminal justice not only at the international, but 
also, and perhaps primarily so, at the national level.  
C. Some (Very) Preliminary Thoughts on the Economic 
Analysis of International Criminal Justice 
For sure, the major problem in assessing the ICC’s success is the lack of 
research as regards the effects produced by the Court in its first decade. 
This is unsatisfactory, not the least because the claim of rationality and 
efficiency is core to every criminal law system – be it international or do-
mestic. Because of this, an economic approach to the analysis of interna-
tional criminal law may be useful. This holds true notwithstanding that 
such an approach should be aware of both the general limitations of the 
economic analysis of international law (cf. Paulus 2009) and the general 
limitations of a purely utilitarian approach to criminal law (which at least 
to a certain extent is hostile to traditional European thinking about crime 
and punishment). 
Criminal law is a well-established subject of law and economics, gener-
ally focusing on the individual’s behavior. The economic analysis of inter-
national law, on the other hand, focusing on states as the most important 
actors within the international legal system is less frequent. International 
criminal law, a hybrid creature at the intersection of criminal and interna-
tional law itself a rather young discipline, so far has rarely been subjected 
to a law and economics perspective.  
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While international criminal law is made by states, in contrast to tradition-
al international law its norms do not regulate the relationship between 
states, but directly impose obligations on the individual. Individuals are the 
addressees of international criminal law. Thus, an analysis of international 
criminal law can either focus on the individual, i.e., whether international 
criminal law has an effect on the individuals’ behavior, or on the actions of 
states. Reflecting this structure of international criminal law – at the inter-
section of individual responsibility and international/inter-state regulation 
– there are two natural starting points of a cost/benefit analysis which is 
crucial to a law & economics approach. 
First, it is possible to think about international criminal law in terms of 
crime and punishment; such a micro-analysis would take on a perspective 
which is well known in Law & Economics (see 1.). Second, an economic 
analysis of international criminal law in general and the ICC in particular 
could start from the perspective of states as major actors in the internation-
al arena. In such a macro-analysis, the ‘sovereignty costs’ connected to the 
surrender of states to the ICC system could be taken into consideration as 
well as possible benefits (see 2.) 
Perhaps a third, separate starting point for an economic analysis of in-
ternational criminal law (which we will not address further) could inquire 
into the costs and benefits of establishing mechanisms for the determina-
tion and enforcement of individual responsibility on the international level 
as compared to applying (traditionally existing) inter-state mechanisms of 
state responsibility. To a certain (although probably small) extent this 
analysis could benefit from the discussion ‘tort law vs. criminal law’ on 
the domestic level (e.g., Posner 1985). 
I. Raising Costs by Increasing Probabilities of Enforcement:  
A ‘Micro-Perspective’ 
Traditionally, international criminal law is framed as a response to the 
widespread impunity of crimes of concern to the international community 
as a whole. Its very basic idea is to hold accountable those individuals who 
attack peace, international security and, as the ICC Statute calls it, the 
well-being of the world.  
Of course, general economic theories explaining crime and punishment 
are, in principle and subject to specific modifications, applicable also to 
crimes under international law, such as genocide, crimes against humanity 
and war crimes. Notwithstanding structural specificities of these crimes, 
i.e., the so-called international element which provides that those crimes 
have an international dimension, they are ordinary crimes giving rise to 
individual responsibility. 
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Starting from Becker’s seminal works on (the economic analysis of) crime 
and punishment we know that individuals are more likely to commit 
crimes when the costs of crime are lower and when the probability of ap-
prehension is lower. Now, it may be argued that the establishment of the 
ICC as well as the emergence of an international system of criminal justice 
increases the costs of crime. Those costs comprise of not only incarcera-
tion, but various elements that would also include, for instance and perhaps 
relevant for a court which commands only very limited enforcement mech-
anisms, the social stigma attached to incarceration. Still, the probability of 
apprehension, even ignoring punishment, is significantly low if it comes to 
state-sponsored crimes such as international core crimes. Therefore, the 
argument that – because disproportionate selectivity is a structural feature 
of the prosecution of international, state-sponsored crimes – the chances of 
conviction and punishment are (still!) so low that the expected costs of 
punishment are unlikely to surpass the possible benefits of perpetrating 
crimes under international law (Langer 2011) has its merit. This would, 
however, miss out that a significant portion of the ‘costs’ produced by the 
ICC does not materialize in prosecutions in The Hague but rather on the 
domestic level.  
II. Why Some States Join the ICC and  
Why Some Don’t: A ‘Macro-Perspective’ 
Joining the ICC means not only direct financial costs in form of the mem-
ber states’ contributions to the Court’s budget. Additional and perhaps 
more sensible costs relate to sovereignty. When states join the ICC, they 
transfer parts of their criminal jurisdiction to the Court and give up some 
of their decision making autonomy (Simmons & Danner 2010). In addition, 
states take the risk that one of their nationals may face a charge before the 
ICC – a fact which would, arguably (but perhaps with some notable excep-
tions, see infra), not be in the interest of any state.  
These costs are unprecedented. Although the IMT and the IMTFE were 
established by states, they were only endowed with jurisdiction over 
crimes committed by the defeated enemies. And both ad hoc Tribunals 
were not established by states but by the UN Security Council with juris-
diction limited to specific conflict-situations only and excluding, as a mat-
ter of fact, nationals of the members of the Security Council. 
The question arises why despite those sovereignty costs states actually 
decided to establish and join the ICC – and why they did not, for instance, 
opt to subject the ICC’s jurisdiction to the recognition of the ICC’s juris-
diction by the state concerned in a specific case or even restrict themselves 
to refine existing and, perhaps, create new international treaty regimes in 
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order to enhance interstate cooperation. Why do 121 states obviously be-
lieve that the costs of joining the ICC-Statute are outweighed by potential 
gains; why do other states believe that the costs are too high? 
It is obvious that motives vary from state to state (cf. Simmons & Dan-
ner 2010). To approach an answer to these questions, it may therefore be 
helpful to distinguish different groups of states. There is a variety of possi-
ble criteria for such a distinction, including the political ‘strength’ and ge-
opolitical standing of the respective state, the possible exposure of nation-
als of the respective state to prosecution and punishment, the quality of the 
internal order of the respective state (democracy, rule of law, human 
rights), the stability of the respective state, and the historical record of in-
ternational crimes committed either by or against the respective state. 
For example, strong states without a history of recent conflicts on their 
territory – for example most of European states – might see no disad-
vantages (no ‘risk’) in joining the Court. They assume that, safeguarded by 
the principle of complementarity, the ICC will never adjudicate crimes that 
were committed either on their territory or by their nationals, either be-
cause they believe that they will not be involved in such conflict-situations 
or, if exceptionally, their citizens that are somehow involved in an interna-
tional conflict do commit such crimes they believe that they will be willing 
and able to investigate and prosecute themselves. Thus, they assume their 
actual sovereignty costs will be rather low – while earning at least a lot of 
reputational benefit. All in all it seems like these states while providing the 
main part of the ICC’s budget, regard the Court as an institution estab-
lished not for themselves, but for others. 
In addition, at least some of these states, those which have implemented 
the principle of universal jurisdiction, might even see an extra benefit in 
joining the ICC. Those states are now able to argue that a specific case 
should rather be adjudicated by the ICC (given that the ICC has jurisdic-
tion) than by its own domestic courts under the principle of universal ju-
risdiction. Thus, the ICC takes the pressure off those states when it comes 
to investigation or prosecuting politically sensitive cases. It’s also usually 
those states, like Germany and Spain, that argue that the principle of com-
plementarity must be construed in a way that gives the ICC’s jurisdiction 
precedence over the jurisdiction of third states. Being able to point at the 
ICC when it comes to politically sensitive cases that fall under a state’s 
universal jurisdiction means less pressure and less political (internal) and 
diplomatic (external) costs.  
With regards to weaker, internal conflict-prone states – particularly Af-
rican states – it is less clear why they decided to join the ICC. Since there 
is a higher risk of ICC scrutiny their sovereignty costs seem to be much 
higher. Several factors are mentioned to explain why those states join the 
ICC, generally external factors like peer pressure, expectations of devel-
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opment aid, or simply to appease the Court. Another, specific benefit to 
those states may be that they – through the mechanism of self-referrals – 
can now use the Court as a tool to comply with their obligation to punish 
perpetrators of international crimes. This way, the activity of the Court can 
be regarded as a matter of choice, as an expression rather than a limitation 
of their own sovereignty – a benefit and not a cost. Others developed what 
they call a ‘credible commitment theory’ and argue that joining the Court 
is a self-binding commitment by the respective government addressed at 
the state’s own population (Simmons & Danner 2010).  
D. Concluding Remarks 
Ten years after it has been established, and despite many flaws, the ICC is 
a functioning criminal court indeed. The times when the ICC was applaud-
ed for the very fact that it exists are, however, over. Now, what matters is 
that the Court gains momentum.  
Whether the first ten years can be regarded as a success very much de-
pends on the perspective. Possible benchmarks for assessing the Court’s 
performance relate to what function is ascribed to the Court. We would 
submit that at least regarding stimulation of domestic activity against in-
ternational crimes, most notably the implementation of the Statute, the 
Court may be regarded as a success. Whether the same holds true with re-
gard to the Court’s direct contribution to the ‘fight against impunity’ and 
the prevention of future international crimes and, even more doubtful, with 
regard to the Court’s capacity to contribute to the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security is not as clear.  
Anyway, it’s about time to address a number of crucial issues related in 
more depth. There are good reasons to think that an economic analysis 
could help to understand and explain the ICC as a major player in interna-
tional criminal justice – and, ultimately, to improve it. 
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In their review of the practice of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in 
its first decade, Florian Jeßberger and Julia Geneuss (Jeßberger and Ge-
neuss) provide a comprehensive account for assessing the achievements of 
the court and of the challenges it faces. They identify the court’s three 
roles (a criminal court, a “watchdog” court, and a “world security” court) 
and point out that it is very difficult to empirically measure its success and 
effectiveness on each of these three functions. Nevertheless, they suggest 
that its effectiveness can be proven merely by the very fact of its existence, 
as “the establishment of the ICC as well as the emergence of an interna-
tional system of criminal justice increases the costs of crime.” They also 
elaborate on the question why states join the ICC. This is an illuminating 
account to which I subscribe. In the following comments I would like to 
offer three points for further reflection on the role of the ICC from the per-
spective of law and economics: the role of the ICC as lawmaker, the moti-
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B. A Fourth Role? 
As Jeßberger and Geneuss mention, the rise of international criminal adju-
dication is a post-Cold War phenomenon. The special tribunals which were 
set up starting with the ICTY and the ICTR not only adjudicated perpetra-
tors (the first role, according to Jeßberger and Geneuss), and not only con-
tributed, albeit indirectly, to the third role of constraining violence in other 
ongoing conflicts. The emerging jurisprudence of these courts has also had 
a tremendous impact on developing the law on the conduct of hostilities: 
questions thus far discussed under international humanitarian law (IHL) 
have found judicial answers – often quite innovative ones – in the judg-
ment of ad-hoc criminal tribunals.1 Specifically, these courts revolution-
ized the law pertaining to non-international armed conflicts (civil wars), 
imposing on governments fighting “rebels” strict rules accompanied by 
effective enforcement measures. Until the ICTY ruled on this matter, the 
law on “internal armed conflict” was quite meager – due to the resistance 
of many non-western governments – and the ICTY purposefully trans-
formed that law by creative analysis of “state practice” that allowed it to 
invoke “customary international law” as the basis of its judgments.2  
Undoubtedly, those states which were behind the creation of the ad hoc 
tribunals were aware of the law-making potential of these ad-hoc criminal 
courts. They realized that through judge-made law that creatively invoked 
customary international law they could impose on recalcitrant govern-
ments, mainly in the developing world, constrains they would hesitate to 
commit to in treaties. In fact, some of those states expressed their appre-
hension that the newly established tribunals would make new law and 
                                                 
1 On the lawmaking by international criminal tribunals, see Kuhli et al. (2011); Swart 
(2010); Danner (2006). 
2 This is vividly recalled by the late Antonio Cassese, who served as President of the 
ICTY, in an interview with Professor Weiler conducted in 2003 (http://www.ejiltalk.org/ 
nino-in-his-own-words/). According to Cassese, the court faced the following challenge: 
“because this [wa]s an internal armed conflict, we [couldn’t] apply rules which only 
apply to international armed conflict.” The question was therefore “shall we move 
forward and be creative? […] should we stick to the traditional concept that war crimes 
can only be committed in international armed conflict?” Cassese abhorred such an 
outcome: “This to me [wa]s crazy! A rape is a rape; a murder is a murder, whether it is 
committed within the framework of an international armed conflict, a war proper, or a 
civil war. The doctrine that had been upheld by everybody, including the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, was that if you kill civilians, you rape women, you murder 
wounded POWs in an internal armed conflict – this is not a war crime. […] So I said 
‘why don’t we jettison this stupid distinction?’ My colleagues said ‘yes we agree with 
what you are saying, it’s very nice, but how can you create this criminal offence?’ […] 
So I took six months, and set up a team. [we went] through state practice and we came up 
with a lot of evidence… well some evidence.[laughter]”. 
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sought to limit that possibility,3 but of course, to no avail. The same states 
may have different preferences with respect to the ICC, which is a general, 
“ex ante,”4 court whose jurisprudence could affect their own behavior. The 
extent to which the ICC’s jurisprudence would ultimately reflect these 
preferences and be more timid in expanding state obligations than the ad-
hoc courts remains to be seen. 
Indeed, the story of lawmaking by international criminal tribunals offers 
a good example for an economic analysis of international lawmaking: by 
empowering international courts which can “find” new norms by interpret-
ing existing texts and practices, those states that set up such courts can 
overcome the need to obtain other states’ consent for new legal obliga-
tions.5 
C. Whose Motivations? 
Jeßberger and Geneuss discuss the motivations of states to set up or join 
the ICC. They distinguish between groups of states. There are those states 
which do not anticipate that their military and civilian leadership would 
find themselves subject to the ICC’s jurisdiction either because these states 
are not expected to engage in armed conflicts or because their internal ju-
dicial system is sufficiently robust to offer reliable prosecution that would 
eliminate the need for ICC prosecution under the complementarity criteri-
on. Moreover, the ICC relieves states from the costly obligation – indeed, 
the global collective action problem – of trying foreign defendants.  
Jeßberger and Geneuss find less clear the motivation of “weaker, inter-
nal conflict-prone states” to join the ICC. And indeed, scholars have come 
up with several explanations which Jeßberger and Geneuss mention, and 
these explanations may well be accurate. These writers approach the ques-
tion of motivations from the perspective of states as unitary actors. But 
economic analysis of state practice and of international law must not re-
main at the level of states. Instead such analysis must look beyond the 
“veil of sovereignty” and in the best tradition of political economy it must 
examine the motivations of different actors within the state that pushed for 
joining the ICC or those who opposed the court. Indeed, it has been 
acknowledged that international law is often used by domestic actors to 
stabilize their internal relationships. A treaty can lock in political victory 
                                                 
3 Cogan (2008) cites on p. 438 statements by the representatives of Argentine and 
Venezuela during the Security Council debates on the establishment of the ICTY and the 
ICTR to the effect that these international tribunals would not have powers to modify 
international law.  
4
 Arsanjani/Reisman (2005).  
5
 Benvenisti/Downs (2011); Bogdandy/Venzke (2011).  
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better than a constitutional provision.6 Setting up international organiza-
tions can insulate the regulation of issues such as trade or human rights 
protection from domestic contestation. Examples include the adoption of 
regional human rights regimes, such as the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights,7 and the international regulation of trade.8  
 There is no reason to think that the same doesn’t hold true in the context 
of the regulation of warfare and the prevention of crimes by soldiers and 
commanders. Indeed, in a forthcoming article, Amichai Cohen and I argue 
that the evolution of IHL and many of its doctrines can be explained as 
designed to resolve acute problems of governance that take place during 
fighting, as soldiers and even their commanders, might have different goals 
than the goals of the government that sent them to battle. From a principal 
agent perspective, IHL as well as international criminal law should be 
viewed as tools for the principals (the government vis-à-vis the army, or 
army commanders vis-à-vis their subordinates) to control their military 
agents.9 A relative weak government that has limited information about 
what transpires in the battlefield and few tools to induce compliance by is 
military, could use the credible threat of external enforcement through, 
inter alia, foreign or international criminal courts. Accordingly, relatively 
weak governments whose armies may be involved in armed conflicts and 
who are concerned about the negative results of insubordination might opt 
for an external court who would serve as a credible threat to the troops. As 
the surprising examples of “self-referrals” suggest, weak governments can 
also benefit from an international court to resolve the politically sensitive 
trial of army heroes.10 
D. Is The Court Independent? 
Economic analysis of courts operating within states explores the factors 
that ensure their independence and thereby their ability to promote 
outcomes of their choice through creative interpretation and application of 
the law. This scholarship suggests that judicial independence depends on 
the degree of political competition among the major political actors and the 
extent there are policy differences among them. In general, the greater the 
competition and policy differences, the more “political space” is available 
for courts to operate within, and the broader their independence and 
discretion is in setting and implementing policies. The absence of these 
                                                 
6
 Benvenisti (2008). 
7
 Moravcsik (2000). 
8
 Down/Rocke (1995).  
9
 Benvenisti/Cohen (2014). 
10
 Arsanjani/Reisman (2005). 
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conditions renders dependent courts which follow the dictates of the 
political branch that controls them.  11 The same analysis is applicable to 
international courts: to the extent that the court is controlled by a handful 
of states it is likely to show partiality to their demands.12  
This analysis can be used to study the extent to which the ICC is 
independent of the state parties that are parties to the ICC Statute, or 
perhaps to another group of states. One of the more sensitive questions in 
the design of the ICC processes was the how to ensure the independence – 
and as a result – the impartiality of the Prosecutor. Jeßberger and Geneuss 
do not address this question directly. They assume that the ICC is 
independent because it is “established not as an organ of the UN but as an 
independent organization with an independent budget.” Independence is 
conditioned by a host of factors which include nominations, promotions, 
respect to judgments, the ability to shape public opinion, and finally the 
control of the court’s budget.13  
Among the factors that promote independence of the ICC judges and 
Prosecutor is the fact that they are elected for non-renewable term. States 
cannot “punish” them the way they can punish, say, the UN Secretary 
General, or judges of the Appellate Body of the WTO, by not reelecting 
him (or her) for another term. Other factors that are more problematic are 
the Prosecutor’s dependence on powerful states in a number of areas. The 
Prosecutor would need assistance by powerful states that control conflict 
zones in the gathering of evidence and in arresting and extraditing sus-
pects. Powerful states can effectively put pressure on other countries to 
cooperate with the court. Finally, and perhaps most delicately, is the de-
pendence on states contributions to the ICC’s budget. As Jeßberger and 
Geneuss point out, the court’s budget is quite limited, and is shouldered 
primarily by a handful of states, led by Germany and Japan. Together Ja-
pan and the European Union provide more than three quarters of the ICC’s 
budget.14 Approved annually, the negotiation over the budget has proved a 
taxing experience for a Prosecutor eager to expand the court’s scope of 
activities and facing donors eager to cut expenses. Informally, the ritual of 
budget approval has become an opportunity for the donor countries to can-
vass the Prosecutor’s plan of action for the forthcoming year. Beyond the 
Prosecutor’s independence, state contributions may informally be connect-
ed with the composition of judges. One report criticized Japan because 
                                                 
11
 Stephenson (2003); McNollgast (2006); McNollgast (1995); Ginsburg (2003),  
21–33; Ramseyer (1994); Landes/Posner (1975). 
12 Benvenisti/Downs (2011). 
13
 On the requirements for independence and impartiality of international criminal 
tribunals see Meron (2005), 360–61. 
14 See the annual reports of the Committee on Budget and Finance, available on the 
ICC website.  
240 Eyal Benvenisti 
 
they “successfully nominated two judges who were not qualified law-
yers.”15 The EU and Japan are also well represented among the court’s 
judges. Small wonder that some observers have linked the court’s budget-
ary constraints to the question of its independence.16  
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Discussion on Florian Jeßberger / Julia Geneuss 
summarized by 
Joseb Gudiashvili 
Opening the discussion, Professor Fehling emphasizes the importance of us-
ing the methodological tools of economics in order to analyze the internation-
al criminal law and court. In addition, he proposes following two questions or 
controversies, which could be implemented into economic model of Prof. 
Jeßberger: 
In Fehling’s view, it is relatively unclear the strategic goal of the ICC. Is it 
to enhance ideal of justice across the globe? Or it is to promote the idea of 
European neo-colonialism? It is only for very weak countries? He supposes 
that some countries are immune towards the ICC influence, whereas others 
and mainly among less developed countries in Africa are less immune. On the 
other hand side, according Mr. Fehling, the International Criminal Court es-
tablishes basic ideas of criminal procedure, so called minimal standards in 
international criminal justice. 
Stefan Voigt shortly depicts an economics model of Sutter, regarding the 
ICC and emphasizes a time inconsistency problem. Using a backward induc-
tion method in evaluating the ICC success, Voigt remarks that International 
Criminal Court can be seen as a deterrent factor for potential perpetrators of 
international crimes. But, if rulers already commit crimes against humanity, 
ICC could play very negative rule in enhancing their willingness to hold in 
power.  
Taking his word, Prof. Kirchner questions following approach to see states 
as rational utility maximizers and proposes to stick to the methodology of 
individual actors. According his view, main actors are citizens, which demand 
from their states to “buy” international security and global rule of law as a 
global public good. Therefore, one can observe certain collective action prob-
lems in international criminal justice within the ICC system.  
In addition, Mr. Kirchner observes the ICC as a principal instrument to ex-
pose crime-prone situations around the globe. 
In response to above remarks, Prof. Jeßberger admits the selectivity issue, 
put forward by Prof. Benvenisti and observes it as a rather general problem 
for criminal law, even for domestic criminal law. Furthermore, Mr. Jeßberger 
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does not agree with labelling of the court as neo-colonial institution or sole 
court for one continent and suggests to analyze the referrals. From all on-
going judicial cases within the International Criminal Court, the prosecutor 
initiated only one case and all remaining cases were either referred by African 
states or by the United Nations Security Council. Regarding the substantive 
part of the Rome Statute, Mr. Jeßberger sees it as a model code for substan-
tive procedure and points out its influence, as well as convergence factor for 
domestic legislations. 
Reopening the discussion, Mr. Benvenisti suggests measuring the effec-
tiveness of the International Criminal Court via comparing the indictments 
before and after establishment of the court. According to his opinion, compar-
ison of indictments could define the role of the ICC in increasing or diminish-
ing of rule of law worldwide.  
The next comment comes from Mrs. Feldtmann and she asks the presenter 
and fellow professors, whether pure indictment numbers can be seen as suc-
cess. Furthermore, he suggests examining more closely the function of the 
court, its stakeholders and future role. Getting back to the argument of Mr. 
Voigt, Prof. Marauhn remarks the importance of time inconsistency and pay-
offs of relevant parties. Additionally, he recommends to analyze incentives of 
governments to sign the Rome Statute and observe it in accordance to com-
mitment theories. Furthermore, Mr. Marauhn emphasized the role of specific 
interest groups within European liberal democracies, which may demand from 
their governments more human right protection and rule of law worldwide.  
Taking his word, Prof. Schmidtchen agrees with Mr. Kirchner and sees in-
ternational criminal justice as global public good, where no country is willing 
to bear individual costs for more human rights protection and lesser crimes 
worldwide. Moreover, he sees certain possibility of ICC abuse in order to gain 
competitive advantage over rivals in a domestic political power games. Flori-
an Jeßberger partially agrees with this argument and brings an example of 
Libya, where ICC became active and started prosecution only with regard to 
crimes committed by Gaddafi and his close allies and not with regard to 
crimes committed by rebels. 
In summary, Eyal Benvenisti observes the International Criminal Court as 
a more or less cost-efficient and effective instrument to prevent massacres and 
crimes against humanity in less developed and more violent-prone countries. 
In order to prevent massive humanitarian crises, he observes two main strate-
gies: 
1. Military Intervention  
2. Using international law in general and International Criminal Court in 
particular, as a legal strategy for global security 
Adding on that remark, Prof. Oeter brings an example of United States of 
America and its refusal to ratify the Rome Statute of International Criminal 
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Court because of anticipated military interventions and strategy of pre-
emptive strikes. 
Closing the discussion, Laarni Escresa turns to the transaction cost analysis 
and depicts minimization of transaction costs between ad hoc international 
tribunals and permanent court as possible success factor of ICC. Furthermore, 













I. The problem 
The history of European integration since 1951 may be seen as a road to an 
‘ever closer union’. The signatories of the Treaty of Rome expressed their de-
termination “to lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples 
of Europe.” The preamble of the Maastricht Treaty added the principle of sub-
sidiarity.1 The preamble of the Lisbon Treaty returned to the text of the pre-
amble of the Treaty of Rome without reference to the principle of subsidiarity. 
The move towards ‘an ever closer union’, i.e., deeper integration, means 
that more and more powers have to be conferred on the European level. This 
can be undertaken by Treaty revisions,2 by court decisions of the European 
courts or by a new interpretation of the Treaties establishing the European 
Union3 by the European Commission, the Council, and the European Parlia-
ment.  
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The goal of an ‘ever closer union’ has been criticised because of its cen-
tralisation effect.4 Centralisation leads to higher externalities in the light of 
divergent preferences of citizens of different Member States. Agency costs 
will rise because of enhanced difficulties of citizens to make political decision 
makers follow citizens’ preferences (democracy deficit). Decentralisation 
means a lower degree of integration. This may be accomplished by repatriat-
ing powers to Member States. The same procedures to be applied for the 
transfer of powers to the European level could be employed for repatriating 
powers. Treaty revisions are the most important instrument here as well.  
If Treaty revisions play a prominent role in power transfers into both direc-
tions, procedural rules for Treaty revisions are of utmost importance for either 
centralisation or decentralisation. In order to find out whether moves towards 
more (or less) integration can be undertaken within the present legal structure 
of the European Union, it is necessary to analyse the existing Treaty revision 
provisions (positive analysis) and possible circumventions. This type of anal-
ysis is different from the studies which have been interested in the effects of 
different degrees of centralisation.5 Some of these studies have dealt with the 
constitutional problems in Europe.6 It was the European Constitutional Group7 
which brought into play the issue of a Treaty revision clause.8 The prominent 
goal of that clause was to prevent further centralisation. As a consequence the 
clause adopted a strict unanimity rule. But the introduction of that clause into 
the proposals of the European Constitutional Group was not based on an anal-
ysis of existing Treaty revision provisions. It was a working group at the Eu-
ropean University Institute which presented an analysis of Treaty revision 
clauses.9 But this was not a positive but a normative analysis without a clear 
methodological fundament, stressing the need for more ‘flexibility’ in order to 
be able to attain the goal of deeper integration. The EUI-proposal which cul-
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minated in the call for an abolition of the unanimity rules for Treaty re-
visions,10 did not find sufficient political support. The revision of the revision 
clause of the old Treaty on European Union (Nice Treaty) in the new Treaty 
on European Union (Lisbon Treaty) did not give up the unanimity rule as 
such. But it mitigated the effect of that rule, by providing three different types 
of Treaty revisions, two of them with reduced Member State participation.  
In December 2011, the Member States of the European Union failed to at-
tain a unanimous vote on a ‘fiscal compact’, which demonstrated the prob-
lems of the - revised - Treaty revision provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. In the 
light of these problems the author undertook a short economic analysis of the 
unanimity rule for Treaty revisions.11 It is the purpose of this paper to develop 
a more refined analysis of the Treaty revision provisions of the Lisbon Treaty 
on the fundament of that earlier paper. The following considerations are not 
confined to an economic analysis of Art. 48 TEU. They are looking into the 
underlying legal issues as well and deal with alternative modes of Treaty revi-
sions.12 
II. The thesis of the paper 
The thesis of this paper is that due to present legal provisions for Treaty revi-
sions in the Lisbon Treaty major moves into the direction of either deeper or 
less integration are impossible (European Constitutional impossibility theo-
rem13). This is the case for a revision of existing revision provisions as well. 
Thus, the present balance of competences between Member States and the 
European level is being petrified. Only slight shifts of power can be achieved 
within the present legal structure of the European Union.  
III. Structure of the paper 
For analysing the ‘European Constitutional impossibility theorem’ the meth-
odological fundament of the analysis is of utmost importance. The as-
sumptions of constitutional economics (as a sub-discipline of New Institution-
al Economics) have to be introduced. On that methodological fundament the 
historical and the political context of European Treaty revisions have to be 
brought into play. Legal issues of European Treaty revisions cannot be left 
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aside, because the economic analysis to be undertaken here is not interested in 
Treaty revisions under model assumptions but in Treaty revisions of the pre-
sent European constitution in the given legal context. But the constitution-
economics analysis is going beyond the existing legal discussion. It is based 
on a clear methodological fundament and separating clearly between a posi-
tive and a normative approach. 
B. Methodological issues 
I. Constitutional Economics: assumptions 
Constitutional economics14 – as a sub-discipline of New Institutional Econom-
ics15 – is dealing with specific legal rules; constitutional ones. It may be under-
stood as economics of constitutions under the assumptions of scarce re-
sources, self-interested rational behaviour of all actors (citizen, political 
actors, and others), incomplete information and the existence of transaction 
costs.16 Constitutions are being understood as a set of fundamental meta-rules 
which govern law-making and decisions on lower levels. Some, but not all 
scholars of Constitutional Economics share the assumption of bounded ra-
tionality with New Institutional Economics.17 
Constitutional economics is interested – like New Institutional Economics 
– in the rules of the game, and how such rules affect the game. But it is con-
fined to constitutional rules. If actors have to decide which constitutional rules 
to opt for, they are acting under a veil of uncertainty,18 which is reducing deci-
sion costs. But the degree of uncertainty may change over time. It is different 
for initial constitutional decisions and for later constitutional revisions.19 
Decisions to be taken under the veil of uncertainty may be fully rational. 
But the rationality assumption in the field of constitutional economics is nei-
ther very realistic nor useful in terms of its heuristic value. The complexity of 
the analysis is being raised if the assumption of bounded rationality20 is being 
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introduced. Today that assumption is based on empirical research of existing 
rationality deficits.21  
In constitutional-economics analysis the assumption of systematically in-
complete information and of information asymmetries between different 
groups of actors are playing a prominent role.22 Treaty revisions within the 
structure of European Union law take place in a context of representative de-
mocracy with only minor elements of direct democracy. Thus information 
asymmetries between citizens of Member States and national and European 
political decision makers are a decisive factor in Treaty revisions. Such 
asymmetries are more pronounced in relations between Member States citi-
zens and European political decision makers compared to those between citi-
zens and their national political decision makers.  
C. The context 
I. Historical context 
In order to understand the problem of constitutional petrification due to appli-
cation of the unanimity rule it is helpful to have a look into the origins of the 
unanimity concept. This concept has to be seen as a necessary complement to 
the concept of national sovereignty. The concept of sovereignty of nation 
states – i.e., external sovereignty – has been developed in the 17th century, 
but can be traced back to medieval times.23 It is being attributed to the writ-
ings of Hugo Grotius, 24 but may be traced back to a Spanish scholar named 
Francisco de Vitoria.25  
It makes sense to distinguish the internal and the external concept of na-
tional sovereignty. The concept of internal sovereignty refers to the authority 
over a given territory and its inhabitants.26 The concept of external sovereignty 
relates to the relationship of nation states to one another and means that there 
is no final authority above and beyond the sovereign state.27 The principle of 
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national sovereignty was protecting nation states by the guarantee that no for-
eign nation would interfere into internal affairs.28 
The concept of (external) sovereignty had been the necessary precondition 
for negotiating and concluding a Peace Treaty between the German emperor, 
the German princes and those European nation states which were involved in 
the Thirty Years’ War in 1648.29 The old concept of supremacy of the German 
emperor over the princes of the various German states had to be abandoned in 
order to allow a peace between equals. National sovereignty of the parties 
concluding the Peace Treaties of 1648 had the consequence, that the unanimi-
ty principle had to be applied. Any diversion from that principle would have 
violated the (external) sovereignty of a state which did not approve the Treaty. 
Thus the unanimity rule in public international law may be described as an 
offspring of the principle of national sovereignty. Whereas the principle of 
national sovereignty has been criticized and modified, when it comes to the 
doctrine of non-intervention into internal affairs,30 it has not been challenged 
in the concept of concluding Treaties under public international law and has 
found its way into the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.31 
In order to solve the problem of unanimity within the World Trade Organi-
zation, a distinction is being made between multilateral and plurilateral agree-
ments.32 Whereas multilateral agreements apply to all members of WTO, plu-
rilateral agreements are applied only to those countries, which are the sig-
natories of such Treaties.33 Thus agreements, for which unanimity cannot be 
achieved, may be concluded as plurilateral agreements. The unanimity prob-
lem is being solved by confining the parties of the agreement to parties which 
are consenting. 
II. Legal context 
The legal context for Treaty revisions of Treaties establishing the European 
Union comprises: (1) public international law with its focus on the principle 
of unanimity (see Section C.I) and (2) European Union law. 
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After the failure of the European Constitutional project the Nice Treaty was 
revised by the Lisbon Treaty, which fell back behind the deeper integration-
goals of the ‘Constitution for Europe’, but nevertheless advanced into that 
direction.34 Art. 48 TEU35 was revised in order to introduce a simplified revi-
sion procedure (Art. 48 par. 6)36 and a general bridging provision (passerelle) 
(Art. 48 par. 7).37 The different procedure will be discussed in more detail in 
Section F.I. But it is important to understand that the unanimity rule as such 
has not been abandoned.  
The Treaty on European Union (Lisbon Treaty) allows a sub-group of 
Member States to enter into so-called enhanced cooperation (Art. 20 TEU). 
This might serve as an instrument to evade the unanimity rule. Thus, this in-
strument will be discussed in more detail in Section F.II. 
D. Economics of the unanimity rule  
in constitution-building 
I. Unanimity Rule in the ‘Calculus of Consent’ 
Economic analysis of the unanimity rule has been one of the major topics in 
the Calculus of Consent by James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock.38 This rule 
is a corner stone of an individualistic approach to constitutional economics. It 
minimizes externalities and protects individual freedom. But this positive ap-
praisal of the unanimity rule may be revisited in the light of decision cost-
problems.39 
II. Economics of constitution-building, the veil of uncertainty  
and decision making costs 
In constitution-building the drafters are acting under a ‘veil of uncertainty’.40 
This veil of uncertainty, used in constitutional economics, is in some way 
similar to the veil of ignorance.41 The latter one may be traced back to Harsa-
nyi.42 It is one of the methodological cornerstones in Rawls’ ‘Theory of Jus-
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tice’.43 In Rawls’ approach the ‘original position’ corresponds to the state of 
nature in the traditional theory of social contract, but not to an actual histori-
cal state of affairs. The ‘original position’ is being understood as a purely hy-
pothetical situation. 44 According to this methodological instrument actors do 
not know their place in society, their class position or social status, their for-
tune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, their intelligence, 
strength and their like.45 This methodological instrument may be helpful in 
discussing standards of fairness and justice. But if the constitution-building 
process has to be analysed and normative propositions have to be developed, 
it makes sense not to refer to such a hypothetical situation. Thus, in constitu-
tional economics a less impermeable veil has been developed: the veil of un-
certainty.46 Here it is sufficient that actors, who want to build a constitution, 
are not certain about the effects of rules in separate individual positions, so 
that particular interests cannot be related to particular rules.47 The veil of un-
certainty in constitutional economics may be understood as a specific case of 
the assumption of systematically incomplete information in New Institutional 
Economics. Translated back into the terminology of constitutional economics 
this means, that the veil of uncertainty is less impermeable compared to the 
veil of ignorance. 
The veil of uncertainty may be understood as a device to reduce decision 
making costs. If in the constitution-building process the participating actors 
do not know how they will be affected by the rules chosen, they will come to 
a collective decision at lower costs compared to a situation, where they are 
better informed. As a consequence decision making costs will rise if the veil 
of uncertainty becomes more permeable. 
III. Constitution-building and the combination  
of the unanimity rule and the veil of uncertainty 
If the unanimity rule serves as the meta-rule in constitution-building no partic-
ipant has to accept externalities from rules he did not consent. Thus, the una-
nimity rule is protecting the preferences of all participating actors. The result 
of constitution-building is conformity with normative individualism. If deci-
sion making costs are zero the unanimity rule is the optimal solution. But de-
cision making costs are existent. In order to come close to the optimal result, 
it is essential to reduce decision making costs. If decisions are being taken 
under a thick veil of uncertainty decision making costs are supposedly mini-
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mal. The combination of the unanimity rule and the veil of uncertainty are 
promising a result close to optimum.  
IV. Constitution-building in a principal-agent-context 
If the constitution-building actors do not draft and enact the constitution on 
their own, but if they delegate constitution-building to experts, e.g., members 
of a constitutional convention, this will affect the veil of uncertainty as well as 
decision making costs. Now information asymmetries are coming into play. In 
constitutional economics this means that the veil of uncertainty is different for 
principals and agents. In constitutional economics citizens are the principals, 
whereas political decision makers, to whom constitution-building powers 
have been delegated, are their agents. The agents are supposedly better in-
formed about the expected effects of the rules they are drafting than the prin-
cipals. The rationale behind the delegation of powers is to reduce decision 
making costs. But decisions taken by the agents may diverge from citizens’ 
preferences, thus adding preference costs. In order to prevent or minimize 
such preference costs citizens may try to control agents, producing agency 
costs. They are confronted with a trade-off between preference costs and 
agency costs.  
It has been argued that the veil of uncertainty is different for principals and 
agents. In a principal agent relation the agent supposedly is better informed 
than the principal. But when it comes to constitution-building principals do 
have a strong incentive to protect them and prevent high preference costs in 
the future. Thus, the common assumption of information asymmetry between 
principal and agent might have to be qualified in constitutional economics. 
But there are good reasons to stick to the information asymmetry assumption 
in constitutional economics. The means and ends-paradigm and the critique of 
that paradigm have to be brought into play.48 
V. Constitution-building, the means and ends-paradigm  
and its critique 
To better understand the information asymmetry between principals and 
agents it is necessary to have a closer look into the process of constitution-
building. The envisaged constitution may be regarded as a tool to serve cer-
tain ends. Then the constitution is an instrument to attain certain goals. Thus, 
the drafters of a constitution are confronted with the means and ends-
paradigm and its critique. 
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The means-and-ends paradigm has its origin in the problem of solving or mit-
igating scarcity of resources. In order to do so, resources have to be used 
where they are producing the optimal output. Given the ends the input 
(means) has to be minimised. Or put into the other version: Given the means 
output has to be maximised. This simple relationship between input and out-
put has been criticized because unintended  side effects are not being taken 
into account.49 Thus, the goal to be attained is no longer given, but is depend-
ing on the input. This insight is important for any endeavour in the field of 
law-making and/or constitution-building. In case of constitution-building the 
drafters have to find out what could be the unintended  side effects. The in-
tended positive effects of the envisaged constitution are clearly visible, 
whereas prediction of the potential  side effects is difficult. The information 
asymmetry between agents and principals is being reinforced by the fact that 
agents have better access to information concerning possible  side effects of 
constitutional rules. 
If the agent – engaged in constitution-building – finds out such side effects 
he will have no incentive to inform the principals about side effects which 
will have negative consequences for the principals. As a rational actor the 
agent will not endanger his re-election. In case the agent is expecting that the 
side effects will only become public after the expiration of his political man-
date he is not interested in informing principals during the period of his man-
date. 
The means-and-ends paradigm is essential for constitutional economics. It 
can explain a tendency of exploiting the given information asymmetries by 
political decision makers in order to draft constitutional rules, which are being 
favoured by their constituency not being aware of potential unintended conse-
quences. 
VI. Constitution-building in case of a hybrid constitution 
The conventional model of constitution-building is referring to a situation 
where citizens of a well-defined nation state agree on a set of meta-rules 
which define the basic legal structure of the state and in most cases fundamen-
tal rights of citizens. There are principal agent relations between citizens, 
members of a constitutional convention or of the legislature. In case of a con-
stitution of an international organization additional actor will enter the scene. 
Members of governments of nation-states – acting as agents of their citizens – 
agree on the meta-rules for the given international organization in a Treaty 
under public international law. This constitution then has to be ratified in the 
envisaged Member States either by the legislature or by referendum. Princi-
pals are no longer being represented by members of a constitutional conven-
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tion or of the legislature but by members of government. Agency costs are 
rising because of the longer agency chain. Citizens elect the members legisla-
ture which then elects and controls the government. In the ratification process 
citizens have the choice between accepting and refusing the Treaty negotiated 
and signed by their government. But they cannot rewrite the text of the Trea-
ty. Thus, in case of constitution-building for an international organization the 
position of principals are much weaker compared to the case of national con-
stitution-building. From the perspective of citizens their veto power is deci-
sive. This is especially true in case of ratification by referendum. Whereas the 
Treaty is one of international law, ratification rules are governed by national 
law. The position of citizens is being better protected by national law. They 
may be interested in strict ratification rules which are strengthening their posi-
tion. But in the end citizens’ position in constitution-building for an interna-
tional organisation is much weaker compared to their position in national con-
stitution-building.  
This complicated process of constitution-building in case of international 
organizations may explain, why the meta-rules for the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) allow for multilateral and plurilateral Treaties. Plu-
rilateral Treaties are only binding the participating GATT Members. The una-
nimity rule is applied, but the group of participating countries if flexible (see 
Section C.I.) 
Whereas legal rules for constitution-building for the nation state and for in-
ternational organizations are well defined, the picture is much more complex 
and rules for constitution-building have been changing over time in case of 
hybrid constitutions. A hybrid constitution is defining the meta-rules for a 
supranational entity (from now on called ‘supranational union’) which has 
been endowed with law-making power to enact supranational law. The first 
supranational constitution has been the Treaty Establishing the European Coal 
and Steel Community in 1951.50 In 1957 the Member States of that Communi-
ty enacted the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 
(Rome-Treaty) and the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community.51 In all three cases the Member States concluded a Treaty gov-
erned by public international law. At first glance the three communities look 
like common international organizations. But these supranational organiza-
tions are insofar different from international organizations as they have their 
own legislature and judiciary. Whereas the legislature is confined to enact 
supranational law within the limits of the Treaties (so-called secondary law), 
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the law courts are interpreting the Treaties (so-called primary law). They are 
engaged in judicial law making as well on the level of primary and of second-
ary law.52 
This specific type of hybrid constitution - combining international and su-
pranational law – is combining elements of international and supranational 
law for a supranational union of nation states which itself is a hybrid between 
a confederation and a federal state.53 International Treaties form the legal fun-
dament of the supranational union, emphasizing its confederate nature. Su-
premacy of supranational law of the supranational union vis-à-vis national 
law of Member States in a system of vertical allocation of powers on the Eu-
ropean and on the national level is emphasizing the federal character of the 
supranational union. It has been the German Federal Constitutional Court 
which has underlined the confederate nature of the supranational union with 
the argument that sovereignty of Member States must not be eroded under the 
German constitution.54 National sovereignty of Member States is the legal 
fundament for constitution-building on the supranational level. According to 
this position the various Treaties establishing the European Community and 
then the European Union are Treaties under public international law. This 
means the unanimity rule cannot be given up.  
If constitution-building for a supranational union, e.g., the European Un-
ion, takes place on the level of international law, it is closer to the creation of 
international organizations than to national constitution-building. The position 
of citizens of the Member States is extremely weak. The legal instruments to 
protect the principals are – national – ratification rules.  
E. The economics of constitutional revisions 
I. The dynamics of the veil of uncertainty 
and the petrification effect 
The economics analysis of a revision of an existing constitution is differing 
from that of constitution-building in one important aspect. The veil of uncer-
tainty has been changed between the time of the original constitution-building 
and the time of the revision. The actors who are engaged in revision of a giv-
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en constitution are well informed about the effects of constitutional rules of 
the present constitution. They know much about the non-intended conse-
quences of that constitution. Thus, in drafting revisions they are better 
equipped in understanding, of how the new rules are working in practice. The 
veil of uncertainty has become less impermeable. This means higher decision 
making costs. The simple message is self-evident: Decision making costs for 
revisions of existing constitutions are higher compared to that of initial consti-
tution-building (petrification effect).55  
The petrification effect is reinforcing path dependency. Even if the present 
constitution turns out to be suboptimal in the light of principals’ preferences it 
is very costly to revise that constitution. This effect should be known ex ante 
so that constitution drafters have the chance of solving or mitigating the prob-
lem by drafting a revision clause that provides for a certain degree of flexibil-
ity. In practice most revision clauses contain various super majority provi-
sions but in most cases not the unanimity rule. As a consequence preference 
costs are higher. Protection of minorities is being weakened. 
If the drafters of the constitution did not tackle the problem of petrification 
and path dependence ex ante and have written a strict revision clause it is ex-
tremely difficult to amend this revision clause which does not allow flexibil-
ity. The reason is simple: In order to amend the revision clause it is necessary 
to revise the – old – constitution. The old revision clause is being applied. 
Minorities which are protected by the strict revision clause may not be inter-
ested to lose their status and block a revision of the revision clause. The petri-
fication of the revision clause is reinforcing the petrification of the constitu-
tion as such.  
II. Escaping the petrification trap  
by circumventing the unanimity rule 
If a strict revision clause of a constitution is preventing major changes of that 
constitution, citizens might watch for other solutions than revising the existing 
constitution. They may abandon the old constitution and draft a new one. 
They may interpret the old constitution in a manner which is giving space for 
the desired changes. They may disregard the old constitution or parts of it and 
allow unconstitutional activities. Legal scholars would identify the third op-
tion as unlawful and focus their attention on measures to prevent such uncon-
stitutional activities. Economists are more realistic. They would be interested 
in the incentives to engage in unconstitutional activities and their probability. 
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They would be interested in measures to prevent such activities as well but 
would put the question, how effective such measures would be.  
The implications of these three unconventional problem solutions are dif-
ferent. A new constitution-building endeavour is very costly, but it minimizes 
preference costs. A new interpretation of the old constitution is a matter of 
judicial law-making, which can only be done by a law court. The agency rela-
tion between citizens as principals and judges is an indirect one. Even if the 
judges are being appointed by political decision makers who act as agents of 
citizens, the power of principals is decisively weakened. Agency costs are 
rising. Thus preference costs in case of judicial revision of a constitution are 
very high. This is the price for the – necessary – independence of the judici-
ary. The third problem solution – allowing unconstitutional – activities has its 
price as well: The actors are deciding on their own which unconstitutional 
activity they prefer. For principals it becomes extremely difficult to control 
them. Agency costs and preference costs are rising tremendously. 
1. Revision of a hybrid constitution 
In case of a revision of a hybrid constitution public international law comes 
into play and thus the unanimity rule (see Section C). Even if all governments 
of the international Treaty would agree on the revision, ratification might 
cause difficulties. In case of ratification via a vote of the legislature members 
of the legislature come into play as new actors. Principal-agent relations be-
tween citizens and members of the legislature are different from that between 
citizens and members of government. Citizens are in a better position to con-
trol members of the legislature than to control members of government, if 
members of the legislature have to expect not be re-elected if they do not take 
into account citizens’ preferences. A revision of a hybrid constitution be-
comes more difficult, if a referendum is necessary to ratify the Treaty in ques-
tion.56 Citizens are directly involved and can better protect their preferences.  
Ratification rules are part of national law. The member states of a suprana-
tional union with a hybrid constitution may adopt easy or strict revision rules. 
Members of the government might prefer easy ratification rules, in order to 
facilitate national ratification. If they have negotiated the terms of revising an 
international Treaty they are supposed to be interested in an easy ratification. 
Thus they would prefer ratification by the legislature. Citizens are supposed to 
prefer strict ratification rules, thus strengthening their position vis-à-vis mem-
bers of the government. According to this hypothesis the problem is being 
understood as a conflict between national principals and national agents. But 
this view does not take into account the international dimension of the prob-
lem.  
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The unanimity rule applicable for revisions of international Treaties is rele-
vant for the bargaining positions of participants of that Treaty. Under the una-
nimity rule it makes sense to play a veto game. The actor who has held back 
his consent until all other actors have given their consent is in a strong bar-
gaining position. This is a rent-seeking game. In this game two different veto 
positions have to be distinguished: (1) the veto on the level of negotiating the 
Treaty, and (2) the veto on the ratification level. Whereas the veto on the ne-
gotiation level has been studied in detail,57 the veto on the ratification level did 
not find much attention.58 For the citizens and members of government of a 
potential veto player it might make sense to adopt strict ratification rules in 
order to strengthen the veto position in the negotiation process. Even if the 
government has given its consent it might have a chance to renegotiate the 
terms of the revision of that Treaty if national ratification cannot be achieved 
without certain changes. 
Whereas the original hypothesis has stressed the interest of national gov-
ernments in easy ratification rules in order to evade effective control exercise 
by their citizens, the second hypothesis is contradicting the first one: it could 
make sense for all national actors to adopt strict ratification rules in order to 
strengthen the international bargaining position of that country. 
If a country belonging to a supranational union with a hybrid constitution 
has been able to strengthen its bargaining position via strict ratification rules 
other Member States might copy the strict ratification rules. This may lead to 
a race to the top (in terms of better protecting citizens’ preferences). Thus, the 
revision of a hybrid constitution becomes extremely costly in terms of deci-
sion making costs. In the end the petrification of the hybrid constitution is 
complete.  
The picture of a hybrid constitution developed here is incomplete insofar 
as there is not only the choice between ratification via the legislature or via 
referendum. In case of ratification via the legislature citizens might try to stop 
ratification via the judiciary. Now, another actor comes into play, in most cas-
es the constitutional court of the country. The court might stop ratification or 
might introduce certain reservations and formulate conditions which have to 
be fulfilled in order to allow ratification. If the other Members of the suprana-
tional union have ratified the Treaties the judgement of the constitutional 
court of the veto player may lead to renegotiation of the Treaty. In case of 
stopping the ratification as such the Treaty has to be renegotiated. In case of a 
reservation of the veto player renegotiation on the introduction of such reser-
vations might be necessary. If the Treaty is being concluded under the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties59, articles 19–23 of that convention are 
covering the process of how to introduce unilateral reservations into an exist-
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ing international Treaty. If not all Member States of the supranational union 
have signed (and ratified) the Vienna Convention, renegotiation on the ac-
ceptance of the reservation by the other Member States are necessary. In order 
to make such acceptance binding under international law, it is necessary to 
revise the original Treaty. It is doubtful whether or not such Treaty revision 
has to be ratified in the Member States accepting the reservation.  
If the non-veto players realize that their relative bargaining position has 
been weakened by the veto player, who has forced the other Member States to 
accept its unilateral reservation, they might be interested in the future to bring 
into play their national constitutional court in the next round of a Treaty revi-
sion. A new race to the top is starting.60  
III. Escaping the petrification gap by  
circumventing the ordinary revision procedure 
The arguments developed in E.II are valid for dealing with problems of cir-
cumventing the specific revision procedures for a hybrid constitution as well. 
But some qualifications are necessary.  
If a veto player tries to block the revision of a hybrid constitution the re-
maining Member States might escape the unanimity rule by circumventing a 
revision of the hybrid constitution and conclude a new international Treaty in 
which they define binding rules for the parties of that Treaty but not for the 
veto player.61 But it is questionable, whether this new Treaty is compatible 
with the existing hybrid constitution. In effect the new international Treaty is 
derogating provisions of the existing hybrid constitution. The parties signing 
the new Treaty are creating a dilemma. They are being bound by provisions of 
the existing hybrid constitution and at the same time by provisions of the new 
Treaty. If provisions of the existing hybrid constitution and those of the new 
Treaty are not compatible, it is legally doubtful, which provisions are applica-
ble and binding.  
If the new international Treaty is outside the existing hybrid constitution 
the courts of the supranational union have no jurisdiction over the provisions 
of the new Treaty. But these courts have to enforce the provisions of the exist-
ing hybrid constitution. They are not supposed to care about conflicts with 
international law outside the hybrid constitution. In the end the Member 
States which have signed the new international Treaty are now servants to two 
masters. Under the assumption of self-interested rational behaviour members 
of governments of the countries which have signed the new Treaty one may 
expect them to act opportunistically and stick to such provisions which are 
more favourable at the time that decision has to be taken. The rationale at the 
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time of signing the new Treaty may be different from the rationale at the time, 
when the decision has to be taken, which provisions to apply. If the new pro-
visions are stricter in terms of creating obligations under international law and 
thus limiting national sovereignty one may predict that the new obligations 
will not be fulfilled. It makes sense to stress supremacy of the hybrid constitu-
tion vis-à-vis the new Treaty provisions. In such a situation courts of the su-
pranational union, which have an interest in the supremacy paradigm, will 
protect the Member States against the application of the provisions of the new 
Treaty.  
The problem situation is different, if the hybrid constitution as such con-
tains opt-out or opt-in provisions which allow for agreements between a group 
of Member States of less than total membership. Whether or not this is a way 
out of the petrification gap depends on how the opt-out or opt-in provisions 
are being formulated. In case of an opt-out provision Member States not will-
ing to agree to a revision of the hybrid constitution may opt for not being 
bound by the revised Treaty provisions. In case of an opt-in provisions only 
such Member States are being bound, which enter into the agreement.  
As well opt-out as opt-in provisions may be understood as instruments to 
allow for different speeds of integration within a supranational union.62 They 
replace unanimous revision of the existing hybrid constitution by establishing 
different rules for sub-groups of Member States of the old constitution. In 
economic terms this means more complexity and thus higher variable costs 
for the supranational union on one side but lower adaptation costs on the other 
side. Such adaptation costs are supposedly lower than the cost for revising the 
old constitution. With higher heterogeneity within the group of Member 
States of a supranational union entity revision costs are rising tremendously, 
whereas variable costs are expected to rise only modestly due to the fact that 
there are high fixed costs for establishing a supranational union together with 
its legal and organisational structure. 
F. Petrification of the constitution of the European Union 
I. Problems of Treaty revisions under Art. 48 TEU 
Today the Treaty on European Union (Lisbon Treaty – TEU) and the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) are containing the meta-
rules for the European Union. From a constitutional economics point of view 
they are forming the EU-constitution.  
The Treaty revision rules are to be found in Art. 48 TEU (see Section C.II). 
As it has been mentioned above Art. 48 TEU provides for different modes of 
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Treaty revisions, the ordinary revision procedure (Art. 48 par. 2–5), a simpli-
fied revision procedure (Art. 48 par. 6) and a general bridging clause 
(passerelle) in par. 7, which may be understood as another simplified revision 
procedure.  
In the ordinary revision procedure Treaty revisions (Art. 48 par. 2–5) have 
to be agreed upon by a conference of representatives of the governments of 
the Member States unanimously. That conference’s decision may be based on 
the results of a Convention composed of representatives of the national Par-
liaments, of the Heads of State or Government of the Member States, of the 
European Parliament and of the Commission. The revisions shall enter into 
force after being ratified by all the Member States in accordance with their 
respective national constitutional requirements. 
Treaty revisions under the simplified revision procedure of Art. 48 par. 6 
TEU require a unanimous decision by the European Council. The revision 
enters into force after being “approved by the Member States in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements”. The scope of application of 
the simplified revision procedure of Art. 48 par. 6 TEU is restricted to revi-
sions of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
The revisions may not increase the competences conferred on the Union in the 
treaties (Article 48 par. 6, third sentence TEU). 
Treaty revisions under the general bridging procedure according to Art. 48 
par. 7 TEU are being based on a unanimous decision of the European Council 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament. But the revision is 
blocked if at least one national Parliament of a Member State makes known 
its opposition to the proposal within six months (Art. 48 par. 7, third sentence 
TEU). The general bridging procedure is only applicable for selective revi-
sions, which refer to voting in the Council or to the legislative procedure. 
These three options for revision of the Treaty have different economic impli-
cations. Whereas all three options provide for the application of the unanimity 
rule, the scope of application, the national ratification process and the in-
volvement of national Parliaments of Member States are different.  
The ordinary revision procedure comes close to the revision of a hybrid 
constitution as being discussed in Section E.III. The petrification effect is 
tremendous. Member States have an incentive to participate in the race to the 
top. But members of government may be more interested in minimising citi-
zens’ control and strengthening their position as agents.  
The simplified revision procedure of Art. 48 par. 6 TEU is limited in its 
scope of application (Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union). The fact that revisions under this procedure may not increase the 
competences conferred on the Union in the treaties is reflecting the anxiety of 
Member States which agreed to this simplified revision procedure that their 
national sovereignty may be eroded by Treaty revisions under the simplified 
procedure. The necessary approval by the Member States “in accordance with 
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their respective constitutional requirements” allows for strict national ratifica-
tion requirements despite the fact, that Art. 48 par. 6 TEU does not refer to 
‘ratification’. Thus Art. 48 par. 6 TEU does not block the race to the top as 
being discussed above. In economic terms decision making costs of the ordi-
nary procedure are much more time consuming and costly compared to the 
revision procedure of Art. 48 par. 7 TEU. Thus this type of simplified revision 
procedure is reducing revision costs and thus is facilitating Treaty revisions. 
But on the other hand it does not give up the unanimity rule and the option of 
national ratification.  
It is interesting to note, that the general bridging procedure of Art. 48 par. 
7 TEU does not give up the unanimity rule. The decision of the European 
Council must be taken unanimously. Under this procedure national parlia-
ments of Member States may play a decisive role. This is important because 
citizens may control members of parliament more easily than members of 
government. But national parliaments have to notify their opposition within 
six months after the decision of the European Council. This may be under-
stood as weakening potential veto players. Let us assume, that the government 
is agreeing to a certain Treaty revision and a majority of members of the na-
tional Parliament are opposed. The latter ones are not being protected by a 
ratification procedure, in which they have to express their agreement with the 
Treaty revision. If they do not act at all they lose their veto position. But the 
general bridging procedure of Art. 48 par. 7 TEU does not exclude national 
rules under which the national parliament has to ‘ratify’ a Treaty revision un-
der the general bridging procedure (quasi-ratification procedure). This is no 
ratification in the sense of public international law. But the parliament may 
bind itself to either approve the Treaty revision or to notify its opposition. 
Such a procedure under national law comes close to a ratification process. In 
the end Member States by means of national rules may modify the general 
bridging procedure in a manner in which they are strengthening their position 
vis-à-vis other Member States. If one Member State is introducing such na-
tional rules of quasi-ratification a race to the top as being discussed above 
may start. 
All three modes of Treaty revision procedures under Art. 48 TEU do not 
prevent veto players to block a Treaty revision. All three procedure allow 
Member States to introduce national ratification rules or quasi ratification 
rules which strengthen their position vis-à-vis other Member States, thus 
opening a race to the top. 
Under all three procedures national constitutional courts can be involved. 
This has become manifest with the last (preliminary) decision of the German 
Federal constitutional Court of 13 September 2012.63 The Court has made the 
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ratification possible under a condition concerning the interpretation of the 
ESM Treaty. Thus, the German government had to make a reservation when 
notifying the ratification. The provisions on reservations of the Vienna Con-
vention cannot be applied because France is not a member of that convention. 
Thus the other Member States had to accept the unilateral German reserva-
tion. It is doubtful whether the decision to accept the German reservation is 
constituting another Treaty revision which has to be ratified according to the 
national procedures of ratification in the other Member States. If the assump-
tion of opportunistic behaviour of political actors is being introduced (see 
Section B), one may expect that in case of an extension of the agreed upon 
limits of liability in the ESM Treaty by a new interpretation of that Treaty a 
national government of a Member State which is in favour of that extension 
will argue that the acceptance of the German reservation is legally not bind-
ing. In such a case the expected response of the German Federal Constitution-
al Court in a similar situation in the future would be to ask the government not 
to notify the ratification unless the reservation has been accepted by the other 
Member States and the agreement on the acceptance has been ratified accord-
ing to national ratification rules.  
To sum up the analysis of existing Treaty revision procedure in the Treaty 
on European Union (Lisbon Treaty): It has been demonstrated that the una-
nimity rule together with national ratification procedures and quasi-
ratification procedures, national rules on how to deal with Treaty revisions 
under the general bridging procedure and national rules governing the in-
volvement of a national constitutional court in ratification procedures or qua-
si-ratification procedure is petrifying the status quo of the Treaty on European 
Union (Lisbon Treaty). According to the analysis only minor modifications of 
the EU-constitution are possible. The European constitutional impossibility 
theorem has been approved for Treaty revisions under Art. 48 TEU. 
II. Circumventing Art. 48 TEU 
The problems discussed in Section E.III under the heading of opt-out and opt-
in provisions have been demonstrated in the European Union by a number of 
opt-out cases64 and opt-in-cases. The most prominent opt-in case has been the 
Schengen Treaty.65 But this Treaty has later been integrated into the frame-
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work of European Union law. All these cases have demonstrated that different 
degrees of integration are possible and can be handled.  
In order to have a general opt-in framework, Art. 20 TEU (Lisbon Treaty) 
has modified the so-called ‘enhanced cooperation’, which had originally been 
introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty. A group of at least eight Member States 
thus may agree on deeper integration in a special field of activities. Art. 20 
par. 2 TEU states that “enhanced cooperation shall aim to further the objec-
tives of the Union, protect its interests and reinforce its integration process.” 
As far as the procedural provisions to start enhanced cooperation Art. 20 TEU 
is referring to articles 326–334 TFEU. Whereas the wording of Art. 20 par. 2 
TEU opens space for broad interpretation and thus is creating legal uncertain-
ty, the articles on the procedural rules are confining the space of application of 
enhanced cooperation considerably. Thus it becomes extremely costly to start 
enhanced cooperation under Art. 20 TEU. Thus the instrument of enhanced 
cooperation is no way out of the petrification trap when it comes to a quasi-
revision of existing Treaty provisions. 
If enhanced cooperation is no relevant substitute for Treaty revision provi-
sions Member States which are confronted with the strategy of a veto-player 
may find another escape from the application of such provisions and cir-
cumvent Art. 48 TEU. They may agree on a Treaty under international law 
outside the framework of European Union law. This case has been discussed 
in Section E.II. It has been demonstrated that this is not a real escape in the 
light of potentially opportunistic behaviour of one or more players. Neverthe-
less a sub-group of Member States on 9 December 2011 agreed on the so-
called Fiscal Pact.66 In criticising this Treaty I have argued that countries 
which have signed the Fiscal Pact nevertheless might invoke their rights under 
Art. 126 TFEU under the expectation that the European Court of Justice will 
let them do so because of the doctrine of supremacy of European Union law.67 
In the end circumvention the Treaty revision procedures of Art. 48 TEU by 
entering into an international Treaty outside the framework of European Un-
ion law, is a very risky endeavour. It is no way out of the petrification trap. 
G. Outlook 
The analysis of treaty revisions of hybrid constitutions in general and of the 
Treaty revision procedures of Art. 48 TEU together with potential circumven-
                                                          
 
Journal L 239, 22/09/2000 P. 0019 – 0062; available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriS 
erv/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:42000A0922%2801%29:EN:HTML (last access: 12 Sept. 
2012). 
66
 Kirchner (2012), Section D. 
67
 Kirchner (2012), Section D; Kirchner (2011). 
268 Christian Kirchner 
  
tions of these provisions has made clear that only minor revisions of the exist-
ing European constitution are possible. The European Constitutional Impossi-
bility Theorem has not been proved in a strict test. But it has been demon-
strated that revisions of the European constitution are extremely costly. This 
fact is preventing any substantial Treaty revision in the future. The incentive 
for Member States to participate in a race for stricter ratification or quasi-
ratification rules may lead to a situation, where impediments for Treaty revi-
sions become insurmountable. If Member States or the European Commission 
should not just try to circumvent the Treaty revision provisions but ignore 
them and take recourse to unconstitutional activities and engage in de-facto 
revisions of the Treaty the price of legal uncertainty and weakening the rule of 
law would be tremendous endangering the European integration process as 
such. 
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Comment on Christian Kirchner 







Christian Kirchner deals in his interesting contribution basically with two 
important questions: 
1. To what extent do constitutions in general and hybrid constitutions, 
such as the Lisbon Treaty, in particular reflect the preferences of the citi-
zens? 
2. How difficult is it to efficiently adapt existing (hybrid) constitutions 
to changing circumstances? 
With respect to the first question, Kirchner refers to the economics of 
constitution-building and points out that the participants of the constitu-
tion-building process act under a veil of uncertainty, which leads ex ante to 
some convergence of interests and thus lowers decision making costs. With 
an impermeable veil of uncertainty decision making costs become very low 
and the unanimity rule will be (close to) the optimal one in the constituent 
assembly. Since the citizens delegate the drafting and enactment of the 
constitution to experts, principal-agent problems between citizens and ex-
perts have to be taken into account. It is assumed that the intended positive 
effects of the envisaged constitution are also visible to the principals, 
whereas the agents are better informed about potential negative side ef-
fects. In case the agent expects the side effects to become public only after 
the expiration of his political mandate, there is no incentive for the polit i-
cal decision makers to reveal them to the citizens. Due to these principal-
agent problems the constitutional rules typically will not reflect citizens’ 
preferences in an undistorted way. Even though I share Kirchner’s basic 
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argument, an explicit formulation of the agent’s objective function is miss-
ing. In this respect, the final version differs from the first version of the 
paper, where Kirchner argued that drafters’ interest to earn reputation as 
the ‘fathers and mothers of the constitution’ explains their incentive not to 
fully inform the citizens about all potential risks. 
In case of a hybrid constitution, which defines the meta-rules for a su-
pranational entity, the agency chain becomes longer and agency costs are 
rising: The principals, i.e., the citizens, are now represented by members of 
national government, who agree on a Treaty under public international 
law. The government is elected and controlled by the legislature, which is 
elected by the citizens; the ratification (by the legislature or by referen-
dum) is governed by national law. Kirchner comes to the conclusion that – 
due to the longer agency chain – citizens’ position in hybrid constitution-
building is much weaker than in national constitution-building. 
B. 
The focus of Christian Kirchner’s paper is on the second question, the re-
vision of (hybrid) constitutions, with special focus on the European Union. 
From an economic point of view, the most important difference between 
constitution-building and constitutional revisions is the following: Due to 
their experience with the existing constitution, the parties concerned are 
much better informed about the actual costs and benefits of the constitution 
at the revision stage as compared to the stage of constitution-building. The 
veil of uncertainty has become transparent, which leads to higher decision 
making costs. For this reason, even those constitutions, that turn out not to 
reflect citizens’ preferences in a proper way, are difficult to revise under 
unanimity (‘petrification effect’). This explains why revision clauses typi-
cally replace the unanimity requirement by qualified majorities, which 
lowers decision making costs, but weakens the protection of minorities.  
The situation is different with the revisions of hybrid constitutions, 
which are governed by international public law. Without explicit excep-
tions, Treaty revisions do not only require the application of the unanimity 
rule, but also have to be ratified according to national rules by the legisla-
ture or by referendum. This implies, that apart from the national govern-
ments, who are engaged in the negotiations, additional players, such as 
citizens, national legislature and national (constitutional) courts come into 
play. Christian Kirchner correctly points out that strict ratification rules 
make, on the one hand, governments’ lives less comfortable, whereas they 
strengthen, on the other hand, the international bargaining position of a 
country. This might lead to a race for ever stricter ratification rules and to 
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an extreme increase in the decision making costs of revising a hybrid con-
stitution. 
The Treaty on European Union provides in Art. 48 TEU for three dif-
ferent revision procedures of the “constitution” of the European Union, the 
ordinary revision procedure, the simplified revision procedure and a gen-
eral bridging clause. However, as Kirchner has convincingly shown, all 
these procedures do not prevent veto players to block a Treaty revision. 
The consequence is the “petrification” of the existing Treaty, which is fur-
ther strengthened by the involvement of a national constitutional court in 
ratification procedures. 
C. 
How can we escape this “petrification trap”? Kirchner identifies two strat-
egies to circumvent the ordinary revision procedure. (1) Ex post, Member 
States, that are going to revise a hybrid constitution, but are blocked by a 
veto player, may conclude a new international Treaty, which is only bind-
ing for the parties of the new Treaty, but not for the veto player. However, 
as Kirchner stresses, problems will arise if the new Treaty is not compati-
ble with the existing hybrid constitution. The parties may be bound by two 
contradicting sets of rules. (2) Ex ante, the parties to the original Treaty 
may agree on opt-out or opt-in provisions, which allow for agreements 
among a subset of all Member States. Examples are Denmark’s and the 
UK’s opt-outs from the third phase of the European Monetary Union, the 
UK’s and Ireland’s opt-out from the Schengen legislation after its inclu-
sion into European Union law with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1998), and 
the UK’s and Ireland’s opt-in regarding Justice and Home Affairs (Sion 
2004; Jensen/Slapin 2012). According to Kirchner, these provisions in-
crease the complexity and the variable costs for the supranational union, 
but lower adaptation costs (compared to a revision of the existing – hybrid 
– constitution). 
The Amsterdam Treaty introduced the possibility of ‘enhanced coopera-
tion’ by a group of Member States, which was modified by the Lisbon 
Treaty (Art. 20 TEU and Arts. 326 – 334 TFEU) and transformed into 
some kind of “general opt-in framework”. Enhanced co-operation has been 
established as an ultima ratio, to allow a subgroup of at least nine Member 
States to intensify integration when there is no consensus among all mem-
ber States to achieve this level of integration. The procedure to trigger en-
hanced co-operation is tough: The Member States concerned have to ad-
dress a request to the Commission, the Commission ‘may’ submit a 
proposal to the Council, the Council and the European Parliament have to 
agree on the proposal. Excluded from enhanced co-operation are fields 
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with exclusive competence of the Union, special provisions apply for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
Christian Kirchner is not convinced that the instrument of enhanced co-
operation provides a way out of the petrification trap. Let us discuss some 
experiences with and the implications of this instrument, to see whether his 
skeptical view is justified. The first time the mechanism of enhanced coop-
eration was used refers to the area of divorce of international couples. 
Since Member States differed a lot on which country’s law should be ap-
plied in case of divorce the European Commission intended to harmonize 
Private International Law accordingly. However, a unanimous agreement 
between all 27 Member States was not feasible, due to the opposition of 
the more liberal Nordic countries. For this reason, Council Regulation 
(EU) No. 1259/2010 of December 20, 2010, authorized 14 Member States 
to proceed with enhanced co-operation in the field of divorce law.1 This 
Regulation applies for divorce petitions brought after June 21, 2012. 
The second example of enhanced co-operation refers to a unitary patent 
protection in the European Union. The European Commission has been 
trying for many years to reduce the enormous translation costs, which 
make patent protection in Europe much more expensive than in the USA or 
Japan: To validate a patent in several Member States it has to be translated 
into the official national languages of all corresponding countries. 2 The 
idea, to submit patent applications in one of the three official languages of 
the European Patent Office (English, French or German) and to translate 
the patent claims into all three official languages, was opposed by Spain 
and Italy. To overcome this stalemate the Commission presented a pro-
posal on enhanced co-operation in the field of unitary patent protection 
among all Member States, except Spain and Italy. Both excluded countries 
challenged the validity of the application of the enhanced co-operation 
procedure in this field before the Court of Justice of the EU. In November 
2012, the final decision on enhanced co-operation is still pending. 
The third example is a very recent one, which has not come into force 
yet. Since there was no unanimous agreement on the European Commis-
sion’s proposal for a Directive on a financial transaction tax, ten Member 
States3 requested to proceed with this tax through enhanced co-operation. 
On October 23, 2012, the Commission adopted a corresponding proposal 
for a Council decision. 
     The crucial question is to what extent enhanced co-operation could be a 
suitable instrument to solve the petrification problem. It has been shown 
                                                          
1
 Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Luxembourg, 
Malta, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia and Spain. 
2
 For more details see Guellec/van Pottelsberghe (2007, 191–196). 
3
 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and 
Spain. 
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that the threat of enhanced co-operation can undermine the veto power of 
each single Member State by deterring inefficient blocking of reforms and 
blackmail of the majority by veto players, if two conditions hold (Berglöf 
et al. 2009): 
1. The formation of a “club in the club” (i.e., enhanced co-operation 
within a subgroup) has to be exempted from unanimous approval. 
2. The “inner club” must impose some negative externalities on the rest 
of the club, or membership of the “inner club” is per se valuable. If this 
condition holds, the members of the “outer club” face an incentive to give 
up their veto against closer co-operation. 
Thus, the option of multispeed integration does not necessarily lead to a 
lack of coherency and the danger of disintegration, but may avoid petrifi-
cation (at least to some extent) in a similar way as a switch from unanimity 
to qualified majority does.4 
The request for enhanced co-operation by a subgroup of Member States 
has typically induced other Member States to participate in the enhanced 
co-operation.5 Member States might be more reluctant to block decisions 
on enhanced co-operation than to block other decisions that directly affect 
all Member States. More research is needed to better understand the eco-
nomics of negotiations on enhanced co-operation. 
D. 
Even though the hybrid constitution of the European Union allows for 
some flexibility, Christian Kirchner is right in his statement that this „con-
stitution”, i.e., primary EU law, is very difficult to change. But does this 
necessarily lead to “petrification”? We have to take into account that high 
costs to change the law (the “constitution”) increase the judicial discretion 
(Voigt 2012). Thus, it is no wonder that the European Court of Justice was 
able to interpret the Treaty in a way far beyond what was expected by the 
Member States as “the masters of the Treaty”, when signing and ratifying 
the Treaty. This judicial discretion helped to remove non-tariff barriers 
between the Member States and even non-discriminatory obstacles to the 
four basic freedoms in a way, which would not have been possible by 
unanimous explicit agreement between all Member States.6 Consequently, 
                                                          
4
 Of course, the instrument of enhanced co-operation is only applicable in one direction, 
towards more integration. It is not applicable, if a subgroup of Member States intends to re-
duce the achieved level of integration. 
5
 In the case of divorce law, originally 10 countries applied for enhanced co-operation, but 
finally 14 countries have been included. In the case of unitary patent protection, the original 
request by 12 Member States has led to a final proposal for enhanced co-operation by 25 
Member States. 
6
 See, for example, Eger/Schäfer 2012, in particular the introduction and chapters 6 and 7. 
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the high decision costs of changing the hybrid constitution, due to the una-
nimity requirement, strengthened another kind of flexibility, i.e., flexibility 
via judicial discretion. It has to be discussed whether this model is charac-
terised by a lack of democracy, i.e., a lack of a presentation of citizens’ 
preferences, compared to the inclusion of national governments and par-
liaments in the decision making process. However, this discussion would 
go beyond what is needed for a comment on the paper presented by Chris-
tian Kirchner. 
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Discussion of Christian Kirchner  




Prof. Oeter stated that he was not convinced that enhanced cooperation 
circumventing the existing framework of rules is an alternative to the im-
possibility theorem. “Treaty making beyond the constitution” suffers from 
the same incentive problems as operating inside the constitutional frame-
work does. The primary law of the European Union is perceived as an ob-
stacle for the achieving results. Some provisions of the primary law that 
make the sanctions of some violations non-automatic, like the fiscal law 
that tries to create some automaticity. Problem of opportunity of the States 
exists since they aim to squeeze out benefits from veto conventions. The 
question is whether this is valuable for the long run or whether another 
constitution is needed. 
Prof. Häberli said that in GATT, consensus is needed every time. Eve-
rything else goes under single-undertaking and it was a condition to join 
the WTO. After 10 years of negotiation, 150 pages of agreements on NA-
MA, industrial tariffs, under the fiction of single undertaking everybody 
has a private application, tailored for everyone, by maintaining a consensus 
basis decision taking for specific decisions. Big countries have a natural 
preference for unanimity. There are two possibilities: Either to have a new 
body, G-20 that directs new situations or to have informal clubs like in 
WTO, called the Green Room, which is not the big members. i.e., African 
countries are represented because they have special sensitivity to industrial 
tariffs. In Switzerland, referendums are seen as a solution to many prob-
lems. A parliamentary decision that has less than 80 percent support has no 
chance to survive. Pragmatic spirit of GATT can be a solution for many 
things. 
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Prof. Fehling announced his four observations; First, he asked which con-
stitutional amendments are talked about stating that there are several sorts 
of amendments, charter of fundamental rights, as an example for a large 
amendment, but it was difficult to achieve and there are amendments that 
are easier than the others. Like reversion of the big constitutional setting, 
but even there if you go step by step there might be a chance not to revise 
the system, but to go step by step in the end it can be a right amount to 
complete change for example the changes regarding the European Parlia-
ment. You have to distinguish between different sorts of constitutional 
amendments. The most difficult thing is to revise the economic model, 
because class interest and other issues play a large role. Secondly he crit i-
cized the principle agent model by being not complex enough. Citizens, 
institutions and the European Union, in reality there is also the effects of 
many interest groups, political parties, representing different interests. The 
paper argues secondary law can be affected by political interests on the 
national level. Not only between the member states and the European Un-
ion, it is also between different political interests and this should be in the 
model. Thirdly, there might be more dynamics in time, when looking at the 
history of the European Union, the window of opportunities; they can 
change the constitution like when there is a big crisis, a pressure from the 
outside. New problems are the ones that lead to the conclusion that at a 
certain amount of time, that new possibilities, constitutional changes, f i-
nancial markets, budget crisis etc. several things would not be possible. 
Lastly, Prof. Fehling asked about the changes about the jurisprudence of 
the court of justice and whether there is a chance to readjust the constitu-
tional framework by a new interpretation of the constitutional provisions. 
It is not impossible that in different times, under different conditions, dif-
ferent interpretations of constitutional provisions would be possible. 
Prof. Benvenisti pointed out that the generalization of points to public 
international law. He suggested that the concept of exit should be intro-
duced into the equation. If the exit option is less costly, then unanimity can 
be overcome by threatening with exit. He declared that he is not sure 
whether exit can be introduced into the European Union. 
Prof. Engert said that if it mitigates the veil of uncertainty, if European 
Union evolves and people know what to expect from the EU, it would not 
mitigate the Principle-Agent Problem. The Principle-Agent Problem helps 
to mitigate distributional struggles related to constitutional changes. Be-
cause the citizens who would lose, are more distant and less informed 
about the consequences for them. The EU is as “political elites” in the 
agency framework, the agents of citizens will be more in favor of the trea-
ties. The agents want it more than the citizens themselves. As concluding 
remarks he stated that to enter into a new agreement if ratification problem 
has the chance of bringing the EU down. If that does not happen, signing 
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parallel treaties are not a way out, because any new treaty would be nego-
tiated in the shadow of the old treaty. States are locked in to the pre-
existing EU constitutional provisions. 
Prof. Voigt referred to the book by Elkins, Ginsburg & Melton about 
the factors that determine the endurance of nation-state constitutions. Prof. 
Voigt pointed out that the difficulty of changing nation-state constitutions 
can be seen as a conscious choice by the drafters, since they want to en-
hance constitutional longevity. He also contributed to the discussion about 
the “veil of uncertainty” by referring to Buchanan & Tullock’s work. 
Those authors do not necessarily rely on incomplete information to make 
their point about the “veil of uncertainty”. Individuals are fully informed 
about their current position in society but assume for a moment that they 
cannot tell what position they will have in the future. Furthermore, Bu-
chanan & Tullock’s formulation of the veil of uncertainty does not include 
agency problems. Instead these authors assume direct democracy, which 
means that citizens decide directly what type of constitution will be cho-
sen, without making reference to an intermediate agent. To include infor-
mation asymmetry between citizens and governments in the choice to mod-
ify constitutions would go beyond Buchan & Tullock’s approach. Prof. 
Voigt also questions if the agent (the government) is necessarily more in-
formed about his future position in society than the principal (the citizens). 
For example, politicians generally experience high career uncertainty be-
cause reelection is always insecure, while the average citizen can probably 
assess future professional prospects more accurately. In his next remark 
Prof. Voigt says that whether a state has a parliamentary or a presidential 
form of government can make a difference for the strategy of a state to-
wards constitutional change at the EU level. Prof. Voigt’s final comment is 
that direct democracy not only has benefits at the domestic level, but 
should also improve a country’s bargaining position at the EU level. The 
question arises why direct democracy is not more widely adopted by Euro-
pean states. 
Prof. Eger said that he is not convinced by the ex-post opportunism 
cannot be mitigated by the enhanced cooperation. There is article 128 on 
the fiscal discipline, with some criteria and relatively weak monitoring. 
Secondary law, and constitutional articles on enhance cooperation, if nine 
or more parties decide they want to get rid of bad monitoring and transfer 
the enforcement power to the EU commission, then it is an enhanced coop-
eration and the constitution lets this. Prof. Oeter declared that this would 
not be possible without making a change in article 128 because the primary 
law has supremacy. 
Prof. Marauhn expressed opinion on two issues. Firstly he referred to 
the role of European Court of Justice. He cited that the paper argues the 
following, while ECJ would be more an element of slowing down the pro-
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cess of change, since it would try to keep up the constitution as doctrinal. 
He questioned the role of the ECJ that has never been as doctrinal as the 
Federal Constitution Court on the ground that its objective has never been 
the law, or the doctrine but the integration process. The ECJ would not 
accept the illegal treatment of the constitution, in light of the overall objec-
tive of the integration process because this may risk a breakdown of the 
integration process and only leaving the alternative to draft a new constitu-
tion. Since ECJ is kind of a political actor on the scene, as the federal con-
stitutional court is, this element should be considered as inserting a little 
bit of dynamics into this analysis to leave some doors open rather than 
making it impossible. He also pointed out the role of national parliament ’s 
stating that they are not the same actor as the nation governments they 
have different positions. He asked how to distinguish their roles. His final 
remark was that the possibility of drafting a new constitution, many prob-
lems in the integration process, still difficult, who is going to reduce the 
number of participants, with a national constitution the area is clear who is 
participating it is clear now, is it equally clear who would draft it, would 
that be the same costs and benefits, if the size is equal, maybe it enhances 
the cooperation if we reduce the number of participants, but is it feasible. 
Prof. Voigt closed the session by quoting a game theorist, stating that no 




Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture:  






“Large-scale acquisition of land by foreign investors” is the correct term 
for a process where the verdict of guilt is often quicker than the examina-
tion. But is there something really new about land grab except in its ex-
tent? In comparison with colonial and post-colonial plantation operations, 
should foreign investors today behave differently? We generally accept 
coffee and banana exports as pro-growth and pro-development, just as for 
cars, beef and insurance. What then is wrong with an investment contract 
allowing the holder to buy a farm and to export wheat to Saudi Arabia, or 
soybeans and maize as cattle feed to Korea, or to plant and process sugar 
cane and palm oil into ethanol for Europe and China? Assuming their land 
acquisition was legal, should foreigners respect more than investment con-
tracts and national legislation? And why would they not take advantage of 
the legal protection offered by international investment law and treaties, 
not to speak of concessional finance, infrastructure and technical coopera-
tion by a development bank, or the tax holidays offered by the host state? 
Remember Milton Friedman’s often-quoted quip: “The business of busi-
ness is business!”1 And why would the governments signing those con-
tracts not know whether and which foreign investment projects are best for 
their country, and how to attract them? 
Besides, foreign investors are not the only land grabbers. There are 
many similar practices by absentee landowners in South America or South 
Asia, or by Israeli settlers in occupied Palestinian territories. 
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This chapter tries to show that land grab, where it occurs, is not only yet 
another symptom of regulatory failures at the national level and a lack of 
corporate social responsibility by certain private actors. National govern-
ance is clearly the most important factor. Nonetheless, I submit that there 
is an international dimension involving investor home states in various 
capacities. The implication is that land grab is not solely a question wheth-
er a particular investment contract is legal or not. 
Since about 2008, advocacy groups have drawn attention to numerous 
cases of what they consider as land acquisitions with a doubtful legal basis, 
especially in so-called weak states. Economic studies as far back as 1989 
have shown the advantages and the intrinsic distortions of agricultural FDI 
in a food security perspective (Drèze and Sen 1989) and taking into ac-
count variables such as tenancy, dualistic land ownership distributions, 
social divisions, and anti-small farmer biased land reforms in poor coun-
tries (Binswanger, Deininger and Feder 1993). Since then, numerous im-
pact modelling and assessment studies have been conducted, often with the 
World Bank economic research programme, and in a land governance 
framework (Deininger, Selod and Burns 2011). A recent modelling study 
concludes that local populations can be better off with agricultural FDI if 
their government has the necessary negotiating capacity and willingness, 
and if alternative sources of income are available at a sufficient level of 
remuneration (Dessy et al. 2011, p. 28). 
Legal scholars and policy makers lag far behind. The numerous new 
proposals for codes of conduct, voluntary guidelines and principles for 
responsible agricultural investment are typically less than three years old, 
and they tend to focus on the national dimension of land grab. This chapter 
deals with legal issues which seem to have largely escaped the attention of 
both human rights lawyers and, especially, of investment lawyers. It ad-
dresses this fragmentation between different legal disciplines, rules, and 
policies, by asking two basic questions: (i) Do governments and parlia-
ments in investor home countries have any responsibility in respect of the 
behaviour of their investors abroad? (ii) What should they and internation-
al regulators do, if anything? 
B. What is the food security issue here? 
I am addressing these questions from a food security vantage point. Food 
security as a scientific and a policy subject has been defined in several 
different ways over the last few decades. The present, generally accepted 
definition for policy purposes was laid down in 2001 in the “State of Food 
Insecurity” Report (FAO 2002): 
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Food security [is] a situation that exists when all people, at all times, have physical, 
social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their 
dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. 
The emphasis here is on consumption and on access to food for all people, 
as already outlined by Amartya Sen in his path-breaking book on poverty 
and famines (Sen 1981). However, this definition omits the two other 
components of food security, besides production, i.e., trade and invest-
ment.2 
For the two questions examined here it is important to point out that 
food security has totally different connotations at the household, national 
and global levels. Agricultural FDI can increase global food security. A 
recent econometric study confirms OECD and FAO models showing that, 
while not a panacea to reduce high cereal prices, FDI will bring about sub-
stantially lower food prices when expanding agricultural land area, and 
thus increase national food security in host countries (Kappel et al. 2012 p.  
19). At the same time agricultural FDI can also impair food availability at 
the local level. Similarly, protection of small farmers may improve their 
own food security but also mean higher food prices for poor urban house-
holds. As shown in a national court case of (refused) tariff protection for 
the Ghanaian poultry industry, this dilemma extends to the processing 
stage (Gathii 2012 p. 103s). The lack of multilateral disciplines on agricul-
tural subsidies is certainly not helping small farmers in poor countries to 
compete. This explains why trade liberalisation (and food aid) is seen as 
acting to the detriment of West African rice farmers, because it “has not 
only undermined the capacity of developing-country farmers to expand, 
but has made the future of small-holder farmers worse, as it serves to in-
tensify pre-existing problems of poverty, trade inequity and inequality” 
(Aniekwe 2010 p. 4.6.1). 
The approach chosen for the legal analysis of agricultural FDI is not a 
search for a higher “moral ground” than profit-maximising return-on-
investment considerations. I am not even arguing that food security is what 
economists call a public good which can only be produced with govern-
ment intervention. Nonetheless, agricultural FDI does relate to food securi-
ty as per the above definition, and land grab is a concern which came to the 
forefront in the context of the international food crisis in the years 2007–
08. As a matter of fact, every government in the world recognises food 
security as a priority policy objective, often based on a constitutional man-
date, albeit with very different and sometimes beggar-thy-neighbour im-
                                                 
2
 An interesting proposal has recently been made for an Index of National Food 
Security that may be readily measured and related to agricultural trade policies and the 
WTO, informing policy makers and the public debate alike. Cf. Daniel A. Sumner and 
Frank H. Buck, Agricultural trade policy and food security, University of California (paper 
on file with author). 
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plementation measures. While this is not the topic of this chapter, it is cer-
tainly noteworthy that the recent food crisis triggered a flurry of intergov-
ernmental activities at all levels, albeit without any rules changes, and per-
haps tellingly at the same time as the Doha Round negotiations collapsed 
(Häberli 2012a, p. 77). 
This was not the first food crisis in history, nor was it the biggest  global 
hunger crisis. But the unique combination of structural and cyclical factors 
which caused a dramatic world market price increase for many basic food 
items also triggered what many economists now consider as a reversal of 
the decade-old downward trend of agricultural commodity prices. In 2011, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
and Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) reiterated their earlier as-
sessment that “agricultural commodity prices in real terms are likely to 
remain on a higher plateau during the next decade compared to the previ-
ous decade”; somewhat surprisingly they also warned that “[p]rolonged 
periods of high prices could make the achievement of global food security 
goals more difficult, putting poor consumers at a higher risk of malnutri-
tion” (OECD/FAO 2011, p. 14). Indeed, looking at these and other often 
self-contradictory political statements, including by the World Bank and 
by NGOs, Swinnen and Squicciarini have called for a “more nuanced de-
bate on how prices and policies affect food security; neither high nor low 
prices are panaceas” (2012, p. 405). 
As a matter of fact, higher prices were good news for efficient farmers 
in Australia and Argentina who immediately responded with production 
increases. However, the first victims were poor consumers in Cairo who 
for decades had been accustomed to relying on dumped wheat imports, at 
prices which Egyptian farmers could never compete with. 
Unfortunately, and this is not new, but relevant for my research ques-
tion, poor farmers in many countries were unable to benefit because the 
price increases did not reach them, or because they lacked what is called 
supply response capacity. In these countries this led first to a further in-
crease in the food bill. Secondly, land owned by poor and subsistence 
farmers unable even to feed themselves became even more attractive for 
land grabbers endowed with capital, technologies, and access to new mar-
kets. As pointed out above, land grab is not a phenomenon limited to for-
eign investors, because some nationals (in extreme cases, generals) partici-
pate in this race for profitable land deals; nor does it always imply a formal 
land purchase, because land often is only leased for a period of 10, 20 or 
99 years; contract farming is yet another form with different food security 
implications. These facts have to be kept in mind even though this chapter 
only refers to foreign and direct investment (FDI) in agriculture. 
     The growing productivity and profitability gap between subsistence 
farmers and cash croppers is probably the main cause for the accelerating 
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land ownership changes. An improving FDI climate and increasing risk-
taking by investors scouring the world for farmland are additional factors. 
This makes for even more difficult answers on how to save local farmers 
without at the same time increasing the food bill, especially when put in a 
dynamic perspective of rapid demographic changes and growing urbanisa-
tion, not to speak of climate change. For instance, it is no longer clear that 
cooperatives of various types are the best means to overcome the organisa-
tional handicaps of remote areas and small producers. Some governments 
have started to realise the impediment which traditional and communal 
structures represent for innovation and modernisation. For instance, the 
time-honoured ejidos, a type of communal land ownership in Mexico, have 
recently been described as a reason for low yields and for insufficient in-
vestment and capital, basically for lack of securitised collateral.
3
 A fact 
which seems obvious but which is often neglected in discussions on how 
small farmers should organise is that a lack of reward for efficiency will 
not increase food security. 
The only fact which is clear in this complex debate is that, in terms of 
its impact on food security, FDI in agriculture means different things to 
different people. Moreover, governments, international organisations, sci-
entists, and private operators use very different premises and criteria when 
they look at FDI from a food security perspective. 
Governments at all times have sought to attract FDI as such. Many con-
sider agricultural FDI as a component of their food security equation. Tra-
ditional investment issues such as protection, promotion, expropriation and 
compensation may look different in this perspective. What matters here is 
which regulatory framework relating to FDI will best support national food 
security defined in a large sense. Agricultural investment projects can (but 
will not automatically) contribute to national food security even if they are 
export-oriented or if they produce biofuels, feed crops, natural rubber or 
cotton. 
Many intergovernmental organisations as well as the G8 and the G20 
have adopted numerous resolutions and decisions aiming at increasing 
food security through more research and investment, local empowerment, 
and sustainable agriculture.4 They recognise that all the world’s farmers 
can only feed this world if production, trade, research and investment 
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 Opinion expressed by the Mexican Minister for Agriculture, Francisco Mayorga, in 
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 3 February 2012, p. 7. 
4
 See, for instance, the interagency report by a dozen international organisations 
submitted on 12 June 2012 to the Mexican Presidency of the G20 “Sustainable 
Agricultural Productivity Growth and Bridging the Gap for Small-Family Farms”. It 
addresses 10 recommendations to the G20, in particular with regards to productivity 
improvements for small farms, including throiugh FDI. The report can be found at 
http://www.fao.org/economic/g20/en/ (accessed 13 June 2012). 
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(whether domestic or foreign) increase substantially. It has also been rec-
ognised that trade becomes even more important in a climate change per-
spective. WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy argues that despite the “car-
bon footprint” of international transportation, trade in food “becomes an 




Agronomists and other natural scientists tell us that the earth can feed 
nine and more billion people. They agree that the challenge is enormous, 
especially in a dynamic context of climate change, increasing soil erosion 
and water scarcity. Most scientists and international organisations includ-
ing the FAO also consider that substantial productivity, yield and post-
harvest improvements are necessary, and that production, processing and 
consumption patterns and technologies throughout the food chain have to 
change. The potential of biotechnology and of organic agriculture is hotly 
debated, albeit often by bystanders in food secure countries, and opinions 
diverge on the production potential of small farmers.
6
 Even food giant 
Brazil has regions exposed to chronic hunger, and millions of people living 
in abject urban poverty. Nonetheless, there seems to be general agreement 
that this world can feed itself even as two billion “vegetarians by default” 
in China and India become richer and start to eat meat regularly – a partic-
ularly dramatic development for global food security these new consumer 
habits require a 5 to 9-fold increase of cereals and oilseed production, not 
to mention the also increasing water requirements and greenhouse gas pro-
duction. 
Social scientists look at broader issues as well. Recent history confirms 
that hunger is what Nobel Prize winner Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze were 
already calling a “multi-headed monster” back in 1989 (Drèze and Sen, 
1989, p. 15). More recently, economists have learned that they also have to 
look at governance issues, way beyond traditional offer and demand equa-
tions (Cotula 2012, p. 674). They also look at related trade issues such as 
price volatility, risk management and export restrictions (Anderson and 
Nelgen 2011, p. 37; Karapinar 2012, p. 11). Most scientists also agree that 
the additional production cannot take place where it is most needed, and 
that most countries cannot be self-sufficient. This is where appropriate 
trade rules are needed to ensure that food can flow to where it is most 
needed. 
Legal analysts face the problem that investment, trade, and human 
rights lawyers speak different languages, that they are often unaware of the 
                                                 
5
 Speech at The Economist Conference “Feeding the World” on 8 February 2012 in 
Geneva, available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/sppl216_e.htm accessed 
on 14 February 2012. 
6
 Cf. Georg Keckl in Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 31 January 2012, arguing that agricultural 
land was never as fertile, and that yields have never been higher than today. 
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treaty obligations and the various facets of national legislation of investor 
home states, and that the policy instruments in this area are even more 
fragmented than elsewhere. Land grabbing occurs especially in weak 
states. Much of it is a result of regulatory failures and corruption at the 
national level and many legal scholars describe these basic governance 
problems. Land tenure seems to be the biggest single problem. In Gabon, 
Benin and many other countries only 1% of agricultural land is registered 
with titles for individual landowners and ancestral communities.  Land and 
ownership mapping prior to registration of land titles acquires a new sense 
of urgency in the face of land grabbing. Communal land tenure is especial-
ly vulnerable, even where it is in principle recognised in national constitu-
tions. Nepal, Cambodia, and the Philippines regulate by various means 
both the granting of permanent titles to local indigenous communities, and 
delegated management where public land and natural resources are en-
trusted to local communities for a period of time (Andersen 2011 p. 26). In 
both cases access to such land by non-indigenous people raises particular 
issues. An example with a negative impact even on local food security is 
the well-studied “inalienability concept” in war-torn Sierra Leone where 
vast areas of land are possessed by customary landholders but unrented, 
unsold and uncultivated, partly because both non-lineage descendants and 
foreigners are prohibited from growing even trees for profit, with a clearly 
negative impact on national food security (Unruh 2008, p. 103). At the 
same time, Sierra Leone is also a country with an ambitious but also con-
troversial biofuels project, presented at the Annual World Bank Confer-
ence on Land and Poverty, on 25 April 2012, by the Geneva-based compa-
ny Addax & Oryx.7 Regardless of these complexities, whereas agricultural 
land in all countries is never ownerless, it seems clear that much is under-
utilised, and even China has fallow land. Africa is the continent with the 
largest unused farm land surface. Violations of non-registered or commu-
nal land rights, the legal protection of women farmers, or “water grab-
bing”, are clearly issues which must be solved at the national level. As is 
the case, for instance, for child labour, implementation of legislation and 
its administrative and judicial enforcement are often even bigger problems. 
With very few exceptions, notably Cotula, Spieldoch and Murphy, and 
Unruh, none of the legal studies published on agricultural FDI deal with 
the international dimensions of the problem which are the subject of this 
chapter. 
Naturally, private operators look first at the economic and technical 
feasibility of an agricultural investment project. To varying degrees they 
also take other factors into account, such as national legislation, govern-
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 See http://www.landandpoverty.com/agenda/thematic-sessions-day3.html accessed 1 
June 2012. 
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ance, fiscal incentives, and reputation. Their exports may increase econom-
ic growth, GDP and government revenues. They may also create new jobs, 
including for the former landowners, bring new technologies for produc-
tion and processing, and increase yields and productivity in the whole sec-
tor. Nonetheless, their contribution to national food security is, at best, 
incidental. Because they mostly produce for exports their investment may 
be positive for global food security, but small or nil for host country food 
security except where they provide the foreign exchange necessary to buy 
cheaper food abroad. On the negative side, there are cases of hit-and-run 
operations with short-term land leases and which are likely to cease after 
the expiry of fiscal incentives. Degraded soils, erosion, deforestation, and 
depletion of groundwater are more likely to result from such investments 
than jobs and government revenues. In fact, only investors intending to 
stay may want to ensure that their investment responds to sustainable agri-
culture principles. Under these circumstances, land sales and long leases 
with sustainability provisions lead to more national food security than tax 
holidays and short-term operations with little if any vertical integration.  
The question then would seem to be whether national food security in 
its multifaceted context would be better or worse off without FDI. The 
counterfactual, put simply, would be a comprehensive ex ante/ex post im-
pact assessment of an investment project, taking all relevant factors into 
account, including available alternatives and public interest. As pointed out 
by Laarni Escresa in this book, this involves numerous issues such as price 
bubbles and productivity increases through FDI, as well as the existence or 
absence of land titles which in turn impacts on situation rents and raises 
the “fair price” question. 
The following sections return to the international dimensions of land 
grab: Section C analyses regulatory deficiencies in investor home states. 
Section D describes the relevant international treaty provisions. Section E 
concludes with suggestions for further research and for initial policy 
changes. 
C. Regulatory deficiencies in investor home states  
and international investment and trade law 
The legal situation was simpler in colonial times, albeit nowhere uniform. 
Just about everywhere, land ownership was regulated and enforced by the 
colonial powers. After independence, however, new foreign investments in 
most countries went into manufacturing. With some notable exceptions of 
large holdings in foreign hands, farm ownership was with nationals and 
naturalised colonials, even though foreign traders and powers continued to 
exercise considerable influence on the local markets and on production 
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patterns (Cotula 2012, p. 661). Even today, globally operating international 
food companies typically abstain from actually buying farm land in the 
countries where they invest in factories, but many have increased vertical 
integration by procuring inputs from contract farmers and by extending 
technical assistance to them in order to raise production standards. 
The sudden increase of FDI in recent years came as a surprise to many. 
As recently as 2008 the World Bank was still complaining about a lack of 
investment in agriculture over the preceding decades and even the relative 
decline of official development assistance for agricultural projects; it rue-
fully acknowledged its own, decade-long lack of engagement (IBRD 2008 
p. 16). Only two years later, on the basis of case studies of 19 projects in 
the field, it noted a rapid increase of local and foreign investment, but of-
ten at the cost of environmental and social concerns. This detailed report 
concluded by calling for an “Evidence-Based Multistakeholder Approach” 
(IBRD 2010 p. 141).  
At the non-governmental level, a number of initiatives were undertaken 
as a response to land grab. For instance, in 2010 experts from a number of 
specialised non-governmental organisations (NGOs) called for human 
rights impact assessments (HRIA)8 for trade and investment agreements 
(Berne Declaration et al. 2010).9 A similar expert meeting in 2011 worked 
on transparency and accountability tools in agricultural FDI (Global Wit-
ness 2011). Also in 2011, the Tirana Declaration adopted by the Interna-
tional Land Coalition (ILC) denounced “all forms of land grabbing, wheth-
er international or national” and called for  
“models of investment in agriculture and other rural land-based activities that are 
socially, economically and environmentally sustainable and that reduce poverty and 
hunger” (ILC 2011a). 
The actual extent of this new phenomenon remained unclear for some time. 
As recently as 2009 the best available data on the extent of land grab were 
mere estimates based on media reports and accompanied by big caveats: 
                                                 
8
 HRIAs are used, inter alia, by the Scottish Human Rights Commission and the 
Canadian “Rights & Democracy” (International Centre for Human Rights and 
Democratic Development) for investments. The latter has issued a “step by step guide to 
assess the impact of foreign investments on human rights” (found at http://www.dd-
rd.org/site/_PDF/publications/Getting-it-right_HRIA.pdf accessed 1 June 2012). 
According to Rights & Democracy, it is a tool by which “local civil society organisations 
can assess the specific human rights impacts of foreign investment projects on local 
communities and seek appropriate remedies. It is primarily an ex post assessment tool.” 
9
 The background paper for this expert group meeting was presented by James 
Harrison from the University of Warwick School of Law where a human rights impact 
assessment tool was developed for a variety of fields (cf. Harrison, James (2011). 
Human rights measurement: reflections on the current practice and future potential of 
human rights impact assessment, 3(2) Journal of Human Rights Practice, 162–187 
(1757–9619)). 
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“Well-documented examples are scarce, details on the deals are often 
murky, and some reports are contradictory” (IFPRI 2009). Today there is 
more reliable information. A recent ILC report finds that between 2000 
and 2011, large-scale land acquisitions increased by 203 million hectares 
globally – a huge figure by all accounts (Anseeuw et al. 2012a).10 Also, a 
land matrix established by ILC estimates that 22% of this newly acquired 
land, mainly in Africa and Asia, is used for mining, tourism, industry and 
forestry, 58% for biofuels production, and only 20% for food production 
(Anseeuw et al. 2012b). Lorenzo Cotula (2012) provides a good political 
economy analysis of the international drivers and implications of the 
“global land rush”. A few sample farming contracts are available on a 
FAO-operated website.11 
Many cases attract the attention of advocacy groups, and considerable 
media coverage. Allegations of corruption and illegal land acquisition with 
the active connivance of national and local authorities abound, more often 
than not with a credible background. Dispossessions of holders of non-
registered or communal land rights make for headlines and opposition by 
concerned NGOs on behalf of the rural poor.12 The Daewoo vs. Madagas-
car story is only one of the better-known early cases which according to 
some NGO sources has led to the toppling of the government and to in-
creased civil strife in that country.13 The Oakland Institute has published a 
series of country reports called Understanding Investment Deals in Afri-
ca.14 Other studies quantify and describe the issue in a national, regional 
and global governance perspective (ILC 2011b). 
Although a fairly accurate picture of the increasing number of invest-
ment projects, and a number of plausible cases of actual, illegal land grab 
have now been made public, there still is no overview of all investments 
actually carried out, let alone of their impact. One difficulty in analysing 
land grab and for carrying out independent impact assessments is the fact 
that most investment contracts are not in the public domain.15 Therefore the 
                                                 
10
 By way of comparison, Germany has 17m hectares of farmland, corresponding to 
47% of its territory (Source: Wikipedia accessed on 29 May 2012 http://de.wikiped 
ia.org/w/index.php?title=Landwirtschaft&stable=1). 
11
 Contract Farming Resource Centre, Toolkit available at http://www.fao.org/ag/ 
ags/contract-farming/toolkit/en/. For a 2009 contract farming investment by the Indian 
company Varun in Madagascar see http://farmlandgrab.org/2849 both accessed on 11 
June 2012. 
12
 Financial Times, 8 September 2010. 
13
 Tom Burgis and Javier Blas. Madagascar Scraps Daewoo Farm Deal, in Financial 
Times, 18 March 2009. This case is also described by Meinzen-Dick and Markelova 
(2009, p. 76). 
14
 See, for instance, Oakland Institute 2011. 
15
 The situation is somewhat more transparent for mining contracts. For agricultural 
investments, according to Cotula (2011) all contracts in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo were also available online, but at the time of writing this was no  longer the case. 
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extent of forced displacements of local farmers and expropriation compen-
sation offered (or refused) remains totally unclear, and the same is true for 
the social and environmental damage which may have been caused by 
large agricultural projects. Hence an exact measurement of the actual ex-
tent of land grab – whatever its definition – is simply not possible. Be-
sides, quite a few cases concern domestic investment projects. Others in-
volve investors from neighbouring countries conducting large projects with 
allegedly illegal means. Moreover, many such projects are implemented by 
way of land leases, or contract farming, rather than land acquisitions. The 
size of some operations can be large but they may also be relatively small, 
with perhaps only 400 hectares involved. In other words, while the rapidly 
increasing acquisition of farmland is evident, the extent of (illegal) land 
grab remains unclear, except that it seems not to be limited to “large” and 
“foreign” investors as narrowly defined. 
The fuzzy borders of the land grab phenomenon and the uncertainties 
and imprecision regarding its extent are but one difficulty for a scientific 
analysis of its international implications. The human rights and develop-
ment aspects are being scrutinised by a number of researchers and in dif-
ferent fora. However, a reliable analysis from a food security perspective 
of the relevant international and national legal investment framework is so 
far largely absent. 
What can then be said about investment treaties and national legislation 
applying to agriculture? 
It appears that even modern versions of regional and bilateral invest-
ment treaties (BITs) do not contain specific provisions on agricultural land 
purchases. The rights and obligations applying, respectively, to investors 
and states have evolved, especially in non-European BITs, but it has been 
pointed out that most of this “rebalancing” has been “limited  to reformulat-
ing core obligations, like national treatment and prohibitions on expropria-
tion without compensation, and adding exceptions to preserve host state 
policy-making flexibility in specific areas” (VanDuzer 2010, p. 2). 
A notable “European” innovation addressing the development impact of 
FDI is Article 72 of the EC – CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agree-
ment which obliges the parties to ensure, among others that investors 
“establish and maintain, where appropriate, local community liaison processes, espe-
cially in projects involving extensive natural resource-based activities, in so far that 
they do not nullify or impair the benefits accruing to the other Party under the terms 
of a specific commitment.” 
Such provisions laying down concrete obligations relating to the develop-
ment impact of foreign investment are still new, and practical experience is 
therefore still lacking. Moreover, most of the large projects reported as 
land grab cases take place in countries without BITs. 
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In addition, in most cases there is an investment contract which presuma-
bly (without being published) is completely legal i.e., does not violate any 
national laws. It has been agreed between a private company or a public 
entity (perhaps a sovereign wealth fund) and a competent national authori-
ty, often times with accompanying contractual commitments, for example, 
for infrastructure, health and education facilities, and training components. 
Such comprehensive investment agreements are decidedly difficult to as-
sess – the more so since in reality they do not always seem to fully materi-
alise. Needless to say, many governments and local authorities are wary of 
foreigners telling them how to pursue their food security objectives and 
farm policies, or how to manage their natural resources. 
This situation both attracts international criticism and makes it difficult. 
Lack of evidence and of transparency are one problem. Investors point out 
the competitive situation they find themselves in and that their projects 
comprise roads, schools, hospitals, technology transfer and technical assis-
tance. How can such package deals, which may or may not be fully imple-
mented, be analysed, especially in the absence of an agreed standard for 
comprehensive impact assessments? Does this mean that international 
rules and treaties neither should nor could offer any remedy? 
An additional difficulty lies in the so-called stabilisation provisions 
contained in a number of investment contracts, by which governments 
commit not to increase for instance social or environmental standards dur-
ing a project’s lifetime (Cotula 2011, p. 40; Mann 2011, p. 7). While such 
provisions can improve the investment climate, they are also seen as a case 
of regulatory chill possibly even condoning land grab. 
The main question examined here is the role played by home govern-
ments in land grab cases. Can home states fight corruption abroad, and yet 
close their eyes if their companies violate human rights or lastingly dam-
age the environment in their operations abroad? How could they act unilat-
erally, and as treaty-makers? Can they, for instance, ask for a comprehen-
sive impact assessment of a large investment project, or for a copy of an 
investment contract? If they could, should they then be satisfied with a 
positive feasibility study result showing an overall positive national wel-
fare increase? In such cases the “only” question would be whether land-
owners are adequately compensated, rather like they would be for a rail-
way or another infrastructure project anywhere in the world, and whether 
access to courts is possible and effective. But is that a matter for involve-
ment of foreign governments? As already pointed out, international in-
vestment rules do not foresee such situations, and investor home states can 
thus argue that they have neither an obligation nor the necessary legal in-
struments to intervene where land grab is claimed or suspected. Do home 
states hence bear no responsibility for the behaviour of private companies 
abroad? In 2006, Anne van Aaken submitted that “investment law must 
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evolve and be interpreted consistently with international law, including 
human rights law, multilateral environmental treaties and WTO law.”  She 
also pointed out that “both investment hawks as well as critics of 'neo-
liberal’ investment law, make a strong argument for applying special areas 
of international law also to investment law; though both sides focus on 
different law: one side on WTO law, the other side on multilateral envi-
ronmental treaties, human rights, etc.” (van Aaken 2006, pp. 92 and 94). I 
have argued elsewhere that the international legal framework applying, 
respectively, to food security, trade, and investment, appears like a particu-
larly flagrant case of rules fragmentation (Häberli 2012a and 2012b). 
Inasmuch as foreign investors often enjoy better treatment than national 
ones, what we have here is a case of overprotection and under-regulation. 
Seen from this angle, land grab prevention through inaction is more than a 
problem of governance and government ethics – even where an investor 
operates totally independently and without any support from its home 
state. Hence the argument has been made that home states have responsi-
bilities that go beyond anti-corruption regulations in a global food security 
perspective (Richardson 2011, p. 44). 
There is more. A closer look at today’s realities shows that , in one way 
or another, governments and international lending agencies are increasing-
ly and directly involved. They may be providing technical assistance, vo-
cational training, technology transfer and infrastructure through their de-
velopment agencies or concessional finance through a development bank, 
in addition to offering the classical panoply of investment protection and 
promotion to their nationals. Arguably, a sovereign wealth fund investing 
in land would also be liable for the compatibility of its operations with the 
international obligations of its state owner. Under such circumstances the 
international land grab responsibility acquires a new dimension. 
A comparable example could be the export risk guarantee schemes op-
erated by most developed and by some developing countries. In most of 
these schemes the competent authorities are increasingly obliged by their 
constituents to look carefully at the social and environmental implications 
of, say, a large dam project before they can approve a guarantee for the 
political risks involved. 
It is submitted here that FDI promotion and protection by home states 
raise questions which so far have escaped both national regulators and in-
vestment treaty makers. As will be shown below, each country has interna-
tional obligations in the field of food security. This means that investment 
promotion and protection, regardless of their impact on food security, indi-
cate a lack of government coherence, to say the least, if not a violation of 
relevant international law provisions. As mentioned above, traditional in-
ternational investment treaties are still almost exclusively aimed at inves-
tor protection, promotion, and compensation in cases of discrimination and 
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expropriation. The more than 3,000 BITs and investment chapters con-
tained in regional trade agreements make no mention of specific situations 
relating to agricultural FDI. So far there seem to be no investment dispute 
settlement cases directly involving land grab. 
Besides, potential problems in this context also lie in the applicable 
multilateral trade rules subscribed to by the same home and host states. For 
instance, WTO rules prevent the application of different import tariffs for 
more or less sustainable production, or for the processing of biofuels; at 
the same time, production subsidies for biofuels largely escape trade disci-
plines even though they distort investment and competition with non-
subsidised supplies from other countries (Cotula 2012 p. 668; Häberli 
2012b p. 212). Moreover, import licensing conditions differentiating be-
tween biofuels production methods imposed by developed countries and by 
the European Union may conflict with the “like product” rules laid down 
under the national treatment provision in Article III of the GATT 1994. 
Another example where trade and investment rules may collide with the 
right to food are export restrictions on food crops in order to ensure ade-
quate food supplies to a state’s own population. While it is generally 
agreed that such export restrictions are in most cases self-defeating, there 
might be situations where export restrictions are the only available tool 
against trade measures taken by another country. Where such policies are 
adopted by a host country despite the investment agreement signed with a 
foreign investor and a BIT, this might require a more differentiated legal 
base under GATT Article XI, able to trump, with an appropriate compen-
sation mechanism, those contractual commitments. 
D. International legal provisions relevant to land grab 
As indicated in the introduction, the 2007–08 food crisis led to a flurry of 
intergovernmental initiatives and new standards for food security im-
provements. Responsible Agricultural Investment Principles have been 
adopted by the competent intergovernmental organisations (FAO et al 
2010). The OECD guidelines for multinational investors were amended on 
25 May 2011 by the Declaration on International Investment and Multina-
tional Enterprises. The International Finance Corporation further devel-
oped its 2006 performance standard in respect of Land Acquisition and 
Involuntary Resettlement (IFC 2006; IFC 2012). Very recently, the FAO 
adopted Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of 
Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security 
(FAO 2012). The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
adopted an Investment Facilitation Compact for sound investment rules 
and principles, stating that “the sensitive issue of access to land requires 
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careful balancing of the rights and obligation of agricultural investors” 
(UNCTAD 2012, p. 21). Earlier on, the United Nations Global Compact 
was launched in July 2000; today it is the world’s largest corporate respon-
sibility initiative, with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of 
human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption.16 
The normative value of these instruments varies and quite a few are yet 
to become operational. I have described them in another publication, also 
showing how they relate to the fundamental texts of all three “book” rel i-
gions Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Häberli 2012c). Put into a historical 
context, they find their origins in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (1948) which also gave rise to a number of UN treaties.  
The conceptual basis for all these instruments is the International Cove-
nant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR 1966). It has been 
ratified by 160 governments. In respect of what today is called the right to 
food (R2F), Art.11/2 specifies that: 
‘The States Parties to the present Covenant, recognizing the fundamental right of 
everyone to be free from hunger, shall take, individually and through international 
co-operation, the measures, including specific programmes, which are needed: 
(a) To improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by mak-
ing full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the 
principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a 
way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources ;  
(b) Taking into account the problems of both food-importing and food-exporting 




This provision constitutes a legal obligation for all states to take R2F-
related action. It is clearly not limited to the territory of a signatory state. 
Unfortunately it still fails to inform investment policies and treaties rele-
vant for food security. 
FDI can be seen as a means to “achieve the most efficient development 
and utilization of natural resources” for the R2F, as expressed in the 
ICESCR. This is where the obligation of home states to take “positive ac-
tion” kicks in. In other words, a fresh look at the BITs signed by home 
states is warranted, including investment chapters contained in regional 
trade agreements. The main thrust of these provisions is to make FDI more 
                                                 
16
 According to the Global Compact’s website, 127 companies and 84 non-business 
stakeholders joined the Global Compact in April 2012, while 115 companies were 
delisted for failing to communicate on progress. The total figures as of 30 April 2012 
were as follows: (1) Business participants: 6,946 (2) Non-business participants: 3,269 (3) 
Communications on Progress (COPs) submitted: 15,060 (4) Delisted business 
participants: 3,402. See http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsAndEvents/UNGC_bu 
lletin/2012_05_01.html accessed 1 June 2012. 
17
 Adopted by UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966; 
entry into force 3 January 1976 (emphasis added). 
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attractive by ensuring investor rights – especially in countries with weak 
legal systems. However, it is precisely in such countries that the recent 
wave of agricultural investment has shown the shortcomings criticised 
even by the World Bank, and which these BITs clearly fail to remedy. To 
take one example, if a foreign investor is being sued, or expropriated, by a 
successor government claiming invalidity of an earlier investment contract 
because of corruption, that investor might obtain protection under a BIT or 
under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of Other States which entered into force on October 
14, 1966 (ICSID 1966). The chances are that such an investor would ob-
tain a compensation award even where an investment project had actually 
evicted small farmers against their rights and wills. 
The first step for home governments accepting their international human 
rights obligations would thus be to engage in a cross-examination among 
the different agencies with a regulatory impact on FDI and food security. 
This is not only a case for human rights and development agencies, and 
delegations to a dozen different intergovernmental institutions involved in 
food security issues. Still other agencies represent their countries on the 
governing boards of development banks where concessional financing for 
investment projects is available, in investor-state dispute settlement. There 
are investment insurance mechanisms with state involvement. Last but not 
least many food security aspects have so far escaped WTO Member repre-
sentatives and negotiators (de Schoutter 2011, p. 2). 
It seems clear that for large-scale agricultural land acquisitions investor 
host states alone cannot fulfil their R2F obligations without the coopera-
tion and support of home states. What is necessary in that perspective is a 
food security impact assessment of all agricultural FDI projects. Such an 
assessment can only take place with the active concurrence of the home 
state, regardless of the actual role played in a concrete case. 
E. Conclusions 
Large-scale land acquisitions are a recent phenomenon which has already 
been quite well documented and described by economists and other schol-
ars, and not least by advocacy groups. However, legal studies especially of 
the international issues of agricultural FDI are still virtually non-existent. 
This makes allegations of the illegality of these acquisitions (land grab) so 
much easier. Much more scientific analytical and empirical research on the 
questions and issues outlined in this paper is thus necessary, and urgent.  
Meanwhile, it seems clear that investor home states and international 
organisations cannot remain aloof. I consider two lines of action to be nec-
essary. 
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First, governments must respect the general public international law prin-
ciple, going back to Hippocrates, to (at least) “do no harm” (primum non 
nocere). This obligation is already quite well established in international 
environmental case law.18 The “responsibility to protect” would be espe-
cially big where governments guarantee or otherwise promote such in-
vestments through national or international investment credits, develop-
ment projects for infrastructure or training, and insurance guarantees. 
National legislation and commitments to fight corruption abroad are not 
sufficient. As a minimum, home states must look into allegations that their 
investors may have misused a “weak state” situation and taken possession 
of agricultural land without full compensation of previous owners, or that 
they might conduct unsustainable operations with resultant land degrada-
tion, soil erosion and encroachment on neighbouring lands and water 
rights. 
Secondly, the obligation to act exists independently of a direct or indi-
rect home state involvement in a particular investment project. It is based 
on international human, social and economic rights and the corresponding 
treaty obligations which these same states have ratified. Hence, interna-
tional investment treaties and trade rules must be re-examined for their 
public interest relevance in general and, in particular, for their impact on 
food security. An appropriate legal basis would be the introduction in in-
vestment treaties of a public interest clause. Such a clause would need to 
be clearly related to investor behaviour and go beyond the general interna-
tional law principles of good faith and fair and equitable treatment, or the 
escape clauses found in some BITs of the United States of America. For 
agricultural investments, such a clause should for instance allow an in-
vestment dispute arbitrator to deny BIT protection for an investment con-
tract obtained through massive and evidenced corruption, or for a project 
involving serious human rights violations. 
These are by no means easy tasks. Especially investment promotion 
agencies and financial organisations may argue that it is not for them to 
examine the human rights and food security implications of investment 
projects, and that government intervention of this type may also scare 
away the geese that lay the golden eggs. The same agencies will also point 
out that the governments with which they have signed a BIT are unlikely to 
accept a revision of those treaties where they only see interference in their 
internal policy space. 
Interestingly, new challenges in the context of labour, environmental 
and public health considerations are beginning to change the political land-
scape at least for new treaties, and this is happening outside Europe. While 
                                                 
18
 For cases of international environmental law, notably the Trail Smelter case (1938 
and 1941) cf. Nadakavukaren and Cottier (2012). 
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the EU and its Member States maintain their basic objective of maximising 
investor protection, other regions seem to take a more differentiated ap-
proach. For instance, the investor-state arbitration provisions in the on-
going Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) negotiations are being 
reviewed as a result of several legal challenges to Australia’s rigorous anti-
smoking policies by a BIT-protected tobacco company (Nottage 2011, p. 
21); Australia is now seeking to exclude itself from such provisions. On 
the other hand, NGO activism in the context of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is increasingly frowned upon by the same 
governments which had opened an access to court possibility for their 
NGOs. Recent studies show that there is precious little evidence of a posi-
tive impact of investment treaties in attracting FDI; they also point to re-
cent examples of BIT provisions with a “better balance between investor 
protection and the regulatory freedom of host states” (VanDuzer 2011, p. 
4). Others even argue that BITs are no longer necessary because private 
insurance instruments are now available by which investors can cover both 
the commercial and the sovereign risk which their investments involve. 
The second thoughts of governments in respect of investment protection 
and promotion may yet extend to investments in agriculture. For instance, 
governments may come to review their support, in whichever form, to a 
large irrigation project involving the displacement of people without full 
compensation. Even more importantly, they may review their own food 
security and agricultural trade policies in the light of their international 
human rights obligations, and take positive action in order to ensure the 
R2F everywhere. 
Investment law, and investment treaties, have so far not been seriously 
scrutinised in this context. Their principal objective being investment pro-
motion and protection, most of them still fail to take on board other con-
siderations and interests such as human rights and food security. It is ar-
gued here that policy and rules fragmentation cannot serve as an excuse for 
not considering the possible negative outcome of over-protection and un-
der-regulation in host states, regardless of whether they are parties to in-
vestment agreements. 
The food security impact of agricultural FDI especially in weak states is 
far from clear, and an overall impact assessment would hardly be feasible. 
But there are enough allegations and some serious evidence of land grab to 
warrant a re-examination of the relevant regulatory framework by home 
states and in the competent intergovernmental organisations. Many policy 
analyses and international guidelines and recommendations already exist 
and show the way for implementation in both host and home states.  Be-
cause the road to improvements is a long one, the groundwork should start 
immediately. 
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Comment on Christian Häberli 
Foreign Direct Investment in Agriculture:  




Owing to the sheer size of the area involved, the rise in large scale foreign 
investment in agriculture in developing countries has raised a number of 
concerns ranging from the impact on the host country’s food security to the 
human rights issues of displaced individuals and, in some cases, stirred 
political instability. Christian Häberli’s paper aims to contribute towards 
its resolution by posing a normative question regarding the possible role of 
international law in addressing food security issues. He finds justification 
in some of its tenets, particularly the need to avoid the fragmentation of 
international law. This implies that international trade and investment law 
should not conflict and should be reconciled with international human 
rights law and other conventions or agreements that are committed to as-
suring food security. 
His paper first lays down the relationship between large scale foreign 
direct investment and food security. It cites studies showing that evidence 
on the impact of FDI on host countries is mixed. In cases where large scale 
FDI negatively impacts on the food security, the host country is usually 
plagued with weak institutions. In such a situation, Häberli asks whether 
there is a responsibility and role for governments of the investor home 
countries to regulate the behavior of firms when doing business in another 
country. He also posed the problem to the international community and 
enumerated existing international legal measures that may be relevant to 
the issue and discussed their respective weaknesses. 
In order to help answer the normative question, my comment to the pa-
per aims to provide a positive economic analysis of land grab, the term 
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commonly used to refer to this trend and to distinguish it from previous 
agricultural FDI. This can serve as a complement to the normative analysis 
provided by Häberli. By providing greater clarity, I hope to shed light on 
the interlocking issues raised in the previous article with the aim of aiding 
in the identification of the appropriate role for international law and the 
international community, if there should be any. My approach is heavily 
rooted in the analysis of prices, factor inputs, the mobility of factors of 
production, and the role of law and legal institutions. Any positive analysis 
would be incomplete without considering the politico-economic behavior 
of all the actors and stakeholders involved. However, due to time consider-
ations it is beyond the scope of our comments. 
B. Background: Landgrab, food security  
and factor movements 
I. Price shocks and food security 
The distinguishing feature of land grab from past investment in agriculture 
is primarily the size of the land area involved1. According to the Deininger, 
et al (2011), the average size of investment in farmlands during the period 
covered ranges from 700 hectares in Ethiopia to 59,374 in Liberia. What 
triggered the trend is the spike in world food prices in 2006–2008 and in 
2010 that made investment in agriculture more profitable2. 
Prior to the early 2000s, the price of agricultural commodities had been 
on the decline and concern over the consequences of the deteriorating 
terms of trade for agricultural producers had been raised. The price in-
crease therefore should have been a welcome development. However, not 
all countries have the capacity to expand production in the short or in the 
medium term, especially if the country faces existing resource constraints 
such as the lack of arable land, capital, or technology. It may also be the 
case that the country has the resource endowment but poor institutions 
serve as obstacles in mobilizing resources that will lead to higher produc-
tivity. 
On the other hand, higher agricultural prices also raised the price of 
food necessary for consumption. Since food is income inelastic, it is the 
                                                 
1
 For a review of large scale FDI in agriculture, see Cotula, et al (2009) and Görgen, 
et al (2009).  
2
 See Headey and Fan (2008) for an analysis of the causes of rising food prices. There 
are many reasons for the spike in world prices: the weather shocks, expansion of 
biofuels, increase in demand as well as macroeconomic factors such as the depreciation 
of the dollar, trade and public policies. 
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poor who suffered more from the price increase. The net effect of higher 
agricultural price on individuals then depends on the income and the con-
sumption effect (See Ivanic and Martin, 2008; and Dorward, 2012). If the 
increase in income is higher than the corresponding increase in consump-
tion expenditure, then the individual is better off. In such a situation, food 
security is also met to the extent that it is defined as access to food3. There 
are two things that should be noted here. The goal of food security should 
be distinguished from self-sufficiency. The former can be achieved with 
international trade while the latter means that the domestic demand for 
food should be met by the domestic economy. Second, its attainment varies 
according to social groups even within a country. Thus, a country may be a 
net food exporter but there can also be poor individuals or groups who are 
also net buyers of food. 
One way by which the attainment of food security can be measured is 
by looking at the extent of undernourishment in the population. A study by 
the FAO (2011) shows that the effect of higher world food prices on the 
level of undernourishment is different for two sets of countries. The per-
centage of undernourished individuals went down for countries who are 
net sellers. Some of these countries such as Brazil, China and India also 
used a combination of trade restriction and other safety nets which kept 
prices relatively low. For net importing countries like Uganda, Senegal, 
Mozambique, Ethiopia, Kenya, Zambia, undernourishment went up.  
II. Price shock and global factor movements 
Following the world food spike, firms from capital rich countries, facing 
relative land constraint at home expanded investment in agriculture in poor 
and relatively capital-starved, land abundant countries. Some governments 
have also encouraged the move after having realized their dependence on 
imported food or fuel, two important and politically sensitive commodities, 
and decided to shelter their domestic market from price fluctuations by 
engaging in agricultural FDI. Most of the present and future output is in-
tended for export back to the investor’s home country.  
According to Deininger, et al (2011), the reported large scale agricultur-
al investment covered 45 million hectares of land in 2009 alone. This im-
plies an average expansion rate of 4 million hectares. Foreign investors 
                                                 
3
 The FAO (2003) defines food security to “exist(s) when all people, at all times, have 
physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets 
their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Household food 
security is the application of this concept to the family level, with individuals within 
households as the focus of concern.” http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4671e/y46 
71e06.htm. 
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have expressed interest in around 56 million hectares of land, two-thirds of 
which is located in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The same study also showed that the large scale investment tends to 
flock to countries with poor governance structure and weak institutions 4. 
Stories that appeared in the media also claimed that the land deals have 
poor contract terms for the host country. Some contracts take the form of 
long-term land lease contracts that promise employment and infrastructure 
projects with low rental fees of land (Cotula, 2011). Due to the weak insti-
tutions and the lack of good governance, concerns have been raised on 
whether the rate of return of land as stipulated in the contract price may be 
unfair.  
Contracts involving the land deals are private and most are not available 
to the public. This makes reliable data hard to find and makes evaluation 
difficult. Table 1 (see pp. 318 & 319) shows the largest FDI investment by 
land size, the host countries and their respective Property Rights Index. 
From this set alone, it appears that there is a correlation between large 
scale investment in agriculture and the host country’s quality of institu-
tions. 
While the Deininger, et al (2011) highlighted the benefits the host coun-
try receives from these investments, it has also raised concern regarding 
the interests of some sectors of society whose rights may have been side-
stepped or ignored. It has also warned that in an effort to attract capital 
inflow, there might be a possible danger of a “race to the bottom”. On the 
other hand, others are sceptical about the welfare gains from such invest-
ment and whether they serve the goals of sustainable development.  
Perhaps one of the questions that needs to be asked is to what extent is 
the contract price, specifically the rental rate of land as specified in the 
contract reflect the marginal productivity of the land? What is the shadow 
price of land in the host countries and what explains the divergence from 
the actual contract price?  
Another set of questions that needs to be asked is why is the agricultural 
sector in some of the African countries continues to lag behind? As agri-
cultural producers, what prevents them from a positive supply response 
from higher world food prices and thus achieving the twin goals of meet-
ing food security at home and global food price stability? Is large scale 
foreign direct investment the most effective and efficient way to raise agri-
cultural productivity in these countries? Are there economies of scale that 
can be taken advantage of? 
Our objective is not so much to answer all of these questions but rather 
to raise them pointedly in order to obtain greater clarity. In the next sec-
tion, we will continue to identify some of the factors that may explain land 
                                                 
4
 See also Cotula, et al (2009) and Cotula (2011). 
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grab and explore its relationship. In the process, we raised more questions 
than answers. 
C. Theoretical and empirical issues  
of the land grab problem 
I. Price increase, volatility in food and agriculture 
and the global factor markets 
Economic theory predicts that under an open economy with perfect mar-
kets, an increase in the price of a particular commodity will lead to an in-
crease in the rate of return of the factor that is most intensively used in its 
production. Thus the world food spike provides incentives for a realloca-
tion of input factors among different sectors and across borders that even-
tually leads towards higher agricultural production as well as equalization 
of factor prices5. 
A peculiarity of agricultural production is the important, almost indis-
pensable role of an immobile input, land. There is also a wider scope for 
the substitutability between labor and capital in agriculture as compared to 
manufacturing. The differences in factor endowments and input choices 
point to the different factor intensities of agricultural production across the 
world (See Kawagoe, et al, 1985). In land abundant countries like the US, 
agricultural production is relatively capital intensive while in labor abun-
dant countries in Asia, it is relatively labor intensive.  
In assessing the comparative advantage of a particular country in agri-
culture, Abbot and Thomson (1987) considered a three-factor model that 
explicitly includes land. A practical application of the theoretical exercise 
is to allow for the determination of the shadow price of land. This infor-
mation is valuable in a situation where the land market is almost non-
existent, or market failures exist that prevent actual prices from reflecting 
its real productive value6. Thus, the shadow price of the land may be higher 
or lower than the actual or observed price in the contract.  
Another characteristic of agricultural production that is often the source 
of agricultural price volatility is its dependence on weather conditions, a 
stochastic variable that is outside the control of the individual. It is also 
dependent on a natural production process that implies a lag period from 
planting, when input decisions are made to product maturation. This may 
                                                 
5
 This follows from the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem of international trade. See also 
Williamson (2002). 
6
 In this case, the shadow price of the land is the marginal physical product of the land 
multiplied by the international price of the agricultural good. 
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range from a few months to a few years (Abbot and Thomson, 1987). In 
order to maximize output from land, which is a scarce resource, and cope 
with output variability in the face of risks, societies have developed institu-
tions to address these issues (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). 
II. Yield gap and the role of institutions 
Institutions as pertained to here refer to the rules, both formal and informal 
that facilitate coordination among individuals and help form expectations 
with regards to the behavior of others when faced with different circum-
stances. It is widely documented that agricultural institutions can facilitate 
or serve as a major obstacle to agricultural modernization and develop-
ment7. 
Poor institutions, along with the lack of access to capital and technolo-
gy8 can also explain why some countries that are endowed with suitable 
and available arable land for agriculture have actual output that is far be-
low their respective potential. According to the Deininger, et al (2011), 
most of these countries that exhibit high yield gap are from sub-Saharan 
Africa which includes Rwanda, Malawi, Mozambique, Sudan and Zambia. 
Among these countries, only 25 percent of actual potential have been at-
tained. The same study pointed out that the attainment of output potential 
will help solve food security issues at home and help in smoothing interna-
tional price volatility in food.  
The next question to ask is, to what extent are poor institutions, specifi-
cally legal rules the cause of this output gap? What are the specific institu-
tional and legal setup and characteristics that hinder these countries?  
III. Property rights in land 
Property rights in land is one of the most important institutions in agricul-
ture as it establishes the user rights in land and determines how the gains 
will be distributed (See for instance, Ellickson, 1993)  9. User rights in land 
                                                 
7
 See for instance Hayami and Ruttan (1985). We adopt their broad definition of 
institutions. See also Feder and Feeny (1991) for the relationship between property rights 
and development. 
8
 See for instance Adesina (2010) for other factors that serve as obstacles to 
agricultural development in Africa. 
9
 Ellickson explored the different land regimes and derived conditions under which 
individual ownership of land is preferable over group ownership given transaction costs, 
organization costs, and formal and informal institutions.  
 Comment on Christian Häberli 311 
  
range from the right to manage the resource and determine its use, the right 
to exclude others and the right to sell (Ostrom and Schlager, 1992)10.  
Among the hierarchy of property rights claim, a land title is the most 
concrete and unambiguous form of ownership that is recognized by the 
government and enforceable by the court. There are many benefits of a 
land title. (1) It reduces enforcement costs by providing clear boundaries 
of ownership. (2) As it ensures security of tenure, it encourages individuals 
to engage in long term improvements in the land and conserve it as a re-
source. (3) Ownership of a land title can also be used as collateral and al-
lows its owners to gain access to credit. (4) It also facilitates transferability 
and exchange and permits allocative efficiency. (5) Land titles also in-
crease the value of the land and increases its price (Feder and Nishio, 
1999). Empirical evidence in Asia and Latin America also supports the 
link between tenure security in the form of land titling and higher invest-
ment (See for instance Alston, et al, 1996 and Feder and Onchan, 1987).   
However, empirical evidence from Africa, the host of some of the larg-
est agricultural FDI have shown little or negligible effect of formal land 
tenure security on farm investment (See for instance Braselle, et al, 2001; 
Gavian and Fafchamps, 1996; and Jacoby and Minten, 2007). The absence 
of a formal credit market as well as the existence of customary rights make 
the net benefit of land titling less attractive (Feder and Nishio, 1999). Ac-
cording to Atwood (1990) while most of the land in Africa are owned by 
households and families, and conditions of tenure permit heritability and 
land transfers, there are two main characteristics that distinguish it from 
the rest of the world. First, the user rights are informally recognized and 
sanctioned but bear no legal status. Second is that they are conditioned by 
group rights and secondary rights to grazing for instance. Apart from other 
transaction costs11, the existence of informal institutions that can serve as 
cheap institutional alternatives to guarantee security of tenure makes the 
costs of formal land titling relatively too high (Atwood, 1990).  
Atwood argues that in this case, land titling may not be a prerequisite 
towards attaining an efficient resource allocation or development. On the 
other hand, Feder and Nishio (1999) recognized that while customary 
rights, through the existence of informal rule and order may be may be 
able to serve this function, it may lose its particular advantages as the size 
of the economy grows and impersonal transactions and exchange in agri-
culture become more important.  
The discussion above poses potential problems with the entry of large 
scale foreign investment with respect to: (1) land valuation, and (2) the 
identification of the proper owners of the land and those who have recog-
                                                 
10
 See also Alchian and Demsetz (1973) for a general discussion of property rights.  
11
 The transaction costs of formalization of land rights involve the determination of 
boundaries which requires, land surveying and other enforcement costs. 
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nized user rights but cannot sell it. There is ambiguity whether the latter 
are legally entitled to some form of compensation on the contested land. It 
also poses problems with regards to (3) dispute settlement12. If not handled 
correctly, then issues of unfair valuing of the land and unjust displacement 
may arise. Cooter and Schaefer (2011) had emphasized the role of volun-
tary transfers as opposed to coercive transfers as crucial in spelling the 
success or failure of changes in the land tenure system.  
In case the land is considered to belong to the state or owned by a com-
munity headed by a leader, then this creates potential agency problems, 
especially if the incentives of the agent representing their principal are not 
properly aligned. There is more room for corrupt transactions and rent-
seeking opportunities in the land deal. 
What these points at is the need to conduct more empirical studies to 
understand the relationship between the existing range of user and property 
rights in the host country and how the introduction of large scale agricul-
tural investment changes or impacts these existing property relations and to 
what extent it raises agricultural productivity. 
IV. Optimal farm size: Scale economies and returns to scale 
Since one of the main issues raised about the agricultural FDI is its size, it 
should also be examined to what extent scale economies exist in agricul-
tural production. According to Eastwood, et al (2010), countries with high-
er income have larger farm size. However, there is a divergence in the pat-
tern with how farm size changed in the 20
th
 century. In advanced countries, 
it increased while in Asia and Africa, the reverse occurred. Regardless of 
the differences, family labor is still the main source of employment, even 
among developed countries where a high degree of mechanization is ob-
served. There appears to be no significant variance across countries.  
According to Eastwood et al (2010), the family as a main source of em-
ployment in agriculture has become the equilibrium setup mainly because 
it is able to minimize the cost of labor supervision. Unlike hired labor, the 
family is the residual claimant. In a context where monitoring becomes 
complicated and where production is exposed to a number of risks, the 
family has the proper incentive to exert the optimal effort (See for in-
stance, Hayami, 2010). Among the range of agricultural activities that 
make monitoring complicated are crop management, crop rotation and 
crop-livestock combination (See Otsuka, et al, 1992; and Hayami and Rut-
tan, 1985). Since the right to land is hereditary, the sustainability and 
                                                 
12
 For a discussion of role of courts and justice in economic development, see Feld 
and Voigt (2009). 
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preservation of the land’s productivity is also considered for future genera-
tions.  
An empirical study by Kawagoe, et al (1985) shows that agricultural 
production in developed countries exhibits increasing returns to scale 
while it is scale neutral in least developed countries. The difference lies in 
the choice of agricultural technology. In developed countries, the agricul-
tural labor force went down as wage rose in the industrial sector, which 
was accompanied by an increase in mechanization. On the other hand, in 
less-developed countries where labor is relatively less expensive than capi-
tal, the adoption of machines to save labor did not occur. Instead, the kind 
of technology that was adopted were land-substituting inputs such as ferti-
lizer and high yielding varieties, that are typical of the green revolution 
period and that are very divisible. In both cases, the agricultural production 
choice reflects the relative scarcity of factors. 
V. Plantation agriculture or family managed and owned farm? 
The question therefore arises whether or not plantation agriculture, charac-
terized by centralized planning and production, usually of a monocrop and 
employing hired labor enjoys some advantages over family-run or owned 
farms. Since most FDIs share the same characteristics as the plantation 
agriculture, it would be useful to review the debate in the literature 
(Hayami, 2010). The traditional notion is that the former is superior be-
cause of mechanization. However, more recent literature, backed by empir-
ical evidence pointed out that the latter is rational and under certain cases, 
is more efficient with respect to resource allocation (See for instance Otsu-
ka, et al, 1992).  
Scale economies in agriculture usually stems from the existence of indi-
visible factor inputs that leads to lower average production cost as the farm 
size increases (Deilinger and Feder, 2001). However at the farm level of 
production, there is no wide scope for economies of scale. According to 
Hayami (2010), it plays greater role at the post-harvest processing and 
marketing stage. Within these stages, the plantation setup has its ad-
vantages. The importance of post-harvest facilities, and marketing and dis-
tribution depends on crop varieties. Sugar, tea and banana for instance are 
good examples. Sugar, apart from the need to process sugarcane, also 
needs tight coordination at the planting and harvesting stage. On the other 
hand, banana is easily perishable. Thus, it is for this reason that plantation 
agriculture is mostly concentrated on the production of cash crops and sel-
dom for crops like rice for instance.  
Historically, the plantation setup had been used mainly to open up fron-
tier lands in colonial countries (Hayami, 2010). As it requires the use of 
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heavy machinery and construction of facilities such as roads where none 
existed before, then scale economies exist. However, where there is al-
ready an existing settlement, the colonial rulers usually relied on a setup 
where a part of the agricultural produce is collected like a huge tax to the 
government while leaving the family as the basic unit of production 
(Hayami, 2010).  
Thus, whether or not the large scale FDI is welfare enhancing should 
weigh the benefits and costs associated with the transformation of the fam-
ily owned or managed farm to a plantation. Apart from the efficiency con-
siderations, it should also be considered that massive centralized produc-
tion is socially more intrusive when the land is already settled. In such a 
situation, then it may be explored whether there are other institutional ar-
rangements that may be more efficient and at the same time, least socially 
costly that increase agricultural productivity. For instance, arrangements 
that take advantage of the advantages of a family owned or managed farm 
while taking advantage of scale economies existing in certain stages of 
production13. It is also important to consider if the technology that is 
adopted was based on factor input efficiency and not due to politico-
economic considerations. 
D. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to work towards a greater understanding of the 
relationship between food security and the large scale FDI, an important 
question raised by the preceding paper. In particular, we looked at the fac-
tors that led to its emergence and focused on two of two aspects that gen-
erate controversy – the implications of its size and the weak institutions in 
the host country. By having a clearer understanding of the agricultural 
price transmission process and the complex real and institutional issues 
surrounding it, we are in a better position to weigh the normative aspects. 
The land grab is partly a reaction to the price volatility in world agricul-
tural prices. On the one hand, it provided incentives for firms with relative 
capital abundance to invest in countries which are relatively abundant in 
land. On the other hand, it is also a matter of a particular transactional 
choice, that of large scale FDI in the form of land sale or lease contract 
with centralized production and hired labor akin to plantation agriculture. 
Seen this way, then it appears that it is one way for firms to bypass the 
world agricultural spot market and directly engaging in production. There 
are however, advantages and disadvantages with this transactional struc-
ture and there may be other ways of expanding agricultural production, 
                                                 
13
 For instance, Hayami proposes contract growing schemes. 
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both at the international and at the national that may be more efficient and 
generates less social harm and displacement. For instance, information 
gathering and sharing among countries is crucial in managing uncertainty 
brought by weather disturbances or shifting demand14.  
Another aspect of the problem is how to increase agricultural produc-
tion in poor countries, especially where there is a high output yield gap. 
This will solve the twin problem of raising agricultural production and 
solving the country and social group specific aspects of undernourishment. 
It appears that one of the reasons for this lag is the poor quality of institu-
tions. The challenge is that while capital is needed to increase output, poor 
institutions in countries where land is relatively abundant and where the 
agricultural output gap is wide, depress the rental rate of land and lead to 
poor contract terms. How to solve this dilemma is again another challenge. 
The most immediate that one can do is to at least ensure that all stakehold-
ers, not just those with formal property rights but all those who have user 
rights in customary law to be included in the bargaining process in order to 
determine the value of the land and allocate its use efficiently. In the me-
dium term, the need to build institutions to sustain agricultural develop-
ment should be prioritized. 
Ensuring food security is an imperative goal for society but the difficult 
and challenging aspect is how to successfully address it, both at the nation-
al and international level. It should be underscored that crucial to a suc-
cessful policy is a deep understanding of the issues surrounding it: the in-
ternational agricultural price transmission mechanism, the relative scarcity 
of factors of production and the formal and informal institutions that con-
tribute or hinder development in agriculture.  
Finally, a positive analysis of land grab is incomplete without examin-
ing the politico economic situation. Land is not just a factor of production 
in most developing countries. It is the main source of livelihood for a large 
percentage of the population in poor countries as well the source of social 
and political power among different social or multiethnic groups. 
                                                 
14
 See for instance FAO, IFAD, IMF, OECD, UNCTAD, WFP, the World Bank, the 
WTO, IFPRI and the UN HLTF Interagency Report (2011) for the G20.  
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Table 1:   Large scale foreign investment in agriculture: 100,000 has. 
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Uganda Egypt 840,000 Unknown Planned 4.9 
Zambia China 2,000,000 Jatropha Requested 4.7 
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Discussion on Christian Häberli 
summarized by 
Johannes Schwarze 
This discussion shows diverging perceptions of reality between the eco-
nomic and legal profession. While both agree that with respect to agricul-
tural issues in least developed countries lies in productive efficiency, 
economists tend to approach Large-Scale Agricultural Investments from 
the theoretically consistent neoclassical concept of functioning markets. 
For them, allocative efficiency is key. Legal scholars, on the other hand, 
highlight the incompleteness of markets and concentrate on issues of dis-
tributive justice.  
Before starting the open discussion, Christian Häberli thanks and gener-
ally agrees with the economic analysis of the discussant (Laarni Escresa) 
but remarks on three points: First, although one might understand land as 
the limiting factor in agricultural production, it has to be pointed out that 
available arable land is underused in most LDCs. Therefore, increasing 
agricultural production is rather an issue of the productivity of the used 
land than an issue of extending the input factor land. Structural problems 
like climate change and cyclical problems like changing weather are af-
fecting harvests the most. Second, he points out that especially new mar-
ket-based risk management can work fine in well-developed and free mar-
ket countries. However, such market structures do not exist in poor LDCs 
especially to address the cyclical problems. Third, Häberli emphasizes that  
agricultural markets, especially in LDCs, are far from perfect (what main-
stream economists falsely assume). Most importantly, structural obstacles 
have to be overcome to significantly decrease the cyclical risk in LDCs’ 
agricultural production. Here lies the main difference between rich and 
poor countries. 
Opening the discussion, Eyal Benvenisti annotates that in addition to 
food security and land property rights, the water aspect is similarly urging. 
The particularity with water is that third-party neighboring countries also 
have water claims, as most water is trans-boundary. It has been shown that 
international water norms and laws can discipline states to refrain from 
unsustainable water use. This knowledge may be beneficial to approach the 
322 Johannes Schwarze 
  
international legal regime regarding the land grabbing issue in that host 
states might refrain from inequitable and unsustainable land use. However, 
Benvenisti questions that home-state liability is the appropriate means to 
approach a global risk. 
Regarding Escresa’s economic analysis, Wolfgang Weigel remarks that 
to the best of his knowledge, productivity increases in agriculture are so 
high that they outweigh land as a limiting factor. Thus, the scarcity of land 
should not be an important constraint. Weigel questions whether the al-
locative efficiency of land use in the host LDCs is different for investors 
and farmers. Finally he conjectures that according to Buchanan, the single, 
unified foreign investor is better organized and thus stronger than the dis-
persed farmers. This dramatic imbalance in bargaining power between the 
parties makes the application of the Coase Theorem impossible. To over-
come this problem (to institutionalize Coasian bargaining), small land-
holders would have to unify into one bargaining party strong enough to 
face the investor. 
Stefan Oeter is fascinated by the topic and recognizes the urgent order-
ing problem of the international community. However, the question of how 
to resolve this problem still remains open also after Häberli’s contribution. 
Oeter points out that one could reflect about strengthening the international 
legal regime in the classical way, by strengthening supervision duties of 
home states over their investors. However, that leads to the conflict of high 
monitoring costs for home states without the necessary incentives for home 
states to undertake this task (little to win and imposing costs on important 
stake holders is risky). This is similar to the problem which had been dis-
cussed during the previous day regarding private military companies. Con-
sequently, international standards might remain ineffective. Finally, Oeter 
questions whether another hybrid organism defining codes of conduct 
might not be more effective. 
In response to the above remarks, Häberli acknowledges that interstate 
water questions are very important in relation to agricultural issues. Some 
can be resolved by adequate property rights regimes and technology – 
however, both rather exist in developed countries. Moreover, energy prices 
affect agricultural production up to three times more than any other eco-
nomic activity. Not only on-farm and farm-to-market transportation costs, 
but also fertilizer costs, depend on the oil price. Property rights are crucial 
in order to improve the LDCs’ farmers’ position. Even though property 
rights might exist de jure in some cases they cannot be implemented de 
facto in the weak institutional frameworks. 
Regarding home-state risk management, Häberli does not think that this 
is superior to the host states’ risk management. But home states have state 
guaranties and ODA that significantly decrease risk and improve the for-
eign investor’s situation over the domestic investor’s situation. Further-
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more, Häberli agrees to Weigelt’s point that productivity increases can 
outweigh land as a scarce input factor. He also points out the severe post-
harvest losses in many developing countries. Addressing these huge prob-
lems would be very beneficial for the agricultural production in LDCs. 
However, Häberli accentuates that agricultural investments in weak states 
are not for “Sunday School Children”. Investors need to be big (China) or 
seconded by the World Bank in order to undertake such investments. To 
attract investors, at least a 20% return on investment is necessary. Moreo-
ver, extraterritoriality is necessary to insure responsible investor behavior 
and avoid corruption. The danger of liability at home effectively disci-
plines investors. However, proving corruption is a most challenging en-
deavor. 
Furthermore, it is important to understand that competing with China 
makes ethical behavior difficult if not impossible for investors. But one 
strong incentive to control home governments stems from migration. The 
disastrous situations in LDCs resulting from agricultural investments will 
trigger migration that investor home countries will then have to deal with. 
In addition, Häberli agrees with the problem of independent monitoring 
and monitoring costs but points to already existing hybrid regimes and 
accompanying international instruments and codes. Soft law can help in 
this context so that hard law is not absolutely necessary. Finally, Häberli 
raises the question of what a welfare increase means in the context of land 
grabbing: one would have to weigh a global and national food security 
increase against the food security decrease for the affected local farmers. 
Reopening the discussion, Thilo Marauhn indicates that, regarding Afri-
ca, the discourse on sustainable land use is strongly fragmented between 
five disciplines. Although the topic is the same, environmental, cultural, 
economic, legal, and political discourses lack interconnection. Remarka-
bly, the law and economics discourse is more interdisciplinary, although it 
traditionally concentrates on land reform. However, Marauhn is optimistic 
that the discourses will become more intertwined in the future. For Ma-
rauhn the main problem lies, first, in the lack of national institutions. He 
emphasizes the unfairly unequal treatment of domestic and privileged for-
eign investors. The interplay between customary law and other forms of 
property rights is a big issue. For Marauhn, the lack of cadastre and the 
resulting uncertainty pose the main problem. He is skeptical that interna-
tional agreements, i.e., BITs, can solve the national property rights defi-
ciency. However, he is confident that informal law can help.  
Michael Fehling brings Sen's capability approach into play. Sen’s ap-
proach might be more helpful as land grabbing is rather more a distribu-
tional problem than a classical economic efficiency problem. Second, he 
questions whether multilateral agreements really can solve the enforcement 
and abuse-of-power issues. 
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Haksoo Ko demands the translation of the more intuitive concepts of Hu-
man Rights and Food Security into the language of mainstream economics, 
to itemize and quantify it. Also, for him, the concept of public interest and 
public order with regards to land grabbing remained unclear during the 
presentation. 
Christopher Drahozal again emphasizes the problem of food security in 
the host country. He questions whether arbitration lawyers do really deal 
with issues of public policy, a point already controversially debated in the 
academic discourse. Who would be the plaintiff? 
Stefan Voigt comes back to Escresa’s economic analysis feeling that 
several points need being highlighting or recapitulation. First, he points to 
the price decrease after the 2007–2008 food crisis. For Voigt, this shows 
the successful market reaction to the food crisis. He argues that if produc-
tivity is the main problem for agricultural efficiency and the security of 
property rights is key for increasing productivity, and if further the insecu-
rity about property rights is substantial in many of the host countries, then 
FDI could not only be a way to increase the security of property rights but 
also to substantially increase food productivity in the world. Voigt is aware 
that he argues in terms of allocative efficiency and not in terms of distribu-
tion, despite the fact that during the discussion, productivity was identified 
as the crucial component in efficiency in production,  
Voigt points out that first the arable land has to be extended before the 
productivity can increase on that land. This follows the logic that the cake 
has to be baked before it can be distributed. As a second point, Voigt rei t-
erates that not property rights per se are important but their enforcement. 
For this, national or international codes do not suffice but an independent 
judiciary is indispensable. Since the domestic creation of such a judiciary 
takes long to build, in order to have quick results, Voigt recommends turn-
ing to an already existing judiciary, i.e., international courts. As an exam-
ple he refers to the former British colonies that successfully attracted in-
vestment by dismantling their traditional committee of public counsel . 
Lastly, he points out that the differences in technology available to farmers 
of developed and developing countries are exactly arguments in favor of 
agricultural FDI, since it is these investments that will bring technology.  
Replying to the second open discussion, Häberli first straightens out 
that his research deals with the international aspects of FDI and food secu-
rity and not with the often disastrous national food situations in host coun-
tries. Although he agrees with all conference participants that the latter are 
more directly causing famine, he hopes to have convinced the audience 
that a severe problem also persists on the international level. He calls at-
tention to the fact that the situation is not black or white: even without in-
dependent judiciaries and corrupt governments, the free press and interna-
tionally supported NGOs might serve as effective means to discipline 
 Discussion on Christian Häberli 325 
  
governments and investors via public pressure (although these players 
might sometimes overdo it in keeping out any type of FDI). On the other 
hand, even if international codes exist they might not be practiced (e.g., 
regarding child labor) or not even respected. With regards to Sen’s capabil-
ity approach, Häberli states that the international character of the problem 
is difficult to tackle with Sen’s approach focusing on the national level.  
On the subject of enforcement and abuse of power in a multilateral 
framework, Häberli suggests making more use of the existing instruments 
(e.g., the subsidies discipline in the WTO, the TRIMS agreement – howev-
er, these instruments could be expanded and improved). The problem lies 
in the tension of a trade liberalization tendency (now on the regional, no 
longer only on the multilateral level) against the food security challenge: 
reductions of tariffs and subsidies increase competition which may be fine 
in the long run – however, in the short run, trade liberalization exposes 
small subsistence farmers to bigger threats. Häberli passes on the question 
on mainstream economics quantification to his co-speaker. 
Häberli disagrees that the ordre publique is not defined in the literature. 
An according exception is included in all international agreements – how-
ever it might be difficult to be invoked, especially in an arbitration dispute. 
With respect to the question whether arbitration can respect public policy 
issues, Häberli concedes that no official convention or code exists here. 
Still, he hopes that international arbitrators will respect the do-no-harm-
approach. 
Regarding the falling in food prices after the 2007–2008 price bubble, 
Häberli explains that this was due to good weather in Australia and the US, 
where production could be increased. US farmers invested heavily in silos 
to stock their harvest as they expected further price rises in the future. 
Häberli agrees that FDI could increase productivity – however only for the 
foreign, not the domestic investor. Still, it might lead to economic growth 
and affect global food security positively – even if cash crops are exported 
and perhaps even via biofuel which serves as a floor price for food-
products. Nonetheless, neither national nor household food security is 
guaranteed through FDI. Häberli concludes that an independent impact 
assessment of large-scale agricultural investments is necessary – and feasi-
ble since investors often have to rely on their home governments for ODA, 
subsidies, or protection. At this point, home governments could easily 
bring in their monitoring. 
Closing the discussion, Escresa turns to the counterfactual and asks 
what would have happened in Africa without FDI. She stresses how diffi-
cult it is for example to define a fair price for land rent in LDCs. Actually, 
the lease price which is now paid by the foreign investor is not lower than 
the estimated price a local investor would have paid. Agreeing with every-
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body in the room that alleviating poverty and famine is key – the urging 
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